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Abstract(
Background: 
Patient safety in healthcare organisations received global attention following the Institute 
of Medicine’s release of its hallmark report “To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health 
System”, where it was estimated that 44,000–98,000 patients die annually in US hospitals 
as a result of errors in care. Similar rates of error and avoidable harm have been 
reported in different research studies in many modern health systems across the world. 
“Safety Culture” has been identified as a key element of healthcare organisations’ ability 
to learn from errors and reduce preventable harm to patients resulting from health care. 
The perceived importance of safety culture in improving patient safety and its impact on 
patient outcomes has led to a growing interest in the assessment of safety culture in 
healthcare organisations. The use of safety climate questionnaires is one of the most 
popular methods for assessing safety culture. These questionnaires are thought to help in 
measuring healthcare workers' perceptions of the prevailing safety culture or “safety 
climate” in their organisations.  Since no surveys of safety climate have been conducted at 
public hospitals in the state of Kuwait, nor are valid or reliable survey instruments 
available, this thesis aimed to investigate patient safety climate in public hospitals in 
Kuwait. 
The main objectives of the study were:  
1.( To identify an existing safety climate tools to be employed in my PhD thesis.  
2.( To test the psychometric properties of the identified tool in a sample of Kuwaiti 
public hospitals. 
3.( To provide a measure of the prevailing safety climate in Kuwaiti public hospitals.  
4.( To explore with key stakeholders the main findings of the safety climate survey 
and identify the potential barriers and facilitators to safety improvement initiatives 
in Kuwaiti public hospitals.  
Based on the overall findings, a series of recommendations are made for clinical leaders, 
policy makers and others to consider and a conceptual model informing a systems’ based 
approach to safety culture theory and practice is proposed for future research. 
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Methods: 
A multi-method, triangulated approach including both quantitative and qualitative 
methods was adopted for the study. There were four phases of the research: A systematic 
review of published literature on safety climate tools used in acute hospital settings was 
carried out using seven electronic databases, with manual searches of bibliographies of 
included papers and key journals. A suitable tool was identified. A cross-sectional survey 
of 1,511 healthcare staff in three public hospitals was conducted for two purposes: Firstly, 
to assess the psychometric properties of the identified tool and develop an optimum model 
for assessing safety climate in Kuwaiti hospitals. Secondly, to provide an assessment of 
the current state of safety climate in Kuwaiti hospitals. Finally, interviews with key 
personnel were conducted to extend the examination of the survey findings and provide a 
rounded picture of the current state of safety climate in Kuwaiti public hospitals. 
Results: 
The search strategy identified 3,576 potential papers. Of these, eighty-eight papers were 
reviewed, with five studies meeting the inclusion criteria. Three out of five studies, 
covering three tools, were rated as ‘good’ quality papers and reported more robust 
psychometric properties. The Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) was 
selected as the most appropriate for my PhD thesis (in terms of usability, applicability and 
psychometric properties), and was pilot tested with minor modifications. A modified 
version of the HSOPSC was used to conduct the survey using a sample of healthcare staff 
with an 87% (n=1,310) response rate. Results of psychometric evaluation, including 
exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, reliability and correlation 
analysis, showed an optimal model of eight factors and 22 safety climate items. General 
evaluation of the prevailing safety climate amongst the workforce in acute hospital 
settings was conducted. The dimensions “Teamwork within units” (84%), “organisational 
learning-continuous improvement” (82%), “supervisor/manager expectations and actions 
promoting safety” (77%) and “management support for patient safety” (74%) were 
identified as strongly positive areas for the three hospitals. The dimensions “Non-punitive 
response to error” (34%), “communication openness” (47%) and “frequency of event 
reporting” (50%) were identified as areas in need of improvement. Building on the survey 
findings, interviews with key stakeholders added rich insight into hospital employees' 
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perceptions on safety and allowed exploration of emerging issues in more detail. The 
research findings of my PhD thesis, and of the literature informed the design of a 
preliminary framework that aims to extend the examination of the construct of safety 
climate beyond the domains and items that typically inform safety climate theory to 
include system wide factors which potentially influence the prevailing safety 
culture/climate. 
Conclusions: 
This is the first validation study of a Standardised safety climate measure in a Kuwaiti 
healthcare setting. The study assessed the psychometric properties of the HSOPSC 
questionnaire and constructed an optimal model for assessing patient safety climate in 
Kuwaiti hospitals. It highlighted important patient safety and staff wellbeing concerns to 
inform organisational and national learning, and provided a baseline for measuring patient 
safety climate in Kuwaiti hospitals. As such, my PhD thesis raises and emphasizes the 
critical importance of appropriate validation of safety climate questionnaires before 
extending their usage in different countries or healthcare contexts. It provided new 
knowledge about areas of strength and weakness in safety climate with the potential to 
drive local improvements in Kuwaiti public hospitals.  
It is recommended that future investigations of patient safety culture and climate combine 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches and adopt a system wide approach to inform 
safety climate theory and questionnaire development, leading to stronger frameworks 
guiding safety culture research and practice.  
 
(
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Glossary((
Accident: An unintentional and/or unexpected event or occurrence that may result in 
injury or death (World Health Organisation, 2009a). 	  
Adverse events: an injury that was caused by medical management or complication 
instead of the underlying disease and that resulted in prolonged hospitalisation or 
disability at the time of discharge from medical care, or both (World Health Organisation, 
2009a) or that results in death (Griffin and Resar, 2009). They may be preventable or non-
preventable. 	 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA): is used to test the proposed factor structure of the 
questionnaire (Pett et al., 2003). 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI): compares the existing model fit with a null model which 
assumes the indicator variables (and also the latent variables) in the model are 
uncorrelated.  
Construct validity: indicates the degree to which items on an instrument relate to the 
relevant theoretical construct and can be assessed by factor analysis (Kane, 2001).  
Content validity: ascertains whether the content of a measure is appropriate and relevant 
to the construct it intends to measure and is usually undertaken by seven or more experts 
and review of empirical literature and relevant theory (DeVon et al., 2007).  
Criterion validity: examines how well scores on a measure correlate with other measures 
of the same construct or very similar underlying constructs that theoretically should be 
related  (Kimberlin and Winterstein, 2008). 
Cronbach's alpha (α): is a commonly used measure for assessing the internal consistency 
of a set of items (Pett et al., 2003). 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA): is used to uncover the underlying factor structure of 
a questionnaire to explain the interrelationships among a set of items (Pett et al., 2003). 
Error: The failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or use of a wrong, 
inappropriate, or incorrect plan to achieve an aim. Errors may result from acts of 
commission (doing something wrong) or omission (failing to do the right thing) that lead 
to an undesirable outcome or significant potential for such an outcome (World Health 
Organisation, 2009a).  
Factor analysis: is a widely used statistical technique in psychology and social sciences 
for theory and instrument development in addition to assessing the construct validity of an 
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established instrument (Pallant, 2007).  
Factor loadings: are the correlations of variables with factors (Kline, 2014). 
Human factors (or ergonomics): is the scientific discipline concerned with the 
understanding of interactions among humans and other elements of a system, and the 
profession that applies theory, principles, data and methods to design in order to optimise 
human well-being and overall system performance (International Ergonomics Association, 
2000). 
Incident reporting: a system in many health care organisations for collecting and 
reporting adverse patient occurrences, such as medication errors and equipment failures. It 
is based on individual incident reports (World Health Organisation, 2009a). It Indicates 
the identification of occurrences that could have led, or did lead, to an undesirable 
outcome (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2017).   
Internal consistency: is the most common way for estimating reliability of an instrument 
and refers to how well the items in a particular dimension of a scale fit together (Pett et al., 
2003).  
Just culture:  in a “just culture” personnel feel comfortable disclosing errors, including 
their own, while maintaining professional accountability (Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality, 2017).   
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO): a measure of sampling adequacy ranges (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007a). 
Medical error: an adverse event or near miss that is preventable with the current state of 
medical knowledge (World Health Organisation, 2009a).   
Near miss: an event or situation that did not produce patient injury, but only because of 
chance or due to timely intervention (Ives and Hillier, 2015, World Health Organisation, 
2009a).  
Oblique rotation: allows for a degree of correlations among the factors and gives one 
high loading and other loadings near zero for each factor (Beavers et al., 2013, Conway 
and Huffcutt, 2003). 
Orthogonal rotation: assumes independence among the factors and results in some high 
loadings and some low loadings for each factor (Beavers et al., 2013, Conway and 
Huffcutt, 2003). 
Patient safety: the freedom from accidental or preventable injuries produced by medical 
care (World Health Organisation, 2009a).  
Chapter One: Introduction 28 
Patient safety incident: events or circumstances which could have resulted, or did result, 
in unnecessary harm to a patient. Incidents arise from either unintended or intended acts. 
Errors are, by definition, unintentional, whereas violations are usually intentional (World 
Health Organisation, 2009a) 
Principle Axis Factoring (PAF): is a method of identifying the relationship between 
latent factors and observed variables from the observed correlations between the variables 
(Fabrigar et al., 1999, Ford et al., 1986). 
Principle Components Analysis (PCA): the linear combinations of measured variables 
that retain as much of the original measures' variance as possible (Conway and Huffcutt, 
2003, Ford et al., 1986). 
Reliability: reflects the degree to which test scores are replicable and ensures that 
respondents are responding consistently to the items within each composite (Geisinger et 
al., 2013a, Streiner et al., 2014). 
Safety culture: The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and 
group values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the 
commitment to an organisation’s health and safety programs (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, 2017a).   
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1" Chapter"One:"Introduction"
1.1" Background"
Patient safety has attracted global attention following the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) 
release of its influential report “To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System.” IOM 
highlighted the magnitude of preventable harm and urged healthcare organisations to  
improve the safety of its care processes and to build a culture of safety into their 
environments in order to reduce harm to patients caused by health care (Institute of 
Medicine, 1999). As a result, policy in modern healthcare systems worldwide became 
concerned with improving the safety of patient care and attempting to build a strong safety 
culture among healthcare organisations. 
Patient safety is described as “Freedom from accidental or preventable injuries produced 
by medical care” (Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research, 2008). The perceived 
importance of safety culture in improving patient safety and its impact on patient 
outcomes has led to a growing interest in the assessment of safety culture in healthcare 
organisations (Colla et al., 2005, Haynes et al., 2011, Singer et al., 2009a). Additionally, 
based on a number of published case record reviews (Baker et al., 2004, Brennan et al., 
1991, Davis et al., 2002,  Thomas et al., 2000, Vincent et al., 2001,Wilson et al., 
1995), patients around the world reportedly continue to suffer preventable harm and 
substandard care (Dixon-Woods et al., 2013), with reported rates of adverse events in the 
range of 3-17%. A recent public inquiry report by Sir Robert Francis into care provided by 
the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust highlighted the undetected failings in the 
quality and safety of patient care (Francis, 2013). Other examples of healthcare systems’ 
failures have occurred worldwide (Tingle, 2011). Kuwait’s healthcare system has not been 
immune to similar failures (Alabdaly, 2009a). Globally, these failings resulted in the 
escalation of healthcare costs, estimated at US$ 19 billion annually, due to further 
hospitalisation, litigation costs and lost productivity (World Health Organisation, 2014a). 
Thus, the economic paybacks of improving patient safety are compelling and have 
prompted policy makers to invest further in measuring and improving patient safety (Jha et 
al., 2013).  
Assessing the status of the existing safety culture in a healthcare organisation has been 
identified as the first step for developing a strong safety culture (Hellings et al., 2007). 
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Safety culture can be broadly defined as a set of shared values, beliefs, norms, and 
attitudes that interact with an organisation’s structure and control systems resulting in 
behavioural norms (Perrow, 2004, Reason, 2002). Safety climate is perceived as a 
measurable component of safety culture (Colla et al., 2005). It provides a “snapshot” of 
the perceptions and attitudes of an organisation’s workforce about the “observable, 
surface-level aspects of culture” at a particular point in time (Mearns and Flin, 1999, p. 5). 
While my PhD thesis is an assessment of safety climate in Kuwaiti public hospitals, safety 
culture and safety climate will be used interchangeably in certain parts due to the fact that 
the main tool adopted in my PhD thesis uses the term safety culture in its name; Hospital 
Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC).  
It is widely acknowledged that the use of safety climate questionnaires is one of the most 
popular methods for assessing safety culture, as they are often practical to apply in terms 
of time and cost-effectiveness (Guldenmund, 2000, Wreathall, 1995). The use of a safety 
climate questionnaire is thought to assist in measuring workers' perceptions of safety 
climate in their healthcare organisations (Singer et al., 2007). Survey findings may provide 
insights into the safety of healthcare environments, identifying areas in need of 
improvement as well as certain challenges that impede making progress in patient safety 
(Smits et al., 2009a). The results may also be used for benchmarking purposes against 
similar surveys conducted at national and international levels and for measuring the 
effectiveness of safety improvement interventions (Blegen et al., 2009). A range of 
questionnaire tools has been developed to assess safety climate in acute hospital settings, 
however the scientific rigour with which they have been developed is variable (Colla et 
al., 2005, Flin et al., 2006, Singla et al., 2006). This makes it difficult to confirm the 
validity and reliability of survey scores and inform organisational learning and 
improvement. Also, appropriate validation of safety climate questionnaires is necessary 
before extending their use to other healthcare contexts (Manser et al., 2016). My PhD 
thesis intends to examine patient safety climate in public hospitals in Kuwait. 
This chapter provides a study overview and outlines the research problem, aims and 
objectives, study questions, significance of the study and the thesis structure. The chapter 
will also describe the Kuwaiti healthcare system and related patient safety issues in its 
public hospitals and in the Middle East.  
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1.2" Research"problem"
The growing cost of healthcare, an aging population, growing diagnostic and treatment 
technologies and rising patient expectations are amongst the many challenges that face the 
providers of healthcare services worldwide. Improving healthcare quality and safety is a 
policy priority in most modern health systems to better meet the needs and expectations of 
patients and contain rapidly escalating financial costs (Palmieri, 2010). Kuwait is 
undergoing a similar transformation and has been committed at a political and policy level 
to delivering high-quality, safe healthcare for more than two decades. Despite substantial 
efforts by the Ministry of Health (MOH), progress in delivering these goals has been 
modest and system failures remain common, generating significant personal and financial 
burdens. Also, patient safety leaders have to deal with a number of cultural and 
behavioural barriers that hinder progress towards developing a positive safety culture 
within their organisations. The organisational culture in Kuwaiti public hospitals is 
arguably struggling to adapt to the vision of the global patient safety movement. Thus, the 
key lies in developing approaches to addressing barriers to organisational cultures 
hindering the delivery of safe healthcare to patients. Moreover, hospitals must move 
beyond just meeting standards or correcting deficiencies to creating an organisational 
culture committed to continuous improvement. The culture surrounding the management 
of errors is too often focused on the individual rather than the system, which is contrary to 
Human Error Theory (Reason, 2000) and is not supportive of employees’ incident 
reporting behaviours. This will be explained further in Chapter two. Moreover, the MOH 
in Kuwait does not have the ability to systematically measure or report on the quality or 
safety of care that is provided to patients. What is currently known, however, clearly 
points out that there are substantial areas for improvement in the quality and safety of 
healthcare provided. Little is known about the prevailing state of safety climate in Kuwaiti 
hospitals. Also, to our knowledge there are no validated safety climate tools appropriate 
for Kuwaiti hospitals. My PhD thesis will, therefore, aim to investigate patient safety 
climate in public hospitals in Kuwait. 
1.3" Research"aims"
Measurement of safety climate in Kuwaiti public hospitals has not been attempted 
previously, nor are valid or reliable instruments available for this setting. My PhD thesis 
intends, therefore, to identify a suitable tool to be used for assessing safety climate in 
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public hospitals in Kuwait and to assess the perceptions of healthcare professionals of the 
safety climate at these hospitals. 
1.4" Research"questions"
My PhD thesis aims to address the following research questions:  
•( Is there an existing safety climate tool with adequate psychometric properties for 
use in public hospitals in Kuwait?  
•( What is the prevailing state of safety climate in public hospitals in Kuwait?  
•( What are the facilitators and barriers to achieving and sustaining a strong safety 
culture in Kuwaiti public hospitals? 
1.5" Research"objectives"
The four main objectives of my PhD thesis are:  
1.( To identify a potentially suitable safety climate tool to be employed in my PhD 
thesis.  
2.( To test the psychometric properties of the identified tool in a sample of Kuwaiti 
public hospitals. 
3.( To provide a measure of the prevailing safety climate in Kuwaiti public hospitals.  
4.( To explore with key stakeholders the main findings of the safety climate survey 
and identify the potential barriers and facilitators to safety improvement initiatives 
in Kuwaiti public hospitals.  
The first study objective is to identify a suitable safety climate tool to be employed, 
followed by testing the psychometric properties of the tool in a sample of Kuwaiti public 
hospitals to determine its adequacy for that setting. This would also provide a measure of 
the prevailing safety climate within the public hospital sector in Kuwait. The final 
objective is to extend the examination of the state of safety climate in hospitals through 
interviews with key hospital informants. By building on the survey findings, interviews 
will add rich insight into hospital employees' perceptions on safety and will allow 
exploration of the emerging issues in more detail. 	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1.6" Significance"of"the"study"
To date, there has been limited research about patient safety in Kuwaiti healthcare 
organisations in general and, more specifically, no studies of safety climate in Kuwaiti 
public hospitals. Thus, my PhD thesis will address this gap and attempt to measure 
healthcare professionals’ perceptions of safety climate in their work areas by identifying 
and adapting an appropriate tool and comparing results with regional and international 
studies that used the same assessment tool. Furthermore, the study will assess the potential 
organisational and behavioural barriers that are impeding progress in making patient care 
safer. Overcoming such barriers will require identification of the needs essential to support 
the development and implementation of patient safety improvement strategies and 
initiatives. Additionally, my PhD thesis seeks to assess the suitability of a safety climate 
tool for use in Kuwaiti public hospitals. The study also highlights the importance of 
appropriate psychometric development and evaluation of safety climate tools and enhance 
our understanding about the use of tools in different contexts. It will contribute to a 
growing area of research around the benefits and limitations of the measurement of safety 
climate in healthcare. The knowledge generated may help to establish a baseline measure 
of patient safety climate in Kuwaiti hospitals upon which future studies can be compared. 
Finally, areas in need of improvement will be identified to guide future strategies to 
improve on patient safety aspects in Kuwait.  
1.7" Kuwait"
Kuwait is a small, oil rich country that is located at the Northwest border of the Arabian 
Gulf. It is a constitutional emirate under the hereditary ruling of the Al Sabah royal family 
since the 18th century (World Health Organisation, 2014b). Kuwait, with a surface area of 
17 188 square kilometers, has south and southwest borders with Saudi Arabia and west 
and north borders with Iraq. On the east, it is bounded by the Arabian Gulf (Kuwait 
Central Statistical Bureau, 2014).  In 2016, the total population of Kuwait was estimated 
to be 4.3 million, of whom Kuwaiti nationals constitute 1.3 million (Kuwait Central 
Statistical Bureau, 2016). The age structure in Kuwait is as follows: 0–14 years: 25.02% 
(male 374,259/female 345,104); 15–24 years: 15.1% (male 238,451/female 195,700); 25–
54 years: 52.27% (male 948,902/female 554,050) and 55-64 years: 5.07% (male 
82,366/female 63,505) and 65 years and over 2.54% (male 33,561/female 39,524) (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2017). According to WHO’s 2015 estimates, Kuwaitis have a life 
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expectancy of 74 years for males and 76 years for females (World Health Organisation, 
2015). Ischemic heart disease is the leading cause of death in Kuwait followed by cancer 
and then road traffic accidents (Kuwait Central Statistical Bureau, 2015a). Kuwait has the 
fourth highest per capita income in the world with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 
114 billion US dollars in 2015 (World Bank, 2015). Petroleum accounts for nearly half of 
the GDP, 95% of export revenues and 95% of government income (World Bank, 2015). 
Kuwait has a common cultural identity with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and 
United Arab Emirates that is a local mix of Islamic and Arab identities (Crystal, 1992). 
Kuwaitis have, however, a unique sense of citizen loyalty and a unique cultural identity 
among Arab and Islamic countries with different social, political, and cultural views (Al"
Naser, 2001).  
In 1990, Kuwait was illegally invaded by neighboring Iraq, which transformed nearly 
every aspect of the economy and led to a systematic destruction of properties worth 
millions of dollars with severe damage to the national infrastructure and ecology. This 
resulted in a heavy economic burden on the country with the health care system one of the 
worst affected sectors  (Crystal, 1992). Since then, the government has been developing 
the sector to match the much-needed standards and by the mid-1990s, Kuwait had 
resumed its pre-invasion prosperity (Crystal, 1992). 
1.7.1$ Kuwait’s$healthcare$system$
Kuwait has one of the most sophisticated healthcare infrastructures in the Arabian Gulf 
region with expenditure on health ranked third in the national budget (5.8%), after public 
works and education (World Health Organisation EMRO, 2016). The healthcare system 
consists of both public and private providers of healthcare services. The MOH is the main 
provider of public healthcare services and accounts for 75.2% of the Government’s total 
health expenditure, although other ministries provide services to a lesser extent (World 
Health Organisation, 2006). The MOH has an extensive network of public primary and 
secondary care health centers, specialised hospitals and research institutions (Ministry Of 
Health, 2013). The private healthcare sector is considerably small but is rapidly 
expanding. Kuwaitis are granted universal coverage of healthcare and receive medical 
services free of charge and non-Kuwaitis are covered through a health insurance scheme 
(World Health Organisation, 2006). The Government of Kuwait aims to achieve and 
sustain a level of healthcare that conforms to the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) 
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“Health for All” strategy through the provision of equitable, free and high level quality 
health services that is attainable for all (Ministry Of Health, 2013). This has led the 
population at large to enjoy a health status that is nearly equivalent to that in developed 
countries (World Health Organisation, 2006).  
The public health system in Kuwait is organised into two levels; the central MOH and 
regional health offices covering six health areas namely Capital, Hawali, Ahmadi, Jahra, 
Farwania and Al Sabah that include primary healthcare centres, six general hospitals and a 
number of specialised hospitals and clinics. Each health region is a decentralized 
administrative unit with significant autonomy in terms of financial and administrative 
activities, training of the health workforce and management of health delivery (World 
Health Organisation, 2015).  
Healthcare providers are now having to face many challenges including conforming to the 
requirements of changing demographics and disease patterns coupled with rising costs of 
healthcare delivery. This is in addition to the increasing demands for better quality and 
safe care. The following section will focus on one of the rising challenges in Kuwait, 
patient safety. 
1.7.2$ Patient$safety$in$Kuwait$
Public confidence in the healthcare sector has been seriously undermined by several high-
profile failures and many Kuwaitis are increasingly concerned with the quality and safety 
of the healthcare services they receive. Media coverage has repeatedly drawn the attention 
of politicians and the public to failings in healthcare delivery and as a result there has been 
growing demands for a better quality of care (Alabdaly, 2009b, Salama, 2016, Sami, 
2015). This led to inquiries and reports which have placed patient safety and quality high 
on the policy agenda in Kuwait. The MOH responded by investing significantly in the 
improvement of healthcare services including the recruitment of highly trained healthcare 
professionals and the provision of the latest in technologies and treatments. Additionally, 
the MOH issued a directive for the creation of the Quality and Accreditation Directorate 
(QAD) via administrative decree No.1055/2000, as a system-wide approach to addressing 
healthcare quality and safety concerns (QAD, 2001). QAD is the main Government body 
responsible for ensuring the quality and safety of public healthcare services in Kuwait. Its 
main functions include the setting of standards on safety and quality of healthcare services 
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and monitoring the implementation of these standards. It also ensures the establishment of 
appropriate frameworks for the management of quality, safety and risk in public hospitals 
including incident reporting systems, mortality, morbidity and risk management 
committees, and performance monitoring, in addition to training and education of 
healthcare staff in quality, patient safety and risk management. In 2004, Kuwait’s 
declaration on patient safety was a major milestone in the improvement journey (EMRO, 
2004). Goals of the declaration included developing national patient safety programmes 
and facilitating a culture of safety through systematic monitoring, analysis and 
improvement of patient outcomes. A number of conferences and meetings were held 
including a recent conference in Kuwait in 2017 entitled “Kuwait conference on quality in 
healthcare”, under the slogan "Think Quality” with key issues relating to patient safety 
being openly raised and discussed. QAD undertook a range of local and national 
improvement initiatives and programmes including the National Accreditation 
Programme. In July 2008, Accreditation Canada was commissioned by the MOH to 
develop the National Accreditation Programme in association with QAD (QAD, 
2010). National standards of care were developed that covered many areas including 
patient safety. The programme requires hospitals, as part of their accreditation process, to 
develop a range of policies and procedures to ensure the safety of both patients and 
employees. Safety climate assessment is one of the latest approaches to be adopted by the 
QAD to improve patient safety in Kuwaiti hospitals. Also, patient safety teaching has been 
recently integrated in the medical curriculum in order to increase the awareness of medical 
students about patient safety at the undergraduate level. 
Despite these efforts, Kuwait’s healthcare system still faces many challenges dealing with 
unsafe practices. The numbers of healthcare errors and adverse events are still on the rise 
(Abdulaziz, 2010) and the system does not yet appear to have the proper framework in 
place to monitor and reduce the likelihood of errors and adverse events occurring. 
Assessment of safety practices rely on a voluntary incident reporting system with a focus 
on counting errors and incidents that occur, classifying their types and investigating the 
steps undertaken by the facility to deal with these incidents. The lack of a structured 
incident reporting system and the means by which to respond effectively to errors by 
analysing them and disseminating lessons to be learned throughout the system is still 
deficient. There are no mechanisms set for monitoring and evaluating the implementation 
of any improvement approaches based on incidents reported. Also, no sufficient 
legislations and regulations are set in place to ensure adequate protection of healthcare 
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staff from workplace penalization and from civil liability when reporting incidents or 
raising safety issues or concerns. Further, MOH still lacks the baseline patient safety data 
that are necessary for developing improvement plans and interventions. Thus, research 
into patient safety culture is still in its early stages within the Kuwaiti context. 
In a recent study by Badr et al. (2017), an assessment of  patient safety climate was 
conducted in three private hospitals in Kuwait. The study attempted to define strengths 
and weaknesses in patient safety culture. Areas of strength were teamwork within units 
and organisational learning and continuous improvement. The areas that required 
improvement were Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and actions supporting patient 
safety, and hospital handoffs and transitions. It concluded that further research is needed. 
1.7.3$ Patient$safety$in$the$Middle$East 
Wilson et al. (2012) performed a study in hospitals in Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, 
South Africa, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen to examine the rate and type of adverse events 
experienced by patients in these countries. They found that among the 15,548 case records 
reviewed, 8.2% revealed at least one adverse event. A range of 2.5–18.4% was reported 
per country with 83% of these adverse events concluded to be preventable. Another study 
reported that one in seven patients suffers harm in Palestinian hospitals (Najjar et al., 
2013b). Unfortunately, how many patients are harmed in the Gulf region remains to be 
investigated. According to Elmontsri et al. (2017), these statistics suggest that patient 
safety is a key policy concern on the health agenda of Arab countries. As a result, it is vital 
to identify and assess the causes of harm to patients to develop appropriate improvement 
strategies. The lack of evidence on patient safety in Arab countries has been recognised as 
a research priority (El-Jardali, 2007, El-Jardali et al., 2010). Elmontsri et al. (2017) 
conducted a systematic review investigating the status of patient safety culture in Arab 
countries based on the findings of the HSOPSC. It was concluded that a “culture of 
blame” still exists among healthcare professionals preventing many from reporting 
incidents. Communication openness, also, seems to be a worrying issue. Thus, a systems-
based approach to patient safety has been viewed as necessary including the introduction 
of legislations and regulations by policymakers to encourage reporting by healthcare staff 
and to ensure that staff are able to speak up, discuss and seek help when they have safety 
concerns in the workplace. This would help identify risks to patients and would help 
healthcare organisations to learn from their mistakes. Al-Awa et al. (2011) argues that 
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policymakers in developing countries are becoming increasingly aware of the risks of 
unsafe practices. Healthcare organisations in the Arab world are moving towards 
evidence-based practices including the need to evaluate patient safety culture of healthcare 
organisations to ensure that appropriate improvement strategies are being developed (El-
Jardali, 2007). 
1.8" Thesis"outline"
 This thesis consists of eight chapters and appendices. The current chapter provides an 
introduction to the research and an overview of my PhD thesis. Chapter two sets the scene 
by reviewing relevant literature around safety in organisations, including healthcare, and 
discussing research related to patient safety. The chapter will also make further reference 
to the concepts of organisational culture and climate and the linked concepts of safety 
culture and climate. Chapter three is concerned with the methodological approaches that 
were adopted in addressing the aims of the present study. Chapter four will systematically 
review relevant literature related to safety climate tools employed in acute hospital settings 
and will conclude with recommendations about appropriate safety climate tools for 
hospitals. Chapter five explains the results of the psychometric assessment of HSOPSC in 
a Kuwaiti sample including testing the original HSOPSC model and constructing an 
optimal HSOPSC model for Kuwaiti hospitals. Chapter six presents the findings of the 
quantitative assessment of safety climate in Kuwaiti hospitals using the HSOPSC. Chapter 
seven presents the interviews with key informants which aim to understand the survey 
findings in more depth. Finally, chapter eight discusses the main research findings of this 
thesis in addition to strengths and limitations of this thesis. This will be followed by 
theoretical and practical implications and directions for future research based on the 
emerging findings. Building on the safety climate literature and the overall findings of my 
PhD thesis, this chapter will then offer a proposed model informing a systems approach to 
improving safety culture theory and practice. 
1.9" Summary"
In summary, my PhD thesis focuses on the assessment of patient safety climate in Kuwaiti 
hospitals and will attempt to identify, psychometrically develop and validate an 
appropriate safety climate tool for use in hospitals in Kuwait.  
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2" Chapter"Two:"Literature"Review"
2.1" Introduction"
The literature review is organised around the following areas: 1) Safety in organisations 
followed by patient safety. 2) Organisational culture and climate, 3) Safety culture and 
climate including: history of the concept of safety culture, analysis of the concept of safety 
culture and climate, theoretical basis, relevant dimensions, measuring safety culture and 
climate, and safety outcomes. 
Throughout my PhD thesis, several key terms including medical errors, adverse events and 
near misses are repeatedly mentioned. These terms are provided and explained in the 
glossary section (Page 26) and are aligned with the International Classification for Patient 
Safety (ICPS).  
2.2" Safety"in"organisations"
Safety is a major concern across a wide range of industries, including the nuclear power, 
railways, aviation and healthcare settings as errors potentially lead to significant fatal 
consequences (Feng et al., 2008, Weick and Sutcliffe, 2011). Thus, the main 
organisational goal of safety is to prevent accidents and injuries to both employees and 
customers (Dalling, 1998). As a result of its importance, safety culture and safety climate 
studies have been widely conducted across industries and countries. It can be argued, 
however, that the healthcare industry is significantly different from the industries which 
introduced the safety culture concept (Colla et al., 2005, Pizzi et al., 2001). In healthcare, 
“accidents” tend to occur one person at a time while in other industries accidents often 
occur as “sweeping disasters” (Pizzi et al., 2001).  
Investigations into major catastrophic events, such as the North Sea Piper Alpha oil 
platform explosion (Flin et al., 2006), moved from viewing the individual as the primary 
source of an event to recognising the role of individuals within the context of the working 
environment (Hutchinson, 2014). Hutchinson (2014) concludes that the conceptual 
position, as a result, moved to view the role of individuals as being a key element in 
preventing errors and adverse events, rather than being the cause. A number of theoretical 
approaches including for example, the concept of “Normal Accident” (Perrow, 1999), 
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“Organisational Accidents” (Reason, 1997), and “High Reliability Organisations” (Weick, 
1987) support this position.  
According to Reason (2000), there are two main ways to approach human errors or 
accidents: the “person approach” and the “system approach” and each model of error 
causation leads to different philosophies of error management. The “person approach” 
emphasizes the errors of individuals at the frontline, including nurses, physicians, 
surgeons, and anaesthetists, and tends to blame them for their forgetfulness, poor 
motivation, carelessness and inattention. Errors, therefore, tend to be managed through 
disciplinary actions and pressures of litigation. This approach isolates unsafe acts from 
their system context. On the other hand, the systems approach’s basic principle is that 
humans are prone to errors and that errors are perceived as consequences rather than 
causes. The approach focuses on the wider circumstances and contexts within which 
individuals work. It attempts to construct defences, barriers, and safeguards to avoid errors 
or lessen their consequences (Reason, 2000).  
High Reliability Organisations (HRO) are promoted as a good example of a system’s 
approach  to understanding and learning from errors and systems failures (Ruchlin et al., 
2004). The systems approach to error is becoming increasingly used in Medicine (Currie 
and Watt, 2007), although the person approach still dominates to some extent and, it is 
argued, impedes the development of safer healthcare institutions (Reason, 2000). In a 
systematic review conducted with the aim of identifying factors that contributed to patient 
safety incidents in hospital settings, the majority of the 95 studies recognised individual 
factors as contributory factors (Lawton et al., 2012a). According to Lawton et al. (2012a), 
the review revealed that more attention may be given to human behaviours than systems 
factors with a tendency to focus on more proximal causes of incidents without attempts to 
understand reasons behind them. It has been argued that various hospital systems are 
designed on the basis of fault-free performance of workers (Leape et al., 1998). While, in 
industry, the inevitability of human error is recognised (Flin, 2007).  
Reason (1997) developed the “Swiss Cheese Model” to portray the occurrence of system 
failures. Initially, Reason’s model was designed for use in complex industrial settings, and 
has been later adapted to describe the occurrence of medical accidents in healthcare 
settings (Vincent et al., 1998). According to this metaphor, in a complex system, a series 
of defences are set in place to protect potential victims from local hazards (any threat to 
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safety, e.g. unsafe practices, conduct, equipment (World Health Organisation, 2009a). 
Each defensive layer has weaknesses or holes that are transient. Each hole represents a 
‘contributory factor’ (active failures and latent conditions) (Reason, 1997) or 
circumstances, actions or influences, which are thought to have played part in the initiation 
or the increase the risk of an incident that could, or might not, lead to the unwanted or 
unintended outcome (World Health Organisation, 2009a).When all holes are aligned, the 
hazard reaches and might cause harm to the patient (Reason, 2000). Active failures are 
“the unsafe acts committed by people who are in direct contact with the patient or system” 
with an immediate impact on the integrity of the defences (Reason, 2000, p.769). They 
include examples such as active slips, cognitive failures and deviations from safe rules and 
operating procedures (Vincent et al., 1998). Latent conditions, on the other hand, are 
“resident pathogens” within the system and can remain dormant for years before uniting 
with an active failure and leading to an accident (Reason, 1997, p.769 , Reason, 2000). 
They mainly stem from weak strategic decisions, often made by individuals not directly 
involved in the processes of care including top level management (Reason, 2000, Vincent 
et al., 1998). Based on medical publications on error, adverse outcomes, and risk 
management, heavy workloads, lack of knowledge or experience, stressful environments, 
ineffective communication and poor leadership are amongst the latent failures that create 
the conditions leading to unsafe acts (Vincent et al., 1998). A combination of both types of 
failures are involved in nearly all adverse events (Reason, 1997, Reason, 2000).  
Vincent and colleagues (Vincent et al., 1998) have developed the “Organisational 
Accident Model” based on Reason’s model of organisational accidents (Reason, 1997, 
Reason, 2000). The model proposes that latent failures, such as the negative consequences 
of management decisions and organisational factors, create working conditions that lead to 
the occurrence of active failures including accidents and adverse events (Carayon and 
Wood, 2010). Vincent’s model identified seven inter-related factors that may affect 
clinical care and lead to patient safety problems including: (1) institutional context, (2) 
organisational and management factors, (3) work environment, (4) team factors, (5) 
individual (staff) factors, (6) task factors, and (7) patient characteristics. These factors are 
mainly related to the organisational level rather than the individual level (Carayon and 
Wood, 2010).  
In industries such as nuclear power and aviation, safety measures moved from a focus on 
retrospective data of employee injuries and accidents towards measures that focus on 
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organisational factors thus allowing a proactive monitoring of an organisation’s safety 
culture (Reason, 1995, Reason, 1997, Weick et al., 2008). Examples include safety 
climate, hazard identification and /or observed safe behaviour (Cooper and Phillips, 2004). 
In healthcare, there are two main approaches to assessing safety performance (healthcare 
errors and adverse events): reactive or lagging indicators and proactive or leading 
indicators (Choudhery et al., 2014, Lawton et al., 2012b). While the reactive approach 
relies on learning from prior incidents to minimise future errors (incident reporting 
systems, root cause analysis of serious incidents, and case note review), the proactive 
approach is based on the prospective identification of latent conditions within 
organisations and addressing them before a serious event occurs (Lawton et al., 2012a, 
Lawton et al., 2012b). Measurement of safety climate is an example of a proactive 
approach where the focus is on current safety activities to determine system success rather 
than system failure (Cooper and Phillips, 2004, Flin et al., 2000). Both approaches 
combined have been argued to help organisations in examining the effects of their safety 
activities (Cooper and Phillips, 2004).  
2.3" Patient"safety"
The growing costs of healthcare, brought about by rapid technological advances in 
healthcare, the increasing complexity of healthcare organisations and the rising demands 
of consumers have led to a worldwide focus on improving the quality and safety of 
healthcare services. Healthcare has begun to adopt many concepts from high risk 
manufacturing industries, in response to the widespread deficiencies in the process and 
outcomes of healthcare (Institute of Medicine, 1999). Many hospitals are developing error 
management systems to face the rising numbers of healthcare errors and adverse events 
(McFadden et al., 2004). In the USA, adverse events were estimated to annually result in 
44,000 to 98,000 deaths and a total cost of about US$29 billion (Kohn et al., 2000). A 
more recent study showed that between 210,000 and 400,000 preventable deaths occur in 
US hospitals each year (James, 2013). In a systematic review of the literature on adverse 
events that occur during hospital admissions worldwide, it was estimated that 
approximately 9% of all patients are affected, with a substantial number of these events 
being preventable (de Vries et al., 2008). According to Hudson (2003), safety culture in 
health care is frequently reactive, that is it tends to take safety seriously and acts only after 
incidents happen. Still, it is often uninterested in systematic improvements (systematic 
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knowledge and approaches about the operation of the system and the management of risks 
(Hudson 2003)).  
2.3.1$ Evolution$of$patient$safety$
Patient Safety in health care organisations has attracted global attention following the 
Institute of Medicine’s landmark reports “To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health 
System” and “Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century” 
published in 1999 and 2001 (Institute of Medicine, 1999, 212). In its reports, IOM 
highlighted the estimated magnitude of deaths related to preventable healthcare errors 
(Institute of Medicine, 1999). Moreover, IOM urged healthcare organisations to develop 
“a culture of safety” with an organisational focus on improving the safety of patient care 
(Institute of Medicine, 1999, 13) and to adopt “the experiences of other industries” in 
providing “valuable insight about how to begin the process of improving the safety of 
health care by learning how to prevent, detect, recover and learn from accidents” (p. 137). 
In the UK, a similar historical development followed with the publication of the seminal 
report, “An organisation with a memory”, by the Department of Health (DOH, 2001). The 
report stated that “Safety cultures can have a positive and quantifiable impact on the 
performance of organisations” (DOH, 2001, p.46). As a result, patient safety culture was 
placed as a key element on the National Health Service’s (NHS) reform agenda (Scott et 
al., 2003). These reports, supported by worldwide studies of healthcare errors in the UK 
(Vincent et al., 2001), Australia (Wilson et al., 1995), Canada (Baker et al., 2004), 
Scotland (Williams et al., 2008) Palestine (Najjar et al., 2013b) and New Zealand (Davis 
et al., 2002), initiated a global debate about the role of organisational culture in the 
occurrence of adverse events in healthcare organisations (Nieva and Sorra, 2003). The 
studies highlighted the reported unacceptable rates (3–17% of admissions) of preventable 
adverse events and the human and financial cost of preventable harm (Andrews et al., 
1997, Brennan et al., 1991, Leape et al., 1991). Such reports made deficiencies in quality 
and safety of patient care markedly visible to health care professionals and the public, and 
caught the attention of politicians (Pronovost et al., 2006b). As a result, the WHO, along 
with many others, launched the world alliance for patient safety in 2004 to promote the 
need for worldwide collaboration and improvements in patient safety across countries 
(WHO, 2009). Additional high-profile failures in care, including the most recently 
publicized case of Mid Staffordshire NHS trust in England have served to drive patient 
safety and safety culture up the healthcare agenda (Francis, 2013). 
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2.3.2$ The$concept$of$patient$safety$
Defined as “the avoidance, prevention and amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries 
stemming from the process of healthcare” (Vincent, 2006, 31), patient safety has gained 
international importance as a key element of high-quality healthcare. The IOM 
conceptualized patient safety as “freedom from accidental injury; ensuring patient safety 
involves the establishment of operational systems and processes that minimise the 
likelihood of errors and maximizes the likelihood of intercepting them when they occur” 
(IOM, 1999, p.211). According to Feng et al. (2008), researchers agree that patient safety 
culture is a subset of organisational culture and that it specifically relates to the values and 
beliefs of individuals regarding patient safety. This is reflected in Mustard (2002, p.112) 
definition: “…a product of social learning; ways of thinking and behaving that are shared 
and that work to meet the primary objective of patient safety.” Nevertheless, the concept 
remains ill-defined (Feng et al., 2008). 
Many modern health care systems, particularly, UK, Canada, Australia and USA, have all 
engaged in national safety initiatives, such as creating patient safety agencies, 
implementing adverse event reporting and defining safety related performance indicators, 
in attempts to design and improve safer healthcare systems. Still, the benefits of such 
efforts are mixed and unclear (Arah and Klazinga, 2004). According to Vincent et al. 
(2008), it is unclear whether there is any actual progress in making patient care safer. 
Reasons include: lack of reliable patient safety data at the national level or at the 
organisational level and difficulty in engaging clinical staff in patient safety improvement 
initiatives (Vincent et al., 2008) in addition to the significant challenges faced in 
improving highly complex healthcare systems and processes of care (Leape and Berwick, 
2005). In a longitudinal retrospective patient record review study, the adverse event rate 
among hospitalised patients in the Netherlands increased from 4.1% in 2004 to 6.2% in 
2008. A retrospective study of a stratified random sample of 10 hospitals in North 
Carolina chosen on the basis of patient safety activities showed little evidence of 
widespread improvement (Landrigan et al., 2010). A second US study, reported that one 
third of patients suffered harm from their medical care at three tertiary care hospitals 
recognised for their efforts in improving patient safety (Classen et al., 2011). This reflects 
that continuous attention to patient safety has failed to produce widespread reductions in 
rates of harm caused by medical care (Shojania and Thomas, 2013).  
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Patient safety literature has highlighted a number of organisational factors that contributed 
to unsafe care such as lack of, or poor, teamwork, communication, leadership and planning 
and decision making (Flin and Yule, 2005, Yule et al., 2006). Johnson and Hudson (2004) 
add that improper communication, weak supervision, excessive workload, inattention to 
safety procedures and staff shortages are amongst the factors that threaten the safety of 
patients. The majority of these organisational factors relate to the construct of safety 
culture (Singer et al., 2003). In a study by McFadden et al. (2006), the authors highlight 
the need for a comprehensive systems approach to safety, including creating a safety 
culture with the collaboration of all hospital stakeholders. The importance of safety culture 
has been emphasized as a way of improving the quality and safety of patient care 
including safety culture assessment as a tool for learning and improving the safety of 
patient care (Alonazi, 2011). The following section provides an overview of the concepts 
of organisational culture and climate. 
2.4" Organisational"culture"and"climate"
Organisational culture and climate have been researched since the 1970s and 1980s with 
studies focusing on healthcare organisations (Harrison et al., 1992, Mackenzie, 1995, 
Sureshchandar et al., 2001). The concept of organisational climate preceded the concept of 
organisational culture by more than 10 years (Reichers and Schneider, 1990). There has 
been substantial research undertaken on organisational climate in the 1970s. During the 
1980s, the term climate gradually replaced the term culture in this kind of research 
(Guldenmund, 2000). As a result, there is an overlap in the definition and 
conceptualization of both concepts. This led to an ongoing debate concerning the 
differences and overlaps between the two concepts (Olsen, 2009) and many definitions 
have been proposed by different authors within the field of organisational behaviour 
(Verbeke et al., 1998).  
Organisational culture is defined as a set “of commonly held beliefs and values about 
work life” that are shared between colleagues in an organisation (Marszalek-Gaucher and 
Coffey, 1993, p.148) while according to Schein (1992), organisational culture is defined as 
follows:  
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“A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group has learned as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration; that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the 
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (p. 12).  
Cultural researchers have also described organisational culture as a three-level model and 
identified several levels from the most basic level of underlying assumptions reflecting the 
unconscious beliefs that structure the behaviour of an individual to the more physical and 
behavioural manifestations of culture (Davies et al., 2000, Glendon and Stanton, 2000). 
Schein (1992) defined basic assumptions at the deepest and least accessible level, beliefs 
and espoused values at the intermediate level and behaviours, and artefacts at the most 
accessible level. The author adds that the differentiation between the different levels of 
organisational culture is of vital importance in health care where the more visible elements 
of culture are more readily controllable with less resistance to external influence as 
opposed to deep-seated beliefs and values.   
Campbell et al. (1970) define organisational climate as “a set of attributes specific to a 
particular organisation that may be induced from the way the organisation deals with its 
members and its environment” (p.390). Schein (1992) considers climate as “a reflection 
and manifestation of cultural assumptions” (p. 230). The author goes on further to describe 
climate as culture in the making. Further, Glendon and Stanton (2000) describe 
organisational climate as “the perceived quality of an organisation's internal environment” 
(p.198). 
Compared to organisational culture, organisational climate has been described as a more 
superficial concept that reflects features of the current state of an organisation (Glendon 
and Stanton, 2000). Ekvall (1983) draws a clear distinction between the two concepts. The 
author describes them as reflecting different components of the social system within an 
organisation, where culture is based on shared beliefs and values and climate reflects 
behaviours. Furthermore, organisational climate is concerned with individuals’ attitudes 
and perceptions of specific aspects of an organisation whereas culture is focused on 
organisation-wide shared beliefs (Reichers and Schneider, 1990). Moran and Volkwein 
(1992) suggest that climate encompasses cultural elements in the two outer layers of 
organisational culture that are “behaviours and artefacts” and “beliefs and values.” It has 
been portrayed by Furnham and Gunter (2015) as an index of organisational health. 
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Organisational culture was viewed by Guldenmund (2000, p.225) as a “relatively stable, 
multidimensional, holistic construct” whereas organisational climate is viewed as being 
less stable and as a result is thought to be more amenable to change (Denison, 1996). 
Despite those distinctions, Glick (1985) and Reichers and Schneider (1990) consider 
culture as simply a replacement for climate. 
As indicated by Hofstede (1986), organisational culture is considered to be the concern of 
top-management while climate is considered to be the concern of lower and middle 
management (Hofstede, 1986). Glick (1985) explains that the two concepts originate from 
two different disciplines. Organisational climate research developed predominantly from 
social psychological disciplines. Organisational culture, on the other hand, is embedded in 
anthropology. Thus, they reflect different research paradigms and their distinction can be 
in terms of applied methodology. Organisational climate follows mainly a quantitative 
approach while organisational culture employs qualitative approaches to study its research 
objectives. Organisational culture is often assessed qualitatively through observation and 
interviews (Wreathall, 1995). Glendon and Stanton (2000) explain that organisational 
climate measures, such as climate survey questionnaires, may assess attitudes, beliefs and 
perceptions at the time the measurement was undertaken providing a glimpse of certain 
aspects of the organisational culture. The authors add that the findings of climate surveys 
may be difficult to interpret without validation. This issue will be discussed further in 
Chapter five. Zohar and Hofmann (2012) suggest that culture and climate are multilevel 
constructs in which workers develop perceptions of the organisational level climate as 
well as perceptions of the group level climate. Zohar and Luria (2005) add that these 
perceptions may be consistent or discrepant, but both are key predictors of safety 
behaviour.  
The next section will review the concepts of safety culture and safety climate and will 
cover different relevant aspects including theoretical basis, dimensions, measurement and 
safety related outcomes. 
2.5" Safety"culture"and"climate"
Safety culture and safety climate are clearly derivatives of organisational culture and 
climate (Cooper, 2000, Guldenmund, 2000). Researchers suggested that the concept of 
safety culture could be studied within the wider context of organisational culture (Frazier 
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et al., 2013, Guldenmund, 2000). According to Neal et al. (2000) “Safety climate is a 
specific form of organisational climate which describes individual perceptions of the value 
of safety in the work environment” (p.100). Olsen (2008) argues that perspectives 
developed to understand organisational culture can similarly be used to understand the 
safety culture of organisations. The author adds that in comparison with general studies on 
organisational culture, safety culture studies put greater focus on safety-related issues. As 
explained earlier, organisational culture and climate lack consistency in definition and 
conceptualization and this has led to a lack of clarity in the concepts of safety culture and 
safety climate (Flin, 2007).  
2.5.1$ History$of$safety$culture$
The concept of safety culture was first introduced in the investigation report of the 
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) after the Chernobyl accident in 
1986 (IAEA, 1986). Since then it has been discussed in different public inquiry reports 
into other high-profile incidents such as the nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island, on the 
Piper Alpha oil rig, at the King’s Cross station fire and the Clapham junction’s train crash. 
Such reports have implicated poor safety culture as an important factor influencing those 
accidents (Cox and Flin, 1998, Fleming and Lardner, 1999, Perrow, 2004, Reason, 2002). 
Therefore, assessing safety culture has become a fundamental requirement and an 
overriding priority in many high-risk industries including aviation, nuclear power and 
chemical engineering plants (Pronovost et al., 2006b). In healthcare, substantial interest in 
patient safety culture arose after release of IOM’s reports in 1999 and 2001(IOM, 1999, 
IOM, 2001), leading to a focus on creating a positive safety culture becoming a core 
element in policy and leadership efforts to improve patient safety in healthcare 
organisations (Hughes and Lapane, 2006). Zhan and Miller (2003) argue that developing a 
positive safety culture is critical for minimising the number of preventable medical 
injuries and their overall cost to society.  
Recent developments in healthcare have heightened the need for adopting recognised 
organisational models and error management approaches from other industries to reduce 
errors and protect patients from harm (Institute of Medicine, 1999). One question that 
needs to be asked, however, is whether knowledge about creating cultures of safety can be 
transferred from high-risk industries into a complex setting such as healthcare. The 
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following section provides theoretical approaches and definitions across the published 
literature. 
2.5.2$ The$concept$of$safety$culture$
Since the Chernobyl accident, a growing body of literature has examined the safety culture 
construct. Several definitions have been developed for the concept of safety culture but 
most of them are implicit and broad (Boughaba et al., 2014, Carroll, 1998, Cooper, 2000, 
Cox and Flin, 1998, Pidgeon, 1998). One of the most widely cited definitions of safety 
culture was developed by the UK Health and Safety Commission and it states that: 
“The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group 
values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organisation’s safety management. Organisations with a positive safety culture are 
characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions 
of the importance of safety and by the efficacy of preventive measures” (HSC, 
1993, p.23).  
This definition stresses that organisations with a positive safety culture are built on high 
levels of trust, shared views about the importance of safety and on the effectiveness of 
their safety management systems (HSC, 1993). Leape et al. (2009) highlighted that 
leadership, communication and preventive safety measures are positive features of safety 
culture while Choudhry et al. (2007) state that a positive safety culture includes five 
components: commitment and support of management to safety; management concerns for 
the staff; shared trust between management and employees; empowerment of staff; and 
finally continuous monitoring and improvements.  
According to Cooper (2000), safety culture reflects individual performance and 
organisational aspects that influence health and safety. Zohar (2007) states that it reflects 
one aspect of an organisation’s overall culture while Edwards and Armstrong (2013) 
describe it as “the assembly of underlying assumptions, beliefs, values and attitudes shared 
by members of an organisation, which interact with an organisation’s structures and 
systems and the broader contextual setting to result in those external, readily-visible, 
practices that influence safety” (p. 77).  
Pidgeon (1998, p.203) has criticized earlier research for being “unsystematic, fragmented 
and in particular underspecified in theoretical terms.” Guldenmund (2000) adds that the 
concept of safety culture remains poorly defined. It is, therefore, logical to suggest that the 
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creation of a universal model or definition of safety culture is not straightforward (Cooper, 
2000). Wilpert and Itoigawa (2001) argue that safety culture is a complex concept which 
requires theoretical and empirical clarification. Ginsburg et al. (2013) argues for the lack 
of clarity in defining the construct of safety culture and climate in addition to the construct 
of patient safety culture. However, a consensus amongst most researchers suggests that 
organisational and contextual factors are important in the definition of safety culture. 
Additionally, it appears that most of the safety culture definitions across different 
industrial sectors share essential elements including a focus on attitude and behaviour of 
workers in terms of health and safety performance (Cooper, 2000). These common 
elements also indicate the importance of the psychological aspect of safety culture which 
is strongly related to the concept of safety climate (Choudhry et al., 2007). Cooper (2000) 
identified two other main components to safety culture; situational and behavioural. The 
main components of safety culture will be further explored in a later section (page 57). 
Sammer et al. (2010) conducted a comprehensive review of the culture of safety literature 
within the U.S. hospital setting and identified seven subcultures of patient safety 
including: (a) leadership, (b) teamwork, (c) evidence-based patient care practices, (d) 
communication, (e) learning, (f) just culture, and (g) patient-centered care. According to 
Gadd and Collins (2002), subcultures of safety are likely to develop when workers within 
the same organisation experience different working conditions. Glendon and Stanton 
(2000) recognise that identifying safety sub-cultures as a basis for refining our 
understanding of the construct under study could be an important development. Reason 
and Hobbs (2017) suggest thinking of safety culture with regard to three fundamental 
components: (1) a just culture, (2) a reporting culture and (3) a learning culture. 
In theory, basic assumptions of organisational cultures are likely to be influenced by 
national cultures, for example the importance of rules and the acceptance of hierarchy may 
vary between countries (Hofstede, 1991). There is some evidence that safety culture varies 
significantly due to differences in national cultures (Cheyne et al., 2003). Lardner (2003) 
argues that the influence of national culture does not prevent creating a strong local safety 
culture that can over-ride national influences. However, there has been little research to 
support this proposition. 
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2.5.3$ The$concept$of$safety$climate$
Zohar (1980) was apparently the first to use the term safety climate in a study on safety 
perceptions amongst the workforces in Israeli manufacturing companies. Zohar (1980, 
p.96) defined safety climate as a “summary of molar perceptions that employees share 
about their work environment.” It provides a “snapshot” of the perceptions held by 
healthcare workers about the visible features of safety culture at a given point in time 
(Mearns and Flin, 1999, 5). Flin et al. (2000, p.178) defined it “as the surface features of 
the underlying safety culture.” It “assesses workforce perceptions of procedures and 
behaviours in their work environment that indicate the priority given to safety relative to 
other organisational goals” (Flin et al., 2006, p.109). In comparison to safety culture, 
safety climate consists of attitudes and perceptions but does not cover values, 
competencies and behaviour (Lardner, 2003). Also, it differs from safety culture in that it 
is specific to one point in time and location. Reichers and Schneider (1990, 23) tracked the 
evolution of the two concepts and concluded that “culture exists at a higher level of 
abstraction than climate, and climate is a manifestation of culture.” In other words, safety 
culture is a broader organisational feature while safety climate is a sub-set of safety 
culture. Cox and Flin (1998) describe safety culture as the personality of an organisation 
with its relative stability of systems, procedures and behaviours. Safety climate, on the 
other hand, was described as a transient mood state as it changes in response to external 
events and pressures. Guldenmund (2000) concludes that safety climate might be regarded 
as an alternate indicator of safety performance. The Health Foundation hosted a roundtable 
event in February 2013 to discuss what is understood as ‘safety culture’ and how it can be 
measured and monitored. They concluded that climate “emerges through a social process, 
where staff attach meaning to the policy and practice they experience and the behaviours 
they observe.” Culture, on the other hand, is described as more interpretative and concerns 
“the values, beliefs and assumptions that staff infer through story, myth and socialisation, 
and the behaviours they observe that promote success” (The Health Foundation, 2013, 
p.3). Kaczur (2017) conducted a conceptual analysis and comparison of the concepts of 
safety culture and safety climate at the level of theoretical and operational definitions to 
identify common features within these definitions and concluded that safety culture and 
safety climate appear to be two distinct constructs, in which safety climate is a 
subcomponent of safety culture. In my opinion, the theoretical development of safety 
climate and safety culture has not mirrored its empirical progression. The definitions of 
both constructs vary markedly in the published research with an evident lack of single, 
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unified definitions for both of these constructs leading to conceptual confusion. According 
to Kaczur (2017), without a clear understanding of the nature of this phenomenon, safety 
culture may lose its potential as an important factor within organisational functioning.  
Denison (1996) states that distinctive differences can be found in research studies that 
have measured safety culture from those that have measured safety climate. Guldenmund 
(2000) adds that according to the Schein (1992) model, safety culture consists of three 
levels, basic assumptions, espoused values and artefacts. Basic assumptions form the core 
layer of culture while the two outer layers of safety culture, espoused values and artefacts, 
form safety climate. Basic assumptions, the inner-most element of safety culture, cover 
beliefs, unconscious thoughts and feelings believed as true and are more readily accessible 
by qualitative methods, as they are subconscious and as a result can only be inferred 
(Schein, 1990). However, the two outer aspects of culture i.e. the more visible and 
conscious values, attitudes and perceptions can be measured quantitatively, by 
questionnaires for example. Schein (1990) proposes ethnographic methods to evaluate 
basic assumptions held by the members of an organisation as a measure of safety culture.  
Safety climate questionnaires are widely used tools to assess safety climate as they 
measure employees’ attitudes and perceptions of safety in their work areas (Choudhery et 
al., 2014, Gadd and Collins, 2002). Denison (1996) argues that questionnaire surveys 
cannot fully represent the underlying culture but are useful in reflecting employee 
perceptions about the prevailing state of safety in their organisation at a specific point in 
time.  
In summary, there are numerous definitions of safety culture and safety climate. Yet, 
despite their distinctive terminologies, they are commonly used interchangeably in the 
literature (Cox and Flin, 1998). Denison (1996) argues that they may represent different 
approaches to measurement of the same phenomenon.  
2.5.3.1& Zohar&and&Luria’s&multilevel&model&of&safety&climate&&
Zohar, in collaboration with Luria, proposed a multilevel model of safety climate at 
organisation and subunit or group levels (Zohar, 2000, Zohar and Luria, 2005). The most 
important assumption underlying the multilevel model is that staff perceptions related to 
the priority given to safety (embodied in policies, procedures and practices) are 
determined by the perceived managerial commitments at different levels of the 
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organisation. Zohar and Luria (2005) highlight that the effect of an organisation climate on 
staff’s safety behaviour is entirely mediated by group climate level. In other words, 
organisation-level and group-level climates are “globally aligned” (p. 625). They add that 
perceptions of managerial commitment at unit level (supervisors) have been shown to be a 
more “proximal measure and powerful antecedent” of safety performance while the 
organisation level (top management) as the “distal antecedent” (p. 618). The study also 
revealed that, in a particular organisation, group-level variation can be related to the 
discretion of supervisors in applying formal procedures. Zohar and Luria’s (2005) 
multilevel safety climate model seems to be the most explicit framework demonstrating 
the effects of staff perceptions at different levels of the organisation on safety outcomes 
(Saraç, 2011).  
In line with Zohar’s theoretical propositions, Colla et al. (2005) report that management 
commitment in patient safety climate studies has been frequently assessed in relation to 
safety outcomes. The influence of top management, through establishing written safety 
procedures and policies, on the level of priority given to safety within the unit level has 
been recognised to result in reducing adverse consequences including treatment errors 
(Naveh et al., 2006). However, in healthcare, the effect of hospital safety climate on 
patient and worker safety outcomes is not entirely clear (Flin, 2007). 
2.5.4$ Theoretical$basis$
In theory, safety culture or safety climate provides a foundation to guide the safety 
behaviour of workers so that they develop perceptions and expectations regarding safety 
behaviour outcomes (Zohar, 1980). Despite the substantial empirical development of 
safety culture and safety climate, theoretical development has not mirrored that 
progression (Clarke, 2000, Guldenmund, 2000, Zohar, 2010). Groves et al. (2011) adds 
that there is an evident lack of a consistent definition of safety culture and an adequate 
underpinning theoretical basis of this construct. There is an absence of a safety culture 
theory that describes the process of keeping patients safe and includes the interaction 
between macro-level organisational structures and micro-level individual actions (Groves 
et al., 2011). 
Clarke (2000, 68) pinpoints the “atheoretical roots” of safety culture and argues that no 
one has developed an independent framework or attempted to operationalise safety culture 
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on the basis of theoretical roots. Guldenmund (2000) conducted a literature review of 
safety culture and climate research and concluded that “All in all, the models of safety 
culture are unsatisfactory to the extent that they do not embody a causal chain but rather 
specify some broad categories of interest and tentative relationships between those” (p. 
243). Additionally, Groves et al. (2011) argue that it is not surprising for a concept, such 
as safety culture, collected from multiple disciplines, to lack a strong theoretical basis in a 
fundamentally different healthcare setting.  
The theoretical roots of patient safety culture research lie mostly in high-risk industries 
(Ausserhofer, 2012). According to Halligan and Zecevic (2011), the five most commonly 
cited theories or models in healthcare research include: (1) High-Reliability Organisation 
Theory (HROT) (Ruchlin et al., 2004), (2) Donabedian’s Quality of Care Model 
(Donabedian, 2002) and its adaptations including the SEIPS (Systems Engineering 
Initiative for Patient Safety) model (Carayon et al., 2006) and Quality Health Outcomes 
Model (Mitchell et al., 1998), (3) The Cultural Maturity Model (Westrum, 2004), (4) 
Organisational Theory (Ruchlin et al., 2004) and (5) System Theory (Nieva and Sorra, 
2003). According to Guldenmund (2000), no single safety culture theory or model has 
been universally accepted as clearly reflecting the construct of safety culture and safety 
climate and none of the theories or models may be applicable to all types of organisations . 
A brief overview of HROT and Donabedian’s Quality of Care Model, including its SEIPS 
adaptation, is provided below, as these are the most common theories adopted in 
healthcare research.  
2.5.4.1& High>reliability&organisation&theory&&
Early safety literature was based on the notion that errors were mostly related to individual 
workers rather than how safety was managed (Cox and Flin, 1998, Reason, 2002). The 
Institute of Medicine (1999), however, stated in its report that errors in organisations are 
mostly due to ill designed systems. The systems approach to error is widely used in 
different industrial settings and is now becoming increasingly popular in healthcare 
(Currie and Watt, 2007). HROT is one example. HROT is based on research around high-
reliability organisations, i.e. organisations that are able to operate risky and complex 
technologies in hazardous conditions where the consequences of errors could be high but 
the occurrence of error is low (Roberts, 1990). Examples include nuclear aircraft carriers, 
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naval and commercial aviation (Baker et al.,2006). It theorises that organisations are 
capable of operating within hazardous environments because of their complexity 
(components have multiple functions) and tight coupling (time dependent operations and 
specialised personnel) (Perrow, 1999, Roberts, 1990). Further, it assumes that accidents 
occur because humans managing and operating complex systems are not complex enough 
themselves to sense and predict the problems generated by the system (Perrow, 1999, 
Ruchlin et al., 2004, Singer et al., 2007). As such, successful operations require proper 
organisation of people, process and technology to handle complex activities, prevent 
accidents and improve reliability (Ruchlin et al., 2004). Recently, research has revealed 
that a key aspect of HROs’ safety culture, facilitating their maintenance of excellent 
performance, is “collective mindfulness” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2011). It is based on 
shared motivation by front-line employees to discover and correct errors before they result 
in negative outcomes and is composed of five inter-related behavioural processes 
including; preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to 
operations, commitment to resilience and deference to expertise (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007, 
p.47) . As Weick and Sutcliffe (2011) argue, these five principles help front-line 
employees to stay mindful and perform work safely even under hazardous conditions. 
Also, a critical factor to the success of HROs are individuals and teams working within the 
organisation, as they are able to demonstrate consistent and effective communication and 
teamwork behaviours over time and while working under high levels of stress in complex 
environments (Wilson et al., 1995). It has been argued that healthcare is confounded by its 
complexity and is different from tightly managed industrial HRO settings (Dekker et al., 
2010). A number of patient safety climate measures, including patient safety climate in 
healthcare organisations and safety organising scale, were based on HROT.  
2.5.4.2& Donabedian’s&quality&of&care&model&and&SEIPS&model&
 Donabedian (2002) provides a framework for understanding the structures, processes and 
outcomes influencing the quality of care provided by healthcare organisations. According 
to Donabedian (2002), structure is described as the conditions in which care is provided, 
including physical and organisational aspects of healthcare settings; process includes 
activities involved in providing care; outcomes are results or changes that can be attributed 
to the care provided in terms of the combined structures and process elements and 
influences. 	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Bonner et al. (2009) states that each component in Donabedian’s model is dynamic and 
transactional, and may influence safety outcomes. Yet, it is limited in its identification of 
the interactions and interdependencies amongst system components (Carayon et al., 2006). 
Human Factors and Ergonomics (HFE) and its systems approach to research, design and 
policy was recognised as crucial for patient safety across all healthcare settings after the 
publication of the IOM’s report “To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System” in 
1999 (Institute of Medicine, 1999). HFE is a scientific discipline which is promoted as 
being useful for the redesign of healthcare systems and processes and improving patient 
safety and quality of care (Carayon et al., 2014, Pronovost and Goeschel, 2011, Pronovost 
and Weisfeldt, 2012). Carayon et al. (2014) argue that to have substantial and sustainable 
impact on patient safety and quality of care, HFE systems approaches should include all 
broad organisational considerations and external influences. The SEIPS model (Carayon et 
al., 2006) incorporates Donabedian’s Structure-Process-Outcome model of healthcare 
quality (Donabedian, 1978, Donabedian, 1988) and replaces the “Structure” by the work 
system to construct a more systematic approach to analysis and improvement of healthcare 
quality and patient safety (Carayon et al., 2014). The SEIPS model describes the system 
components and their relationships, as well as their impact on patients (e.g. errors, 
incidents, and adverse events, satisfaction, experience), employee (e.g. incidents, stress, 
burnout, joy, satisfaction) and organisational outcomes (e.g. productivity, efficiency, staff 
injuries). It supplements Donabedian’s model with a more comprehensive description of 
organisational structure (i.e., work system) and its interacting components (person, tasks, 
tools and technologies, physical environment, organisation) and incorporating 
employee/organisational outcomes with possible relationships between patient outcomes 
and employee/organisational outcomes.  
2.5.5$ Dimensions$of$safety$culture$
Management commitment to safety has been recognised as a leading theme in safety 
climate measurement both within the industrial safety literature (Flin et al., 2000) and 
patient safety climate literature (Flin, 2007) making it the most commonly measured 
dimension of safety climate. However, an understanding of the specific mechanisms that 
determine how senior management influences employees’ attitudes, perceptions and 
behaviours is still not clear (Flin et al., 2000). Many scholars seem to agree that senior 
management’s commitment to safety, effective communication, organisational learning 
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and participative management and leadership style are the main components of safety 
culture (Flin et al., 2000, Sawacha et al., 1999, Sorensen, 2002, Thompson et al., 1998). 
This issue will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
2.5.6$ Measuring$safety$culture$and$climate$
As healthcare organisations endeavor to improve the quality and safety of their services, 
there is an increasing recognition of the importance of building a culture of safety (Sallie 
et al, 2013). A strong safety culture is an essential element to promote patient safety and 
improve the quality of patient care (Kaafarani et al., 2009). Assessing the status of the 
existing safety culture in a healthcare organisation has been identified as the first step for 
developing a strong and solid safety culture (Hellings et al., 2007). The resulting data offer 
policymakers, healthcare providers, teams and managers a clear view of areas in need of 
attention to strengthen their patient safety climate, in addition to identifying specific 
challenges that impede progress in patient safety initiatives (Smits et al., 2009b). It can 
also be used for benchmarking the strengths of safety cultures across time and between 
organisations on national and international levels (Blegen et al., 2009, Lee and Harrison, 
2000). Also, safety climate  has been viewed as antecedent and safety outcomes as the 
consequences (Payne et al., 2009). This will be explored further in another section in this 
chapter. 
As discussed earlier, there are three main components of safety culture; psychological, 
situational and behavioural (Cooper (2000). Those components can be assessed with 
various qualitative and quantitative tools. Situational components of safety culture, 
including policies, working procedures and management systems, can be investigated 
through audits of safety management systems (Cooper, 1998). Behavioural aspects, 
including extrinsic elements of behaviours, norms and rituals, can be assessed through 
peer observations and outcome and self-report measures. The psychological aspect, 
including a person’s beliefs, values, attitudes and perceptions, is related to safety climate 
and is commonly assessed by safety climate questionnaires (Cooper, 2000, Kirk et al., 
2005). Lee and Harrison (2000) argue that an overall assessment of the three components 
of safety culture is “beyond the scope of any single method” (p.63) and that methods, such 
as peer reviews, performance indicators and safety audits, can be used to assess safety 
culture in a comprehensive way. Yet, Zohar (1980) and Griffin and Neal (2000) argue that 
culture is difficult to assess and that it is more feasible to measure safety climate.  
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As will be discussed in a later chapter, tools for assessing safety culture can be categorized 
as either qualitative or quantitative. Qualitative methods include observations, focus group 
discussions, interviews, and case studies (Wreathall, 1995). Such methods allow members 
of an organisation to act as informants, who directly or indirectly interact with the research 
team while using their own terms to express their points of view (Rousseau, 1990, 
Wiegmann et al., 2004). Quantitative approaches, including tools such as survey 
questionnaires, allow members of an organisation to act as respondents, who answer a set 
of standard questions provided by the research team as they try to measure safety culture 
numerically using procedures that are highly Standardised (Rousseau, 1990, Wreathall, 
1995).  
Wreathall (1995) concludes that quantitative methods are straightforward to implement in 
different organisations and interpret findings according to a common frame of reference. 
The most popular strategy to assess the state of a patient safety climate in a healthcare 
organisation is to survey healthcare professionals regarding their perceptions and attitudes 
on patient safety issues (Ausserhofer, 2012). Therefore, the majority of research on patient 
safety climate involves the administration of questionnaires either developed or adapted 
for healthcare settings. Safety climate questionnaires assess surface level features of the 
underlying safety culture in terms of perceptions of the workforce of procedures and 
practices in their workplace that show the level of priority given to safety in relation to 
other goals of the organisation (Cooper, 2000, Flin et al., 2006). Cheyne et al. (2003) 
argue that these quantitative measurements apply only to a specific setting at a particular 
point in time and are subject to short-term fluctuations. Kirk et al. (2007) add that despite 
their usefulness as safety measures, they offer a superficial evaluation of an organisation’s 
culture. Additionally, Pronovost et al. (2006) outlines the need for scientifically sound and 
feasible measures of patient safety. As will be discussed in Chapter four, it is vital that 
tools are developed with robust psychometric properties to enable valid interpretations of 
patient safety climate test scores (Flin et al., 2006). 
There are a number of safety climate questionnaires that are used to assess patient safety 
climate in healthcare (Colla et al., 2005) and over the past ten years, a number of 
comprehensive reviews of studies addressing patient safety in general or patient safety 
climate instruments in particular have been published (Colla et al., 2005, Fleming, 2005, 
Flin et al., 2006, Halligan and Zecevic, 2011, Jackson et al., 2010, Pumar-Méndez et al., 
2014, Sammer et al., 2010, Singla et al., 2006). Most of these reviews recommend the 
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Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) and Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 
(HSOPSC) as the most widely used tools in healthcare organisations. At the same time, a 
number of these published reviews critiqued patient safety climate tools for their lack of 
appropriate scale development and validation and weak evidence for their predictive 
validity (i.e. their overall psychometric rigour). Flin et al. (2006) argues that the HSOPSC 
is one of the most rigorously tested instruments with good psychometric properties in 
addition to being tested on a large sample size. This issue will be expanded further in the 
systematic review chapter (Chapter four).  
One issue that should be taken into consideration when quantifying safety culture is the 
level of aggregation. Choudhery et al. (2014) argue that researchers should pay attention to 
whether the organisational level truly represents a fairly homogenous culture. Zohar 
(2000) adds that conditions determining the appropriate level of analysis require within-
group homogeneity and between-groups variance. According to Cooper and Phillips 
(2004), an organisation’s departments (sub-units) are the appropriate level of analysis and 
aggregation of individual response. Additionally, researchers have a tendency to focus 
exclusively on workers’ perceptions while overlooking important other aspects such as 
safety environment, safety management system and workers’ safety behaviour (Choudhery 
et al., 2014).  
The next section will explain, in detail, three instruments commonly used in healthcare 
organisations. 
2.5.6.1& The&Hospital&Survey&on&Patient&Safety&Culture&
The HSOPSC was developed by researchers under a contract for the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) (Sorra and Dyer, 2010). It is designed to 
evaluate views of staff on patient safety culture in their work areas (Sorra and Dyer, 2010). 
Haugen et al. (2010, p.278) stated that the HSOPSC could be considered as assessing the 
patient safety climate through “giving a picture of the safety culture at a specific time 
point.”  
The development of the survey tool was based on literature review in the areas of 
organisational and safety climate and culture, safety management and accidents, error, 
error reporting and patient safety. In addition, available tools of safety climate and culture 
were assessed. A draft tool was subsequently developed and further input was obtained 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 60 
through cognitive examination and review of the tool by researchers and hospital 
administrators (Sorra and Nieva, 2004a, Sorra and Dyer, 2010). In 2003, the survey was 
pilot tested in 21 hospitals across six states in the United States. Based on the 
psychometric results of the pilot study, the survey was finalized and made publicly 
available in 2004 (Sorra and Nieva, 2004a, Sorra and Dyer, 2010). Since its introduction, 
the tool has been extensively used in hospitals in the United States to measure safety 
culture (Sorra et al., 2010). Furthermore, The HSOPSC has been validated for use in more 
than 60 countries and translated into 30 different languages (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, 2015, Bodur and Filiz, 2010, Haugen et al., 2010b, Perneger et al., 
2014, Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010, Sarac et al., 2010, Smits et al., 2008, Waterson et al., 
2010).  
The HSOPSC includes 42 questionnaire items on 5-point Likert scales of agreement or 
frequency that assess 12 dimensions of patient safety culture, with 3 or 4 items per 
dimension. Seven dimensions assess safety culture at the unit level including: 1) 
Communication openness; 2) Feedback and communication about error; 3) Organisational 
learning– continuous improvement; 4) Supervisors’/managers’ expectations and actions 
promoting safety; 5) Non-punitive response to error; 6) Teamwork within units; 7) 
Staffing, while three dimensions assess safety culture at the hospital level including: 8) 
Handoffs and transitions, 9) Management support for patient safety, and 10) Teamwork 
across units. Also, four outcome measures are included in the tool: two multiple items, 11) 
Overall perceptions of patient safety and 12) Frequency of event reporting, and two 
additional single items, patient safety grade and number of events reported. Some items 
concerning background demographic information are included (Sorra and Nieva, 2007, 
Sorra and Dyer, 2010).  
Psychometric data analyses covered the following items: intraclass correlations (ICCs), 
design effects, Multilevel Confirmatory Factor Analysis (MCFA) results, model fit 
indices, item factor loadings, internal consistency reliability analyses, and dimension 
intercorrelations (Sorra and Dyer, 2010). They all confirmed the HSOPSC as having good 
psychometric properties across all levels of analysis (i.e. individual, unit and hospital) with 
strong evidence supporting the construct and discriminant validity of the tool. HSOPSC 
reported good model fit indices.  
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Cronbach’s alpha was used to confirm the internal consistency of the patient safety climate 
composites (Sorra and Dyer, 2010). Cronbach’s alpha values ranged from 0.64 to 0.85, 
except for the “staffing” composite which fell below cutoff values (0.59).  
As mentioned earlier, the intercorrelations between the 12 composites, both among patient 
safety composites and with the two outcome measures (number of events reported and 
patient safety grade) has been examined (Sorra and Dyer, 2010) and will be further 
explored in Chapter four. 
In summary, the HSOPSC can be viewed as a comprehensive measure of patient safety 
climate, which examines a number of fundamental dimensions related to patient safety, at 
the individual, unit and hospital levels of analysis. This multi-dimensional approach may 
establish a baseline measure to guide progress with patient safety improvement initiatives 
(Madsen, 2001). It has evident content validity and the results from the survey can be used 
to assess the prevailing status of patient safety culture and the effect of patient safety 
initiatives (Sorra and Dyer, 2010). It also helps in initiating an open dialogue between staff 
and in raising their awareness about safety issues, while at the organisational level it may 
facilitate evaluation of the impact of patient safety initiatives and programmes, 
benchmarking with other hospitals and provide evidence to fulfil regulatory requirements. 
Worldwide, there is extensive published literature reporting the psychometric properties of 
the HSOPSC. Yet, no research has been able to test the predictive validity of the tool by 
relating climate scores to outcome measures such as increasing actual incident reporting 
data (Sarac et al., 2010) More research is needed to assess the criterion validity of the 
HSOPSC tool by examining the relationship between patient safety culture and patient 
(and other) outcomes (Sorra and Dyer, 2010). 
2.5.6.2& The&Safety&Attitudes&Questionnaire&
The SAQ, developed by Sexton et al. (2006), is a modification of the Intensive Care Unit 
Management Attitude Questionnaire (ICUMAQ), which was derived from a widely used 
questionnaire in aviation called the Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire (FMAQ) 
(Helmreich et al., 1993b, Sexton et al., 2006, Sexton et al., 2000). Sexton and colleagues 
(2006) specify that the SAQ is based on two conceptual models: Vincent’s framework for 
analysing risk and safety, and Donabedian’s conceptual model for assessing quality 
(Donabedian, 1988, Vincent et al., 1998).  
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The original extended version of the SAQ consists of 60 items including 30 core items that 
are the same in all clinical settings. It measures healthcare providers’ attitudes about six 
safety-related dimensions including teamwork climate, safety climate, perceptions of 
management, job satisfaction, working conditions and stress recognition. The SAQ was 
designed to measure safety climate at both the individual and group level (Pronovost and 
Sexton, 2005). It aggregates individual attitudes by the clinical area thus provides a 
“snapshot” of the climate in that particular clinical area. Furthermore, clinical areas can 
benchmark their climate against themselves and against other units in their organisations 
(Sexton et al., 2006, p.44). Also, it helps in assessing the impact of initiatives implemented 
to improve patient safety (Thomas et al., 2005). 
Different versions were developed for intensive care units, operating theaters, general 
inpatient settings, and ambulatory clinics with slight modifications of the SAQ to reflect 
the clinical area (Sexton et al., 2006).  
This questionnaire has been pilot tested on large sample sizes in different settings 
including intensive care units, operating theatres and ambulatory units in the USA, the UK 
and New Zealand (Sexton et al., 2006). The SAQ was subjected to rigorous psychometric 
testing. In Sexton et al. (2006) study, Raykov's coefficient was used to assess composite 
scale reliability of the SAQ with a value of 0.90, indicating strong reliability (Raykov and 
Du Toit, 2005). In addition, a MCFA, which demonstrated that the SAQ has shown “good 
psychometric properties” (Sexton et al., 2006, p.44). 
The SAQ has been translated into different languages including Dutch (Devriendt et al., 
2012), Swedish (Nordén-Hägg et al., 2010), Spanish (Gutiérrez-Cía et al., 2010), Chinese 
(Lee et al., 2010) and Arabic (Hamdan, 2013). It also preserves its continuity with the 
FMAQ, as 25% of its items were retained on the SAQ, it allows for cross-industry 
comparisons (Sexton et al., 2006). Singla et al. (2006) stated that the SAQ focuses on 
management and institutional commitment to safety, communication openness, teamwork, 
and beliefs about causes of errors and adverse events. 
The SAQ has been used to investigate the relationship between safety climate scores and 
patient outcomes. Favorable scores were found to be associated with better patient 
outcomes including shorter lengths of stay and less medication errors (Thomas et al., 
2005).  
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2.5.6.3& The&Safety&Organising&Scale&
The Safety Organising Scale (SOS), developed by Vogus & Sutcliffe in 2007, is a 
promising tool that assesses the degree to which registered nurses and their colleagues are 
involved in safety behaviours and practices on their units. It has nine items and uses 7-
point Likert scales. The questionnaire items were developed based on the five inter-related 
behavioural processes of “collective mindfulness” including: preoccupation with failure; 
reluctance to simplify interpretations; sensitivity to operations; commitment to resilience 
and deference to expertise (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007, p.47) . The development of the SOS 
was based on case studies of HROs.  
The SOS reported strong psychometric properties. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
have shown an excellent fit to the data across all fit indices, confirming the instrument's 
uni-dimensionality, and high factor loadings. Cronbach’s alpha was reported to be 0.88, 
which supports scale reliability. Results have also shown significant between-unit 
variability, intra-class correlations and within-group agreement, which strongly supports 
that the SOS reflects safety climate at the unit level. The SOS used independent outcome 
measures to examine associations between safety climate scores and safety related 
outcomes as will be discussed in the next section.  
The following are some limitations of the scale including that the SOS was validated using 
a sample comprised entirely of registered nurses. Palmieri (2010) argued that the SOS, 
despite being a promising measurement tool, lacks the psychometric rigor of the HSOPSC 
and SAQ. Further, Ausserhofer (2012, p.131) highlighted that the SOS items, compared to 
the SAQ, might not fully capture the “psychological safety” aspects including fear of 
blame and shame. 
2.6" Safety"outcomes"
Measures of safety culture or safety climate have been suggested as potential “leading 
indicators” of safety performance (Flin et al., 2000). Safety climate has been viewed as an 
antecedent or cause and safety outcomes (i.e., accidents, injuries) as the consequence or 
effect (Payne et al., 2009). In a review of industrial literature, there was strong evidence 
for the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes assessed using different 
safety climate instruments at different levels of analysis using objective or self-report 
measures (Clarke, 2006, Neal and Griffin, 2006, Neal et al., 2000, Saraç, 2011, Wallace et 
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al., 2006). It has been shown that safety climate is directly linked with reductions in 
worker accidents and injuries (Huang et al., 2006, Zohar, 2002) and enhances worker 
safety behaviours (Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996). This confirms the predictive validity of 
safety climate on safety outcomes (Cooper and Phillips, 2004, Johnson, 2007, Saraç, 2011, 
Zohar, 2010). 
According to Zohar (2010), several reviews identified two chief antecedents that are likely 
to promote the emergence of shared climate perceptions amongst employees including 
leadership and member–member interactions (Kozlowski and Doherty, 1989, Ostroff et 
al., 2003, Schneider and Reichers, 1983). 
In healthcare, possible outcome data could include worker injuries and behaviours, patient 
injuries or other organisational outcomes including litigation costs (Flin, 2007). Examples 
include: workers’ self- reported compliance with standard precautions (Gershon et al., 
2000, Gershon et al., 2007, Neal et al., 2000); workers’ self-reported frequency of 
reporting adverse events (Sorra and Nieva, 2004a); independent measures of worker 
injuries (Felknor et al., 2000b, Vredenburgh, 2002); and independent measure of reports of 
injuries to patients (Itoh et al., 2002). Flin (2007) argues for the need to link these findings 
to underlying theoretical models.  
In a study by Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) using the SOS, criterion-related validity was 
examined using reported medication errors and patient falls that were collected over a six 
month period. Multilevel regression analysis showed a negative relationship between 
safety climate and reported medication errors and patient falls. Also, significant positive 
relationships have been shown between climate levels and the theorised antecedents: trust 
in manager and commitment and staffing levels. In a study by Zohar et al. (2007), 955 
Israeli hospital nurses’ safety behaviours were assessed using observational techniques, 
and revealed that both unit and hospital level safety climates were predictors of staff’s 
safety behaviours. Lower safety climate scores, across 30 intensive care units (ICUs) in 
the USA, were found to be related to increased length of stay for patients, and less 
favourable perceptions of management by staff were related to higher patient mortality 
rates (Huang et al., 2007) while another study found that safety climate predicted both 
patient outcomes including patient satisfaction, medication errors and urinary tract 
infections in addition to nurse outcomes such as nurse satisfaction, back and needle stick 
injuries (Hofmann and Mark, 2006). In a study conducted on 1,866 NHS clinical staff in 
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six Scottish acute hospitals, safety climate was found to be significantly related to both 
patient and worker safety outcomes including workers’ safety behaviour and patient and 
worker injury measures (Agnew et al., 2013). The SAQ has been used to investigate the 
relationship between safety climate scores and patient outcomes where positive scores 
were associated with lower rates of ventilator associated pneumonia and lower 
bloodstream infection rates (Thomas et al., 2005).  
According to Flin (2007), studies in healthcare have started to confirm that safety climate 
scores can be linked with workers’ safety behaviours or workers’ injuries, though few 
independent measures were used. Flin (2007) adds that both worker and patient outcomes 
would appear to result from proximal worker behaviours, influenced by the prevailing 
safety climate. Still, there is a need to ascertain whether a different set of cultural factors 
that determine healthcare workers’ safety behaviours influence patient safety outcomes as 
opposed to worker injury outcomes (Flin, 2007). Finally, the influence of hospital safety 
climate on patient and worker safety outcomes is not yet clear (Flin, 2007). Further 
research is needed as there is a shortage in the literature understanding how safety culture 
or climate impacts outcomes (Wilson, 2007).  
2.7" Quality"improvement"science"
Improvement science is an emerging concept which focuses on systematically and 
rigorously investigating how to undertake quality improvement efforts based on best 
evidence-based practices and the best ways to measure and disseminate this knowledge to 
ensure positive change (The Health Foundation, 2011). It has been described as the 
scientific study of methods to encourage the integration of research findings and evidence-
based interventions into health care policy and practice and therefore to improve the 
quality and effectiveness of health services and care (Schackman, 2010). According to 
Marshall et al. (2013), adopting a scientific approach to improvement has great potential to 
enhance the capability of health systems to provide high-quality care. Still, there is a 
paucity of empirical research around the topic and it has been argued that only minority of 
evidence-based healthcare improvements are implemented in practice (The Health 
Foundation, 2011). One example is an evidence-based intervention that was used to reduce 
the incidence of catheter-related bloodstream infections. A cohort study of 103 intensive-
care units in Michigan, USA, resulted in a substantial reduction in rates of these infections 
(Pronovost et al., 2006a). The mechanisms through which the programme worked have 
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been assessed, and a theory of change that could inform later repetitions of the programme 
was generated (Dixon"woods et al., 2011). Policymakers are encouraging healthcare 
organisations to implement safe practices despite the absence of explicit criteria for 
evaluating the strength of the evidence supporting the practice under consideration or 
evidence about the likelihood that patients will benefit (Shekelle et al., 2010). As a result, 
AHRQ funded a study that reviewed studies of patient safety and used an expert panel 
process to identify evidence from this type of research and to suggest which factors are 
important. Those covered organisational characteristics, external factors, culture, 
teamwork, and leadership at the level of the unit, and management tools (Shekelle et al., 
2010).  
Safety climate surveys are increasingly popular worldwide. They have been developed and 
used within healthcare organisations to examine the effectiveness of patient safety 
improvement strategies. Thus, targeting practice change through patient safety climate is 
considered to be a key strategy for strengthening and enhancing patient safety and 
outcomes in hospitals (Morello et al., 2013). The effects of utilising them merit further 
research with detailed investigations of how organisations use safety climate surveys as a 
tool for learning and change (Singer and Vogus, 2013). It has been suggested to integrate 
both quality improvement science (Plan-Do-Study-Act, Lean, Six Sigma) and HFE to 
provide powerful philosophical and practical approaches to the improvement of 
healthcare. An example of such a combination has been utilized to improve handover from 
day to night and illustrates both tensions and benefits (Hignett et al., 2015).  
2.8" Summary"
In summary, this chapter examined the relevant literature of safety culture research. This 
included key elements of safety in organisations, patient safety, organisational culture and 
climate, safety culture and climate including: concepts analysis, theoretical basis, relevant 
dimensions, measurement, and safety outcomes. Safety is a concept that has attracted 
much attention across the healthcare industry. Still, the reviewed literature revealed 
substantial variation in the concepts of safety culture and climate, their associated 
dimensions and amount of evidence about their theoretical basis. The methodological 
rigour associated with the design of safety climate measures and the standard reporting of 
their psychometric properties was shown to be lacking.  
Chapter Two: Literature Review 67 
The topic of patient safety is still at an early stage of development in Kuwait. Little is 
known about the prevailing state of safety climate in Kuwaiti hospitals. Also, to our 
knowledge, there are no validated safety climate tools appropriate for Kuwaiti hospitals. 
Therefore, my PhD thesis aims to investigate patient safety climate in public hospitals in 
Kuwait. In the next chapter, the research methodology used to address the aims of my PhD 
thesis are presented.  
Chapter Three: Research Methodology 68 
3" Chapter"Three:"Research"Methodology""
3.1" Introduction"
The following chapter is concerned with the methodological approaches employed in 
addressing the aims of the study. To explore the complex concept of safety climate in 
healthcare, a multimethod approach was viewed as most appropriate with methodological 
approaches adopted including a systematic review, a cross-sectional survey and semi-
structured interviews. The first part of the chapter will cover the research design adopted. 
The second part moves on to describe the methods used to conduct the research and 
analyses. This will also include the reasons for choosing those methods and any associated 
limitations. Finally, ethical considerations will be addressed. 
3.2" Research"paradigms"
Over the past decade, a large rise in patient safety research has been documented (Lilford 
et al., 2006). Moreover, safety culture assessment has become an important research 
priority (Battles and Lilford, 2003). Approaches to assessing safety culture and climate 
can be quantitative, such as using questionnaires, or qualitative such as interviews and 
observations, or a combination of both. Safety climate surveys have been the dominant 
method for evaluating care team perceptions and experiences of patient safety culture in 
organisational settings (Battles and Lilford, 2003, Brown et al., 2008, Brown and Lilford, 
2008, Guldenmund, 2007, Halligan and Zecevic, 2011, Runciman et al., 2008, Shekelle et 
al., 2011). However, it is worth noting that Runciman et al. (2008) argues that qualitative 
methods have not been given sufficient weight or attention compared to quantitative 
methods, and may offer a more in-depth and insightful approach than questionnaire 
surveys.  
3.2.1$ Positivist$research$paradigm$
Quantitative research is often termed as the “positivist” or “traditional” paradigm 
(Bryman, 1984, Creswell, 2013) where a paradigm defines the philosophy on how 
research is conducted (Kuhn and Hawkins, 1963).This paradigm is associated with a belief 
that reality can be measured and observed objectively, independent of the researcher’s 
own views (Creswell et al., 2011a, Cronholm and Hjalmarsson, 2011). The research 
approach follows a formal and systematic process with numerical data being used to 
Chapter Three: Research Methodology 69 
measure a certain phenomenon and produce findings (Carr, 1994). Fundamental features 
of various quantitative studies include the use of instruments such as surveys or tests to 
collect data (Harwell, 2011). Another feature is that it sets out to test a hypothesis that 
corresponds to a research question of interest using a “deductive” process of knowledge 
attainment (Bekhet and Zauszniewski, 2012, Carr, 1994). In a deductive approach, 
findings from statistical hypotheses testing lead to broad conclusions about characteristics 
of a population (Harwell, 2011). Strengths of quantitative research include its potential to 
develop generalizations of findings if based on samples that are of appropriate size and 
representative of the population being studied (Creswell et al., 2011a). Moreover, it allows 
researchers to better predict, understand and explain the underlying phenomenon 
(Creswell et al., 2011a, Cronholm and Hjalmarsson, 2011).  It remains the predominant 
research paradigm in health services research (Barbour, 2003, Moffatt et al., 2006, Pope 
and Mays, 1995). This approach, however, is limited in its ability to provide an in-depth 
understanding or explanation of complex cultural or social phenomenon (Tariq and 
Woodman, 2013). 
3.2.2$ Constructivist$research$paradigm$
Qualitative research is also termed as the “constructivist” (Bryman, 1984)  or 
“naturalistic” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) paradigm. It is typically informed by a belief that 
reality is “subjective” and “multiple” as constructed by individuals involved in a research 
situation including, the researcher and persons being investigated. The approach develops 
theory through an “inductive” logic where the researcher seeks a detailed exploration, 
guided by certain perspectives or ideas, of the phenomenon being investigated and this, as 
a result, allows the hypothesis to emerge from the data (Gerrish and Lacey, 2010, Tariq 
and Woodman, 2013). A qualitative researcher is involved as an “instrument” in the 
information being collected through interacting with participants, in natural settings with 
little boundaries, leading to an open and flexible research process (Harwell, 2011). Yet, 
findings of qualitative research lack generalizability as they are limited by the small 
sample sizes that are required to allow an in-depth exploration and analysis (Tariq and 
Woodman, 2013). Although Hinton (1987) argues that, if a sample is well defined, 
qualitative findings can be generalized to a population at large. Examples of this approach 
include case studies, ethnographies and interviews (Creswell et al., 2011a).  
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Generally, one fundamental difference between these two approaches is that quantitative 
research aims to propose a hypothesis to be accepted or rejected while qualitative research 
aims to generate a hypothesis (Cronholm and Hjalmarsson, 2011). 
3.2.3$ Mixed$methods$research$
Research in the first half of the 20th century was largely quantitative. Qualitative research 
emerged as an alternative to quantitative research during the second half of the 20th 
century (Johnson and Christensen, 2008). Quantitative and qualitative research advocates 
engaged in strong disputes, with purists appearing on both sides (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Quantitative researchers have often argued that qualitative research 
was hard to generalize, replicate, and interpret  (Cronholm and Hjalmarsson, 2011). While, 
qualitative researchers have argued that quantitative researchers employed irrelevant 
hypotheses and superficial descriptions (Bryman, 1984, Goldstein, 1963).  
As the debate around the relative characteristics and merits of quantitative and qualitative 
research evolved, researchers who supported combining both research approaches 
emerged (Hall, 2013). They argued that combining both methodologies can be 
complementary to each other as they can potentially build on the strengths and offset the 
weaknesses of both research approaches (Tariq and Woodman, 2013). To explain it 
further, quantitative research is viewed as deficient in understanding the context in which 
the study was undertaken, while qualitative research can overcome that by providing 
contextual insight. Conversely, qualitative research suffers from a difficulty in 
generalizing findings to a large population and a potential for biased researcher 
interpretations that quantitative research can compensate for. Also, the use of multiple 
methods increases the robustness of results through the cross-validation or “triangulation” 
that is accomplished when various data types and sources join and are found to be 
congruent (Benbasat et al., 1987, Bonoma, 1985, Kaplan and Duchon, 1988).  
In 1959, Campbell and Fiske introduced the idea of triangulation, referring to “multiple 
operationalism.”  They highlighted the value of using different methods and multiple data 
sources to study the same phenomenon as a form of validating results (Campbell and 
Fiske, 1959).  Triangulation usually mixes qualitative and quantitative methodologies 
(Jones, 2014). Jick (1979) refers to triangulation as a research approach that recommends 
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using two or three different methodologies and study designs in order to validate results 
and overcome the methodological limitations of using a single approach. 
Many researchers have since supported the idea of combining qualitative and quantitative 
approaches (Cronholm and Hjalmarsson, 2011). The preferred term for combining these 
approaches is “mixed methods” (Bryman, 2015). As pointed out by Tashakkori and 
Teddlie (2010), the combination of both research approaches is expanding.  
Over the past twenty years, mixed methods research has become increasingly recognised 
as the third major research approach, alongside quantitative research and qualitative 
research (Johnson et al., 2007). Mixed methods research, according to Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie (2004, p.17), is formally defined as “the class of research where the 
researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, 
approaches, concepts or language into a single study.” The objective of combining these 
two approaches is to capitalize on the strengths and reduce the weaknesses in both 
approaches (Bergman, 2008). 
Since it is common to find the terms “multiple method”, “mixed methods”, and 
“multimethod” designs used interchangeably in the literature, it is necessary to clarify 
what is meant by each term (Esteves and Pastor, 2004).  
Multiple methods, according to Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003, p.11), is defined as 
“research in which more than one method or more than one worldview is used.” Three 
broad categories of multiple method designs have been identified in the literature 
including: mixed method research, multimethod research, and mixed model research 
designs (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003).  
Mixed methods design has been defined by Morse (2003, p.190) as “the incorporation of 
various qualitative and quantitative strategies within a single project that may have either a 
qualitative or quantitative theoretical drive.” In this design, the major method is 
supplemented by “imported” methods to provide pointers that are followed up within the 
major method (Esteves and Pastor, 2004).   
Morse (2003, p.190) defined multimethod design as “the conduct of two or more research 
methods, each conducted rigorously and complete in itself, in one project. The results are 
then triangulated to form a complete whole.”  
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Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) attempted to create a common nomenclature of research 
designs in response to the definitional inconsistencies across the literature. As a result, 
they proposed the following typology: mixed methods design covers both mixed methods 
research and mixed model research. Mixed methods research involves the use of 
quantitative and/or qualitative data collection or analysis methods in a single study. 
Methods are mixed in the methods part of a study and data can be collected and integrated 
at one or more stages in the process of the research. Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) 
indicate that more than 40 mixed methods designs are reported in the literature. The most 
popular designs fall into two groups, concurrent and sequential, based on the type and time 
of data collection and integration. They are additionally classified into two levels, basic 
mixed methods and advanced mixed methods which are combinations of the basic ones. 
The three basic designs, are convergent parallel mixed methods design, exploratory 
sequential mixed methods design and explanatory sequential mixed methods design 
(Creswell et al, 2011b). Convergent parallel design uses different quantitative and 
qualitative methods concurrently and mixed at interpretation stage to reveal convergence 
or divergence in the results (Tariq and Woodman, 2013). Exploratory sequential design 
uses qualitative methods to inform the development of the quantitative data collection and 
analysis. The results are mainly integrated at the interpretation phase (Creswell et al, 
2011b). Explanatory sequential mixed methods design uses qualitative methods to answer 
questions generated from preceding quantitative research (Tariq and Woodman, 2013). 
This approach helps to gain more understanding of the significant issues raised in the 
quantitative phase with the results mainly integrated at the interpretation phase (Creswell 
et al, 2011b). 
Mixed model research, in contrast, involves qualitative and quantitative methods being 
mixed in numerous or all stages of a study. Multimethod design involves qualitative and 
quantitative methods that are relatively complete on their own, and are integrated to form 
fundamental components of one research study (Morse, 2003). Thus, each study is planned 
and conducted to answer a certain sub-question, and the results of the research triangulated 
to form a comprehensive whole. According to Morse (2003), in multimethod design all 
projects are rather complete on their own, which is the major difference between 
multimethod and mixed method design. Hunter and Brewer (2003, p.578) explain that a 
multimethod approach “is a strategy for overcoming each method’s weaknesses and 
limitations by deliberately combining different types of methods within the same 
investigations.”  
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The most challenging aspect of using such an approach is the integration of qualitative and 
quantitative data. O'Cathain et al. (2008) recommends an initial stage of analysis of the 
two data types separately followed by a second stage of analysis where findings can be 
compared, contrasted and combined. Tariq and Woodman (2013) add that the integrity of 
quantitative and qualitative data is preserved by keeping the initial stage of analysis 
separate using the appropriate techniques of analysis that are usually associated with that 
type of data. At the same time, combining the findings in a second stage of analysis will 
potentially allow capitalization on the analytical findings. The integrative strategy is 
another approach to data analysis where one type of data may be transformed into another 
type. Thus, qualitative data may be transformed into quantitative data or quantitative data 
may be turned into qualitative data and data can be combined and analysed together 
(Margarete, 2000). My PhD thesis will follow the former approach of analysis and 
integration as it was considered to be more appropriate for this type of study. 
3.2.4$ Multiple$methods$research$and$patient$safety$
For the past two decades, combining qualitative and quantitative methods in a single study 
has become a widely accepted practice in different areas of healthcare research (Sale et al., 
2002). However, quantitative research remains the dominant methodology with qualitative 
methods rarely used in safety culture research (Tariq and Woodman, 2013). Researchers 
have argued that the complex and multifaceted nature of healthcare requires the use of a 
broad range of qualitative and quantitative methods (Baum, 1995, Steckler et al., 1992). 
In Halligan and Zecevic (2011) review of safety culture in healthcare, it was stressed that 
safety research seems to be in its infancy compared to high reliability organisations in 
other high hazard industrial sectors where it has advanced and where the current focus is 
on using qualitative methodologies to investigate underlying culture. They pointed out that 
despite surveys being a pragmatic means of gathering data, they can only provide a 
superficial snapshot of an organisation’s safety climate. Quantitative data must be 
supplemented with qualitative data through interviews, focus groups and observations to 
gain a better sense of the underlying culture. This view was shared by a number of 
prominent studies (Flin, 2007, Flin et al., 2006, Halligan and Zecevic, 2011, Runciman et 
al., 2008, Singer et al., 2009b).  
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Brown et al. (2008) recommends that the complexity of patient safety research will greatly 
benefit from a pragmatic philosophy and a mixed methods approach. Pragmatism has 
gained substantial support as a stance for mixed methods researchers (Creswell, 2013, 
Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010, Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). Pragmatism in mixed 
methods research allows the researcher to use the methods, techniques or procedures that 
best suits their research problem rather than being limited by the philosophical 
underpinnings of the best approach (Creswell, 2013, Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010). This 
view informs much of the applied mixed methods research in health services (Murphy et 
al., 1998). 
A multimethod, triangulated approach for assessing safety culture combines both 
quantitative (questionnaires, audits, injury and near miss data) and qualitative (interviews, 
focus groups, observations and document analysis) tools in an effort to gain a deeper 
understanding of the underlying culture while offsetting the intrinsic weaknesses 
associated with each approach when used on its own (Cooper, 2000, Cox and Cheyne, 
2000). Triangulation has been defined as "the combination of methodologies in the study 
of the same phenomenon” (Denzin, 2009, p.297). This, as a result, offers valuable insights 
into the different aspects of measuring and constructing safety culture. A multimethod 
approach is always viewed as appropriate for obtaining a valid, reliable and trustworthy 
assessment of safety culture (Scott et al., 2003). One of the key advantages of using a 
multiple methods approach, as Creswell et al. (2011a, p.5) argue, is that it involves the 
intentional integration of both quantitative and qualitative data and “the combination of 
the strengths of each to answer research questions.” It allows researchers to view issues 
from multiple perspectives with a more complete understanding and an ability to 
contextualize, validate or compare data (Clark, 2010, Creswell et al., 2011a). 
3.3" Research"design"
The research design is a guiding framework indicating the current research strategy and 
informing research methods. The following section will summarize the overall research 
design and methodology.  
The research design will follow a pragmatic philosophy where a multimethod, triangulated 
approach combining both quantitative (safety climate questionnaire) and qualitative 
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(interviews and free text comments in the survey) methods was considered most 
appropriate for investigating the current research questions.  
As discussed earlier, the present study aims to identify an appropriate tool with adequate 
psychometric properties for assessing patient safety climate in Kuwaiti public hospitals. A 
patient safety climate tool will be identified through a systematic review (Chapter Four). 
Then, the selected tool will be used to collect data from three public hospitals in Kuwait 
for two purposes. Firstly, to test the psychometric properties of the identified tool in a 
sample of three public hospitals in Kuwait (Chapter Five). Secondly, to provide a measure 
of the prevailing safety climate in Kuwaiti public hospitals (Chapter Six). Finally, the 
main findings of the safety climate tool will be explored with key stakeholders (Chapter 
Seven).  
3.4" Summary"
In this chapter, it is argued that a multiple methods design, underpinned by a pragmatic 
philosophy, is the most appropriate approach to explore a complex topic such as safety 
culture. This approach was designed to collect two types of data, quantitative (survey) and 
qualitative (interviews), in an effort to offer a more complete understanding of safety 
climate in Kuwaiti public hospitals with an in-depth contextual insight into the significant 
quantitative issues and findings that were raised from investigating the general population 
of the study including an examination of the population characteristics. 
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4" Chapter"Four:"A"Systematic"Review"and"analysis"of"measurement"tools"
4.1" Introduction"
Worldwide, various tools have been developed to assess safety climate in acute care 
settings (Colla et al., 2005, Flin et al., 2006). However, the rigour with which tools have 
been developed and psychometrically tested has varied considerably across the published 
literature (Singla et al., 2006). There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that the lack 
of rigorous psychometric evaluation makes it difficult to confirm the validity and 
reliability of survey scores and the proper identification of unique underlying safety 
culture dimensions (Flin et al., 2006). Pronovost and Sexton (2005a) hold the view that 
this will impact on the tools’ ability to reliably measure specific features of patient safety 
and to make correct inferences regarding survey scores in addition to limiting the 
generalizability of tools across different healthcare settings. Emerging evidence about the 
predictive validity of safety climate measures suggest that positive safety climate scores 
are associated with clinical outcomes including shorter lengths of stay and fewer 
medication errors (Singla et al., 2006). Favourable scores have also been linked also to 
safety-related behaviours and attitudes of healthcare staff (Griffin and Neal, 2000, Neal 
and Griffin, 2006, Zohar et al., 2007). Thus, in order to provide reliable data, it is 
imperative that tools are developed with robust psychometric properties that enable valid 
interpretations of patient safety climate test scores (Flin et al., 2006). 
4.2" Aim"and"objective"
This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive review of quantitative studies designed to 
assess safety climate or safety culture in the hospital setting, with particular focus on 
questionnaires. The objective of the systematic review was to conduct an evaluation of the 
reported psychometric properties of the identified questionnaires in order to provide a 
structured overview of their psychometric adequacy as measurement tools for their stated 
purpose. This chapter will conclude with a recommendation about an appropriate safety 
climate tool to be employed for my PhD thesis. 
The PICO framework-Population, Intervention, Comparison/Studies, and Outcome-was 
applied to inform the review objectives in Figure 4.1 (below) (Richardson et al., 1995). 
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Figure 4.1: PICO framework 
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4.3" Methods"
4.3.1$ Data$sources$
A systematic review of published empirical literature was undertaken using seven 
electronic databases (Medline, PubMed, CINAHL, Web of Science, PsycINFO, Embase, 
Scopus). A comprehensive search strategy was developed. The strategy included searching 
the following key terms: “Safety Culture”, “Safety Climate”, “Safety Attitudes”, “Hospital 
Safety”, “Patient Safety”, paired with “Health Care Workers”. These terms were searched 
as a combination of key words and Medical Subject Heading (MeSH) terms in order to 
maximize the sensitivity of the search strategy. Several search techniques, including 
truncation and adjacency, were applied to find more relevant literature. The full Medline 
search strategy was translated for other databases as appropriate and is shown in Appendix 
1. The searches covered the time period from January 2004 to December 2014 and were 
limited to English-language studies. In 2006, Flin et al published a comprehensive review 
of quantitative studies of safety climate in healthcare and provided a qualitative 
description of the questionnaires designed to measure the construct including any reported 
psychometric data as indicated by the original tool developer(s). This review builds on the 
findings of Flin’s review (Flin et al., 2006). As a result, this review covered the time 
period from January 2004 to December 2014 in order to identify any new instruments 
published since the original review. 
Manual searches of reference lists generated from articles included in this review were 
performed in order to identify any papers that may have been missed by electronic 
searching. In addition, electronic “searches” of key journals, including the BMJ Quality 
and Safety, Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Safety, Journal of Patient Safety and 
the International Journal of Quality in Healthcare, were undertaken.  
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In addition, websites of organisations dedicated to the improvement of patient safety, 
including: The AHRQ; the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, the Health Foundation 
and the National Patient Safety Agency, were also accessed in addition to other 
international organisations. Finally, Proquest dissertation and thesis databases were 
searched for any unpublished research and authors were contacted for any clarification 
required. 
Electronic records were stored and managed online through a web-based systematic 
review data management software, DistillerSR (Evidence Partners Incorporated, 2011). 
A protocol detailing the methods for this systematic review has been previously published 
(PROSPERO registration number: CRD 42015016637) in addition to a PRISMA 
checklist. Refer to Appendix 2 for more details. 
4.3.2$ Study$selection$
4.3.2.1& Inclusion&and&exclusion&criteria&
In order to facilitate the identification and selection of appropriate papers, pre-determined 
inclusion and exclusion criteria were developed (See Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3). 
4.3.3$ The$selection$process$
The process of identification and selection of eligible papers was conducted in two stages. 
The first stage involved evaluating the potential relevance of all titles and abstracts 
identified from the electronic database searches.  Following that, full text copies of all 
papers that were judged to be potentially relevant were retrieved and reviewed in the 
second stage. Two independent reviewers completed title, abstract and full text screening 
of potentially relevant records. Screening results were compared and discrepancies were 
resolved by discussion or arbitration with a third reviewer, when necessary. A flow chart 
in Figure 4.2 (below) shows the selection process of eligible papers. All identified 
citations were uploaded to DistillerSR (Evidence Partners Incorporated, 2011). Electronic 
forms for title/abstract and full-text screening were designed according to the above 
specified inclusion criteria. In addition, the forms were pilot tested and refined before 
implementing them in study selection process. 
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4.3.3.1& First&stage&screening&
An initial list of studies that purport to measure safety climate/culture was developed from 
the original database search, which covered the years 2000 till December of 2014. The 
reason for this was to create an overlap period between our current search and Flin et al. 
(2006) previous search in order to make sure that the search strategy was sensitive enough 
to identify all of Flin’s reviewed papers. 
To be eligible for inclusion at this stage, published empirical studies had to fulfill the 
abstract inclusion criteria (See Table 1). 
Table 1: Abstract inclusion criteria 
Table 1 
 
Abstract Inclusion Criteria 
I1 
Use of a questionnaire as a quantitative measure of safety 
climate or safety culture. 
I2 
Use of a self-report questionnaire for eliciting the individual 
perceptions of healthcare workers. 
I3 
Used with healthcare staff in a healthcare setting. 
The titles and abstracts of retrieved records were reviewed and studies that did not meet 
the abstract inclusion criteria were discarded. For articles without an available abstract, the 
full text version of the original article was retrieved and reviewed. The reviewers, using 
DistillerSR (Evidence Partners Incorporated, 2011), marked the papers by either ‘yes’, 
‘no’ or ‘maybe’. When the eligibility of the reviewed studies was unclear, they were 
included for next stage review. As a result, eighty-eight studies were considered as 
potentially eligible for this stage.  
The screening result is outlined in Figure 4.2. The chart is based on the PRISMA checklist 
items (Moher et al., 2009). 
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Figure 4.2: PRISMA flow diagram of study screening & selection 
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Hand searches of included articles identified 
38 Citations 
!
3,960 records identified in total 
(Duplicates removed within databases)!
3,576 records screened by titles and abstract against 
inclusion criteria: 
(Articles had to use a questionnaire as a quantitative measure 
of safety climate with healthcare staff in a healthcare setting, 
use of a self-report questionnaire for eliciting the individual 
perceptions of healthcare workers) 
 
88 articles for full text review of against inclusion1 & 
exclusion criteria2 
!
83 articles excluded after full text 
review: 
Adapted/translated versions of original tools 
(n= 32), designed for other settings or 
specific professions (n= 21), not main aim of 
study (n= 14), tool not designed in English-
language (n= 6), published prior to 2004 (n= 
6), directed at non-healthcare staff (n= 1), 
tool not publically available (n= 1), non-peer 
reviewed (n= 1), measures a sub construct of 
safety (n= 1) 
 Data Extraction and Quality Appraisal 5 of selected 
articles 
!
Included studies: 5 articles 
!
384 duplicates 
removed!
3,488 citations 
excluded after 
titles and abstract 
screening 
!
Full Text Inclusion criteria1: 
• Explicitly state the aim of the study is survey development & 
establishing the psychometric properties of the tool. 
• Designed for general administration to healthcare staff in a 
hospital setting. 
• Original tool or an updated version of an original tool 
produced by the original team. 
• Questionnaires developed in English-language from January 
2004 to December 2014. 
• Publicly available tool. 
Full Text Exclusion criteria2: 
• Qualitative studies. 
• Opinion papers or grey literature. 
• Target other aspects of culture. 
• Adaptations of original survey tools. 
• Designed for internal use in a single institution or for a particular 
specialty or profession. 
• Aimed at junior doctors, nursing or medical students. 
• Literature published prior to 2004.  
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4.3.3.2& Second&stage&screening&
In the second stage, all abstracts and full text versions of the relevant studies were 
reviewed against the pre-specified full text inclusion and exclusion criteria (See Table 2 
and Table 3).  
Table 2: Full text inclusion criteria 
Table 2 
 
Full text inclusion criteria 
I1 
Explicitly state the aim of the study is questionnaire 
development and establishment of its psychometric 
properties. 
I2 
Designed for general administration to healthcare staff in a 
hospital setting. 
I3 
Original tool or an updated version of an original tool 
produced by the original team. 
I4 
Questionnaires developed in English-language from January 
2004 to December 2014. 
I5 
Publicly available tool. 
Table 3: Full text exclusion criteria 
Table 3 
 
Full text exclusion criteria 
E1 
 
Qualitative studies. 
E2 
Opinion papers or grey literature. 
E3 
Target other aspects of culture. 
E4 
Adaptations of original survey tools. 
E5 
Designed for internal use in a single institution or for a 
particular specialty or profession. 
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Table 3 
 
Full text exclusion criteria 
E6 Aimed at junior doctors, nursing or medical students. 
E7 Literature published prior to 2004.  
To be eligible for inclusion at this stage, studies had to primarily focus on questionnaire 
development and explicitly state that the purpose of the study was to establish the 
psychometric properties of the tool as part of tool development, testing and 
implementation. Descriptive articles without evaluative methodology or reported 
psychometrics were excluded from the review.  
The tool also had to be designed for general administration to all healthcare staff working 
in a hospital setting. This meant that studies relating to other healthcare settings or non-
healthcare professions were excluded.  Studies aimed at medical or nursing students were 
excluded, as were studies involving postgraduate trainees or residents. Qualitative studies 
in addition to grey literature, such as studies that are unpublished, conference proceedings, 
graduate theses, book chapters or papers that are not included in bibliographic retrieval 
systems, opinion papers (including discussion papers, editorials, letters to the editor, short 
communications and expert opinion papers) and literature published prior to 2004 were 
also excluded (Miquel, 2014). 
Only original tools developed in English were included as well as any updated version of 
an original tool that was produced by the original team in which the latest improved 
version was included. Adaptations of original tools were excluded in addition to tools 
aimed at other types or aspects of culture or were exclusively designed for use within 
single institutions or specific specialties. Studies had to be published in English between 
January 2004 and December 2014. The tool also had to be publically available. Table 2 
and 3 (above) summarize the inclusion and exclusion criteria used in this review. 
Where a full version of an instrument was not published, attempts were made to retrieve it 
through direct contact with the author(s).  
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The second stage inclusion results were compared and consensus on the final list of 
included studies was reached. After full review, eighty-three studies (n=83) were excluded 
while five studies (n=5) were eventually included for further analysis. The reasons for 
exclusion were noted in Figure 4.2 (above). 
4.3.4$ Data$extraction$and$quality$appraisal$
Three reviewers undertook data extraction and quality appraisal of included studies 
independently using pre-designed data extraction and quality appraisal forms. 
The first reviewer carried out full data extraction and quality appraisal of the five included 
papers while the second and third reviewers, each separately, extracted data and appraised 
the quality of fifty percent of the included papers. Discrepancies were resolved by 
discussion and consensus. The two forms were attached to each eligible (See appendix 3 & 
4). 
4.3.5$ Data$extraction$$
A customized data extraction form was developed and was piloted on a number of 
included studies in order to ensure the full capture of all information needed. Based on the 
results of the pilot, the data extraction form was modified, in order to meet the study’s 
specific needs and unify all relevant data. The final data extraction form is given in 
Appendix 3. 
The list below summarises the data extracted from each article:  
1.( Authors, title, journal, year, volume, pages 
1.( Aim(s) and Objective(s) of study 
2.( Study design 
3.( Study setting and population characteristics 
a.( Location, size and type of setting(s) 
b.( Sample size and sample characteristics 
4.( Study tool features 
a.( General features 
b.( Safety climate dimensions covered 
c.( Level of analysis 
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d.( Psychometric properties 
e.( Theoretical underpinning(s) 
f.( Safety outcome measures 
5.( Main findings 
6.( Conclusions 
7.( Limitations 
When the eligibility of an included paper was unclear or the data reported were 
inadequate, corresponding authors were contacted for further clarification about 
unpublished data. This enabled the reviewers to clearly judge the potential eligibility of 
the studies and, if eligible, helped provide data, which were extracted for further analysis.  
The variability in the included safety climate dimensions across the reviewed papers have 
led the author to evaluate the content of dimensions in each tool. A list, including the most 
common safety climate themes that had been previously mentioned in the literature by Flin 
et al. (2006) in addition to other comprehensive reviews of studies addressing patient 
safety climate tools, was developed for the categorization of the content of dimensions 
across the five tools (Refer to Table 5 (below)) (Colla et al., 2005, Fleming, 2005, 
Halligan and Zecevic, 2011, Jackson et al., 2010, Singla et al., 2006). I have examined the 
content of the proposed list and consensus was achieved after discussion with my 
supervisors. The list included the following safety climate dimensions: (1) Top 
management support and institutional commitment to safety, (2) Safety systems, (3) 
Organisational learning and continuous improvement, (4) Teamwork, (5) Communication 
openness, (6) Feedback and communication about adverse events, (7) Reporting incidents, 
(8) Work pressure, (9) Safety attitudes and behaviours of staff, (10) Training and 
continuous education, (11) Staff satisfaction, (12) Beliefs about the causes of errors and 
adverse events, and (13) Competence. The proposed list must be regarded as a preliminary 
synthesis and is not entirely inclusive. 
4.3.6$ Quality$appraisal$
The methodological quality of included papers was assessed using two customized quality 
appraisal tools: one for the overall methodological quality of each included study and the 
other tool was developed for the appraisal of the reported psychometric properties.  
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4.3.6.1& Methodological&quality&
The methodological quality of the studies was assessed based on the quality criteria 
developed by Buckley et al. (2009). A total of seven questions were set to examine the 
quality of a paper, and a score of 0, 1 or 2 was allocated for every section. Those meeting 
the quality standard were given a score of two, while those partially or not meeting the 
standard were given a score of one or zero respectively. Items not applicable to a 
particular study design were marked “n/a” and were excluded from the total quality score. 
For each paper, the total quality score was calculated by adding the scores obtained across 
the items. The quality appraisal form is given in Appendix 4. 
Higher quality studies were considered to be those that met a minimum of six of these 
seven indicators. That is, a score of 0-5 means a ‘poor’ quality study; 6-10 indicates a 
‘fair’ quality study and a score of 11-14 means a ‘good’ methodological quality. The 
assessment of each study, included items related to the appropriateness of the study 
methodology, study population, data collection and analysis, appropriateness of the 
response rate and results. 
4.3.6.2& Psychometric&properties&
Hubley and Zumbo (2013, p.3) defined psychometrics as “a field of study that focuses on 
the theory and techniques associated primarily with the measurement of constructs as well 
as the development, interpretation, and evaluation of tests and measures.” Psychometric 
analysis involves the use of established assessment techniques that help in evaluating the 
psychometric properties of the designed questionnaires and the proper identification of 
underlying safety culture dimensions (Singla et al., 2006). As mentioned earlier, it is 
crucial that patient safety climate questionnaires are designed with robust psychometric 
properties in order to provide valid interpretations of test scores. Despite that, many 
studies still lack proper reporting of the psychometric properties of questionnaires (Colla 
et al., 2005, Flin, 2007, Flin et al., 2006, Nieva and Sorra, 2003).  
Validity and reliability are two essential elements in the psychometric evaluation of a 
measurement tool. DeVon et al. (2007) adds that confirmation of the validity and 
reliability of tools is a prerequisite for confirming the integrity of study findings. 
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Instrument validity reflects the degree to which a tool measures what it intends to measure, 
whereas reliability reflects the degree to which test scores are replicable (Geisinger et al., 
2013, Streiner et al., 2015). Validity encompasses three types of validity that are discussed 
relative to measurement tools: construct, content and criterion validity (Streiner et al., 
2015). Construct validity can be defined as the degree to which items on an instrument 
relate to the appropriate theoretical construct (Kane, 2001). A variety of ways exists to 
assess the construct validity of an instrument, including Factor analysis (FA). FA, includes 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). EFA is 
used to uncover the underlying factor structure of a questionnaire, while CFA is used to 
test the proposed factor structure of a questionnaire (Hutchinson et al., 2006). Convergent 
validity represents the degree to which different measures of the same construct show 
correlation with each other and is tested using CFA. Conversely, discriminant validity 
represents the extent to which measures of different constructs show correlation with one 
other (DeVon et al., 2007).  
A CFA measurement model shows convergent validity if items load significantly (0.40 or 
greater) on the assigned factor and if model fit indices indicate adequate fit (Vogus and 
Sutcliffe, 2007). Model fit indices include: Chi-square; comparative fit index (CFI); and 
the standardised root mean square residual (SRMR) and the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA). Models with a cutoff value close to 0.90 for CFI; a cutoff value 
close to 0.08 for SRMR; and a cutoff value close to 0.06 for RMSEA are indicative of 
good model fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999). As noted by Sorra and Dyer (2010), model fit 
indices can be produced for factors with four or more items only. Guadagnoli and Velicer 
(1988) highlighted that factors with three items or less should be discarded. They added 
that more variables per factor add to the stability of the results. 
Content validity has been defined by Haynes et al (1995, p.238)  as “the degree to which 
elements of an assessment instrument are relevant to and representative of the targeted 
construct for a particular assessment purpose.” It is used for ascertaining whether the 
content of the measure was suitable to the purpose of the study and is usually evaluated by 
seven or more experts (DeVon et al., 2007).  
Criterion validity delivers evidence about how well scores on a measure relate to other 
measures of the same construct or very similar underlying constructs that theoretically 
should be related (Kimberlin and Winterstein, 2008). As Flin et al (2006) indicated, 
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criterion validity can be proven by correlating the safety climate scores with outcome 
measures such as patient injuries, worker injuries, or other organisational outcomes. 
Reliability is also referred to as consistency. It can be assessed by using Cronbach's alpha, 
which is the most commonly used internal consistency reliability coefficient (Cronbach, 
1951, Tavakol and Dennick, 2011). Calculating Cronbach's alpha assesses the extent to 
which survey respondents answered consistently to theoretically similar items in each 
composite (Sorra and Dyer, 2010). Miller (1995) reported that Cronbach's alpha biases 
scale reliability estimates since it assumes that all factor loadings of items are identical. 
Raykov's ñ reduces this restrictive condition, yielding more accurate reliability estimates. 
Also, Cronbach's alpha is limited to single-level analyses whereas Raykov's ñ address the 
multilevel nature of the data (Raykov and Du Toit, 2005). 
The following psychometric measures were used as assessment criteria, based on a review 
by Colla et al. (2005) and Flin et al. (2006): item analysis; EFA; CFA; Cronbach's alpha; 
Correlation across dimensions; Test/Retest Reliability; and Analysis of Variance. An 
overall judgment of the extent to which the psychometric properties of the tools had been 
met for each category was made according to the above measures.  
4.4" Results"
4.4.1$ First$and$second$stage$screening$
The electronic database searches retrieved a total of 3,922 records. In addition, manual 
searches of of bibliographies of included studies identified 38 additional papers. 384 
duplicate records were removed. Titles and abstracts of 3,576 records were examined 
against the initial inclusion criteria (Table 1). Irrelevant records were discarded (3,488 
papers) yielding 88 potentially relevant studies. The search strategy was sensitive enough 
to pick up all of Flin’s reviewed papers (Flin et al., 2006). 
Full texts of the 88 abstracts were retrieved and examined in detail against the full text 
inclusion and exclusion criteria (Table 2 & Table 3), narrowing it down to 5 potential 
articles for inclusion. Reasons for exclusion are noted in Figure 4.2. The three main 
reasons for excluding studies at the screening, extraction and appraisal steps were as 
follows: a) Use of an adapted or translated version of an original tool (n=32); b) Tools 
designed for other settings or particular professions (n=21); and c) The main aim of the 
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study was not explicitly stated as survey development and establishment of the 
psychometric properties of the developed tool (n=14). Other reasons for exclusion 
included original tools that were not designed in English language; literature published 
prior to 2004 and tools that were not publicly available (n=14). 
4.4.2$ Data$extraction$and$quality$appraisal$
At this stage, data extraction and quality appraisal of the 5 included papers was carried 
out. A total of five studies met the inclusion criteria and were included for this review. The 
following section will cover their key descriptive features in detail.  
4.4.3$ General$characteristics$of$reviewed$studies$$
The main characteristics of the reviewed studies were examined in terms of location, aim, 
scope, instrument and sample details as summarized in Table 4. More specialised features 
including cultural dimensions covered, origin and theoretical basis, key features and 
limitations are included in Appendix 5. The tools included the Hospital Survey on Patient 
Safety Culture (HSOPSC) (Sorra and Dyer, 2010), Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) 
(Sexton et al., 2006), Patient Safety Climate in Healthcare Organisations (PSCHO) (Singer 
et al., 2007), Canadian Patient Safety Climate Scale (Can-PSC) (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 
2007), and the Safety Organising Scale (SOS) (Ginsburg et al., 2009). 
4.4.3.1& Location&
Four of the included studies originated from the USA (Sexton et al., 2006, Singer et al., 
2007, Sorra and Dyer, 2010, Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007) while one study originated from 
Canada (Ginsburg et al., 2013). For example, the HSOPSC was developed by the AHRQ 
in the USA (Sorra and Dyer, 2010) and the SAQ was developed by the Centre of 
Excellence for Patient Research and Practice at the University of Texas (Sexton et al., 
2006). 
4.4.3.2& Aim&
Most of the included questionnaires were designed to assess healthcare staffs’ attitudes 
and perceptions about various aspects of patient safety. The HSOPSC, for example, was 
developed to assess hospital staff perceptions about key cultural dimensions related to 
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patient safety (Sorra and Dyer, 2010). The SAQ states that it measures the attitudes of 
healthcare staff about patient safety related areas (Sexton et al., 2006). The SOS measures 
self-reported behaviours thought to contribute towards a culture of safety (Vogus and 
Sutcliffe, 2007).  
4.4.3.3& Scope&&
All of the included surveys were designed for general administration to personnel in 
hospital settings. In addition, different versions of the SAQ were developed for other 
healthcare settings including intensive care units, operating rooms and ambulatory clinics 
(Sexton et al., 2006). 
4.4.3.4& Instrument&and&sample&details&
All of the questionnaires were designed to be self-administered and used Likert response 
scales. A 5-point Likert scale was used in four of the tools (Ginsburg et al., 2013, Sexton 
et al., 2006, Singer et al., 2007, Sorra and Dyer, 2010) and only one tool, the SOS, used a 
7-point Likert scale (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007). Open-ended sections for comments were 
included in three of the surveys (HSOPSC, SAQ, PSCHO). 
The length of questionnaires ranged from nine to sixty items. The survey with the least 
number of items was the SOS (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007), whereas the longest survey 
was the SAQ (Sexton et al., 2006).  
Studies measuring safety climate using the HSOPSC and the SAQ reported positive 
percentage scores while PSCHO derived percentage problematic scoring to measure safety 
climate. 
The surveys sampled a variety of hospital personnel across different occupations, staff 
positions and work areas or units. This included physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and other 
healthcare providers. The SOS was the only survey that was validated using a sample 
composed entirely of registered nurses (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007). 
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Table 4: Descriptive features of included studies 
 
Features 
 
Name of instrument 
HSOPSC 
)1(  
SAQ 
)2(  
PSCHO 
)3(  
SOS 
)4(  
Can-PSC 
)5(  
Authors Sorra & 
Dyer 
Sexton Singer et al Vogus & 
Sutcliffe 
Ginsburg et 
al 
 
Publication year 2010 
 
2006 2007 2007 2013 
Country USA 
 
USA USA USA Canada 
Instrument details: 
•( Number 
of items 
 
•( Type of 
Likert 
scale 
 
 
•( Level of 
analysis 
 
•( Results 
Reporting 
 
42 
 
60 
(30 core items) 
 
38 
 
9 
 
19 
 
5 point 
 
5 point 
 
5 point 
 
7 point 
 
5 point 
 
Individual, 
Unit, 
Hospital 
Individual, 
Unit 
Individual, 
Unit, 
Hospital 
 
Unit Unit, 
Hospital 
 
Positive 
percentage 
scores 
Positive 
percentage 
scores 
Percentage 
problematic 
scoring 
Not reported Not reported 
 
Setting & Staff  Hospital 
setting 
Healthcare 
Staff 
Hospital 
setting 
Healthcare 
Staff 
Hospital 
setting 
Healthcare 
Staff 
including 
non-clinical 
staff 
Hospital 
setting 
Nursing units 
Hospital 
setting 
Healthcare 
Staff 
•( Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) (Sorra and Dyer, 2010)1, Safety Attitudes 
Questionnaire (SAQ) (Sexton et al., 2006)2, Patient Safety Climate in Healthcare Organisations 
(PSCHO) (Singer et al., 2007)3, Canadian Patient Safety Climate Scale (Can-PSC) (Ginsburg et 
al., 2013)4, Safety Organising Scale (SOS) (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007)5. 
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4.4.3.5& Safety&culture/climate&dimensions&
Safety climate dimensions included in each tool varied considerably across the reviewed 
papers. Surveys varied in the number of dimensions where they had a range from one 
dimension (SOS) to twelve dimensions (HSOPSC). The tools also varied in scope, some 
focusing on the assessment of one or more specific dimensions of safety climate, while others 
assessed a more comprehensive range of dimensions such as the HSOPSC. The dimensions 
also differed in the content and number of items that represented a particular dimension. 
Moreover, the terminology of the dimensions mentioned in the included studies varied across 
surveys (Singla et al., 2006).  
The five tools included a total of 141 items under 36 reported dimensions. The content of 
safety climate dimensions was independently categorized by the author and her supervisors, 
as items loading on each dimension were evaluated against the proposed list that was 
described earlier. A list of all the dimensions and their frequency of appearance in the five 
tools is given in Table 5 (below).  
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Table 5: Safety culture/climate dimensions categorization 
Safety Culture 
Dimension 
SOS1 
items 
HSOPSC2 
Items 
SAQ3 
items 
PSCHO4 
Items 
Can-
PSC5 
Items 
Total 
Number 
of 
items/dimension 
Percentage of 
items/dimension 
% 
Top 
management 
support & 
institutional 
commitment to 
safety 
0 7 6 9 7 29 
 
 
20.6 
Teamwork 5 8 7 0 0 20 14.2 
Safety systems: 
“Policies & 
Procedures, Safety 
Planning, Hand offs 
& Transitions, 
Staffing, 
Equipment” 
2 7 3 6 0 18 
 
12.8 
Safety 
perceptions & 
Attitudes of 
staff, Risk 
perceptions 
0 3 3 9 1 17 
 
11.3 
Reporting 
Incidents & 
non-punitive 
response to 
error  
0 3 1 6 5 14 
 
 
10.6 
Communication 
openness 
1 4 4 1 0 10 
 
7.1 
Organisational 
learning and 
continuous 
improvement 
1 3 0 1 4 9 6.4 
Beliefs about 
the causes of 
errors & 
adverse events  
0 0 4 3 0 7 
 
5.0 
Training & 
continuous 
education 
0 0 3 2 0 5 
 
3.5 
Staff 
satisfaction 
0 0 5 0 0 5 
 
3.5 
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Safety Culture 
Dimension 
SOS 
items 
HSOPSC 
Items 
SAQ 
items 
PSCHO 
items 
Can-
PSC 
items 
Total 
Number 
of 
items/dimension 
Percentage of 
items/dimension 
% 
Feedback & 
Communication 
about adverse 
events 
0 2 0 0 2 4 
 
2.8 
Work Pressure 0 2 0 1 0 3 
 
2.1 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 
 
Total 
9 39 36 38 19 141 100% 
 
•( Safety Organising Scale (SOS) (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007)1,Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 
(HSOPSC) (Sorra and Dyer, 2010)2, Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) (Sexton et al., 2006)3, Patient 
Safety Climate in Healthcare Organisations (PSCHO) (Singer et al., 2007)4, Canadian Patient Safety 
Climate Scale (Can-PSC) (Ginsburg et al., 2013)5. 
 
Seven dimensions were addressed by the majority of the reviewed tools including: top 
management support, safety systems, safety attitudes and behaviours of staff, reporting 
incidents, communication openness, organisational learning. Teamwork was addressed in 
three of the tools. Moreover, none of the dimensions was addressed in all of the surveys. Staff 
satisfaction was only covered by the SAQ. None of the surveys explicitly addressed 
competence and professionalism. 
4.4.3.6& Origin&and&theoretical&basis&
Two questionnaires were adapted versions of tools developed in other industries. The SAQ, as 
mentioned in Chapter two, is a modification of the ICUMAQ (Sexton et al., 2000, Thomas et 
al., 2003), which was adapted from the FMAQ (Helmreich et al., 1993), a widely used 
questionnaire in the aviation industry (Sexton et al., 2006). More recently, tools such as the 
HSOPSC have been developed exclusively for healthcare settings (Flin et al., 2006).  
Four studies used theory to guide their tool development while one study did not fully explain 
their theoretical basis (Sorra and Dyer, 2010). Within these studies, the PSCHO and SOS 
were based on HROT. The SAQ employed more than one theory. Sexton et al. (2006) stated 
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that the SAQ was based upon two conceptual models: Vincent's framework for analysing risk 
and safety (Vincent et al., 1998) and Donabedian's conceptual model for assessing quality 
(Donabedian, 1988). Vincent’s framework incorporates the many factors influencing clinical 
practice including organisational factors and work environment factors while Donabedian's 
conceptual model provides a framework for evaluating the quality of healthcare (Donabedian, 
1988, Vincent et al., 1998). The theoretical basis for the Can-PSC is rooted in Zohar’s 
definition of Safety climate and Hofmann and Mark’s model on safety climate (Ginsburg et 
al., 2013). Refer to Appendix 5 for further details. 
4.4.3.7& Psychometrics&
All five studies reported significant results for validity and reliability. The results will be 
discussed in the following section.  
4.4.4$ Methodological$quality$and$psychometric$assessment$of$reviewed$studies$
Convincing evidence of reliability and validity of any measuring tool can only be established 
by firstly assessing the methodological quality of the studies. As mentioned earlier, the 
methodological quality of the studies was assessed based on the quality criteria developed by 
Buckley et al. (2009). Also, a comprehensive assessment of the reported psychometric 
properties in each study was performed.  
The quality appraisal results for each individual study are summarized in Table 6. The quality 
appraisal results of the questionnaires’ psychometric properties are shown in Table 7 (below).  
4.4.5$ Methodological$quality$of$reviewed$studies$
Three out of five studies (Sexton et al., 2006, Sorra and Dyer, 2010, Vogus and Sutcliffe, 
2007) were rated as ‘good’ quality papers while two studies were rated as ‘fair’ (Ginsburg et 
al., 2013, Singer et al., 2007).  Studies that were rated as ‘good’ fulfilled six indicators related 
to: study aim(s), study methodology and design, data collection, study population, response 
rate, data analysis method(s) and results. The response rate was below 60% for two of those 
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studies (Sorra and Dyer, 2010, Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007). One study did not report their 
study population in sufficient detail to allow judgment to be made (Sexton et al., 2006).  
Two studies, Singer et al. (2007) and Ginsburg et al. (2013), were rated as fair quality papers 
as neither described their study population in sufficient detail. The response rate was not 
acceptable in PSCHO while data collection was not sufficiently described in Can-PSC. See 
Table 6 for details.  
 Table 6: Quality appraisal results 
 
4.4.6$ Psychometric$assessment$of$reviewed$instruments$$
As mentioned earlier, the following psychometric measures were used as assessment criteria 
for the reviewed tools including: content validity, criterion validity and construct validity 
(EFA, CFA, Reliability (Cronbach's alpha)). Other measure included correlation across 
dimensions, item analysis, test/retest reliability and analysis of variance. Three tools, 
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including the HSOPSC, SAQ and SOS, reported more robust psychometric properties 
following their psychometric assessment in comparison to PSCHO and Can-PSC.  
The psychometric properties of patient safety climate questionnaires, in the included papers, 
are discussed below. See Table 7 (below) for details. 
Table 7: Psychometric properties of included tools 
 
1 Model fit indices recommended criteria: comparative fit index (CFI ≥0.90) (Hu and Bentler, 1999), the  
standardised root mean square residual (SRMR <0.08) & the Root Mean Square Error Of 
Approximation (RMSEA <0.08) )Kenny, 2015), Chi-square (Chi <0.05) )Yuan and Bentler, 2000). 2Model 
fit indices were examined for six of the 12 HSOPSC composites that had four items.  
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Table 7 Continued: Psychometric properties of included tools 
 
1 Model fit indices recommended criteria: comparative fit index (CFI ≥0.90) (Hu and Bentler, 1999), the 
standardised root mean square residual (SRMR <0.08) & the Root Mean Square Error Of 
Approximation (RMSEA <0.08) )Kenny, 2015), Chi-square (Chi <0.05) )Yuan and Bentler, 2000). 
2Model fit indices were examined for six of the 12 HSOPSC composites that had four items.  
4.4.6.1& Content&validity&
Instrument development across all studies, typically involved the use of literature reviews and 
views and opinions of experts in the field of safety or of those who represent the healthcare 
population, to conceptualize the domains of safety culture to be measured, and to generate 
corresponding items. This evidence aims to support the relationship between the instrument’s 
content and the construct it intends to measure. Also, instruments were pilot-tested. Two 
studies used the term safety climate (Ginsburg et al., 2013, Sexton et al., 2006) as their 
measure while two studies used the term safety culture (Sorra and Dyer, 2010, Vogus and 
Sutcliffe, 2007), and one used both terms (Singer et al., 2007). Definitions of safety climate 
and culture overlapped among the reviewed studies despite two studies that clearly draw a 
distinction between the two terms and stressed that they were set out to measure safety 
climate (Ginsburg et al., 2013, Sexton et al., 2006).  
Another significant aspect of content validity is that the theoretical basis of the tools should be 
explicit. Three studies (Ginsburg et al., 2013, Sexton et al., 2006, Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007) 
reported that their survey items were based on a conceptual model. Still, it was not clear how 
they linked theory to their questionnaire items. One exception was the Singer et al. (2007), 
which provided an explanation of its nine-dimension theoretical model. The HSOPSC had no 
explicit theoretical basis. In a personal communication with one of the developers of the tool 
to provide a more detailed explanation regarding the theoretical basis of the tool (Yount, 
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Naomi, personal communication, 11 February 2016). Naomi Yount stated that they reviewed 
the literature relating to patient safety, healthcare errors and quality-related events, error 
reporting, safety climate and culture, organisational climate and culture and existing surveys. 
Furthermore, they conducted interviews with patient safety experts and with hospital staff. 
Yount added the survey was not developed based on any specific theoretical model (see copy 
of email communication in Appendix 6).  
Regarding safety climate dimensions, there was considerable degree of overlap with safety 
dimensions measured in industry as was noted from Flin’s study (2006). Safety climate 
features in industry include: management/supervisors, safety systems, risks, work pressure, 
competence, procedures and rules (Flin et al., 2000). In our review, two “core” dimensions 
from the industrial sector were measured as aspects of safety climate in health care in four 
studies including management and supervisory commitment to safety and safety systems. This 
is due to the fact that most of the instruments were based on HROs theory or were derived 
from tools designed for the industrial sector. One or two of the “core” dimensions were 
included in the remaining studies.  
4.4.6.2& Criterion&validity&
Three studies had no reported independent outcome measures of safety climate in healthcare 
(Ginsburg et al., 2013, Sexton et al., 2006, Singer et al., 2007). The HSOPSC included two 
self-reported outcome measures including patient safety grade and number of events reported 
where respondents are required to assign an overall grade on patient safety for their work 
area/unit and to indicate the number of events they reported over the past 12 months. Positive 
correlations have been shown between climate scores and self-reported safety measures (Sorra 
and Dyer, 2010). Yet, Podsakoff et al. (2003) warned against common method bias in 
questionnaire with measures obtained from the same source. 
The SOS was the only study that used independent outcome measures to examine associations 
between safety climate scores and safety related outcomes. Reported medication errors and 
patient falls were collected over a subsequent six-month period. Multilevel regression analysis 
showed a negative relationship between SOS and reported medication errors and patient falls. 
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Also, significant positive relationships have been shown between SOS levels and two 
theorised antecedents: trust in manager and commitment and staffing levels. 
4.4.6.3& Construct&validity&
4.4.6.3.1(Factor(structure(
All five studies reported the results of a factor analysis. CFA was performed in four studies. 
Multilevel Analyses, including MCFA was performed in two scales (HSOPSC, SAQ). For the 
HSOPSC, the between-unit factor loadings ranged from 0.54 to 1.00 while the within-unit 
factor loadings ranged from 0.36 to 0.93. The between-hospital factor loadings ranged from 
0.60 to 1.00 and the within-hospital factor loadings ranged from 0.36 to 0.93. The staffing 
composite had one item, “We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care,” 
with a low within- unit and within-hospital factor loading (0.36). At the unit and hospital 
levels, overall model fit indices were examined for the six composites with four items. All six 
composites showed significant Chi-square tests. The P value was significant at < 0.05. Five of 
the six composites had comparative fit indices (CFIs) above the 0.90 criterion, with the 
exception of supervisor/ manager expectations and actions promoting safety (CFI = 0.88 at 
unit level, CFI= 0.82 at hospital level). In addition, the within and between unit SRMRs for 
all six composites were at or below the cutoff of 0.08, signifying good model fit. Staffing and 
supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting safety composites fell slightly below 
cutoff values in a number of areas. Due to the importance of both concepts to patient safety, 
Sorra et al. (2010) recommended that both composites be retained.  
For the SAQ, factor loadings were examined at the individual and clinical area levels for the 
30 retained items. The between-area factor loadings ranged from 0.51 to 0.99 while the 
within-area factor loadings ranged from 0.40 to 0.81. The Overall model fit indices were 
examined for the final model of the SAQ including: CFI = 0.90, p < 0.0001, RMSEA = 0.03, 
SRMR (between clinical areas) = 0.17, and SRMR (within clinical areas) = 0.04. The SOS 
and the Can-PSC scales had CFI >0.90, p < .0001 and RMSEA < 0.06 so overall, they 
reported good model fit indices. PSCHO did not report any model fit indices, as CFA was not 
performed (PSCHO). 
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EFA was reported to be performed in four studies except the SOS (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 
2007). As an example, EFA was conducted on the HSOPSC to explore the dimensionality of 
their survey data. The EFA revealed a 14-factor structure. A CFA was conducted following 
that and the final confirmatory factor model contained 12 factors with 42 items. See Table 7 
(above) for more details. 
4.4.6.4& Internal&reliability&
Reliability was reported in all of the studies (See Table 7 (above)) and internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s Alpha) was the most commonly reported reliability coefficient (4 out of 5 
studies). Cronbach’s Alpha was reported to exceed the accepted standard (≥ 0.70), in the 
majority of scale composites of the reviewed studies. The only two exceptions were the 
HSOPSC and the PSCHO. The HSOPSC had one composite reported to be low (staffing α = 
0.62), and the PSCHO had three composites that demonstrated low internal consistency 
(learning α =0.50, fear of shame α =0.58, fear of blame α =0.61). 
Raykov's ñ coefficient was reported as the scale reliability estimate for the SAQ (Sexton et 
al., 2006). Raykov's ñ coefficient value was 0.90, indicating strong scale reliability. 
4.4.6.5& &Intercorrelations&
The HSOPSC intercorrelations, both among the 12 safety composites and between the 12 
composites and the two outcome measures (number of events reported and patient safety 
grade), have been explored at three levels of analysis: individual, unit, and hospital levels 
(Sorra and Dyer, 2010). The intercorrelations should be less than 0.80 for the composites to 
be considered unique and reflect construct validity (O’brien, 2007).The highest 
intercorrelations among the 12 composites at the individual, unit, and hospital levels were 
between teamwork across units, and handoffs and transitions while the lowest 
intercorrelations at the individual, unit, and hospital levels were between staffing and 
frequency of event reporting.  The intercorrelations were also explored between the 12 
composites and the two outcome items on the survey to determine if those composites were 
related to the self-reported measures. For patient safety grade, intercorrelations with the 12 
safety culture composites at all levels were all statistically significant with the strongest 
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relationships between overall perceptions of patient safety and patient safety grade. The 
number of events reported showed a less statistically significant relationship with the 12 
composites.  
SAQ’s six factors showed lower intercorrelations at the clinical area level than at the 
individual level, indicating that the six factors are more diagnostic when used at the clinical 
area level. All correlations were significant with a few exceptions (Sexton et al., 2006). Also, 
PSCHO showed correlations ranging from 0.00 to 0.73, which confirms that the measure 
reflects correlated but distinct aspects of safety climate (Singer et al., 2007). The Can-PSC 
showed that discriminant validity was supported for all dimensions with the exception of the 
incident follow-up dimension, which shares variance with safety leadership commitment at 
the organisation and unit levels (Ginsburg et al., 2013). 
4.4.6.6& Other&measures&
Item analysis was reported in all of the studies including mean and standard deviation. Test-
retest reliability was not reported for any of the studies. One-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was only reported for the SOS. 
4.5" Discussion"
The aim of this systematic review was to identify and review quantitative studies that were 
designed to assess safety climate in acute hospital settings, with particular focus on 
questionnaires. The objective was to assess the adequacy of the reported psychometric 
properties of identified tools in order to select an appropriate tool to be employed in my PhD 
thesis. 
Instruments were selected from a pool of existing tools. Firstly, data extraction involved the 
qualitative features of tools. Secondly, the studies were subjected to quality appraisal to 
determine whether they were of sufficient quality. In addition, the psychometric properties of 
the included tools were assessed using a checklist developed specifically for this review.  
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In 2006, Flin et al. completed a comprehensive review of twelve safety climate measures 
designed for the health care setting. Building on their search criteria, we have identified a vast 
number of additional measures available for different healthcare settings. Our review provides 
an overview of the five tools for which an evaluation of their psychometric properties has 
been reported.  
At the outset, this large number may seem to be an optimistic picture of safety climate tool 
development in healthcare. Nevertheless, such an increase, arguably, adds to the present state 
of ambiguity in the assessment of safety culture in healthcare. In this review, a detailed 
inspection of the five included tools revealed a number of limitations to these measures. The 
limitations and ambiguity center around the concepts of safety culture and climate, their 
associated dimensions, the methodological rigor associated with the design of these measures 
and the lack of clarity in the relationship between safety culture and outcomes (Groves et al., 
2011). This may call into question the interpretations of safety climate test scores. 
All of the survey tools (HSOPSC, SAQ, PSCHO, SOS, Can-PSC) have key similarities and 
common dimensions. Yet, they vary in terms of length, theoretical grounding and reported 
psychometric properties. Most of the instruments reported a theoretical basis, which is 
deemed to be an essential component of a psychometrically sound tool. Also, instruments 
varied in scope, with some covering a more comprehensive range of dimensions while others 
focused on the assessment of one or more specific dimensions of safety culture. The HSOPSC 
is an example of a broad tool that includes 42 items and covers 12 safety culture dimensions. 
It is directed at a wide range of specialties and different care settings. Such a comprehensive 
tool is more suitable for a patient safety interventional programme as it may have more 
potential for uncovering areas in need of improvement compared to shorter questionnaires 
like the one dimensional 9-item SOS.  The SOS is guided by nine specific questions that are 
limited in scope and as a result, the tool may be less sensitive in identifying problematic areas 
(Madsen, 2006). Yet, shorter questionnaires have the potential of increasing the response rate 
and reducing the non-response bias associated with longer surveys (Edwards et al., 2002, 
Sorra and Dyer, 2010).  
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4.5.1$ Psychometric$properties$
Despite the growing body of evidence about the value of establishing the psychometric 
properties of safety climate tools, there is still a lack of proper reporting of related 
questionnaire properties across published literature (Colla et al., 2005, Flin, 2007, Flin et al., 
2006, Nieva and Sorra, 2003)– given the numbers of identified studies, which did not meet 
the study inclusion criteria. Studies have shown considerable variation regarding the methods 
and the standards applied in reporting the psychometric properties (Manser et al., 2016). 
Psychometric evaluation of safety climate measures is not a trivial task.This can be partly 
explained by the methodological rigor and resources required for tools to be properly 
developed and psychometrically tested (Singla et al., 2006). The lack of rigorous 
psychometric evaluation makes it difficult to confirm the validity and reliability of survey 
scores and the proper identification of underlying dimensions. Thus, it is imperative that tools 
are developed with robust psychometric properties (Flin et al., 2006). To ensure a thorough 
scientific approach, Flin et al. (2006) proposed the reporting of standardised psychometric 
tests with EFA, CFA, reliability analysis and correlations among survey dimensions as a 
minimum psychometric analysis.  
Overall, the five tools covered the standard psychometric criteria recommended by Flin et al. 
(2006). Three tools, including the HSOPSC, SAQ and SOS, had more robust psychometric 
properties. PSCHCO and Can-PSCS generally reported less robust psychometric properties 
(Table 7).  
In Flin et al. (2006) review of the psychometric properties of 12 safety climate tools designed 
for healthcare settings, the authors concluded that none of the tools achieved full scale testing 
and that further attention should be given to psychometric properties in the design of safety 
climate tools. Two notable exceptions were the HSOPSC and the SAQ where a detailed 
process of scale development was provided and more of the indicated psychometric criteria 
were met (Colla et al., 2005, Flin et al., 2006). Conversley, Perneger et al. (2014), argue that 
even the original HSOPSC instrument did not fulfill the standard psychometric criteria of a 
sound structure as proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999) and recommended that the tool be 
partially redesigned.  
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In comparison, earlier studies did not report standard psychometric criteria (Felknor et al., 
2000b, Itoh et al., 2002, Neal et al., 2000, Pronovost et al., 2003a, Singer et al., 2003). Our 
results provide evidence for an improving trend in reporting the psychometric properties of 
tools in this area. This, as a result, places safety climate assessment on the right track.  
A number of reported adaptations of the HSOPSC, in China, France, Norway and the UK 
(Haugen et al., 2010, Nie et al., 2013, Perneger et al., 2014, Waterson et al., 2010, Zhu et al., 
2014), have performed less well than the original tool as they often identify different 
underlying constructs. Coyle et al. (1995) suggested that this might be due to the contextual 
specificity of the construct of safety culture. As a result, there is a need to reexamine the 
psychometric properties of tools before extending their use in different settings to ensure their 
applicability, reliability and validity (Manser et al., 2016).  
4.5.2$ Safety$culture/climate$dimensions$
Over the past ten years, a number of comprehensive reviews of studies addressing patient 
safety in general or patient safety climate instruments in particular have been published (Colla 
et al., 2005, Flin et al., 2006, Halligan and Zecevic, 2011, Jackson et al., 2010, Singla et al., 
2006). Those reviews provide a comparative database of available instruments to identify 
similarities and differences including common dimensions. As mentioned earlier, this 
provided the basis for our categorization process. Our results showed that seven dimensions 
were addressed by the majority of the reviewed tools including: (1) Top management support, 
(2) Safety systems, (3) Safety attitudes and behaviours of staff, (4) Reporting incidents, (5) 
Communication openness, (6) Organisational learning and (7) Teamwork. Table 8 (below) 
compares the twelve common safety climate dimensions that are mentioned in the five review 
papers in comparison to our results. The results confirm the findings of Singla et al. (2006, 
p.113) , who suggested that common dimensions including communication, teamwork, and 
leadership support for patient safety might be considered “core dimensions” of patient safety 
culture. Few tools such as HSOPSC and PSCHO addressed issues related to management 
such as policies and procedures, which are essential elements of safety culture (Kobuse et al., 
2014).  
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Taken together, the above studies support the view that there is a need to establish a 
fundamental set of generic dimensions. More studies will need to be undertaken. 	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Table 8: A comparison of the common safety culture dimensions that are 
mentioned in five review papers and the current review 
 
 
Safety culture dimensions 
 
Safety climate/culture review studies 
(Colla 
et al., 
2005) 
9 
Tools 
(Flin 
et al., 
2006) 
12 
Tools 
(Singla 
et al., 
2006) 
13 
Tools 
(Fleming, 
2008) 
 
4 studies 
(Halligan 
and 
Zecevic, 
2011) 
130 
Studies 
Current 
systematic 
review 
Top management support  
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
Teamwork 
 
 √ √ √ √ √ 
Safety systems √ √  √  √ 
Feedback & Communication  
 
√ √  √   
Reporting Incidents and non-
punitive response to error 
 
√ √  √ √ √ 
Communication openness 
 
 √ √  √ √ 
Organisational learning 
 
   √ √ √ 
Beliefs about the causes of errors & 
adverse events 
 
  √    
Work Pressure 
 
 √  √   
Risk perception 
 
 √  √   
Beliefs about the importance of 
safety 
      
Safety Attitudes of staff 
 
 √    √ 
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Most of the reviewed studies failed to examine the influence of local cultural factors as part of 
their safety climate assessment tools. Almutairi (2012) questioned the impact of multicultural 
workforce on safety climate in healthcare settings and concluded that this diversity can 
adversely affect the quality of care and patient safety. In a study by Algahtani (2015), the 
author investigated the influence of a multicultural workforce in Saudi Arabia on patient 
safety and developed a new dimension, “Multicultural Workplace”, with items relating to 
local culture to assist in measuring cultural factors related to patient safety. Results showed 
strong, positive correlations with most SAQ dimensions indicating its relevance and 
importance to safety culture. The author recommended that the newly developed dimension 
should be investigated in different settings and cultures to test if it has wider international 
application. Another area that is overlooked is the physical environment of a hospital facility. 
This includes its technology and equipment, and its effect on patient safety (Carayon et al., 
2006). In addition, little is known about the effect of the psychosocial work environment, 
including job demands and resources available to cope with them, on safety climate (Phipps 
and Ashcroft, 2011). 
In my view, the SAQ focuses on human factors such as stress recognition and staff 
satisfaction while the HSOPSC addresses supervisors’ commitment to safety and handoffs 
and transitions. The SOS was developed to measure the behaviours theorised to enable a 
safety culture (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007). It mainly stresses teamwork. Finally, the PSCHO 
focuses on management and institutional commitment to safety, safety systems, and safety 
attitudes of staff. Risk-taking behaviour, a commonly measured safety dimension in other 
industries, was only covered by the PSCHO.  
This diversity in focus is partly related to the tools’ development process as the above models 
are mainly driven by expert opinion and not necessarily reflect what hospital staff think about 
patient safety (Perneger et al., 2014). 
As previously discussed in Chapter two, most of the work carried out on safety culture and 
climate in healthcare reveals the lack of consensus regarding the constructs of safety culture 
and climate (Flin et al., 2006, Palmieri, 2010, Pronovost and Sexton, 2005a) in addition to the 
construct of patient safety culture (Ginsburg et al., 2013). Reason (1997, p.192) describes it as 
having the “definitional precision of a cloud.” Palmieri (2010, p.98) adds that the existing 
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literature on the safety culture concept “is neither theoretically defined nor consistently 
applied and researched.” Singer et al. (2007) argues that “to date no theoretical model has 
codified discrete and measurable dimensions of safety culture” (p.2001). As a result of this 
definitional ambiguity, a wide range of safety culture dimensions have been incorporated into 
safety climate surveys. Singer and Vogus (2013) pointed out that the wide use of a broad 
range of dimensions will “dilute this domain” (p.2) . There is also a significant degree of 
overlap in the content of dimensions between the different surveys. Items assigned to certain 
dimensions loaded onto differently labeled dimensions in other tools. This has been noticed, 
for example, in the overlap between the teamwork and communication openness dimensions’ 
items. This may be the result of developing tools using different definitions of safety 
dimensions by authors. Also, some authors defined dimensions broadly while others used 
narrowly defined dimensions. In addition, the differences in judgment of the content of 
dimensions between different authors also play a major role.  
Despite these inconsistencies, these studies offer some insight into common safety culture 
dimensions that were recurrent in literature in addition to identification of characteristics of 
healthcare organisations with effective safety cultures including acknowledging the high risk 
nature of an organisation’s operations, supporting a blame-free environment, facilitating 
teamwork to pursue safety, and directing resources to address safety issues (Shojania et al., 
2001).  
To date, there has been no agreement on what safety culture dimensions constitute core 
concepts. Thus, it is difficult to judge whether safety culture measures exploring twelve 
dimensions appropriately address more relevant aspects of safety culture than those measures 
examining only one dimension (Singla et al., 2006). 
Overall, these studies highlight the need for robust research to clarify which dimensions 
belong to the core concept of safety culture and what the main sources of safety culture 
variability are. Flin et al. (2006, p.110)  called for “a set of universal or core variables that 
underpin safety climate across work sectors.” Further work is required to confirm this finding.  
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4.5.3$ Theoretical$basis$
As discussed in Chapter two, the theoretical development of safety culture and safety climate 
has not mirrored its extensive empirical development (Clarke, 2000, Guldenmund, 2000, 
Zohar, 2010). Furthermore, most of the reviews carried out, in industry and in healthcare, 
have clearly noted the lack of theoretical basis or model to outline the proposed relationships 
between safety climate and safety outcomes including worker safety behaviours and patient or 
worker safety outcomes (Colla et al., 2005, Flin, 2007, Flin et al., 2006, Flin et al., 2000). 
This, as a result, limits a better understanding of safety culture and its improvement in 
healthcare organisations (Groves et al., 2011).  
Earlier in this chapter, it was stated that four studies used theory to guide their tool 
development process. But none of the reviewed instruments provided an adequate explanation 
about their guiding theoretical framework nor do they clearly articulate the links between 
questionnaire items and specific theoretical constructs (Flin, 2007). Walshe and Boaden 
(2005, p.175) pointed out that the HSOPSC has “no explicit theoretical framework” as it has 
been developed based on a review of the literature in areas of safety management, 
organisational safety, patient and employee safety, and healthcare error. In addition to a 
review of existing safety culture instruments and further input by researchers and hospital 
administrators. SAQ (Sexton et al., 2006), was also designed based on literature reviews, with 
item development guided by existing survey instruments from various industries. Such 
evidence suggests that many healthcare researchers overlook the importance of the 
epistemological and theoretical roots that underlie the development of their instruments 
(Halligan and Zecevic, 2011) with more focus on the measurement of the concept rather than 
further conceptual development (Palmieri, 2010). In other words, they often jump directly to 
“operationalisation” of the measure (Reiman et al., 2013, p.170).  
Early attempts to measure safety climate were based on adapting existing instruments from 
other industries (aviation, oil, nuclear) to healthcare settings (Helmreich, 2000, Sexton et al., 
2000). For example, the SAQ. The theoretical bases of some of the original instruments, 
including HROT (e.g., PSCHO and SOS) (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2011) and Human Factors 
Framework (Reason, 2008), explain the relationships between safety culture or safety climate 
in settings “far-removed from healthcare” (Ausserhofer, 2012, p.129).  The organisational 
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structures and cultures of such industries are different than those of healthcare organisations 
(Flin and Yule, 2004a). When the processes of safety culture are not clearly understood, this 
makes it difficult to evaluate how well the questionnaire actually measures the phenomena 
under study and calls into question the interpretation of survey results (Groves et al., 2011).  
In summary, if the theoretical assumptions are not explicit, then evidence on the construct 
validity of the developed instruments is inadequate. This makes it difficult for organisations to 
use the questionnaire findings effectively for organisational learning and development aims 
(Halligan and Zecevic, 2011, Reiman et al., 2013).  
There is an evident lack of safety culture and climate theories in healthcare and none of the 
reviewed tools were built upon such a theory. As a result, recent developments in safety 
culture have heightened the need for a theory that defines the process of keeping patients safe 
in healthcare organisations through the interaction between organisational structures at the 
macro-level and individual actions at the micro-level (Groves et al., 2011). They add that such 
theory is crucial for further progress towards patient safety.   
The influence of safety climate on patient and worker safety outcomes is not yet clear, though 
studies have begun to confirm that safety climate scores can be associated with workers’ 
outcomes, including workers’ safety behaviours or workers’ injuries, in healthcare (Flin, 
2007). There is a need for more evidence to understand how safety culture or climate impacts 
outcomes (Wilson, 2007). Researchers have attempted to systematically define the 
relationship between safety culture and patient safety outcomes and found inadequate 
evidence to link the two (Colla et al., 2005, The Health Foundation, 2011). Dicuccio (2015) 
conducted a systematic review to examine the relationship between patient safety culture and 
patient outcomes and found trends emerging related to connections between patient safety 
culture and specific patient outcomes and concluded that more work needs to be done 
concerning the study of patient safety culture and its connection to patient outcomes. Taylor et 
al. (2012) surveyed 723 nurses from 29 units in a US hospital and found that two safety 
climate factors, safety and teamwork, were associated with nurse injuries and patient adverse 
events (decubitus ulcer). Groves et al. (2011), on the other hand, conducted a meta-analysis, 
examining the relationship between safety culture and each of the following patient safety 
outcomes in acute care hospitals: pressure ulcers, falls, medication errors, nurse-sensitive 
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outcomes, and post-operative outcomes. and safety culture in that setting. No significant 
relationships of any size were identified.  
In a number of comprehensive reviews of safety climate tools in healthcare, the HSOPSC and 
SAQ repeatedly emerged as recommended tools (Flin, 2007, Halligan and Zecevic, 2011, 
Jackson et al., 2010, Singla et al., 2006). In Flin et al (2006) review, the HSOPSC and the 
SAQ were identified as the only tools that detailed the process of scale development and met 
more of the specified psychometric criteria. Jackson et al. (2010) identified four tools, 
including the HSOPSC, SAQ, PSCHO and the Hospital Safety Climate Scale (HSCS), as the 
most widely used in the USA and applied internationally across different clinical settings with 
acceptable psychometric properties. They add that the HSOPSC and the SAQ were shown to 
measure climate perceptions at the unit level as the dominating level for aggregating 
responses, whereas studies using PSCHO provided evidence for hospital level variance. 
Fleming (2005) identified the HSOPSC and SAQ as freely available tools, tested on large 
samples, reported psychometric properties and with available benchmarking data. They both 
shared a weakness of being relatively long. He adds that the HSOPSC has a more 
comprehensive coverage of safety culture elements with good psychometric properties and 
good supporting documentation. Their results are in agreement with those obtained by Singla 
et al. (2006). Results of our systematic review seem to mirror those of the previous studies 
that have examined hospital safety climate tools. The three studies that reported the SAQ, 
HSOPSC and SOS tools have been reported to have good overall methodological quality with 
good assessment of their reported psychometric properties (Sexton et al., 2006, Sorra and 
Dyer, 2010, Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007). For additional information regarding the SAQ, 
HSOPSC and SOS tools, please refer to section 2.5.6 in chapter two. 
4.6" Strengths"and"Limitations"
One of the strengths of this study is that it represents a comprehensive examination of the 
patient safety climate tools designed for hospitals. The author employed a thorough search 
strategy covering seven databases, manual searches of reference lists, electronic “searches” of 
key journals and websites of organisations dedicated to the improvement of patient safety. 
The search strategy was sensitive enough to identify all of Flin’s reviewed papers. Further, at 
all stages of the review including the two-stage screening process and the data extraction and 
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quality appraisal process, assessment of studies was performed with at least two independent 
reviewers in order to avoid selection bias. The reviewers followed a rigorous method of 
review using a pre-set protocol and standardised forms of data extraction and quality 
assessment for each included study. A series of indicators were used to assess the quality of 
the reviewed studies and provide detailed insight into the reported psychometric properties of 
the included tools. No assumptions were made. Quality indicators were marked as met only 
where it was clearly stated in the study report. 
A number of important limitations need to be considered despite the efforts that were 
undertaken by the researcher to minimise their effects on the general findings of the 
systematic review. Safety climate measurement is a fast-growing field and as a result, this 
study may not have captured all relevant studies in databases chosen and some relevant 
studies might have been omitted. The exclusion of other bibliographic databases and grey 
literature could potentially lead to overlooking valuable studies. Our review did not report on 
tools that are currently under development and not yet published, while non- English language 
papers were not included and this may also constitute a limitation. Nevertheless, our study 
included the most widely used safety climate questionnaires that represent what is currently 
available in the published literature.  
Regarding the assessment of the quality of the reviewed studies, some quality indicators were 
not reported in sufficient detail to allow a judgment to be made. I have contacted authors for 
further clarification. In cases where further information was not available, the indicator was 
marked as unmet and the study quality might have been underestimated due to under 
reporting.  
Additionally, this review has been limited to quantitative measures of safety climate with 
reported results of psychometric assessment. This might have led to the exclusion of relevant 
safety climate measures for which psychometric assessment is still not publicly available. 
Finally, the categorization process of questionnaire items into safety culture dimensions, 
despite being carried out by three reviewers, is still limited by the subjective nature of the 
process. 
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4.7" Conclusions""
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in the assessment of safety climate in 
healthcare organisations. Several reviews have uncovered a wide variety of safety climate 
tools available for healthcare settings. Still, theoretical and methodological challenges limit 
their use as assessment measures. Pronovost and Sexton (2005a) warn that “the enthusiasm 
for measuring culture may be outpacing the science” (p.231). 
This chapter systematically reviewed the literature aimed at quantitative assessment of safety 
climate in the hospital setting. The main goal of our investigation was to provide an 
assessment of the adequacy of the reported psychometric properties in the identified papers. A 
total of five studies met our inclusion criteria and were included for this review while many 
other studies were excluded as they lacked the proper reporting of psychometric properties or 
were adapted versions of original tools. 
This research has thrown up many questions in need of further investigation. 
The theoretical and research literature surrounding safety culture and climate is often 
confusing and contains diverse views on how to define and measure those constructs. Many 
tools lack an explicit theoretical basis and have been criticized for being based on weak 
evidence (Flin et al., 2006, Hutchinson et al., 2006). There is still a lack of proper reporting of 
psychometric properties across literature despite the fact that all of the reviewed tools, in my 
systematic review, covered the standard psychometric criteria recommended by Flin et al 
(2006). This general lack of methodological rigour may call into question the results of 
cultural assessments and may be responsible for contradictory findings in the literature (Colla 
et al., 2005, Flin et al., 2000, Guldenmund, 2000, Palmieri, 2010). It is evident that further 
consideration should be given to psychometric properties in the design and selection of tools 
in order to ensure the robustness of the resulting safety culture data. Psychometric testing, on 
its own, does not fully characterize an instrument. Other forms of item analysis, such as 
cognitive testing, should not be overlooked as they provide rich insight into locally held 
attitudes and perceptions related to patient safety (Singla et al., 2006).  
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It is recommended that research first be conducted to resolve the controversies in the 
definitions and dimensions of safety culture and climate and identify the main sources of 
safety culture variability (Pumar-Méndez et al., 2014). This need for research will help 
generate more conceptual clarity about the concept of safety culture and climate. Substantial 
methodological advances with respect to psychometric assessment are also required. Another 
important challenge for the future direction of safety science is to focus on developing 
theoretical models and “study the link between culture, behaviours, and patient outcomes” 
(Pronovost et al., 2009, p. 336).  
The outcomes of this systematic review will provide guidance and support to healthcare 
policymakers, survey users and safety researchers to make more informed decisions when 
selecting an appropriate safety climate assessment tool.  
4.8" Summary"
In summary, my systematic review provided a thorough assessment of the reported 
psychometric properties of the identified safety climate tools used in acute hospital settings in 
addition to reviewing other characteristics including reported safety climate dimensions and 
theoretical basis. Detailed inspection revealed substantial variation in the concepts of safety 
culture and climate, their associated dimensions and their theoretical basis. The 
methodological rigour associated with the design of the identified measures was variable. The 
HSOPSC can be viewed as a comprehensive measure of patient safety climate, which 
examines a number of fundamental dimensions related to patient safety, at the individual, unit 
and hospital levels of analysis. It has evident content validity and the results from the survey 
can be used to assess the prevailing status of patient safety culture and the effect of patient 
safety initiatives.  
4.9" Recommendations"
The decision to choose the HSOPSC as the most appropriate tool for our study was made 
based on many reasons. The HSOPSC is a comprehensive measure of safety climate in 
healthcare settings as it assesses key aspects related to patient safety at multiple levels of 
analysis including the individual, unit and hospital levels. This multi-dimensional approach 
Chapter Four: A Systematic Review and analysis of measurement tools 115 
helps to establish a baseline to guide patient safety improvement initiatives (Madsen, 2001). 
The original survey was developed for use in hospitals, but has been adapted for use in patient 
safety climate assessment for different care settings including community pharmacies, 
ambulatory surgeries, nursing homes, and outpatient medical offices (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, 2017b). According to Jackson et al. (2010), the majority of safety 
climate studies, including the HSOPSC, have been conducted on a large scale, examining 
perceptions of staff within units and/or across hospitals within one healthcare organisation. 
The effectiveness of different quality improvement initiatives and interventions has been 
tested using the HSOPSC (Blegen et al., 2010, Ford et al., 2014, Jackson et al., 2010) 
including determining the impact of a multidisciplinary (pharmacy, nursing, medicine) 
teamwork and communication intervention to improve unit-based safety culture with a before-
after design (Blegen et al., 2010). Five of eleven safety culture subscales showed significant 
improvement. The link between aspects of safety culture and incident reporting behaviour was 
examined (Patterson and Pace, 2016, Richter et al., 2015). Also, before and after 
implementation of a voluntary non-punitive incident reporting system in neonatal ICUs was 
assessed. The number of self-reported incidents was found to be increased following the 
intervention and positively associated with the safety climate dimension of non-punitive 
response to error (Snijders et al., 2009). It can also be used for benchmarking the strengths of 
safety cultures across time and between organisations on national and international levels 
(Blegen et al., 2009). The impact of accreditation in a university hospital was studied through 
a cross-sectional retrospective and prospective study using the HSOPSC in Saudi Arabia (Al-
Awa et al., 2012) and in Lebanon (El-Jardali et al., 2011).  
Although it has been argued the original HSOPSC instrument did not fulfill the standard 
psychometric criteria of a sound structure and was recommended to be partially redesigned 
(Perneger et al., 2014). Also, the HSOPSC has “no explicit theoretical framework” (Walshe 
and Boaden, 2005) and no research has been able to test the predictive validity of the tool. 
Still, extensive literature reporting the psychometric properties of the HSOPSC exist as the 
HSOPSC has been validated for use across the world and translated to many different 
languages. Additionally, benchmarking data against larger datasets is available on the 
AHRQ’s website. The HSOPSC is freely available with no restrictions on copyright. It uses 
clear language and wording with a scale that is simple and easy to use. 
Chapter Five: Psychometric properties of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 116 
5" Chapter"Five:"Psychometric"properties"of"the"Hospital"Survey"on"Patient"
Safety"Culture"
5.1" Introduction"
This chapter presents an assessment of the psychometric properties of the HSOPSC 
questionnaire based on survey data gathered from three public hospitals in Kuwait.  
Psychometric analysis involves the use of established assessment techniques to assess the 
psychometric properties of questionnaires. It allows the identification of underlying safety 
culture dimensions (Singla et al., 2006). As previously mentioned, it is crucial that patient 
safety climate questionnaires are designed with robust psychometric properties, particularly 
focusing on their construct validity and reliability, to provide valid interpretations of test 
scores.  
A variety of ways exist to assess the construct validity of an instrument, including factor 
analysis. FA is a statistical method that “explores the extent to which individual items in a 
questionnaire can be grouped together according to the correlations between the responses to 
them”, thus reducing the dimensionality of the data (Hutchinson et al., 2006, p.348). It can be 
applied as a data reduction or a structure detection method (Hill et al., 2006). It can also 
provide evidence for the construct validity of self-reporting scales (Williams et al., 2010). The 
two main techniques of FA are EFA, and CFA. EFA allows the researcher to uncover the 
main dimensions to develop a theory, or model from a smaller number of latent constructs 
that are often represented by a larger set of measured variables (Henson and Roberts, 2006, 
Pett et al., 2003). In CFA, the researcher tests a pre-determined factor structure or a proposed 
theory (Henson and Roberts, 2006, Pett et al., 2003). Geisinger et al. (2013) point out that, 
under EFA, the optimal factor model is suggested by the data, while in CFA, the researcher 
must suggest a factor model before starting the analysis. Reliability is also referred to as 
consistency and a common way of estimating reliability is through assessing internal 
consistency (Pett et al., 2003). 
The HSOPSC questionnaire was used to collect data from three public hospitals in Kuwait. 
The following section covers the processes of data collection, management and analysis. This 
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will be followed by results of the psychometric analyses of the HSOPSC questionnaire. The 
descriptive findings will be reported in the following chapter (Chapter six).  
5.2" Research"design"
Research methodology is defined as “the general approach the researcher takes in carrying out 
the research project” (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001, p.14). As described in chapter three, surveys 
are one form of descriptive research. In safety culture research, safety climate surveys are the 
main measurement tool (Gadd and Collins, 2002, Guldenmund, 2000). The tool assists in 
evaluating healthcare workers' perceptions of safety climate in their healthcare organisations 
(Singer et al., 2007). Guldenmund (2007) describes it as a “quick and dirty” instrument. 
Surveys are labelled as “quick” and efficient tools for data collection since “it requires less 
time, is less expensive, and permits collection of the data from a much larger sample” (Gay et 
al., 1996, p.255). Likewise, safety climate surveys are often viewed as time and cost-effective 
tools (Guldenmund, 2000, Wreathall, 1995). On the other hand, they were labelled as “dirty” 
since they only give a hint of what a certain safety culture might be about, with limited ability 
to control unwanted influences affecting responses. The first feature has been argued to cancel 
the effect of the second one if there are a large number of responses and when unwanted 
influences are normally distributed and unsystematic (Guldenmund, 2007). Other drawbacks 
include the lack of an in-depth understanding of survey findings and the low response rates 
associated with misinterpretation of the objectives or wording of questionnaires (Jones, 2014). 
Also, questionnaires are liable to “social desirability bias” due to the tendency of some 
individuals to present themselves in the most favorable manner according to prevailing norms 
and customs of the society (King and Bruner, 2000).  
Still, safety climate surveys can potentially provide an insight (Smits et al., 2009b) or a 
“snapshot” of an organisation’s safety culture (Mearns and Flin, 1999, p.5).  
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5.3" Study"setting"and"sample"
5.3.1$ Study$setting$
The location of the study was three public hospitals in the state of Kuwait. The HSOPSC 
questionnaire was administered to a sample of healthcare workers at these hospitals during the 
time period from April until the end of August 2015.  
The three hospitals that were selected for this study are anonymized as:  
1.( Hospital A 
2.( Hospital B 
3.( Hospital C 
Table 9: Characteristics of included public hospitals 
Hospital Type Number of beds 
Hospital A General >600 
Hospital B General >600 
Hospital C Specialist 300-600 
*Note: information was obtained from the “Annual bulletin of health statistics 2015” report (Kuwait Central 
Statistical Bureau, 2015b), To maintain anonymity during the study, the hospitals were coded A, B, C.  
The three hospitals were selected for a number of reasons. They cover both general and 
specialist hospitals and represent areas that cover the majority of Kuwait, both urban and 
rural. As shown in Table 9, hospital sizes ranged between large hospitals with more than 500 
beds and medium sized hospitals with 250 to 499 beds. All chosen hospitals underwent two 
cycles of accreditation and are involved in patient safety programmes, as all Government 
hospitals are. Thus, the three hospitals would provide an appropriate platform for the present 
study.  
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5.3.2$ Study$sample$
The population of the study consisted of a sample of healthcare staff with direct or indirect 
contact with patients including: doctors, nurses, technologists (e.g., ECG, laboratory, 
radiology staff) and other healthcare staff members (dietary services, medical records, 
hospital management). Staff cover a wide range of nationalities and different specialities. The 
common language of communication is English.  
Based on the recommendations set by the HSOPSC report (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) staff 
members were invited to participate in the survey if they satisfied the following criteria: 
Staff with at least six months of employment, whether directly involved in patient care or 
members of management, were invited to participate in the survey including:          
• Healthcare staff who have direct interaction with patients (physicians, nurses, allied 
health professionals). 
• Healthcare staff whose work indirectly affects patient care (dietary services, 
diagnostic services). 
• Hospital supervisors, managers, or administrators.  
Staff who did not agree to participate or who did not have direct or indirect impact on patient 
care were excluded from the study. Also, managers who undertook pure administration duties 
that were not related to medical care and those with less than 6 months of employment were 
excluded from the study. 
5.3.3$ Sample$size$
Tinsley and Tinsley (1987) highlighted the importance of assessing sample size requirements 
(sample size of the study, ratio of the sample size to the number of variables, ratio of the 
number of variables to the number of factors) to evaluate whether the sample size is sufficient 
to satisfactorily undertake FA. This will be explained in more detail in section 5.8.1. The 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) rule recommends having at least 300 cases to undertake FA. 
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Therefore, the estimated number of completed questionnaires required was a minimum of 300 
to adequately undertake FA. Surveys of health professionals can be challenging and are 
characterised by declining response rates (Cho et al., 2013) with a significant downward trend 
in response rates from 1998 to 2008 (McLeod et al., 2013). Based on their findings, the 
predicted response rate for this study was 20% and it was estimated that the sample size 
should be a minimum of 1,500 of distributed questionnaires. The sample fulfilled all three 
requirements (N=1,511) and was considered appropriate for undertaking both descriptive and 
factor analysis. A calculation was done to establish the minimum sample size required from 
each hospital. According to Murphy et al. (1998), researchers must decide on their sample 
size early on in the research process as random sampling error is inversely related to sample 
size. Based on Ary et al. (2013) guidelines for determining a minimum sample size, if we 
assume a ±5 or a ±3 % margin of error, at 95% confidence level and a hypothesized p of 0.05, 
then the minimum sample size required is 385 or 1069 subjects respectively. Yet, he argues 
that a representative sample is more important than sample size as it allows researchers to 
draw more appropriate conclusions. 
5.3.4$ Sampling$procedures$$
Quantitative sampling methods aim to draw a representative sample from the population to 
enable a researcher to make inferences about the whole population (Marshall, 1996). 
Selection of an appropriate sampling method depends on the aim of the study. Quantitative 
sampling approaches fall under two categories: probability or random sampling and non-
probability sampling (Yu and Cooper, 1983). The most common sampling approach is 
random sampling where all members of a population have an equal chance of selection. 
Stratified random sampling is a variant of random sampling that allows subgroups to be 
studied in more detail (Marshall, 1996). A stratified random sampling approach was chosen 
for this study to help the researcher examine the different views with regard to patient safety 
from different healthcare groups (doctors, nurses, technologists, others) working in various 
units across the three hospitals. Also, it will ensure that each group will be represented 
proportionately to their numbers in the general population (Ary et al., 2013).  
The sampling procedure for this current study is as follows: Firstly, strata of interest were 
identified (doctors, nurses, technologists, others). Following that, a sampling frame was 
Chapter Five: Psychometric properties of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 121 
provided by the human resources’ departments in each of the selected hospitals with lists of 
staff names and total numbers working in each department at the time of the study. Then, the 
sampling frame was divided into various strata before selecting the sample. Finally, a 
proportionate stratification procedure was adopted where a specified number of subjects was 
randomly drawn from each stratum that was in proportion to the size of the stratum in the 
specific population. This allowed each group the chance to be proportionately sampled 
according to their numbers in the overall population.  
Table 10 shows the selected sample in each hospital, including the total number of the 
sampled health care workers, in the three hospitals. The sample was selected by taking 30% 
from each category of health care worker in each hospital.  
Table 10: Characteristics of study sample from three hospitals  
Hospital Doctors Nurses Technologists Others* Total 
Hospital A 205 300 90 10 605 
Hospital B 160 340 90 10 600 
Hospital C 75 175 50 6 306 
Total 440 815 230 26 1,511 
Percentage 29% 54% 15% 2% 100% 
*Others category include pharmacists, dieticians, respiratory therapists, physical, occupational or speech 
therapists and management staff 
5.4" Ethical"approval"
Prior to commencing the study, ethical approval was sought from the Medical, Veterinary and 
Life Sciences College ethics committee of the University of Glasgow in Scotland and the 
Medical and Health Sciences Research Committee of the Ministry of Health in Kuwait in 
order to both administer the questionnaires for data collection and conduct interviews (see 
copies of ethical approval in Appendix 7 and Appendix 8). The proposal for the current study 
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and relevant forms including ethical approvals were also submitted to the three hospitals’ 
councils for further approval in order to start the data collection process. 
Participation in the study was voluntary and each participant was provided with a participant 
information sheet (PIS) and an informed consent form along with each questionnaire. The PIS 
explains the study objectives, what participation entails, any associated risks and benefits in 
addition to ethical considerations (Appendix 9). If participants decided to take part in the 
study, they were required to sign the informed consent form and return the completed 
questionnaire within 7 days. Even after deciding to take part in the research, participants were 
informed of their ability to withdraw from the research at any point, without any 
consequences and without giving a reason. The researcher’s contact details were also included 
in case participants wished to contact the researcher regarding any issues or concerns related 
to the study. Participants were informed that returned questionnaires would be stored in a 
locked filing cabinet in a secured office with anonymity and confidentiality preserved at all 
times. Furthermore, they were informed that data would be securely stored on a password-
protected database and would be linked only with a study identification number. Hard and soft 
copies would be maintained for a minimum of three years after the completion of the study 
then they would be destroyed. 
5.5" Hospital"Survey"on"Patient"Safety"Culture"(HSOPSC)"tool"
The survey tool used for my PhD thesis is the HSOPSC (See Appendix 10 for the original 
version). A description of the overall tool is included in Chapter two. As previously 
mentioned, the selection of the HSOPSC was because of the empirical findings of the 
systematic review, along with international evidence on its use. In addition, the tool had good 
psychometric properties reported across the literature, it was feasible to translate and 
demonstrated cross-cultural adaptation and practicability. 
5.5.1$ Pilot$study$
A pilot study is commonly required to solve any technical and feasibility issues associated 
with a study instrument or tool (Gerrish and Lacey, 2010, Sarantakos, 2013). The HSOPSC 
was pilot tested and some modifications were made according to recommendations and 
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suggestions from a panel of experts who were also frontline clinicians and eligible to 
complete the survey (Appendix 11). Seven interviews were carried out with safety and quality 
improvement experts in the MOH in order to evaluate the content of the HSOPSC 
questionnaire. This step attempted to ensure the content validity of the tool and the proper 
transfer of the intended meaning of the questionnaire items to the culture and language 
differences in Kuwait. In addition, it confirmed that the survey items are understandable and 
clear. The panel consisted of two nurses and five doctors and interviews were carried out 
face-to-face or via telephone. They all held the view that the HSOPSC content covered issues 
relevant to safety culture in Kuwaiti hospitals, but also noted the absence of aspects related to 
workers’ safety. Based on these interviews, the questionnaire was revised and modified as 
follows: wording was modified in eight items to clarify their meaning as some comments 
indicated ambiguity in items’ interpretation. Items F 3 “Things “fall between the cracks” 
when transferring patients from one unit to another” and A14 “We work in "crisis mode" 
trying to do too much, too quickly” are examples of items reported as being ambiguous. Some 
items were only adjusted by adding an explanation of certain terms in brackets. Changes to 
the wording of individual questionnaire items for terminology used within Kuwait included 
the term “event report” changed to “incident report”, “event reporting” changed to “incident 
reporting” and “event” to “incident.” Further background items were added. Appendix 12 and 
Appendix 13 show the modified items and the modified version of the HSOPSC.  
5.5.2$ Modified$Hospital$Survey$on$Patient$Safety$Culture$(HSOPSC)$
Kuwait’s version of the HSOPSC questionnaire, as in the original HSOPSC questionnaire, is 
comprised of three main sections. The 42 items of HSOPSC, 2 single safety outcome 
measures and 11 demographic questions. In total, there are 55 items (see Appendix 13). The 
HSOPSC questionnaire measures 12 dimensions of patient safety culture (Sorra et al., 2016). 
Details of these dimensions, including their definitions, are presented in Appendix 14. The 
three outcome scales in the original HSOPSC were relocated to be together in sections E, F 
and G. Sections of the questionnaire are in the following order: A. Your Work Area; B. Your 
Supervisor/ Manager; C. Communication; D. Your Hospital; E. Incident Reporting; F. 
Number of Incidents Reported; G. Patient Safety Grade; H. Background Information; I. Open 
comments. Sections A to D cover key aspects of unit and hospital level safety culture where 
section A consists of 18 items reflecting the unit level dimensions “Teamwork within hospital 
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units” (A1, A3, A4, A11), “Organisational learning and continuous improvement” (A6, A9, 
A13), “Non-punitive response to error” (A8, A12, A16), “Staffing” (A2, A5, A7, A14) and 
the outcome measure “Overall perceptions of safety” (A10, A15, A17, A18). Section B 
consists of four items (B1, B2, B3, B4) aimed at assessing staffs’ perceptions of supervisors’ 
expectations and actions promoting safety. Section C has six items that are related to 
“Communication openness” and “Feedback and communication about error” dimensions. 
Section D has 11 items that address hospital level dimensions; “Hospital management support 
for patient safety”, “Teamwork across hospital units”, and “Hospital handoffs.” Section E, F 
and G are three outcome measures. Section E has three items that were developed to measure 
the frequency of incidents reported including incidents caught and corrected before affecting 
the patient, incidents with no potential to harm the patient, and incidents that could harm the 
patient but did not. Section F includes a single item that measures the number of incidents 
reported by respondents in the last 12 months. Section H asks respondents to give an overall 
grade to their work area/unit on patient safety (Sorra et al., 2016).  
The final sections are section H and I. Section H has 11 items related to demographics of 
respondents including staff position, current profession, and years of experience within the 
hospital. An additional item about respondent’s unit participation in the National Patient 
Safety Programme and if so, whether the respondent feels that the programme is improving 
patient safety within their units. Section I provided an open space for comments. 
5.6" Survey"distribution"and"collection"
After the pilot study, data collection was undertaken using the modified HSOPSC version at 
the three study sites (Appendix 13). The questionnaire tool was used to collect data for two 
purposes. Firstly, to examine the tool’s psychometric properties in order to develop an optimal 
measurement model for assessing patient safety climate in Kuwaiti public hospitals. Secondly, 
to assess the prevailing state of patient safety climate at the selected hospitals. 
Survey distribution and collection process plan included the following points: 
•( Planning of the survey: This step involved defining the scope of the survey based 
on available human and financial resources and planning the tasks of the project.  
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•( Selecting the sample: This step included deciding who to survey, sample size, and 
sample lists preparation. 
•( Establishing departmental and unit level contacts to support survey distribution 
and collection in addition to maintaining open communication channels during the 
survey phases. 
•( Preparing survey materials including printing surveys, relevant forms and return 
envelopes for survey distribution.  
•( Distributing and collecting survey materials: Distributing relevant letters, surveys 
and handling completed surveys collection.  
•( Tracking survey response through identifiers only known to the researcher and 
sending initial and final reminders.  
•( Handling entry and management of data: Reviewing the survey data for 
completeness and errors. 
As mentioned earlier, the data collection process aimed to collect a minimum of 300 
completed questionnaires to undertake FA thus it was decided to distribute around 1,500 
questionnaires as a minimum based on available financial and human resources. The project 
tasks were carefully planned, keeping in mind the limited time available as the month of 
Ramadan and summer holidays were approaching. As the sample lists were prepared during 
the planning phase, preparing the survey material including printing of the questionnaires with 
all supporting documents in Kuwait was started. A support letter from the MOH’s 
undersecretary encouraging hospitals to help the researcher during the data collection process 
was submitted to the hospitals’ councils along with the research ethics committees’ approvals. 
Accordingly, endorsement letters were obtained from the hospitals’ councils and distribution 
of the questionnaires started immediately according to a planned strategy. The strategy started 
with an introductory week in each hospital in order to gain support for the data collection 
process, inform staff about the nature of the study and establish departmental and unit level 
contacts to support survey distribution and collection processes in addition to assisting in 
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maintaining an open communication with staff throughout the survey distribution and 
collection phases. The introductory week included meetings with hospital management and 
key personnel including medical and nursing directors to introduce the proposal of the study 
in addition to discussing the data collection protocol and ethical approval. Also, pre-
notification letters were sent to inform staff about an upcoming survey, its significance and 
the value of their participation. This was an important step as it aimed to seek assistance and 
support for the study through encouraging key personnel’s engagement. Patient safety is an 
emerging topic in Kuwaiti public hospitals due to several reasons including requirements of 
the accreditation process and parliamentary and public pressure demands on the MOH to 
improve patient safety. As a result, staff were very keen to support the research. Additionally, 
they were interested in knowing about the level of patient safety in their departments 
compared to other departments and hospitals. Hospital management offered to send internal 
memos to medical and nursing directors to encourage staff to participate in the survey. In 
addition, they offered the help of their secretaries in distributing questionnaires in the doctors' 
and nurses mail boxes. Furthermore, with the co-operation of hospital management, copies of 
the questionnaires were distributed by the patient safety and risk management unit of each 
hospital. In addition, head nurses were requested to collect the questionnaires from their 
nursing staff during their daily shifts. This support has long been recognised as an important 
factor for increasing the response rate of staff (Hunter, 2008). It also reveals the level of 
interest of hospital management and the medical and nursing directors in patient safety. 
 Following that, heads of departments in the three hospitals were approached by the researcher 
to encourage staff participation and engagement. A short presentation about the study 
objectives was given whenever possible. They were personally handed customized packets 
containing a cover letter, the study proposal, the data collection protocol, ethical approval 
letters, a consent form and additional support letters with a copy of the questionnaire.  
The questionnaires were placed in a single envelope along with a cover letter, the consent 
form, participant information sheet, additional support letters and a return envelope to each of 
the participants. The cover letter contained an explanation of the purpose and significance of 
the study in addition to the expected completion time and clear instructions regarding the 
collection process, contact details of the researcher and the key hospital contacts in case 
further information or clarification was needed.  
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One thousand, five hundred and eleven questionnaires were distributed across different 
departments in the three hospitals. Return envelopes were used to maintain respondents' 
confidentiality as an important factor for increasing the response rate (Bourque and Fielder, 
1995). The questionnaires were returned to an assigned hospital staff member or to collection 
boxes located within the hospitals. Respondents were given a period of two weeks to return 
the questionnaires. Two reminders were sent, two weeks apart including a thank you note for 
all respondents. 
The process of questionnaire distribution and collection was closely followed up by the 
researcher to ensure the distribution and collection of the target number of questionnaires and 
maximize the return rate in the limited time available. The aim of this stage was to finish most 
of the data collection processes before the month of Ramadan and the summer holidays thus 
the researcher tried many approaches in order to maximize the response rate in the three 
hospitals. 
The researcher kept an electronic tracking record for distributed and returned questionnaires 
that was daily updated from the three hospitals. Also, a designated person was provided with a 
tracking list to follow up with head nurses and secretaries in each hospital. The questionnaire 
contained identifiers that signify the code of the hospital and department involved. This 
helped in tracking the responses. The process took more than three months to complete. Each 
hospital was given a period of 5-6 weeks to complete the data collection process.  
At the end of the data collection process, all staff involved in the data collection process from 
the three hospitals were thanked for their help and support. 	  
5.7" Data"management"
          This consisted of two main steps. The first involved screening each returned 
questionnaire for completeness prior to coding and entering the data into an electronic data 
file using a statistical software programme, the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS 
24). The second involved numbering and defining the HSOPSC questionnaire variables in an 
SPSS data file. After entering the data into the SPSS file, data cleaning followed. 
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5.7.1$ Data$screening$and$preparation$$
The data management phase aims to prepare a clean data file for analysis. Therefore, prior to 
carrying out data analysis, all returned questionnaires were thoroughly checked and examined 
by the researcher to ensure their completeness. The process included categorization of the 
returned questionnaires in terms of complete and incomplete questionnaires.  
Based on the AHRQ’s recommendations (Sorra et al., 2016), the following criteria were used 
by the researcher to identify incomplete surveys and exclude them from the data set: 
•( Less than one entire section of the survey was answered by the respondent.  
•( Less than half of the items throughout the entire survey (in different sections) were 
answered by the respondent. 
•( Every item was answered the same.  
Of the 1,511 questionnaires distributed at the three hospitals, 1,317 questionnaires (87%) were 
returned. According to the above criteria, the returned questionnaires (n=1,317) were screened 
for their eligibility and screening resulted in the exclusion of seven questionnaires from the 
overall sample since they were found to have less than half of the questionnaire items 
completed (n=1,310). The final response rate was 87% and averaged between 80% and 92% 
in the three hospitals. Table 11 shows the numbers of distributed and returned completed 
questionnaires including the response rates for the three hospitals. 
Table 11: Distributed and returned questionnaires and response rates for the 
three hospitals 
Hospital Distributed 
questionnaires 
Returned 
questionnaires 
Returned 
completed 
questionnaires 
Response rate 
A 605 547 545 90% 
B 600 485 482 80% 
C 306 285 283 92% 
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Hospital Distributed 
questionnaires 
Returned 
questionnaires 
Returned 
completed 
questionnaires 
Response rate 
All 1,511 1,317 1,310 87% 
At this stage, the number of completed questionnaires (N=1,317) was initially considered 
sufficient to satisfactorily perform descriptive and factor analysis.  
5.7.2$ $Data$entry$
Variables of the HSOPSC questionnaire were initially numbered and defined in the SPSS data 
file. They were then classified into 44 patient safety climate variables and 11 background 
variables.  The total number of SPSS variables was 55 data variables in addition to the 
identification numbers of questionnaires. Following that, the data entry into SPSS file took a 
period of six weeks to complete. In order to ensure the precision of the data entry process and 
reduce the likelihood of data entry errors, double checking of individual questionnaires was 
undertaken by the researcher. A data analysis journal was kept by the researcher to keep track 
of the data management process and any steps taken. 
5.7.3$ $$$Data$cleaning$and$editing$
Data cleaning, as proposed by Van den Broeck et al. (2005), is a three-stage process, 
including screening, diagnosing, and editing data irregularities. The following process intends 
to identify errors, correct them and minimise their effect on the results of the study. Thus, the 
entered data were carefully reviewed in order to identify duplicate cases, outliers and missing 
values.  
5.7.3.1& Identifying&duplicate&cases&
Three duplicate cases were identified using the SPSS software. These cases were numbered 
66, 149 and 640. Each case was individually reviewed and corrected. The first data entry error 
found was with case 660 which was wrongly input as 66. The second error was case 149 
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which was entered instead of 147. The third error was case 640 and it was entered instead of 
number 679. All duplicate cases were corrected.  
5.7.3.2& Identifying&outliers&
The number of implausible values outside the range were two - see Table 12. The 
questionnaires were identified through SPSS software and were thoroughly checked and all 
the outliers were corrected.  
Table 12: Identified outliers 
Case no. Item Wrong variable Correct variable 
1024 A5 51 5 
979 A15 34 3 
5.7.3.3& Identifying&blank&records&and&missing&values&&
The next step involved checking the data for blank records and missing values using SPSS 24. 
As a result, blank records, due to mistakes in data entry, in 15 questionnaires were completed 
using the missing responses from the questionnaires. Afterwards, the data were checked again 
and the frequency tables showed no more blank records.  
According to the AHRQ’s recommendations (Sorra et al., 2016), responses that are 
unreadable or inappropriate will be marked as missing. In cases where a respondent has 
multiple marked responses, the highest number will be chosen. This rarely occurred. 
Missing values were analysed using SPSS 24 to examine their patterns. This will be discussed 
further in section 5.8. 
In cross-sectional studies using surveys, individuals may refuse to participate entirely in the 
survey, also known as unit non-response, or may answer some but not all the items in the 
survey, also called item non-response (Raghunathan, 2004). Item non-response happens for 
many reasons including sensitivity of the item and fatigue with the tool (Garson, 2012). I have 
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examined incomplete questionnaires in my PhD thesis in order to identify the reasons behind 
the incompletion and to identify if there were any issues in these questionnaires. Different 
sections and different items were incomplete with no common items or sections between the 
questionnaires. Respondents might have faced difficulty with completion due to time 
constraints or because of the length of the questionnaire.  
5.7.3.4& Reverse&coding&
As previously mentioned, the HSOPSC measures 12 dimensions of patient safety and consists 
of 42 items. 24 items are positively worded and 18 items are negatively worded.  Negatively 
worded items (A5, A7, A8, A10, A12, A14, A16, A17, B3, B4, C6, D2, D3, D5, D6, D7, D9, 
D11) were reverse coded prior to any further data analyses. 
5.7.3.5& Skewness&and&Kurtosis&
Skewness is a measure of the asymmetry of a distribution and kurtosis is a measure of 
peakedness of a distribution (Kim, 2013). Values for asymmetry and kurtosis between -2 and 
+2 are considered acceptable in order to prove normal univariate distribution of values (Field, 
2009, George and Mallery, 2010). For sample sizes greater than 300, West et al. (1995) 
suggested either an absolute skewness value greater than 2 or an absolute kurtosis value 
greater than 7 as reference values for determining substantial non-normality. Furthermore, 
skewness and kurtosis values are reported as not a major problem within large samples 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Values of skewness and kurtosis were calculated for each 
individual item using SPSS 24 and histogram plots were visually inspected. The values of 
skewness of each item ranged between 0.016 and 1.25. The values of kurtosis of each item 
ranged between 0.0 and 3.6. All of the items’ skewness and kurtosis values were within an 
acceptable range and did not suggest any deviations from normality. Also, examination of the 
histograms suggested normal distribution of values.  
5.8" Data"analysis""
As previously mentioned, among the 1,511 questionnaires that were distributed at the three 
hospitals, 1,310 questionnaires were completed and returned. Prior to analysis, the data were 
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screened for missing values using SPSS 24 and a further 30 questionnaires (n=30, 2%) were 
excluded at this phase since they were found to have missing values of more than 7%. As a 
result, none of the items were found to have missing values more than 7%. Therefore, it was 
decided to keep those cases, as recommended by the statistical department, and to delete them 
on a list wise manner in the subsequent psychometric analysis in order to minimise any 
possible biases. The simplest and most common approach to missing data is complete case 
analysis or listwise deletion (Allison, 2003). Garson (2012) adds that, if the number of 
missing cases is small (5% of a sample), it is common simply to drop these cases from 
analysis. Therefore, the cases that were found to have missing values were deleted in a 
listwise manner in order to minimise any possible biases. One thousand, two hundred and 
eighty questionnaires (n=1280) were considered eligible and this number of completed 
questionnaires (n=1280) was sufficient to undertake FA as will be explained later 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).  
Before proceeding to FA, a pre-analysis phase is necessary to examine the suitability of the 
data for FA and to examine the strength of the correlations amongst the items of the HSOPSC 
(Pallant, 2007).  
Next, in order to test the construct validity of the tool, it is recommended to use the strengths 
of both EFA and CFA analytical techniques (Gerbing and Hamilton, 1996). This study 
combined both approaches to develop an optimal model, based on the original HSOPSC 
model, for assessing patient safety climate in Kuwaiti public hospitals. Our data analysis plan 
was based on three main phases. The first phase aims to investigate whether the original 
HSOPSC 12 Factor model is appropriate for the Kuwaiti data. Both CFA and reliability 
analysis were used at this step. The second phase aimed to examine whether an alternative 
factor model would fit the Kuwaiti data better. For model construction, EFA was carried out 
using the calibration half of the data set (Sample A, n=640). The third and final phase 
involved undertaking CFA and reliability analysis using the validation half of data set, to test 
the fit of the resultant model from the previous phase (Sample B, n=640). Factor correlations 
of the optimal model were performed in addition to comparisons between the CFA output of 
my optimal factor model and the outputs reported in previous studies.  
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5.8.1$ PreTanalysis$phase$
A number of issues need to be considered when judging whether a particular data set is 
suitable for FA including sample size and the strength of the inter-correlation amongst the 
items (Pallant, 2007, Williams et al., 2010). 
5.8.1.1& Sample&size&requirements&
Tinsley and Tinsley (1987) highlighted the importance of reporting sample size requirements 
such as sample size of the study, the ratio of the sample size to the number of variables and 
the ratio of the number of variables to the number of factors in order to assess whether the 
sample size is sufficient to satisfactorily undertake FA. 
There are different opinions and guidelines in the literature about the importance of sample 
size as a requirement for FA (Hair J, 1995, Hogarty et al., 2005, Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2007). General rules of thumb include the Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) rule that recommends 
having at least 300 cases for FA. Comrey (1973) classified a sample of 100 as poor, 200 as 
fair, 300 as good, 500 as very good, and 1,000 as excellent in their guide to the adequacy of 
sample sizes. Tinsley and Tinsley (1987) argue that factors derived from the analysis of large 
samples are more generalizable than factors obtained from the analysis of smaller samples. 
This view is supported by De Vellis and Dancer (1991) as they stress that larger sized samples 
increase the generalizability of the conclusions obtained by means of FA. Also, the impact of 
sampling error can be minimised with a large sample size and, as a result, FA solutions 
become more stable and robust (MacCallum et al., 1999). As shown in Table 13, the sample 
size in this study was sufficient to conduct FA (n=1280). 
The majority of the proposed guidelines, as stated by Fabrigar et al. (1999), recommend 
determining the sample size based on the number of measured variables included in FA. One 
serious drawback to such guidelines is that they drastically vary (Fabrigar et al., 1999), 
ranging anywhere from 3:1, 6:1, 10:1, 15:1, or 20:1(Gorsuch, 1983, Hair J, 1995, MacCallum 
et al., 1999, Pett et al., 2003, Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The ratio of sample size to 
number of variables in this reported study is greater than 30:1, which is sufficiently large 
based on the different recommendations. According to the review by Osborne and Costello 
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(2009) of current practices in FA, larger samples tended to produce more accurate factor 
solutions. 70% of the studied samples with the largest subject to item ratio of 20:1 produced 
correct factor structures. 
Another set of recommendations involves the number of variables required for each factor, 
also known as variable-to-factor ratio. Fabrigar et al. (1999) recommended a variable-to-
factor ratio of at least 4:1 while Osborne and Costello (2009) considered a factor with less 
than three items as weak and unstable. The ratio of the number of variables to number of 
factors in the reported study is 3:1 and 4:1. 
In conclusion, the study sample fulfilled the sample size requirements and is appropriate for 
undertaking FA as shown in Table 13. 
Table 13: Sample size requirements of factor analysis 
Sample size requirements                                                               Number 
Sample size of the study 
Number of variables 
Sample-to-variables ratio 
Variables-to-factor ratio 
1280 
42 
>30:1 
3:1 and 4:1 
5.8.1.2& Factorability&of&the&correlation&matrix&
A correlation matrix displays the relationship between individual items. Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2007) recommend inspecting the correlation matrix, also known as Factorability of !, 
for correlation coefficients over 0.30 (Hair J, 1995, Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The 
researcher should reconsider whether FA is the suitable statistical method to employ if no 
correlations are above 0.30 (Williams et al., 2010). This signifies that the factors account for 
around 30% of the relationships within the data. According to Churchill Jr (1979),  low 
correlations indicate that items do not reflect the appropriate domain and are leading to error 
and unreliability. On the other hand, high correlations between items (above 0.80) indicate 
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that there is a large degree of overlap between patient safety culture aspects (Smits et al., 
2008). This will be discussed further in later. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) coefficient is a measure of sampling adequacy. KMO 
coefficient values range between 0 and 1. A value of less than 0.5 indicates that the data is 
considered unacceptable for FA (Kaiser, 1974). Values between 0.5 and 0.7 are considered 
mediocre, 0.7 and 0.8 are good, 0.8 and 0.9 are great and values above 0.9 as excellent 
(Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999, Kaiser, 1974).  
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity is another measure of the suitability of data for FA (Bartlet, 
1954). The null hypothesis of Bartlett’s test states that the observed correlation matrix is equal 
to the identity matrix, suggesting that there is no correlation amongst the items (Pett et al., 
2003). In other words, Bartlett's test examines whether the correlation matrix resembles an 
identity matrix (Field, 2009). If Bartlett's test is not significant, then the correlation matrix 
resembles an identity matrix and all item correlation coefficients are close to zero (Field, 
2009). For FA to be considered appropriate, Bartlett's test should be significant (P<0.05) 
(Tabachnick et al., 2001) indicating that the correlations between items are significantly 
different from zero (Field, 2009).  
As shown in Table 14 (below), the KMO statistic has a value of 0.88, which indicates that the 
sample has a sufficient level of homogeneity. Therefore, FA is appropriate for the data set.  
Bartlett's test indicates that the correlation matrix differs from the identity matrix at a high-
level of significance ("<0.001). The presence of non-zero correlation means that FA is 
appropriate for the sample. 
Table 14: KMO and Bartlett's Test Results 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.880 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 8442,924 
Df 861 
Sig. 0.000 
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In conclusion, these measures show that the Kuwaiti survey data are appropriate for 
conducting FA.  
5.9" Testing"the"original"USA"HSOPSC"model"
The main purpose of this step is to test how well the original HSOPSC 12-factor model fits 
the Kuwaiti data.  This step of analysis includes the CFA and reliability analysis using the 
whole sample (1280 questionnaires) of the Kuwaiti data (Sorra and Nieva, 2004).  
5.9.1$ Confirmatory$Factor$Analysis$
In this step, CFA will be used to test the hypothesized factor structure of the original 
HSOPSC questionnaire using Kuwaiti data. CFA, as the name suggests, is a confirmatory 
technique (Ullman, 2006). In a CFA, the researcher examines a proposed theory, or model. 
Thus, the researcher has strong expectations and assumptions based on a priori theory about 
the number of factors, the relations between the latent factors, and the relations between the 
latent factors and measured variables (Henson and Roberts, 2006, Pett et al., 2003, Ullman, 
2006).  
CFA is considered an essential analytic tool for construct validation. The results of CFA can 
deliver compelling evidence of the convergent and discriminant validity of theoretical 
constructs (Hoyle, 2012).  
There is a wide consensus in the literature to evaluate the overall model fit using goodness of 
fit indices. A variety of fit indices are available to researchers (DiStefano and Hess, 2005) 
including the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Standardised Root Mean Square Residual 
(SRMR), the Root Mean Square Error Of Approximation (RMSEA), Tucker-Lewis Index 
(TLI, nonnormed fit index or NNFI, ), Root mean square residuals (RMR) (Kline, 2014, 
Marsh, 1996, Sanislow et al., 2002). This variety complicates the issue of selecting and 
deciding the cut-off values for each of the fit indices to indicate a good model fit (Bentler, 
1990, Hu and Bentler, 1999). In a review by McDonald and Ho (2002), the most commonly 
used fit indices were reported as the CFI, the RMSEA, the GFI (goodness of fit index), the 
NNFI (TLI) and the NFI (normed fit index). While there is no golden rule regarding the 
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assessment of model fit and since different indices reflect a different aspect of model fit, 
reporting a variety of indices becomes necessary (Crowley and Fan, 1997). Kline (2014) 
recommends the use of Chi-Square test, the RMSEA, the CFI, and the SRMR. A two-index 
strategy that involves coupling the SRMR with another index; the NNFI, RMSEA or the CFI 
was recommended. These indices were recommended because they were found to be the least 
sensitive to sample size, model misspecification and parameter estimates (Hu and Bentler, 
1999).  
According to Hu and Bentler (1999), models with a cut-off value close to 0.90 for CFI; a 
cutoff value close to 0.08 for SRMR; and a cutoff value close to 0.06 for RMSEA are 
indicative of good model fit. While McDonald and Ho (2002) recommend that a RMSEA of 
less than 0.05 corresponds to a good model fit and an RMSEA less than 0.08 corresponds to 
an acceptable model fit. Perfect model fit regarded these (CFI, GFI) as acceptable if they were 
greater than 0.90.  
To evaluate CFA model fit in our study, the Chi-square test statistic (#2), Chi-squared statistic 
per one freedom degree (#2/DF), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Standardised Root 
Mean Square Residual (SRMR), the Root Mean Square Error Of Approximation (RMSEA), 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI, nonnormed fit index or NNFI, ) and Root mean square residuals 
(RMR) are used. Table 15 shows the fit indices and their acceptable threshold levels. 
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Table 15: CFA fit indices and their acceptable thresholds 
Fit Index Acceptable Threshold Levels 
Chi square (X2)	  Low χ2 relative to degrees of freedom with an insignificant p value (p > 0.05) (Hooper et al., 
2008) 
Smaller rather than larger values indicate a 
good fit  
Chi-squared statistic per one degree of 
freedom (#2/DF) 2:1 (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007) 
3:1 (Kline, 2014) 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)  
 
CFI should be equal to, or greater than, 0.90 to 
indicate a good model fit (Hu and Bentler, 
1999) 
Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA)  
 
RMSEA < 0.08 indicates an acceptable fit 
(McDonald and Ho, 2002) 
RMSEA < 0.05 indicates a good fit 
(McDonald and Ho, 2002) 
Root mean square residuals (RMR)  RMR should be < 0.10, or 0.08, or 0.06, or 
0.05, or even .04 for a well- fitting model (Hu 
and Bentler, 1999) 
Standardised root mean square residual 
(SRMR)  
SRMR < 0.08 indicates good fit (Hu and 
Bentler, 1999) 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI)  Should be greater than 0.90 for a good fit (Hu 
and Bentler, 1999) 
 
CFA steps were conducted with the use of AMOS software (Arbuckle, 2014). The results 
obtained by applying CFA for the original 12 factors USA HSOPSC model using Kuwaiti 
data in comparison to USA data are reported in Table 16. 
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Table 16: CFA Fit indicators of original 12 factors HSOPSC model; Kuwaiti and 
USA data (Sorra and Dyer, 2010) 
Model Chi-Square 
statistic 
DF CMIN/DF CFI 
 
RMR 
 
SRMR 
 
RMSEA TLI 
USA data 2064 746 - 0.94 - - 0.04 - 
Kuwaiti data 3623.5 753 5 0.81 0.06 0.06 
 
0.056 0.784 
As described in Table 16 (above), the original 12 factor HSOPSC model has an unsatisfactory 
fit with the Kuwaiti data compared to the USA data.  
CMIN/DF has a value of approximately 5 while CMIN/DF value should be 2 or less for a 
good fit (Ullman, 2006) or at least CMIN/DF < 5 for the acceptance of the model 
(Schumacker and Lomax, 2004). CFI has value 0.81 for Kuwaiti data compared to CFI of 
0.94 for USA data. CFI of >0.90 is needed for a good model fit. TLI has value 0.784 while for 
a good model TLI should be >0.90 (Hu and Bentler, 1999). Overall, the values indicate an 
unsatisfactory fit of the original 12 Factor HSOPSC model for the Kuwaiti data.    
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5.9.2$ Reliability$analysis$of$the$original$12$factor$HSOPSC$model$
Reliability, also referred to as consistency,  reflects the degree to which test scores are 
replicable (Geisinger et al., 2013, Streiner et al., 2015). De Vellis and Dancer (1991, p.27) 
defined it as “the proportion of variance attributable to the true score of a latent variable.” A 
common way of estimating reliability is through assessing internal consistency. Internal 
consistency is based on the correlation among the items comprising a specific dimension of 
the instrument (Pett et al., 2003). It can be assessed by using Cronbach's alpha, which is the 
most commonly used internal consistency reliability coefficient (Cronbach, 1951, Tavakol 
and Dennick, 2011). Cronbach's alpha (α) ranges from 0 to 1; with the minimum criterion for 
acceptable reliability of at least α=0.70. Higher alphas signify better reliability (Nunnally et 
al., 1967). The level of internal consistency (George, 2003, 231), can be classified as 
‘excellent’ if values are above 0.9, ‘good’ if between 0.8 and 0.9, ‘acceptable’ if above 0.7, 
‘questionable’ if above 0.6, ‘poor’ if above 0.5, and ‘unacceptable’ below 0.5. It should be 
noted that Cronbach’s alpha must be interpreted with caution. Cronbach’s alpha value α ≥ 
0.60 is recommended for the majority of research purposes (Field, 2009, Suhr, 2003). 
Acceptable Cronbach’s alpha values may not reflect the internal consistency of items but may 
derive from a large number of test items (Streiner, 2003). Further, it has been reported that 
alpha coefficients may be low because of lack of homogeneity of variances among items or 
when there are fewer items in the factor (Kline, 2014). 
To examine the internal consistency of the original HSOPSC 12 factor model using Kuwaiti 
data, Cronbach's alpha (α) was calculated for all original HSOPSC dimensions. The HSOPSC 
questionnaire consists of both positively worded items (24 items) and negatively worded 
items (18 items). Therefore, negatively worded items were re-coded to provide a higher value 
that would correspond to a more positive response (Pallant, 2007). Cronbach’s alpha was 
calculated for every set of the items within each dimension and were then compared with 
results for USA data (Sorra and Dyer, 2010). The results of the reliability analysis for Kuwaiti 
data are reported in Table 17 (below). 
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Table 17: Reliability analysis results for Kuwaiti and USA data 
HSOPSC Dimension  Cronbach’s alpha 
Kuwaiti 
data 
USA data 
Teamwork Within Units 0.634 0.83 
Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting Safety 0.613 0.75 
Organisational learning—Continuous improvement 0.494 0.76 
Management Support for Patient Safety 0.709 0.83 
Overall Perceptions of Patient Safety 0.286 0.74 
Feedback and Communication About Error 0.614 0.78 
Communication Openness 0.601 0.72 
Frequency of Events Reported 0.858 0.84 
Teamwork Across Units 0.720 0.80 
Staffing 0.382 0.63 
Handoffs and Transitions 0.701 0.80 
Non-punitive Response to Errors 0.604 0.79 
The internal consistency of the Kuwaiti data (n=1280) was ≥0.60 within nine dimensions. 
Three dimensions had internal consistencies less than 0.60. Cronbach’s α=0.382 for 
“Staffing”, 0.286 for “Overall perceptions of patient safety”, and 0.494 for “Organisational 
learning—Continuous improvement.” Additionally, two dimensions have a questionable 
internal consistency because their Cronbach’s alpha value was 0.60 (Cronbach’s α=0.604 for 
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“Non-punitive Response to Errors” and Cronbach’s α=0.601 for “communication openness”. 
For all dimensions reported there was a lower internal consistency of the Kuwaiti data than 
the internal consistency of the USA data except “Frequency of events reported.” 
In summary, the results of the CFA and reliability analysis indicate that the original HSOPSC 
12 Factor model is not a satisfactory fit when it is used for the Kuwaiti data. Therefore, an 
EFA was used for investigating an alternative factor structure which might be more 
appropriate for Kuwaiti data. 
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5.10" Construction"of"an"optimal"model"
There are major procedural decisions that a researcher should consider when conducting a FA 
(Fabrigar et al., 1999). First, one must determine the appropriateness of using EFA based on 
the goals of the research. Second, a method of data extraction must be selected. Third, the 
researcher must decide how many factors should be retained in the model. Finally, the 
researcher must select a method for rotating the initial factor analytic solution to reach a final 
more readily interpreted solution (Fabrigar et al., 1999, MacCallum et al., 1999).  
5.10.1$Determining$the$appropriateness$of$EFA$$
The primary aim of EFA is to identify a set of latent constructs represented by a set of 
measured variables (Henson and Roberts, 2006) or as Fabrigar et al. (1999, p.274) best 
explains it “…to arrive at a more parsimonious conceptual understanding of a set of measured 
variables by determining the number and nature of common factors needed to account for the 
pattern of correlations among the measured variables.” Thus, a researcher should carefully 
consider if identifying latent constructs is a goal of the research project before moving any 
further with EFA.  
A variety of factor extraction techniques are available. Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
and Principal Factor Analysis (PFA), often referred to as Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) or 
Common Factor Analysis, are the two most common factor extraction techniques (Gorsuch, 
1983, Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The terms are often used interchangeably by researchers, 
despite serving different purposes (Beavers et al., 2013). The main difference between the two 
techniques lies in their purposes. If the purpose is to determine the linear combinations of 
measured variables that retain as much of the original measures' variance as possible, then 
PCA can be an appropriate form of analysis (Conway and Huffcutt, 2003, Ford et al., 1986). It 
is widely described as a data reduction method (Osborne and Costello, 2009). PCA does not 
attempt to interpret the results in terms of latent constructs. Whereas, if the purpose is to 
understand latent factors that account for relationships among measured variables, then PAF 
can be more appropriate (Fabrigar et al., 1999, Ford et al., 1986). In other words, a clear 
distinction has to be made between identifying latent constructs as an objective and that of 
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data reduction as different extraction methods have been designed to achieve these two 
different objectives (Fabrigar et al., 1999). 
Conway and Huffcutt (2003) highlight that both theory and empirical evidence support PAF 
as the more appropriate method. Gorsuch (1990) and Snook and Gorsuch (1989) agree that 
there is little reason to use PCA if PAF produces more sensible and accurate results than PCA. 
It should be noted that when there are 30 or more variables or variables have high reliability, 
the practical differences between the two techniques are often insignificant (Gorsuch, 1983, 
Thompson, 2004).  
Since the aim of this study is to identify a suitable tool to be used for assessing patient safety 
climate in Kuwait’s public hospitals, this aim incorporates uncovering and interpreting the 
resulting dimensions or latent factors that represent the structure of the tool based on Kuwaiti 
survey data. Therefore, PAF was selected as the appropriate statistical method of EFA for our 
study. 
5.10.2$Determining$the$number$of$factors$to$retain$
After extraction, the researcher must decide the number of factors to retain for rotation 
(Osborne and Costello, 2009). This decision should attempt to explain as much variance as 
possible while sustaining a parsimonious model (Knight, 2000). In other words, the objective 
is to choose enough factors to sufficiently represent the data, while eliminating factors that are 
not theoretically or statistically relevant (Fabrigar et al., 1999). 
Choosing the correct number of factors in a model is of critical importance as errors in the 
selection can have a significant effect on the results obtained (Comrey, 1973).  As a result, 
there is wide agreement in the literature that the use of multiple techniques to estimate the 
number of factors to retain gives the most interpretable solution (Fabrigar et al., 1999, 
Ferguson and Cox, 1993, Gorsuch, 1997). Two widely used techniques are the Eigenvalue 
rule (Kaiser, 1974) and the Scree plot (Cattell, 1966). Kaiser’s criterion suggests retaining all 
factors that are above an Eigenvalue of 1 (Kaiser, 1974). Eigenvalue represents the amount of 
variation, in all the variables, contributed by each factor (Garson, 2012). Thus, according to 
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this method, we can retain only factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1. In other words, a 
factor needs to extract at least as much as the equivalent of one original variable to be 
included. This method helps in “deciding the number of factors underlying the observed 
variables, based on extracting only factors that explain more variability than any single 
observed variable would” (Waterson et al., 2010, p.3).  
It has been argued that Kaiser’s criterion might result in overestimation of the number of 
extracted factors (Field, 2009, Osborne and Costello, 2009). As a result, it is suggested to use 
the Scree plot in combination with Eigenvalues to determine the number of factors to retain 
(Yong and Pearce, 2013). The Scree plot is a graphical representation of Eigenvalues and 
factors (Cattell, 1966). It is used to indicate the number of extracted factors (Pallant, 2007) as 
it helps “to identify at which point subsequent extracted factors explain only spurious extra 
variability, and hence should not be retained” (Waterson et al., 2010, p.3). 
Ideally, as described by De Vellis and Dancer (1991), the progression of factors will have an 
abrupt point of transition from vertical to horizontal regions of the plot and a clear elbow. 
Occasionally, the transition is gradual with a gentle curve made up of several factors found 
between the vertical and horizontal regions of the plot. Cattell’s criterion recommends 
retaining those factors that lie above the elbow of the plot (Cattell, 1966). To determine the 
break point, researchers suggest drawing a horizontal line and a vertical line starting from 
each end of the curve (Yong and Pearce, 2013). The Scree plot cut-off is relatively subjective 
and some researchers face difficulties in identifying the precise cut-off point (De Vellis and 
Dancer, 1991). This may lead to over-extraction of factors (Henson and Roberts, 2006). As a 
result, a combination of Eigenvalues greater than 1 rule and the Scree plot were used in our 
study in order to achieve the most interpretable solution.  
The decision on how many factors to retain should be based on the degree of 
comprehensibility and interpretability of the factor structure in the context of the research 
(Suhr, 2006). 
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5.10.3$Determining$the$method$of$factor$rotation$
Factor rotation usually aims to create a more meaningful and interpretable solution (Fabrigar 
et al., 1999, Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). It improves the interpretation of factor loadings by 
decreasing some of the ambiguities accompanying the preliminary analysis (Suhr, 2006).  It 
identifies clusters of variables that can be characterized mainly in terms of a single latent 
variable (De Vellis and Dancer, 1991). 
Extracted factors should be rotated to an optimal “simple structure”, defined as each variable 
having a high loading on one of the factors, and zero or low loadings on the other factors 
(Beavers et al., 2013, Gorsuch, 1983). Factor loadings are the correlations of items with 
factors and factors are deduced by their loadings (Kline, 2014).  
Rotations can be either orthogonal such as Varimax, or Oblique such as direct oblimin. 
Orthogonal rotation assumes independence among the factors and results in some high 
loadings and some low loadings for each factor, while Oblique rotation allows for a degree of 
correlations among the factors and gives one high loading and other loadings near zero for 
each factor (Beavers et al., 2013, Conway and Huffcutt, 2003).  
Orthogonal rotations are not always theoretically appropriate while Oblique rotations should 
theoretically render a more accurate solution (Loo, 1979, Osborne and Costello, 2009). 
Therefore, an Oblique rotation is preferred (Fabrigar et al., 1999, Gorsuch, 1997).  
Following the rotation of factors, the researcher must examine the factor pattern matrix and 
decide on the acceptable level of loading for variables to define factors (Beavers et al., 2013). 
Factor loadings represent the strength of relationships (Yong and Pearce, 2013). Guadagnoli 
and Velicer (1988) recommends that each factor should be represented by at least three to five 
items that load strongly on that factor. De Vellis and Dancer (1991) labelled factors that have 
less than three variables and item loadings that are less than 0.32 as undesirable.  
Guidelines vary in the literature (Beavers et al., 2013). An item that has a loading of 0.70 or 
higher and does not significantly cross load on another factor greater than 0.40 is considered a 
Chapter Five: Psychometric properties of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 147 
good identifier of the factor (Garson, 2012). Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) recommend 0.32 
for a minimum loading on an item as a good rule of thumb.  
Osborne and Costello (2009) propose a loading of 0.50 as strong while Guadagnoli and 
Velicer (1988) recommend that the loading should be 0.60 or greater. A loading of 0.70 or 
greater is viewed as ideal  (Beavers et al., 2013). It suggests that nearly 50% of the variance of 
that item is accounted for by the factor. A cross loading item is an item that loads at 0.32 or 
higher on two or more factors (Osborne and Costello, 2009). Cross loadings are often 
problematic as they indicate that a variable is related to more than one factor. On the other 
hand, cross loadings may indicate conceptual overlap (Ferguson and Cox, 1993). 
If the difference in the degree of loading is small (! 0.2), then removal of the variable is 
acceptable as it is difficult to say which factor it belongs to. However, if the degree of loading 
is large ( "0.2), then the variable can be allowed to remain and be assumed to load on the 
factor with the highest loading (Ferguson and Cox, 1993). If there are several items that cross 
load, this may indicate either poorly written items or a weak a priori factor structure (Osborne 
and Costello, 2009). As a result, a decision needs to be made by the researcher whether a 
cross loading item should be kept or dropped from the analysis.  
FA as a statistical approach is not without criticism. This is largely related to the 
subjectiveness of the outcomes which are determined by the researcher (Henson and Roberts, 
2006). Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p.611) point out that “decisions about number of factors 
and rotational scheme are based on pragmatic rather than theoretical criteria.” 
Notwithstanding these limitations, Henson and Roberts (2006) suggest that to limit the 
subjectiveness of EFA, researchers must be systematic and apply thorough judgement to 
factor reduction and construction and latent variables.  
In this study, Varimax rotation was used initially to examine the clarity of the initial solution. 
Following that, Oblique rotation was used to allow factors of patient safety climate to be 
correlated.  
In summary, the following EFA criteria were used for my PhD thesis:  
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1.( Principle Axis Factoring was selected to use as the extraction method of EFA.  
2.( A combination of Eigenvalues greater than 1 rule and the Scree plot were used to 
estimate the number of factors to retain.  	  
3.( Varimax then Oblique rotation (direct oblimin) were used as the rotation methods. 	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5.10.4$$Exploratory$Factor$Analysis$
In EFA, the observed variables (questionnaire items) are analysed to examine the degree to 
which these items correlate. Such correlation may provide evidence for the composition of a 
latent factor. The correlation coefficient is called a factor loading which reflects the 
magnitude of the relationship between the variable and the factor. This analysis creates a more 
manageable set of factors  (Paltridge and Phakiti, 2010).  
As recommended by Garson (2012), EFA is best used in a research design that includes cross-
validation as one data set is used for model construction while another set is used for model 
validation. Also due to the controversy associated with conducting EFA and CFA on the same 
data, it is recommended to follow a split-half validation technique (De Vellis and Dancer, 
1991, Kline, 2015). Therefore, the Kuwaiti data set was randomly split into to two 
independent data sets using SPSS 24. Each group contains a set of 640 (n=640) cases. EFA 
was first carried out on the calibration half of the data set (Sample A, n=640) to produce an 
optimal model. This step was followed by CFA using the validation half of the data set to test 
the fit of the resultant model (Sample B, n=640). In other words, the calibration half of the 
data set was used for model construction and the validation half of the data set was used for 
confirming the explored factor structure resulting from model construction.  
5.10.4.1& EFA&steps&and&output&
At this step, EFA aims to examine the suitability of the original HSOPSC 12 Factor model, in 
addition to identifying an alternative factor model which might fit the Kuwaiti data better. 
Data analysis was carried out using SPSS 24 on the 42 items of the original 12 HSOPSC 
factor structure, excluding the two single outcome items (patient safety grade, number of 
incidents reported).  
EFA consists of two basic stages. In the first stage, EFA is concerned with estimating the 
number of factors that should be extracted to represent the HSOPSC factor structure. The 
second stage is concerned with interpreting the meaning of the extracted factors and 
representing them in terms of the theoretical structures that reflect the patient safety climate 
dimensions.  
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EFA output of the initial steps (Steps 1 to 8) including tables of communalities, total variance 
explained, rotated factor matrix and pattern matrix are presented in a separate Appendix 
(Appendix 15- Appendix 60) due to space restriction. EFA output of the final steps (Steps 9 to 
12) is provided in this chapter. A summary of the different solutions is summarised below. 
5.10.4.2& Conclusion&from&the&solutions&with&different&numbers&of&the&factors&(12>&9>
8>7>10>11)&
An investigation of five possible solutions was undertaken in steps 4-8 to explore the number 
of factors that could be extracted. The initial solution with 12 factors demonstrates that 8 
factors could fit the 42 safety climate items. The 9 Factors solution demonstrates that 7 factors 
could fit the 42 safety climate items. The 8 Factors solution demonstrates that 6 factors could 
fit the 42 safety climate items. The 11 Factors solution demonstrates that 9 factors could fit 
the 42 safety climate items. The 10 Factors solution demonstrates that 9 factors fit the 42 
safety climate items. The summary results of the six solutions including the initial solution are 
reported in Table 18 (below). 
Table 18: Summary results of the six solutions 
Step  Number of extracted 
factors 
Number of the 
satisfactory 
factors 
Total variance 
explained by 
extracted 
factors 
Items not loading 
1 12 8 45 A5- A11- A15- 
A17 
4 9 7 41.0 A5 - A9- A15- 
A17-A7 
5 8 6 39.2 A5-A15-A17-A9 
6 7 5 37.4 A11-A5-A7-A9-
A15- A17 
7 11 9 43.8 A5-A7- A17 
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Step  Number of extracted 
factors 
Number of the 
satisfactory 
factors 
Total variance 
explained by 
extracted 
factors 
Items not loading 
8 10 9 42.6 A5-A7- A17 A9 
Items with low communalities and loadings in each solution are reported in Table 19. 
Table 19: Items which have low communalities and loading 
Step Number of 
the factors 
Items which have low 
communalities (<0.3) 
Items which have low loadings 
(<0.4) 
1 12 A5-A7-A9-A10-A11-A15-
A17 
A13- B3-D9- A6- C1-C5- A10- 
A7- D11- A18- C3 
4 9 A2-A5-A7-A9-A10-A15-
A17 
D9- B3- C5- A10- A2-A11 
5 8  A2 - A5- A7- A9-A10- 
A11-A15-A17 
A13-D9- C5-A6- B3- A10-A7- 
A2-A11 
6 7 A2 - A5- A7- A9-A10 - 
A11- A15- A17- B3 -C3-D6 
C3-A18-A13- C1- A2- B4-B3-
A10 
7 11 A5- A7- A9- A10- A11- 
A15- A17- D6 
B3-D9- A6- A10- A9-A13- C5- 
A7-A11 
8 10 A5 - A7- A9- A10 - A11- 
A15- A17- D6 
A13-D9- C5- A10- A11 
The items A5 and A17 did not load upon any factors within all investigated solutions and 
items A7, A9 and A15 did not load upon most of the investigated solutions. The items A5, 
A7, A9, A10, A15 and A17 have low communalities across all investigated solutions. The 
item A10 has low loading in all solutions. It is important to point out that items A10, A15, 
and A17 are from the dimension “Overall perceptions of patient safety”, item A9 is from 
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dimension “Organisational learning—Continuous improvement” and items A5 and A7 are 
from dimension “Staffing.” 
The comparison of the different solutions suggests that the 8 Factors solution is most 
appropriate (four items without loadings, the initial solution with 12 factors indicates that 8 
factors is satisfactory, only one factor is without strongly loaded items) (See Appendix 36-
38). Scree plot indicates that 8 Factor and 9 Factor solutions are more appropriate. Both 8 
Factors and 9 Factors solutions did not produce heavy loadings of all items. 
According to the 8 Factors solution, two factors (Factor 7 and 8) have less than two strongly 
loading items (Appendix 37) but as indicated by the factor matrix of the 8 Factors solution 
(Appendix 36), A14 has a loading of 0.382 and A2 has loading of 0.355 on Factor 8, and A6 
has a loading of 0.349 on Factor 7. Approximately 0.40 is reached in all cases. The rest of the 
factors have strong loadings by two and more items.  
The 9 Factors solution showed that two factors (Factors 8 and 9) have less than two strongly 
loading items (Appendix 30). As seen in the factor matrix of the 9 Factors solution (Appendix 
29), B3 has loading 0.323 upon Factor 8. A2 has a loading of 0.353 and A14 has loading 
0.353 upon Factor 9. So, only two items have loadings approximately close to 0.4. After 
Oblique rotation (Appendix 32), the 9 Factors solution had item B4 with a loading of 0.323 
and item B3 with a loading 0.337 upon Factor 7. A10 has loading 0.304 upon Factor 5 and A7 
has loading 0.377 upon Factor 5. Thus, only one item has loading approximately near 0.4. So, 
the final solution for 9 factors demonstrates that one factor (Factor 5) has only one loaded 
item (see Appendix 32). Therefore, the Eight Factors solution was chosen as most 
appropriate. 
Next, for obtaining the optimal solution, the 8 Factors solution was investigated using 
Oblique rotation. 
5.10.4.3& Step&9:&Eight&Factors&solution&
At this step, EFA was conducted with all 42 safety climate items of the HSOPSC and an 
extraction of 8 factors and Oblique rotation. 
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Total explained variance is the same as at step 5 because the changing of the rotation method 
does not change the explained variance. The pattern matrix of the solution with 8 factors is 
reported in Appendix 38. It indicates that items A5, A13, A17, A9, C5, and A15 did not load 
on any factor. Items A6, A11, A2, A7, A10, D11, B3, D9, A18 have loadings <0.40. 
Therefore, the items A5, A13, A17, A9, C5, A15, A6, A11, A2, A7, A10, D11, B3, D9, and 
A18 were excluded.  
5.10.4.4& Step&10:&Eight&Factors&model&
Then EFA with 8 factors was run without A2, A5, A6, A7, A9, A10, A11, A13, A15, A17, 
A18, B3, C5, D9, D11 using Oblique rotation. The results are reported in Appendixes 54-56. 
Two items (A14 and B4) are poorly explained because they have communalities <0.3. Item 
D6 has a communality slightly less than 0.3 (0.29) (See Appendix 54). As shown in Appendix 
55, the total variance explained by 8 factors is about 47.5%. D10 cross loaded on two items. 
Items B4 and C3 have low loadings (<0.4) (See Appendix 56). Therefore, items D10, C3, and 
B4 were excluded. 
5.10.4.5& Step&11:&Eight&Factor&model&with&items&D10,&C3&and&B4&excluded&
At this step, EFA was conducted with 24 items (excluding A2, A5, A6, A7, A9, A10, A11, 
A13, A15, A17, A18, B3, B4, C3, C5, D9, D10, D11) using 8 extracted factors and Oblique 
rotation. 
As reported in Appendix 57, A14 has low communality. Total variance explained by 8 factors 
is 48.4% (See Appendix 58). Item C1 has low loading.  Item A14 has a low communality and 
is theoretically not related to other items within Factor 4 (Please see Appendix 59). So C1 and 
A14 were excluded (Appendix 60).  
5.10.4.6& Step&12:&Final&EFA&solution&with&8&factors&
At this step, EFA was conducted within 22 items (excluding A2, A5, A6, A7, A9, A10, A11, 
A13, A14, A15, A17, A18, B3, B4, C1, C3, C5, D9, D10, D11) using 8 extracted factors and 
Oblique rotation (Appendix 60). 
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5.10.4.7& Output&of&the&final&EFA&solution&(8&factors,&22&items)&&
The communalities are reported in Appendix 61. As Appendix 62 shows, the total variance 
explained by 8 factors is about 50.2%. 
The Scree plot of the final EFA solution is shown at Figure 5.1 (below). 
Figure 5.1: Scree plot of the final EFA solution (8 factors, 22 items) 
 
As Figure 5.1 shows, point 8 can be considered as a break point. Table 20 represents the 
pattern matrix of the final solution. 
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Table 20: Pattern matrix of the final EFA solution (8 factors, 22 items) 
 
•( Supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs and transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
 
The structure and factors loadings of the final EFA solution are reported in Table 21 (below). 
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Table 21: Structure and factors loadings of the final EFA solution (8 factors, 22 
items) 
Number 
of Factor 
Factor Heavy loaded items 
(>0.4) 
Number of items 
1 Supervisor/Manager Expectations and 
Actions Promoting Safety 
B1-B2 2 
2 Frequency of Events Reported E1-E2-E3 3 
3 Handoffs and Transitions D3-D5-D6-D7 4 
4 Non-punitive Response to Errors A8-A12-A16 3 
5 Teamwork Across Units D2-D4 2 
6 Teamwork Within Units  A1-A3-A4 3 
7 Communication Openness C2-C4-C6 3 
8 Management Support for Patient 
Safety 
D1-D8 2 
The final solution explains 50.2% of variance by eight extracted factors and represents 22 
items from the safety climate questionnaire. The final solution includes 8 factors and 22 items 
(20 items were excluded). The excluded items are A2, A5, A6, A7, A9, A10, A11, A13, A14 
A15, A17, A18, B3, B4, C1, C3, C5, D9, D10, and D11. It is important to note that items 
A10, A15, A17, A18 came from one factor that is “Overall perceptions of patient safety”, A6, 
A9, A13 came from “Organisational learning—Continuous improvement” factor, A2, A5, A7, 
A14 came from “Staffing” factor and lastly C1, C3, C5 came from “Feedback and 
communication about error.” 
All factor loadings are within the range of 0.428-0.864. Five factors (Factor 2, Factor 3, 
Factor 4, Factor 6, and Factor 7) have three and more items with loading >0.4. Factor 1, 
Factor 5, and Factor 8 have two items with very high loading of >0.5 and the items in each 
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factor are theoretically related. There are no cross loaded items and there are no items with 
loading <0.4 and with communalities <0.3 in the solution. The solution is essentially 
consistent with the theoretical pattern. All items within each factor are theoretically related. 
Only D6 moved from "Teamwork across units" to "Handoffs and transitions.” 
5.10.4.8& EFA&within&each&scale&of&final&solution&
At the next step, each factor from the final model will be investigated to determine if the set 
of items within each factor can be explained as a single factor. The results of this step are 
reported in Appendix 63. These showed that each set of items which are corresponding to a 
certain factor can be satisfactorily explained by a single factor. In the next section, the testing 
of the fit of the optimal solution will be conducted using CFA. 
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5.10.5$Optimal$model$fit$testing$by$CFA$
The purpose of this step is to test, using the validation half of the data set (n=640), the fit of 
the optimal 8 Factor model that emerged from the EFA that was performed earlier using the 
calibration half of the dataset (n=640). 
The main steps of CFA were performed with 22 variables using AMOS software (Arbuckle, 
2014).   
The CFA results of the 8 Factor optimal model are reported in Table 22. 
Table 22: CFA Results of 8 factor optimal model (validation half of the sample)  
Model Chi-
Square 
statistic 
DF CMIN/DF CFI 
 
RMR 
 
SRMR RMSEA TLI 
8 
Factors 
424.9 
good 
181 
good 
2.3 
acceptable 
0.94 
good 
0.049 
good 
0.048 
good 
0.046 
good 
0.92 
good 
According to Table 22 (above), the investigated model (8 factors and 22 items) has a good fit. 
The Chi-squared statistic has a value of 424.9 and $ value <0.000.  Chi-square statistic (#2) 
value per one degree of freedom (#2/DF) is 2.3. Ullman (2006) proposed CMIN/DF value to 
be 2 or less for a good fit while Schumacker and Lomax (2004) proposed a value of at least 
CMIN/DF < 5 for the acceptance of the model). CFI has a value of 0.94 (good model fit 
>0.90). SRMR has a value of 0.048 (good model fit <0.08). RMSEA has a value of 0.046 
(good model fit <0.05). RMR has a value of 0.049 (good model fit <0.10). TLI has value 0.92 
(good model >0.9). Overall, the fit indices values from the CFA of the 8 Factors model 
indicate a good model fit. Next, the fit of the optimal model (8 factors, 22 items) was tested 
for the whole sample (n=1280).  
As Kline (2014) indicated, the standardised path coefficients reflecting the strength of the 
relationship between items and dimensions signify a small effect if values are < 0.10, a 
medium effect if values are around 0.30, and values >0.50 signify a large effect. For the 8 
Chapter Five: Psychometric properties of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 159 
Factors model, they were found to be generally large and ranged from 0.46 (Communication 
openness) to 0.89 (Frequency of incidents reported) (see Figure 5.2).  
Figure 5.2: HSOPSC 8 factor model in Kuwait and individual item 
standardised path coefficients 
 
Table 23 shows the results of the CFA of the optimal model (8 factors, 22 items) for whole 
data (n=1280). 
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Table 23:  CFA Results of 8 Factors optimal model (whole sample) 
Model Chi-
Square 
statistic 
DF CMIN/DF CFI 
 
RMR 
 
SRMR 
 
RMSEA 
 
TLI 
 
8 
Factors 
617.8 
good 
181 
good 
3.4 
acceptable 
0.946 
good 
0.041 
good 
0.038 
good 
0.043 
good 
0.931 
good 
All estimated parameters using the Kuwaiti data set indicate a good model fit (8 factors and 
22 items). Therefore, this model was accepted as the optimal model of my PhD thesis.  
 Table 24 presents the CFA results of the USA (Sorra and Nieva, 2004), Saudi Arabia 
(Alonazi, 2011), UK (Waterson et al., 2010) studies compared with our current study optimal 
model.  
Table 24: Comparison of CFA results of USA, UK, Saudi Arabia, and current 
research 
Model Chi-
Square 
statistic 
DF 
 
CMIN/DF 
 
CFI 
 
RMR 
 
SRMR 
 
RMSEA TLI 
 
USA 2064 746 2.8 0.94 - - 0.04 - 
UK 587 288 2 0.94 - 0.04 0.04 0.93 
Saudi 
Arabia 
553 202 2 0.94 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.93 
Current 
study 
617.8 181 
 
3.4 
 
0.95 
 
0.041 
 
0.038 
 
0.04 
 
0.93 
 
The CFA results generated from the optimal model in the current research are consistent with 
the CFA results of the USA, UK and Saudi Arabia models. It confirms that the 8 Factors 
solution (22 items) is the optimal model for the Kuwaiti data.  
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5.10.6$Construct$validity$
In order to test the construct validity of the HSOPSC instrument, inter-correlation coefficients 
with Pearson’s r were calculated between the 8 factors in addition to the two single item 
outcome measures (patient safety grade and number of incidents reported). The inter-
correlations of the 8 Factors optimal model were examined using a correlation matrix that 
displays the relationship between the individual factors.  
According to Sorra and Nieva (2004), the construct validity of each factor is reflected in 
moderately related scale scores. Correlations between 0.20 to 0.40 indicate a moderate 
relationship between dimensions, below 0.20 would indicate weakly related safety culture 
dimensions and correlations that are exceptionally high (>0.85) would indicate that the 
dimensions are measuring the same construct and that these dimensions could possibly be 
combined with some items eliminated. The Pearson’s correlation coefficients between scale 
scores are reported in Table 25. 
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Table 25: Inter-correlations between 8 Factors (scales) 
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05 
Table 25 shows that for my PhD thesis the inter-correlation coefficients ranged between 0.08 
and 0.72. All correlation coefficients are significant. 
The highest correlations were those between “Management support for patient safety” and 
“Teamwork across units” (r=0.722) but no correlation was exceptionally high. Three factors, 
“Non-punitive response to error” (r=0.133), “Teamwork within units” (r=0.105) and 
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“Communication openness” (r=0.088) were weakly correlated with one factor; Frequency of 
events reported. 
In general, construct validity is acceptable for all factors. All Eight factors are interrelated to 
each other. Most of the correlation coefficients indicate a moderate correlation between 
dimensions. This indicates that no two factors are measuring the same construct.  
Chapter Five: Psychometric properties of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 164 
5.10.7$Reliability$analysis$of$the$optimal$model$(8$factors$and$22$items)$
At this step, the reliability analysis was conducted to test the internal consistency of each of 
the eight factors of the optimal model by calculating Cronbach's alpha (α) for all eight 
dimensions. The HSOPSC questionnaire consists of both positively worded items and 
negatively worded items. Therefore, reverse scoring of the negatively worded items was 
performed to provide a value that would correspond to a positive response (Pallant, 2007) 
Reliability analysis was performed using the whole sample (N=1280). See Table 26. 
Table 26: Reliability analysis results for optimal solution (8 factors, 22 items, 
N=1280) 
Number 
of Factor 
Factor Heavy loaded items 
(>0.4) 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
1 Supervisors’/Managers’ Expectations 
and Actions Promoting Safety 
B1-B2 0.776 
2 Frequency of Events Reported E1-E2-E3 0.858 
3 Handoffs and Transitions D3-D5-D6-D7 0.685 
4 Nonpunitive Response to Errors A8-A12- A16 0.604 
5 Teamwork Across Units D2-D4 0.689 
6 Teamwork Within Units  A1-A3-A4 0.705 
7 Communication Openness C2-C4-C6 0.601 
8 Management Support for Patient 
Safety 
D1-D8 0.724 
Table 26 indicates the Cronbach’s Alpha value is >0.60 for all factors. Four factors (Factor 1, 
Factor 2, Factor 8, and Factor 6) have Cronbach’s Alpha value >0.70. Factor 3 and Factor 5 
have the Cronbach’s Alpha values around 0.70. Factor 4 and 7 values are 0.604 and 0.601 
respectively. 
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The value of the Cronbach’s Alpha ≥0.7 is appropriate for most studies (De Vellis and 
Dancer, 1991) and values of  ≥ 0.60 are recommended for the majority of research purposes 
(Field, 2009, Suhr, 2003). Therefore, the internal consistency is acceptable for the Eight 
Factors solution. Additionally, the model shows a good fit (CFA results). 
In summary, the 8-factor model (22 items) can be considered an optimal model for Kuwaiti 
data.  
5.11" Proposed"optimal"Eight"Factors"model"for"Kuwaiti"data"
As shown in Table 27, the proposed optimal model structure includes 8 dimensions (two 
negative factors, four positive factors, two mixed factors) and 22 items (13 items are 
positively worded and 9 items are negatively worded). 
Table 27: Proposed Eight Factors optimal model for Kuwaiti data 
Factor 1: Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting Patient Safety (2 
items) 
B1: My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to 
established patient safety procedures 
B2: My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient 
safety. 
Factor 2: Frequency of Events Reported (3 items) 
E1: When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the patient, how 
often is this reported? 
E2: When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is this 
reported? 
E3: When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is this 
reported? 
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Factor 3: Handoffs and Transitions (4 items) 
D3: Things "fall between the cracks" when transferring patients from one unit to another. 
(negatively worded)  
D5: Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. (negatively 
worded) 
D6: It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units. (negatively worded) 
D7: Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units. (negatively 
worded) 
Factor 4: Non-punitive Response to Errors (3 items) 
A8: Staff feel like their mistakes are held (used) against them. (negatively worded) 
A12: When an incident is reported, it feels like the person is being reported, not the 
problem. (negatively worded) 
A16: Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file. (negatively 
worded) 
Factor 5: Teamwork Across Units (2 items) 
D2: Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other. (negatively worded) 
D4: There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together. 
Factor 6: Teamwork Within Units (3 items) 
A1: People support one another in this unit. 
A3: When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the 
work done. 
A4: In this unit, people treat each other with respect. 
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Factor 7: Communication Openness (3 items) 
C2: Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care. 
C4: Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority. 
C6: Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right. (negatively 
worded) 
Factor 8: Management Support for Patient Safety (2 items) 
D1: Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety. 
D8: The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority. 
In summary, the reliability and validity of the HSOPSC were extensively tested using Kuwaiti 
data. The sample size used included completed questionnaires from 1280 respondents. The 
preliminary analysis indicates that Kuwaiti data was suitable for FA. The preliminary results 
of the reliability and CFA analyses demonstrated the fit of the original HSOPSC model was 
not satisfactory when used with Kuwaiti data. EFA, CFA, reliability and correlation analyses 
indicate that optimal model for Kuwaiti data is an 8 Factors (dimensions) model with 22 
items. 
5.12" Discussion"
Flin et al. (2006) argues that it is essential that tools are developed with robust psychometric 
properties that enable valid interpretations of patient safety climate test scores. Despite that, 
many studies still lack the proper reporting of the psychometric properties of questionnaires 
(Colla et al., 2005, Flin, 2007, Flin et al., 2006, Nieva and Sorra, 2003). Flin et al. (2006) 
proposed the reporting of standardised psychometric tests with EFA, CFA, reliability analysis 
and the correlations among survey dimensions as minimum psychometric analyses to ensure a 
comprehensive scientific approach. Psychometric properties of the HSOPSC have been 
assessed in the US, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and many other countries with variable 
results. This chapter explored the psychometric properties of the HSOPSC in a Kuwaiti 
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healthcare setting. This section will be divided into four parts. The first part will review the 
key findings that resulted from testing the original HSOPSC tool in a Kuwaiti healthcare 
setting (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). The second part moves on to examine the findings that 
resulted from the development of an optimal model of the HSOPSC. Methodological issues 
are addressed in the third part. Finally, the fourth part summarizes the findings, strengths and 
limitations and impact of the study.  
5.12.1$Testing$the$original$model$
There is a growing body of literature that recognises the importance of examining the 
suitability of data for FA prior to assessing the psychometric properties of patient safety 
climate questionnaires (Hammer et al., 2011, Pallant, 2007, Phipps et al., 2011, Smits et al., 
2008). In this study, a pre-analysis step was performed using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
measure of sampling adequacy (Kaiser, 1974) and Bartlett's test of sphericity (Bartlet, 1954) 
to assess the suitability of the Kuwaiti data for FA. The results showed that the Kuwaiti data 
was appropriate for performing FA. Following that, the first phase of psychometric analysis 
was performed, using CFA and reliability analysis, to investigate the suitability of the original 
HSOPSC model (12 factors, 42 items) for the Kuwaiti data (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). Results 
from our current study revealed an unsatisfactory fit of the original HSOPSC model for the 
Kuwaiti data (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). Consequently, the factor structure of the original USA 
HSOPSC questionnaire cannot be effectively used in Kuwaiti hospitals.  
5.12.1.1& CFA&
First of all, the results obtained by applying CFA to the original 12 factor HSOPSC model 
using Kuwaiti data in comparison to USA data are reported in Table 28. 
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Table 28: CFA Fit indicators of original 12 factor HSOPSC model: Kuwaiti and 
USA data (Sorra and Dyer, 2010).  
Model Chi-
Square 
statistic 
DF 
 
CMIN/
DF 
CFI 
 
RMR 
 
SRMR 
 
RMSEA 
 
TLI 
 
USA 
data 2064 746 - 0.94 - - 0.04 - 
Kuwaiti 
data 3623.5 
 
753 
 
5 
 
0.81 
 
 
0.06 
 
 
0.06 
 
 
0.056 
 
0.784 
The original 12 factor HSOPSC model has an unsatisfactory fit when used with the Kuwaiti 
data in comparison to the USA data. In our study, CFI has a value of 0.81 for Kuwaiti data 
compared to CFI of 0.94 for USA data. CFI of >0.90 is needed for a good model fit. RMSEA 
has a value of 0.056 for Kuwaiti data compared with a RMSEA of 0.04 for USA data (Sorra 
and Nieva, 2004). A RMSEA of < 0.05 indicates a good fit (McDonald and Ho, 2002).  
The global fit of our model was not consistently satisfactory as three criteria indicate an 
acceptable fit (RMSEA = .056, RMR = 0.06, SRMR = 0.06,) while CFI = 0.81, CMIN/DF = 
4.81, and TLI = 0.784 values indicate that the fit is not adequately good to confirm the 
proposed factor structure.  
Overall, model fit indices of the Kuwaiti data did not meet the goodness of fit criteria in 
comparison to the USA data (See Table 28, above  and Table 29, below). This indicates that 
when applying the original HSOPSC model to the Kuwaiti data, the model fit was 
unsatisfactory. 
According to Waterson et al. (2010), the CFA fit indices that were reported in the original 
HSOPSC study (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) had relatively higher values. This may be partly due 
to their use of the same sample for both the EFA and CFA. They go further by explaining that 
split-half validation was not undertaken and as a result, this would probably result in an over-
estimation of the degree of fit. Other studies have demonstrated similar results to ours (See 
Table 29).  
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In an assessment of the psychometric properties and suitability of the original HSOPSC 
within a large acute NHS Trust in the United Kingdom, a CFA achieved a poor model fit 
when compared with the original HSOPSC model (Waterson et al., 2010) (See Table 29). 
Similarly, Najjar et al. (2013a) investigated the factor structure of the original HSOPSC using 
data collected from 13 Palestinian hospitals. The model fit indices proved unsatisfactory. In 
addition, not all of the items loaded significantly on the expected dimension of the HSOPCS. 
Subsequently, data were analysed with EFA to examine whether the items represented a 
different factor structure in the Arabic data (See Table 29, below). EFA showed an 11 Factors 
structure with good validity and acceptable reliability. Also, a study conducted by Alonazi 
(2011) showed that the CFA fit indices of the original HSOPSC model using data from three 
Saudi hospitals were similarly unsatisfactory (See Table 29, below). 
Pfeiffer and Manser (2010) assessed the dimensionality and psychometric properties of the 
German version of the HSOPSC questionnaire in a large German speaking hospital in 
Switzerland. The values of the CFA fit indices showed that the fit was not consistently 
satisfactory to confirm the proposed factor structure of the original HSOPSC questionnaire 
(Sorra and Nieva, 2004) (See Table 29, below). 
Based on evidence from results of CFA in the different international studies mentioned above, 
it appears that the overall fit was consistently unsatisfactory when compared with Sorra and 
Nieva (2004) original USA HSOPSC questionnaire.  
The results obtained by applying CFA to the original 12 factor HSOPSC model using 
international data are reported in Table 29. 
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Table 29:  CFA Fit indicators of original 12 factor HSOPSC model: Cross-
international comparison Kuwait (KWT), United States (US), Dutch (NL), 
Turkey (TUR), Switzerland (SWISS), England (ENG), Saudi Arabia (SA), 
Palestine (PAL) 
Model Fit Indices KWT US 
Sorra and 
Nieva 
(2004) 
NL 
Smits et 
al. (2008) 
TUR 
Bodur 
and Filiz, 
(2010) 
SWISS 
Pfeiffer 
and 
Manser 
(2010) 
ENG 
Waterson 
et al. 
(2010) 
SA 
Alonazi 
(2011) 
PAL 
Najjar et 
al. 
(2013a) 
CFI  
(Bentler's 
Comparative Fit 
Index)  
0.81 
 
0.094 - - - 0.091 0.642 0.091 
GFI  
(Goodness of Fit 
Index)  
 0.092 - - - - - - 
AGFI	  
(GFI Adjusted for 
Degrees of 
Freedom)  
 0.090 - - - - - - 
NNFI  
(Bonett's Non-
normed Index)  
0.784 
 
0.093 - - - 0.89 0.617 0.90 
RMR  
(Root Mean 
Square Residual)  
0.06 
 
0.04 - - - 0.05 0.178 - 
RMSEA  
(Root Mean 
Square Error 
Approximation) 
0.056 
 
0.04 - - 0.04 0.04 0.678 0.04 
SRMR	  
(Standardised 
Root Mean Square 
Residual)  
0.06 
 
- - - - 0.05 0.193 0.05 
Chi-Square/ df  
 
4.81 2.77 - - 2.27 2.83 6.20 3.04 
The study reported in this thesis also highlights important differences in the reporting 
practices of CFA studies. As seen in Table 29 above, Two of the studies were incomplete in 
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terms of CFA fit indices (Bodur and Filiz, 2010, Smits et al., 2008). Jackson et al. (2009) 
explains that the lack of complete CFA reporting might be due to several reasons including 
lack of awareness of established reporting standards, space limitations and journals emphasis. 
They recommend that researchers should report all parameter estimates essential for the 
reader to make an interpretation of the results (Jackson et al., 2009, McDonald and Ho, 2002).  
5.12.1.2& Reliability&
In my PhD thesis, reliability (internal consistency) of safety climate dimensions was estimated 
using Cronbach's alpha (α).  The internal consistency of the 12 factors of the original 
HSOPSC questionnaire using Kuwaiti data (n=1280) was ≥ 0.60 for nine dimensions (Table 
17 on Page 141). The first dimension, “Overall perceptions of patient safety”, was the 
dimension with the lowest reported internal consistency (α=0.286) in this study. This 
dimension consists of four items and is concerned with the extent to which procedures and 
systems in hospitals are perceived to be effective at preventing errors and minimising patient 
safety problems (Famolaro et al., 2016).  
Waterson et al. (2010) reported the results of a reliability analysis on the original HSOPSC 
questionnaire using UK data. “Overall perceptions of patient safety” (α = 0.67), amongst other 
factors, fell below an acceptable level of internal consistency (Cronbach’s a<0.7). 
Additionally, Alonazi (2011) reported the internal consistency of the Saudi data for three 
dimensions as less than 0.6  including “Overall perceptions of patient safety” which was 
reported as unacceptable (α =0.31).  
Najjar et al. (2013a) reported that three dimensions achieved low reliability including 
“Overall perceptions of patient safety” (α = 0.43) using Palestinian data. Similar findings 
were reported in other studies (Bodur and Filiz, 2010, Smits et al., 2008).  
The second dimension that had a low internal consistency was the “Staffing” dimension 
(α=0.382). It consists of four items and is concerned with the degree to which there is 
sufficient staff to handle the workload and whether work hours are suitable to provide the best 
care for patients (Famolaro et al., 2016). This dimension reported low internal consistency in 
many studies. In the original USA HSOPSC study, Sorra and Nieva (2004) reported that all 
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composites had acceptable reliability (0.70 or greater) except the staffing composite (α = 
0.63). Waterson et al. (2010) reported the results of a reliability analysis on the original 
HSOPSC questionnaire using UK data. Staffing, amongst other factors (Overall perceptions 
of safety, Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations, Organisational learning and continuous 
improvement, Communication openness, Non-punitive responses to error, Hospital 
management support for patient safety), exhibited a poor level of reliability (α=0.58). 
Similarly, Bodur and Filiz (2010) reported  an unacceptable level of internal consistency for 
the staffing dimension (α = 0.19), along with the non-punitive response to error (a = 0.31), 
when they tested the fit of the original HSOPSC questionnaire using Turkish data. Alonazi 
(2011) reported the internal consistency of the Saudi data for each dimension as greater than 
0.6 except for three dimensions. “Staffing” dimension’s internal consistency was reported as 
poor (α =0.57). Other studies conducted in Scotland (Sarac et al., 2011), Germany (Pfeiffer 
and Manser, 2010), Netherlands (Smits et al., 2008), Portugal (Eiras et al., 2014), Norway 
(Haugen et al., 2010), Sweden (Hedsköld et al., 2013) and Slovenia (Robida, 2013) reported 
similar results.  
The third dimension, “Organisational learning–continuous improvement”, consists of three 
items and represents the degree to which mistakes have led to positive changes and whether 
changes are evaluated for their effectiveness (Famolaro et al., 2016). This dimension fell short 
of an adequate level of internal consistency in a number of studies conducted in Scotland 
(Sarac et al., 2011), Norway (Haugen et al., 2010), Sweden (Hedsköld et al., 2013), Slovenia 
(Robida, 2013) and the Netherlands (Smits et al., 2008).	  
In summary, all dimensions reported a lower internal consistency of the Kuwaiti data than the 
internal consistency of the USA data except “Frequency of events reported”, which reported a 
value equal to 0.858. Three dimensions reported the internal consistencies to be unacceptable 
(α=0.29 for “Overall perceptions of patient safety”, α=0.38 for “Staffing”, α= 0.49 for 
“Organisational learning—Continuous improvement”). Similar results were reported in other 
studies. For example, in the study by Alonazi (2011), the internal consistency of the Saudi 
data was lower for each dimension than the USA data except for “Supervisors’/Managers’  
expectations and actions promoting safety” which was reported as the same (Sorra and Nieva, 
2004).  
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Waterson et al. (2010) reported the internal consistency of the UK items as lower for eleven 
dimensions than that of the original items of the HSOPSC questionnaire except for “Feedback 
and communication about error” dimension which was the same (Sorra and Nieva, 2004).  
Najjar et al. (2013a) reported a lower or similar internal consistency of the Arabic items for 
each dimension compared to the original questionnaire items (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) except 
for “Frequency of events reported” (α=0.87) and “Organisational learning—Continuous 
improvement” (α=0.79) which reported higher results. Bodur and Filiz (2010) reported the 
internal consistency of the Turkish items as lower for ten dimensions than the original 
questionnaire items (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) except for teamwork within units (α=0.83) and 
frequency of events reported (α=0.86). Smits et al. (2008) reported the internal consistency of 
the Dutch data as lower than that of the original items in the AHRQ study (Sorra and Nieva, 
2004) except for communication openness, which was the same. Finally, the Scottish data 
showed a total of eight HSOPSC dimension to have lower internal consistency compared to 
the US findings (Sarac et al., 2011).  
Table 30 provides comparative data of the internal consistency of eight studies. 
Table 30: Cronbach’s alpha scores of HSOPSC scales for USA (US), Kuwait 
(KWT), Saudi Arabia (SA), Palestine (PAL), England (ENG), Scotland (SCO), 
Netherlands (NL), and Turkey (TUR)  
HSOPSC Dimensions US KWT SA PAL ENG SCO NL TUR 
Supervisor/manager 
expectations and actions 
promoting safety (4) 
0.75  0.61 0.75 0.75 0.68  0.79 0.70  NA 
Organisational learning-
continuous 
improvement (3) 
0.76  0.49 0.63 0.79 0.66  0.64 0.57  NA 
Teamwork within 
hospital units (4) 
0.83  0.63 0.75 0.77 0.73  0.80 0.66  0.83 
Communication 
openness (3) 
0.72  0.60 0.67 0.41 0.67  0.73 0.72  NA 
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HSOPSC Dimensions US KWT SA PAL ENG SCO NL TUR 
Feedback and 
communication about 
error (3)  
0.78 0.61 0.74 0.69 0.80  0.78  0.75  NA 
Non-punitive response 
to error (3) 
0.79  0.60 0.72 0.59 0.65  0.77 0.69  0.31 
Staffing (4)	  0.63 
 
0.38 0.57 0.65 0.58  0.60 0.49  0.19 
Hospital management 
support for patient 
safety (3) 
0.83  0.71 0.65 0.66 0.69  0.79 0.68  NA 
Teamwork across 
hospital units (4) 
0.80  0.72 0.69 0.61 0.70  0.70 0.59 NA 
Hospital handoffs and 
transitions (4) 
0.80  0.70 0.59 0.73 0.77  0.74 0.69 NA 
Frequency of incident 
reporting (3) 
0.84  0.86 0.83 0.87 0.83  0.84 0.79 0.86 
Overall perceptions of 
safety (3)  
0.74  0.29 0.31 0.43 0.67  0.71 0.62 NA 
•( NA: Not available in the Turkish study but their internal consistency was reported as being lower than 
USA dimensions (Bodur and Filiz, 2010), Numbers in italics indicate a poor or unacceptable level of 
internal consistency. 
As outlined in Table 30, organisational learning-continuous improvement, communication 
openness, non-punitive response to error, staffing, teamwork across hospital units, hospital 
handoffs and transitions and overall perception of patient safety dimensions reported the 
lowest internal consistencies across the different studies.  
In conclusion, CFA and reliability analysis findings of my PhD thesis indicate that the 
original factor structure of the HSOPSC is not replicated in Kuwaiti hospital settings. 
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Additionally, our results are in line with results of other studies investigating the 
psychometric properties, including validity and reliability, of the original HSOPSC 
questionnaire. The need for proper validation of the original HSOPSC questionnaire before 
extending its application in other international contexts needs to be highlighted and addressed. 
Various underlying factor structures were identified as optimal factor models. The original 12 
factor model was replicated in Belgian (Hellings et al., 2007), Portuguese (Eiras et al., 2014) 
and Scottish data (Sarac et al., 2011). Other studies reported 11 factor models for Dutch 
(Smits et al., 2008), Arabic (Najjar et al., 2013a), Croatian (Brborovic et al., 2014) and 
Norwegian data (Haugen et al., 2010); 10 factor models for French (Perneger et al., 2014), 
Turkish (Bodur and Filiz, 2010), Chinese (Zhu et al., 2014) and Brazilian data (Reis et al., 
2016); 9 factor models for UK (Waterson et al., 2010) and Slovene data (Robida, 2013); 8 
factor models for Swiss (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010), Saudi (Alonazi, 2011), Kosovo 
(Brajshori and Behrens, 2016) and Kuwaiti data. This discrepancy in results could be 
attributed to differences in employing survey methods and psychometric analytical 
techniques, in addition to the various modifications made to adapt the original instrument to 
different healthcare settings (Sarac et al., 2011). Thus, the original HSOPSC will clearly be 
limited when used in other contexts without proper assessment of its psychometric properties. 
This point has been highlighted in a number of studies. The factor structure of the original 
HSOPSC model (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) was not replicated with UK data (Waterson et al., 
2010), Turkish data (Bodur and Filiz, 2010), Saudi Data (Alonazi, 2011), Palestinian data 
(Najjar et al., 2013a), Dutch data (Smits et al., 2008) and Swiss data (Pfeiffer and Manser, 
2010). This finding is in contrast with other studies that assessed patient safety climate by 
using the original USA HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) in hospitals without 
examining the reliability and validity of the questionnaire in a different context (Al-Awa et 
al., 2012, Al-Mandhari et al., 2014, Alahmadi, 2010, Bahrami et al., 2013, El-Jardali et al., 
2011, El-Jardali et al., 2010, El-Jardali et al., 2014).  
Considering all of this evidence, it seems that the original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) does not perform well in different countries. Therefore, an exploratory factor 
analysis was used for investigation of an alternative factor structure which is more appropriate 
for Kuwaiti data. 
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5.12.2$Developing$an$optimal$model$
An EFA in addition to CFA and reliability analysis were used for investigating an alternative 
factor structure that would be more appropriate for the Kuwaiti context. For model 
construction, EFA was carried out using the calibration half of the data set while CFA and 
reliability analysis were carried out using the validation half of the data set, to test the fit of 
the resultant model from the EFA. 
EFA, CFA, reliability and correlation analyses indicate that the optimal model for Kuwaiti 
data is an Eight Factor model (see As shown in Table 27, the proposed optimal model 
structure includes 8 dimensions (two negative factors, four positive factors, two mixed 
factors) and 22 items (13 items are positively worded and 9 items are negatively worded). 
Table 27). The proposed optimal Eight Factor model can, therefore, be used in Kuwaiti 
hospitals to assess patient safety climate.   
The findings of EFA, CFA and Reliability analysis are discussed next with comparisons of 
optimal models across different countries.  
5.12.2.1& EFA&results&
EFA is recommended for use in a research design that includes cross-validation (Garson, 
2012). As a result, the Kuwaiti data set was randomly split into two independent sets of 640 
(n=640) cases. A split-half validation technique is recommended due to the controversy 
associated with conducting EFA and CFA on the same data (De Vellis and Dancer, 1991, 
Kline, 2015). Split-half validation was not undertaken in the original HSOPSC study and 
testing the fit of the resultant model was done using the same data set (Sorra and Nieva, 
2004). This probably resulted in an over estimation of the achieved CFA fit indices (Waterson 
et al., 2010). A number of other studies did not perform split-half validation (Bodur and Filiz, 
2010, Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010, Smits et al., 2008)  
Since the aim of our study is to identify a suitable tool to be used for assessing patient safety 
climate in Kuwait’s public hospitals, PAF was selected as the appropriate statistical extraction 
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method of EFA for our study. Varimax was chosen as the rotation method. In addition, a 
combination of Kaiser’s criterion with Eigenvalues greater than one (Eigenvalues > 1) and the 
Scree plot were used to assess the number of factors to be extracted. This resulted in a number 
of solutions with each solution being examined through extracting a number of factors and 
changing the rotations (from Varimax to Oblique) to allow interpretation of the factors. 
Oblique rotation allows for a degree of correlations amongst factors  (Beavers et al., 2013, 
Conway and Huffcutt, 2003). 
Following the rotation of factors, the researcher must examine the factor pattern matrix and 
decide on the acceptable level of loading for variables to define factors (Beavers et al., 2013). 
To reach a satisfactory solution, a number of points need to be taken into consideration 
including identifying items with low communalities, no or low loading, items with cross 
loadings and the theoretical structure of items.  
Studies varied in their choice of factor extraction and rotation techniques, in addition to their 
techniques in estimating the number of factors to retain, depending on the purpose of the 
study. Sorra and Nieva (2004), used PCA, along with Varimax rotation and Kaiser’s criterion 
(Eigen value>1). Almost all items had a high loading on only one factor (loading greater than 
or equal to 0.40) with the final 12 factor model explaining 64.5% of the total variance. 
Waterson et al. (2010) used PAF as an extraction method with Varimax rotation, Kaiser's 
criterion (Eigenvalues>l) and the Scree plot. An Oblique rotation was used to help in the 
interpretation of their resulting factors. The study reported examining a series of possible 
models. Evidence suggested a 9 Factor model with 27 items after gradual removal of 13 items 
that either severely cross-loaded or had very low loadings and communalities. Their final 
model consists of strongly loading items (>0.40) and accounted for 66.8% of their total 
variance. All dimensions of the optimal model consist of two to four safety climate items. 
Likewise, in a study by Alonazi (2011) a number of solutions were identified following EFA. 
PAF, Varimax and Oblique rotation, Kaiser's criterion (Eigenvalues>l) and the Scree plot 
were the chosen EFA techniques. An 8 Factor model was identified as an optimal model for 
the Saudi study with 23 items, after gradually removing 19 items that either cross-loaded or 
had no or low loading (<0.30) across different solutions. Their final model consists of 
strongly loading items (>0.40) and accounted for 51.5% of total variance. All dimensions of 
the optimal model consist of two to four safety climate items.  
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Smits et al. (2008) used PCA, Varimax rotation, Kaiser’s criterion (Eigenvalues>l) and the 
Scree plot for investigating the Dutch data. An 11 Factor model was identified as an optimal 
model for the Dutch hospital setting with 40 items and it accounted for 57.1% of the total 
variance.  All dimensions of the optimal model consist of two to six strongly loading (>0.40) 
safety climate items. It should be noted that their optimal model contained two items which 
cross-loaded on two factors. Pfeiffer and Manser (2010) study followed a similar analysis 
strategy as Smits et al. (2008) to investigate an optimal factor model, including PCA along 
with Varimax rotation and Kaiser’s Criterion. Eight underlying factors were identified as 
optimal for the Swiss hospital setting and accounted for 59.8% of the variance of the items. 
Yet, their model contains multiple cross-loading items in two factors and a number of items 
with low loading. In both studies, this might be due to a lack of examining a series of possible 
solutions where they can gradually remove low loading and cross-loading items in addition to 
the absence of varying factor rotation methods as it helps to produce an easily interpretable 
solution especially in case of cross-loading items (Osborne and Costello, 2009). EFA is an 
exploratory approach and all of the possible solutions should be investigated until a 
satisfactory factor structure is reached (Pallant, 2007).  
In my PhD thesis, a series of exploratory factor analyses were performed to identify an 
optimal model that fits the Kuwaiti hospital setting. Investigation of all possible solutions was 
undertaken including 12-11-10-9-8-7 number of factors. The most appropriate solution is one 
that makes most theoretical sense. Items in each factor should be theoretically related. 
Theoretical knowledge regarding the construct under study is more significant than a 
statistical measure and the items and factors should make conceptual sense (Beavers et al., 
2013).  
Further, items should explain the most total variance with each item being well explained by 
the proposed number of factors. The rotated factor solution should have all items loading 
upon factors with no or low loading items or cross loading items with < 0.30. Most items 
should have a loading of around 0.40 in the final model. Inappropriately loading items can be 
deleted, and the analysis repeated, until a satisfactory factor structure that explains the most of 
the total item variance is obtained (Hinkin, 1998). Three or more strongly loading items on 
each factor is the best but two items are acceptable, especially if they have high loadings 
(above 0.5) and make strong theoretical sense. 	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Factors in CFA were treated as correlated latent variables, while EFA using Varimax rotation 
treated factors as uncorrelated. In addition, EFA using Oblique rotation was performed to 
examine the difference between the two techniques (Sarac et al., 2011).  
The optimal model is an Eight Factor model with 22 safety climate questionnaire items (20 
items were excluded) that explains about 50.2% of the total variance. All factor loadings are 
within the range of 0.426-0.866. Five factors (Factor 2, Factor 3, Factor 4, Factor 6, and 
Factor 7) have three or more items with loadings >0.40. Factor 1, Factor 5, and Factor 8 have 
two items with very high loading >0.50 and acceptable theoretical basis. There are no cross 
loaded items and there are no items with loadings <0.40 in the solution. The solution is 
essentially consistent with the theoretical pattern. All factors consist of two to four items and 
all items within each factor are theoretically related. Only D6 moved from "Teamwork across 
units" into "Handoffs and Transitions.” It should be noted that “Overall perceptions of patient 
safety”, “Organisational learning—Continuous improvement”, “Staffing” and “Feedback and 
communication about error” have no items in the final 8 factor solution. 
The optimal model of my PhD thesis is in line with other studies. In a study by Alonazi 
(2011), an Eight Factors model was identified as an optimal model for the Saudi study with 23 
items after gradually removing 19 items that either cross-loaded or had no or low loading 
(<0.30) across different solutions. Their final model consists of strongly loading items (>0.40) 
and accounted for 51.5% of total variance. Factor loadings were between 0.43 and 0.97. All 
dimensions of the optimal model consist of two to four safety climate items. Waterson et al. 
(2010) identified a Nine Factors model with 27 items after gradually removing 13 items that 
either severely cross-loaded or had very low loadings and communalities. Their final model 
consists of strongly loading items (>0.40) and accounted for 66.8% of their total variance. 
Factor loadings were between 0.48 and 0.93. All dimensions of the optimal model consist of 
two to four safety climate items.  
The composition of HSOPSC eight dimensions resulting from the optimal factor model was 
similar to that of the original HSOPSC model (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). The dimensions for 
“Communication openness”, “Frequency of event reporting”, and “Non-punitive responses to 
error” all formed the same factor composition as in the original model. The dimensions for 
“Hospital handoffs and transitions”, “Teamwork within units” and “Hospital management 
Chapter Five: Psychometric properties of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 181 
support for patient safety”, dropped a single item, and the dimensions “Supervisor/manager 
expectations and actions promoting patient safety” and “Teamwork across units” dropped two 
items. The absence of dimensions “Organisational learning-continuous improvement”, 
“Overall perceptions of patient safety”, “Feedback and communication about error” and 
“Staffing” were the most visible differences. “Hospital handoffs and transitions” had a new 
item shifted from “Teamwork across units.” On the other hand, “Overall perceptions of 
patient safety”, “Organisational learning—Continuous improvement”, “Staffing” and 
“Feedback and communication about error” have no items in the final 8 factor solution.  
5.12.3$Dimensional$changes$
“Overall perceptions of patient safety” was absent in my PhD thesis. It combined with the 
“Staffing” dimension in the optimal factor models derived from the UK (Waterson et al., 
2010), Scottish (Sarac et al., 2011), and Swiss (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) studies while both 
dimensions were absent in our current study. “Overall perceptions of patient safety” 
dimension was absent in the Saudi study (Alonazi, 2011). Alonazi (2011) concluded that the 
absence of this dimension might be related to the different cultural backgrounds of survey 
respondents as they come from 23 different countries and this might have resulted in different 
perceptions of patient safety climate. He also recommended merging “Overall perceptions of 
patient safety” with “Staffing” as the first dimension relates to systems and procedures that 
prevent errors and patient safety problems and staffing is one of those issues that contributes 
to providing safe care to patients.  
So far there has been little discussion about the influence of a multicultural workforce on 
patient safety perceptions. In my current study, open comments and interviewees’ discussions 
(see Chapter six and seven) revealed links between different aspects of safety culture and the 
impact of the multicultural workforce in hospitals. This includes the effect of language as a 
barrier amongst healthcare workers and between healthcare workers and patients. In addition, 
the negative wording of certain items might have influenced results. 
 “Organisational learning—Continuous improvement” is a second dimension that was 
dropped in this study. Dimension items point out that mistakes have led to positive changes 
and that changes are evaluated for effectiveness. Lack of feedback about any changes or 
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improvements based on incidents reported was repeatedly highlighted in interviews and in 
open comment and might have led to this result. This dimension reported a low level of 
internal consistency in a number of studies conducted in Scotland (Sarac et al., 2011), Norway 
(Haugen et al., 2010), Sweden (Hedsköld et al., 2013), Slovenia (Robida, 2013), Croatia 
(Brborovic et al., 2014) and the Netherlands (Smits et al., 2008). Pfeiffer and Manser (2010) 
reported a number of cross-loadings between the dimensions “Organisational learning—
Continuous improvement” and “Overall perception of patient safety” and highlighted that this 
might be related to insufficient wording of items and propose developing new items for both 
dimensions. Flin et al. (2006) proposed that “Organisational learning—Continuous 
improvement” amongst other dimensions should not be considered part of safety climate 
except if their relationship with safety outcomes can be established.  
A third dimension that was dropped in our study is the “Staffing” dimension which contain 4 
items. “Staffing” was grouped with “Overall perceptions of patient safety” as one dimension 
in the UK (Waterson et al., 2010), Swiss (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) and Scottish studies 
(Sarac et al., 2011) while it dropped two items in the Saudi study (Alonazi, 2011). Also, low 
factor loading for item “A13: We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient 
care” was reported in the UK study (Waterson et al., 2010). Further, weak internal 
consistency has also been demonstrated for the “Staffing” dimension in the original HSOPSC 
study (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) in addition to almost all other studies that assessed the 
psychometric properties in their settings including the UK(Waterson et al., 2010), Turkey 
(Bodur and Filiz, 2010), Saudi Arabia (Alonazi, 2011), Scotland (Sarac et al., 2011), 
Germany (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010), Netherlands (Smits et al., 2008), Portugal (Eiras et al., 
2014), Norway (Haugen et al., 2010), Sweden (Hedsköld et al., 2013), Croatia (Brborovic et 
al., 2014) and Slovenia (Robida, 2013). “Staffing” might not constitute a dimension of safety 
climate, as suggested by Flin et al. (2006) in their review. This suggests that this dimension 
needs to be evaluated and its content needs to be revised, in addition to wording of items 
reassessed, by the developers of the tool.  
The fourth dimension that was dropped in my PhD thesis is “Feedback and communication 
about error.” This dimension was also absent in the Saudi study (Alonazi, 2011). This might 
be due to the relative absence of feedback about changes implemented in relation to errors 
reported and discussed. One item in this factor “C1: We are given feedback about changes put 
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into place based on event reports” was reported to score 37% of agreement as opposed to the 
other two items in the dimension; items “C3: We are informed about errors that happen in this 
unit” and “C5: In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again” which 
scored 75% and 74% respectively. This suggests that errors are communicated and discussed 
with staff while feedback about changes implemented is not. This was highlighted in a 
number of interviews and open comments as the lack of feedback about any changes or 
improvements based on incidents reported through the incident reporting system or discussed 
with their supervisors was reported.  
“Feedback and communication about error” was reported to be combined with 
“Communication openness” in a number of studies (Najjar et al., 2013a, Pfeiffer and Manser, 
2010, Sarac et al., 2011). It was also combined into one dimension with “Organisational 
learning – continuous improvement” in the Dutch study (Smits et al., 2008) and combined 
“Supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting patient safety” in the Turkish study 
(Bodur and Filiz, 2010). 
5.12.4$Items$changes$
"Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and actions promoting safety" dropped two items (B3, 
B4). “Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it 
means taking shortcuts” and “My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that 
happen over and over” are negatively worded items. They point to the role of 
Supervisors’/Managers’ in sustaining patient safety. On the other hand, items B1 and B2 are 
positively worded items, “B1: My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a 
job done according to established patient safety procedures” and “B2: My supervisor/manager 
seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety”, and as a result if 
respondents agreed with items B1 (80%) and B2 (80%), they would disagree with items B3 
(61%) and B4 (87%). Spector et al. (1997) explain that factor analyses of scales that contain 
items written in opposite directions sometimes show two factors. This can be caused by the 
way in which individuals respond to items rather than the independency of the oppositely 
worded items. Both items were dropped in a number of other studies including the Saudi 
(Alonazi, 2011) and UK (Waterson et al., 2010) studies. 
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Item D6, moved from “Teamwork across units” to “Handoffs and transitions” dimension in 
the optimal model. This shift is expected as item D6, “It is often unpleasant to work with staff 
from other hospital units”, relates to dealing with staff from other units to provide the care for 
patients is connected to “Handoffs and transitions” which relates to the transfer of patient care 
information across hospital units and during shift changes. A similar shift also occurred in the 
Turkish study (Bodur and Filiz, 2010) and the Saudi study (Alonazi, 2011). Also, item D10 
“Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients” was dropped from 
this factor in our study. It should be noted that items from this dimension loaded on “Hospital 
handoffs and transitions” in the Swiss study (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) and loaded on 
“Hospital management support for patient safety” in the Turkish study (Bodur and Filiz, 
2010). Such item shifts might be associated with the wording of items, the way respondents 
comprehend their meaning and the way they perceive the connection between the items. 
A single item, D11 “Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital”, was dropped 
from "Hospital handoffs and transitions.” In addition, items A11 “When one area in this unit 
gets really busy, others help out” and D9 “Hospital management seems interested in patient 
safety only after an adverse event happens”, were dropped from “Teamwork within units” and 
“Hospital management support for patient safety” respectively. This might signify that these 
items do not belong to any of the optimal model dimensions. 
In conclusion, EFA, CFA, reliability and correlation analyses indicate that the optimal model 
for Kuwaiti data is an Eight Factor model. The proposed optimal factor model can be used in 
Kuwaiti hospitals to assess patient safety climate.   
The overall composition of the HSOPSC dimensions resulting from the optimal Eight Factor 
model was similar to that of the original HSOPSC model as the main parts of the Eight factors 
mainly remained unchanged. The dimensions for “Communication openness”, “Frequency of 
event reporting”, and “Non-punitive responses to error” all formed the same factor 
composition as in the original model while the remaining dimensions reported dropping one 
or two items.  
Table 31 shows a comparison between the structures of the Eight factors of HSOPSC in the 
original study and the Kuwaiti study.  
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Table 31: Comparison between the structures of the Eight factors of HSOPSC in 
the original study and my PhD thesis 
Factor  USA Kuwait     
Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions 
Promoting Patient Safety  
B1-B2-B3-
B4 B1-B2     
Frequency of Events Reported  E1-E2-E3 E1-E2-E3     
Handoffs and Transitions  D3-D5-D7-D11 
D3-D5-D6-
D7     
Nonpunitive Response to Errors  A8-A12-A16 
A8-A12-
A16     
Teamwork across units  D2-D4-D6-D10 D2-D4     
Teamwork Within Units   A1-A3-A4-A11 A1-A3-A4     
Communication Openness  C2-C4-C6 C2-C4-C6     
Management Support for Patient Safety  D1-D8-D9 D1-D8     
 
Table 31 shows that when comparing both structures, seven items were dropped from our 
current model, one of which “D6”, shifted from “Teamwork across units” to “Handoffs and 
Transitions.”  
In summary, the optimal Eight Factor model shows good psychometric properties with no 
cross loaded items and there are no items with loadings <0.40 in the solution. All factors 
consist of two to four items and all items within each factor are theoretically related. The 
optimal model of my PhD thesis was confirmed by using CFA.  
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5.12.5$CFA$results$
Following EFA, CFA using the validation half of the data set (n=640) was performed to test 
the fit of the optimal Eight Factor model that emerged from the EFA performed earlier on the 
construction half of the data set (n=640). 
Overall, the fit indices values from the CFA of the Eight Factor model indicate a good model 
fit because the values of the fit indices met the acceptable threshold levels (Table 22). 
According to Table 22, this model was accepted as the optimal model of my PhD thesis.  
Afterwards, the fit of the optimal model (8 factors, 22 items) was tested for the whole data set 
(n=1280). All estimated parameters using the Kuwaiti data set also indicate a good model fit 
(8 factors and 22 items) (Table 23). As a result, the optimal model of my PhD thesis was 
vigorously examined and validated by performing two confirmatory analyses.  
According to Hoyle (2012), CFA is the best procedure for investigating factor structures 
given an adequate sample size. A number of studies performed CFA to confirm their optimal 
factor model (Alonazi, 2011, Najjar et al., 2013a, Waterson et al., 2010, Zhu et al., 2014) 
while others did not (Bodur and Filiz, 2010, Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010, Smits et al., 2008). 
CFA results of the USA, UK, Saudi Arabia, Palestine and Scotland models were compared 
against the CFA results of the optimal model of our current research. Table 32 presents the 
CFA results of the USA (Sorra and Nieva, 2004), Saudi Arabia (Alonazi, 2011), Palestine 
(Najjar et al., 2013a), UK (Waterson et al., 2010), Scotland (Sarac et al., 2011) and our 
current study optimal model.  
Table 32: Comparison of CFA results of USA, UK, Saudi Arabia, and current 
research for USA (US), Kuwait (KWT), Saudi Arabia (SA), Palestine (PAL), 
England (ENG), Scotland (SCO), Netherlands (NL), and Turkey (TUR)  
Model 
 
Chi-
Square 
statistic 
DF 
 
CMIN/DF 
 
CFI 
 
RMR 
 
SRMR 
 
RMSEA 
 
TLI 
 
Current 
study 
617.8 181 3.4 0.95 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.93 
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Model 
 
Chi-
Square 
statistic 
DF 
 
CMIN/DF 
 
CFI 
 
RMR 
 
SRMR 
 
RMSEA 
 
TLI 
 
       
USA 2064 746 2.8 0.94 - - 0.04 - 
Saudi 
Arabia 
553 202 2 0.94 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.93 
PAL 1375.5 610 2 0.91 - 0.06  0.04  0.90 
ENG 587 288 2 0.94 - 0.04 0.04 0.93 
SCO 1708.9 753 2.27 0.91 - 0.05 0.04 - 
The CFA results generated from the optimal model in the current research are consistent with 
the CFA results of the USA, UK, Saudi Arabia, Palestine and Scotland models. It confirms 
that the Eight Factors solution (22 items) is the optimal model for the Kuwaiti data.  
5.12.6$Reliability$results$
Reliability reflects the degree to which test scores are replicable (Geisinger et al., 2013, 
Streiner et al., 2015). A common way of estimating reliability is through assessing internal 
consistency which is based on the correlation among the items involving a particular 
dimension of the instrument (Pett et al., 2003). Cronbach's alpha is the most commonly used 
internal consistency reliability coefficient (Cronbach, 1951, Tavakol and Dennick, 2011). 
Cronbach’s Alpha value of  ≥ 0.7 is appropriate for most studies (De Vellis and Dancer, 
1991).  
Reliability analysis was conducted in a large number of studies compared to confirmatory 
factor analysis (Alonazi, 2011, Bodur and Filiz, 2010, Hedsköld et al., 2013, Pfeiffer and 
Manser, 2010, Sarac et al., 2011, Smits et al., 2008, Waterson et al., 2010). This might be due 
to the simplicity of the reliability procedure compared to CFA procedure (Alonazi, 2011).  
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Reliability analysis was conducted to test the internal consistency of each of the Eight factors 
of the optimal model. To examine the internal consistency of the optimal Eight factor model, 
Cronbach's alpha (α) was calculated for each of the groups of items defined by the eight 
dimensions. Reliability analysis was performed using the whole sample (N=1280). The results 
of the reliability analysis are reported in Table 26 on page 164.  
Cronbach’s Alpha value is ≥ 0.60 for all factors. Four factors (Factor 1, Factor 2, Factor 5, 
and Factor 6) have Cronbach’s Alpha values of >0.70. Factor 3 and Factor 8 have Cronbach’s 
Alpha values of around 0.70 while factors 4 and 7 have Cronbach’s Alpha values of 0.604 and 
0.601 respectively. Therefore, the internal consistency is acceptable for the Eight Factors 
solution. Those factors, “Non-punitive response to errors” (α=0.604) and “Communication 
Openness” (α=0.601) are considered acceptable because they both contain strongly loading 
items (Table 26 on page 164) and are theoretically related. Also, both dimensions are among 
the three dimensions to remain unchanged from the original 12 factor model (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004).  
Also, as mentioned earlier, CFA fit indices of the optimal model met with the acceptable 
threshold levels (Table 15 on page 138).  
To summarize the findings, an optimal factor model was constructed through a series of 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses with split-half sample validation technique. The 
model consists of eight factors compared with the original 12 factors in the American model 
(Sorra and Nieva, 2004). The composition of the dimensions resulting from the optimal factor 
model was similar to that of the original model. The dimensions for “Communication 
openness”, “Frequency of event reporting”, and “Non-punitive responses to error” all formed 
the same factor composition as in the original model. The dimensions for “Hospital handoffs 
and transitions”, “Teamwork within units” and “Hospital management support for patient 
safety”, dropped a single item, and the dimensions “Supervisor/manager expectations and 
actions promoting patient safety” and “Teamwork across units” dropped two items. The 
absence of dimensions “Organisational learning-continuous improvement”, “Overall 
perceptions of patient safety”, “Feedback and communication about error” and “Staffing” 
were the most visible differences. Thus, the proposed optimal Eight Factor model can be used 
to assess patient safety climate in Kuwaiti hospitals.  
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5.12.7$Optimal$factor$models$
Singla et al. (2006, 116) conducted a review of quantitative patient safety culture instruments 
and concluded that all of the surveys designed for general administration to hospital personnel 
addressed three common dimensions: management support and commitment to safety, 
communication openness and teamwork. They suggested that these common dimensions 
might be considered “core dimensions” of patient safety culture (p.116). In addition, a number 
of dimensions seem to be common among optimal factor models across different countries. 
Optimal factor models constructed and tested in different contexts will be examined further in 
Chapter Eight in order to identify if there is a common set of patient safety culture dimensions 
and items across different countries.  
5.12.8$Contextual$specificity$
Survey instruments that are designed for particular settings are tailored to meet the unique 
characteristics of the local setting and population. A local setting is a mix of cultural, social, 
organisational, economic, and political factors that influence actors as individuals or as groups 
and affect the setting of priorities on an organisation’s agenda. When a tool is used in a 
different setting, it is more likely to perform less well than in the original setting (Pfeiffer and 
Manser, 2010, Waterson et al., 2010). In the case of the HSOPSC, a number of the reported 
adaptations have performed less well than the original tool (Haugen et al., 2010, Nie et al., 
2013, Perneger et al., 2014, Waterson et al., 2010, Zhu et al., 2014). This might be due to the 
contextual specificity of the construct of safety culture (Coyle et al., 1995). Other factors 
include unique country characteristics, types of health systems and settings, staff groups, and 
cultural differences (Ginsburg et al., 2009, Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010). Hedsköld et al. (2013) 
pointed out that such differences might weaken the validity of the instrument. Safety climate 
questionnaires, therefore, need to be appropriately validated before being used in different 
healthcare contexts.  
The importance of HSOPSC questionnaire validation and adaptation before extending its use 
to hospital settings outside of the USA have been recognised by researchers (Zhu et al., 2014). 
More work is needed on cross-cultural investigations of differences in dimensionality to allow 
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comparisons of healthcare safety climate results at an international level (Hutchinson et al., 
2006, Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010).  
Zhu et al. (2014) translated and modified the original HSOPSC questionnaire to measure 10 
safety climate dimensions from 32 hospitals in 15 cities across China. Results of their 
research support the idea that integrating both qualitative and quantitative methods is crucial 
in developing a culturally appropriate instrument. They add that a standard approach that 
exclusively relies on translation and quantitative validation may not be sufficient to produce 
an instrument that is applicable to the local context. Rather, including a component of cultural 
adaptation into the approach may be more suitable when transferring an existing safety 
climate tool to settings other than originally proposed. As a result, the adopted tool will be 
more culturally appropriate and results will be able to reflect important safety climate themes 
that are specific to the local healthcare context.  
As mentioned previously, literature has suffered from a lack of clarity in defining the 
constructs of safety culture and climate in addition to the construct of patient safety culture 
(Ginsburg et al., 2013). Furthermore, there is an evident inconsistency in safety culture 
research findings and a lack of consensus about the dimensions that are central to safety (Cox 
and Flin, 1998, Singla et al., 2006). This supports the notion that the construct of safety is 
highly context specific and generic measure approaches will have little value (Jeffcott et al., 
2006). Furthermore, much effort has been exerted towards identifying a generic core set of 
variables to characterize safety culture, mainly using the self- administered questionnaire 
approach (Bennett et al., 2015, Flin et al., 2006). Such efforts have proved generally 
unsuccessful (Guldenmund, 2007).  
Cox and Flin (1998, p.199) suggest that the nature of safety climate is “context-dependent.” 
They recommend the employment of multiple methods, to adequately characterize safety 
climate or culture in addition to multilevel analysis to identify core variables and patterns of 
relationships with outcome measures. Keiser (2015) argues that since safety climate measures 
include both general and contextualized items, excluding contextual measures might provide a 
rather deficient evaluation of the underlying safety climate construct. These findings indicate 
the need for further research to provide contextual information on patient safety construct (Al-
Mandhari et al., 2014). Further research is needed to shed light on the benefits of qualitative 
Chapter Five: Psychometric properties of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 191 
exploration as a precursor and basis for the development of quantitative climate measures 
(Bennett et al., 2015, Flin et al., 2006) 
Safety climate measures are often developed based on previously existing measures or 
theoretical constructs (Flin et al., 2006). This methodology has been criticised by Seo et al. 
(2004) as running the risk of imposing theoretical models and reducing the potential for social 
difference. This has negative consequences for instrument validity across sectors or 
professions as pointed out by Guldenmund (2000).  
Pfeiffer and Manser (2010) recommend more cross-cultural investigations of dimensionality 
to enable international comparisons of safety climate in healthcare. In addition, the influence 
of cultural diversity of the health care workforce on the perceptions of safety should be 
studied (Almutairi et al., 2013). 
5.13" Conclusion"
My PhD thesis is the first validation study of a patient safety climate questionnaire conducted 
in a Kuwaiti healthcare setting. The study assessed the psychometric properties of the 
HSOPSC questionnaire in Kuwaiti hospitals. Our findings differ from the findings obtained 
from the USA original HSOPSC model. EFA run on the calibration data set showed an 
optimum Eight factor measurement model. The confirmatory factor analyses run using the 
validation data set confirmed that the optimum model fitted the Kuwaiti data adequately with 
good psychometric properties. Thus, the optimal model for assessing patient safety culture in 
Kuwait is an Eight Factor model with 22 items. The composition of the Eight factors of the 
optimal model of the study was similar to that of the USA HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) because the main part of the Eight factor structure was unchanged. In general, 
the structure of the optimal model of my PhD thesis was considered appropriate. At the 
international level, it seemed that the approach to identifying an optimal model in different 
countries (e.g., UK, Netherlands, Germany, and Turkey) is varied. However, these countries 
did in general follow recommended practice in terms of psychometric analysis strategy (EFA, 
CFA and reliability applications). Still, it appears that there is a need for better reporting 
practices regarding the psychometric properties of patient safety climate tools. The 
composition of the optimal model factors varies from country to country. There are some 
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dimensions and items of the original HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) that are 
absent in each country. In addition, some dimensions combined into one dimension and some 
items shifted to other dimensions. However, it does seem that there are common dimensions 
of patient safety culture at an international level. More work is needed on cross-cultural 
adaptations of safety climate tools. Additionally, more importance should be given to the 
appropriate validation of safety climate questionnaires before extending their usage in 
healthcare contexts different from those in which they were originally developed.  
The optimal factor model that was constructed using data from my PhD thesis can be used as 
a basis for measuring patient safety climate in Kuwaiti hospitals and in evaluating changes in 
safety climate as part of patient safety improvement initiatives. 	 
5.14"Methodological"concerns"
5.14.1$Negatively$worded$items$
The original HSOPSC questionnaire consists of twelve constructs of which four comprise 
positive factors, one comprises a negative factor while seven factors are comprised of a 
combination of both negative and positive items. In whole, it consists of 18 negatively worded 
items and 24 positively worded items (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). In psychological measures, the 
combination of positively and negatively worded items is to counter acquiescence response 
bias since some respondents have a tendency to agree with all items or to indicate a positive 
implication (Schriesheim and Hill, 1981). As recommended by Marsh et al. (1988), the 
proportion of negatively and positively worded items should be balanced for each factor in a 
scale because it helps to create distinction between different factors. Researchers have long 
debated the impact of negatively and positively worded items on the factor structure of a 
questionnaire (Alonazi, 2011). Some studies argued that negatively worded items tend to be 
grouped together as a separate factor (Schmitt and Stuits, 1985, Woods, 2006). On the 
contrary, Spector et al. (1997) argues that negative items correlate with positive items to form 
a separate factor. The optimal model of my PhD thesis consists of both negative and positive 
items (nine negative items and 13 positive items) composing eight factors (two negative 
factors, four positive factors, two mixed factors). The negative items were grouped together in 
a number of dimensions such as "Non-punitive response to error", and "Handoffs and 
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Transitions.” The positive items were grouped together in "Frequency of Events Reported", 
“Teamwork within units”, “Supervisor’s/Manager’s Expectations and Actions Promoting 
Safety”, “Hospital management support for Patient Safety.” This result is consistent with the 
views of other studies in the literature (Marsh, 1996, Schmitt and Stuits, 1985, Spector et al., 
1997).  
The results of my PhD thesis are similar to the UK study conducted by Waterson et al. (2010), 
where four factors in their optimal nine factor model consisted of both negative and positive 
items.  
5.15" Strengths"and"limitations"
To examine the psychometric properties of the HSOPSC, a rigorous and scientific 
psychometric approach was designed and executed based on recommended reporting 
practices. Furthermore, strengths of both EFA and CFA analytical techniques were used to 
test the original HSOPSC model and construct an optimal model. Additionally, the researcher 
attempted to report all parameter estimates required for the reader to make valid 
interpretations of the results. Also, a large sample size (n=1280) allowed for the dataset to be 
split and for factor analysis, including EFA and CFA, to be undertaken with acceptable model 
fit indices.  
One limitation of my PhD thesis is the number of items per factor in the optimal model. Three 
factors contained only two items per factor in the final Eight factor model. This is less than 
the recommended minimum of three items per factor. However, the items reported high 
loadings with strong theoretical sense. Also, similar findings were reported in the literature.  
Another limitation is the exclusion of partially answered questionnaires. As a result, a subset 
of the total sample, with all items answered, was used for the validation of the psychometric 
properties of the HSOPSC. Data imputation techniques were avoided due to their potential 
impact on the tool’s reliability and construct validity estimates and in order to minimise any 
possible biases. This led to a more uniform sample. 
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Lack of reporting explicit psychometric data in some important studies used in the 
comparative analyses was another challenge faced in my PhD thesis.  
5.16" Summary"
In summary, the validity and reliability of the HSOPSC questionnaire was rigorously tested 
using Kuwaiti data. Using CFA and reliability analysis, the suitability of the original 
HSOPSC model for Kuwaiti data was tested and results revealed an unsatisfactory fit of the 
original HSOPSC model for Kuwaiti data. An EFA, CFA and reliability analysis were used to 
investigate an alternative factor structure which might be more appropriate for the Kuwaiti 
context. Investigation of all possible solutions was undertaken. An optimal eight-factor model 
with 22 safety climate items was identified and was in line with other international studies. 
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6" Chapter"Six:"Patient"safety"climate"in"Kuwaiti"public"hospitals"
6.1" Introduction"
Following the identification of an appropriate tool for assessing safety climate in Kuwaiti 
hospitals, this chapter aims to examine the prevailing state of patient safety climate in three 
public hospitals in Kuwait using the identified HSOPSC tool. The process of data analysis 
will be described first, followed by a description of the survey findings including 
demographic, descriptive and inferential results. Finally, the results of the open-ended 
questions will be presented.  
6.2" Data"analysis"
The process of data collection and management was previously described in Chapter five. 
Data analysis was carried out using SPSS 24, Excel and the data entry and analysis tool 
developed by AHRQ and provided to the researcher upon request. The tool calculates the 
items and dimensions’ percentage of positive response in addition to comparing the results 
against the US database. Survey items were grouped according to their respective safety 
climate dimensions. To make the results easier to view and to increase the score of the 
positive response rate, response categories were combined (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). The two 
highest response categories were combined (strongly agree/agree or most of the time/always) 
and the two lowest response categories were combined (strongly disagree/disagree or 
never/rarely). Midpoints of scales (neither or sometimes) were reported as a separate 
category. For each positively worded item in a dimension, the number of positive responses 
(strongly agree/agree or most of the time/always) and percent positive response rates were 
calculated. In negatively worded items, disagreement signified a positive response. Thus, 
frequency of positive responses (strongly disagree/disagree or never/rarely) and percent 
positive response rate were also calculated. Then, the percent positive response rate for each 
individual dimension was calculated by adding together the percent positive response rates for 
each item in a dimension and dividing the result by the number of items in that particular 
dimension (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). Table 33 shows an example of calculating the percent 
positive response rates for each item in the dimension “Overall perceptions of patient safety” 
and percent positive response rate for the overall dimension. The dimension includes four 
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items, two positively worded (A15, A18), and two negatively worded (A10, A17). The 
percent positive response rate for this dimension was 61%.	  
Table 33: “Overall perceptions of patient safety” dimension percent positive 
response rate 
Items Positive response 
frequency 
All responses 
frequency 
Percent positive 
response rate 
A10R.It is just by 
chance that more 
serious mistakes don’t 
happen around here. 
628 1252 50% 
A15.Patient safety is 
never sacrificed to get 
more work done. 
844 1238 68% 
A17R.We have patient 
safety problems in this 
unit. 
564 1265 45% 
A18.Our procedures 
and systems are good 
at preventing errors 
from happening. 
1047 1288 81% 
Overall percent positive response rate 61% 
•( An “R” indicates items that are negatively worded and reverse-scored when calculating percent positive 
scores 
AHRQ identified areas of strengths in patient safety culture as those survey dimensions where 
the overall mean positive response rate to items in a dimension as 75% or more. This indicates 
that respondents answered “strongly agree/agree” or “most of the time/always” to positively 
worded items, or when 75% or more of respondents answered “strongly disagree/disagree” or 
“never/rarely” to negatively worded items (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). In addition, individual 
survey items can be considered areas of strength when the item’s positive response rate is 
75% or more. Also, the AHRQ defined patient safety areas in need of improvement as those 
survey dimensions where about 50% or more respondents answered negatively (strongly 
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disagree/disagree) or “neither” to positively worded items, or 50% or more agreed (strongly 
agree/agree) with negatively worded items (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). 
Regarding the open comments section, the process of interpretation of data started initially by 
reading all comments to gain a comprehensive understanding of the key issues presented by 
the respondents. Following the initial reading, the researcher identified major ideas within 
each comment. Finally, content was categorized based on major themes and subgroups within 
the themes. Comments that fell into a specific theme were tabulated while those that did not 
fall into a particular theme were tabulated into a section entitled “other.” All comments were 
coded by consensus of two researchers.   
6.3" Descriptive"results"
The following section contains a summary of the descriptive findings of the survey. It will 
initially examine the demographic features of survey respondents. Afterwards, it will present 
an analysis of responses to the HSOPSC questionnaire items including frequency distributions 
and percentages for each of the questionnaire items (Appendix 64). The means, standard 
deviations, and percent positive scores for survey items are provided in Table 39.  
All items, except items (A3, A6), showed good response variability with no items reporting 
90% or more agreement rate. Moreover, there were low rates of missing data, ranging from 
1% to7% missing responses per item. 
6.3.1$ Sample$demographics$
A total of 1,310 healthcare staff completed and returned the questionnaires (87% response 
rate). Table 34 reports the work areas of survey respondents. 
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Table 34: Work areas/units of survey respondents 
Work area/ Unit Frequency (n) Percentage (%) 
Many different hospital units 
/No specific unit 
20 1.5 
Medicine 303 23.3 
Surgery 243 18.6 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 58 4.5 
Paediatrics 172 13.2 
Emergency Department 77 5.9 
Intensive Care Unit and 
Anaesthesiology 
87 6.7 
Physical Therapy and 
Rehabilitation 
18 1.4 
Pharmacy 24 1.8 
Laboratory 113 8.7 
Radiology/Nuclear Medicine 126 9.7 
Dietary 11 0.8 
Infection Control 12 0.9 
Quality and Accreditation 11 0.8 
Administration 17 1.3 
Other 11 0.8 
The above Table 34 shows the various work areas of survey respondents. The majority of 
respondents (23%, n=303) were from medical units, followed by surgery (19%, n=243) and 
paediatrics (13%, n=172). The lowest percentage of respondents (<1%, n=10) worked in 
dietary services, infection control, quality and accreditation and other. 
Table 35 summarizes the demographics of survey respondents including tenure, hours worked 
per week, position, gender, nationality, age, qualification, direct contact with patients and 
experience.  
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An additional item was added to the demographics section to assess whether the survey 
respondents’ units were involved in the National Patient Safety Programme and if so, whether 
the respondent believed that the programme was improving patient safety within their units. 
Table 35: Sample characteristics of the study (n=1,310) 
Variable Category Frequency (n) Percentage (%) 
Staff Position Assistant Nurse 30 2.4 
Nurse 697 55.0 
Head nurse/Nurse manager 27 2.1 
Unit Assistant/Clerk 4 0.3 
Attending/Staff Physician 227 17.9 
Resident Physician/Physician in training 41 3.2 
Pharmacist 21 1.7 
Dietician 10 0.8 
Respiratory Therapist 3 0.2 
Physical, Occupational, or Speech Therapist 18 1.4 
Technician 176 13.9 
Management 13 1.0 
Gender Male 479 37.2 
Female 808 62.8 
Nationality Kuwaiti 113 8.8 
Non-Kuwaiti 1168 91.2 
Non-Kuwaiti Egyptian 114 12.0 
Indian 582 61.3 
Indonesian 7 0.7 
Iraqi 1 0.1 
Jordanian 9 0.9 
Lebanese 2 0.2 
Omani 1 0.1 
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Variable Category Frequency (n) Percentage (%) 
Pakistani 8 0.8 
Yemeni 1 0.1 
Philippine 57 6.0 
Saudi 2 0.2 
Somalian 1 0.1 
Srilankan 1 0.1 
Syrian 13 1.4 
Sudani 7 0.7 
Bulgarian 1 0.1 
Not recorded 142 15 
Age 15-24 21 1.6 
25-34 558 43.4 
35-44 502 39.0 
45-54 147 11.4 
55-64 52 4.0 
65 or above 6 0.5 
Qualification PhD Doctorate/Board Certified/Fellowship 101 7.9 
Master’s degree 204 16.0 
Bachelor degree 551 43.2 
Diploma 419 32.8 
Other 1 0.1 
Tenure in profession Less than 1 year 70 5.5 
1-5 years 302 23.9 
6-10 years 364 28.8 
11-15 years 276 21.8 
16-20 years 135 10.7 
21 years or more 119 9.4 
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Variable Category Frequency (n) Percentage (%) 
Tenure with hospital 
 
 
 
 
Less than 1 year 148 11.5 
1-5 years 444 34.4 
6-10 years 329 25.5 
11-15 years 193 15.0 
16-20 years 88 6.8 
21 years or more 87 6.7 
Tenure in work area Less than 1 year 161 12.5 
1-5 years 506 39.3 
6-10 years 345 26.8 
11-15 years 142 11.0 
16-20 years 67 5.2 
21 years or more 67 5.2 
Hours worked per week Less than 20 hours per week 6 0.5 
20 to 39 hours per week 165 13.0 
40 to 59 hours per week 944 74.6 
60 to 79 hours per week 104 8.2 
80 to 99 hours per week 33 2.6 
100 hours per week or more 14 1.1 
Direct Patient Contact Yes 1112 88.5 
No 144 11.5 
The study sample consisted mainly of nurses (60%, n= 754) followed by doctors (20%, 
n=268) and technicians (14%, n=176). Sixty-three percent (63%, n=808) of survey 
respondents were females. The majority (91%, n=1168) of the sample were non-Kuwaiti 
nationals from 16 different nationalities. Indian nationals (61%, n=582) occupied the highest 
percentage of foreign workers in our sample. The sample was relatively young as the mean 
age group of 82% (n=1060) of the participants ranged between 25-34 and 35-44 years old. In 
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addition, the majority reported holding a Bachelor’s degree (43%, n= 551) followed by 
Diplomas (33%, n=419) and Masters (16%, n= 204) degrees.  
Regarding the respondents work experience, more than half the respondents (53 %, n= 666) 
reported to have one to ten years’ work experience in their current profession. Further, 60% 
(n=773) of respondents worked from one to ten years in their hospital and 66% (n=851) 
worked from one to ten years in their current work area. 40 to 59 hours was the most common 
category of hours worked per week (75%, n=944). Most respondents (89%, n=1112) reported 
having direct contact with patients. 
Table 36: Involvement in the national patient safety programme 
Variable Category 
 
Number of responses Percentage 
 
National Patient 
Safety 
programme unit 
involvement  
 
Yes 
 
631 
 
52.2 
 
No 
113 9.3 
 
I don't know 
465 38.5 
 
National Patient 
Safety 
Programme is 
improving Patient 
Safety in my unit  
 
Strongly Disagree 
 
17 
 
1.3 
 
Disagree 
6 .5 
 
Neither 
45 3.5 
 
Agree 
413 32.1 
 
Strongly Agree 
128 9.9 
According to the above table (Table 36), around half of the sample (52%, n=631) reported 
their involvement in the national patient safety programme However, 40% (n=465) had no 
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knowledge of their unit’s involvement in the programme. 42% (n=541) of those involved in 
the programme stated that it is improving patient safety in their units. 
6.3.2$ Item$analysis$
Despite the fact that item results can illuminate some aspects of patient safety culture, they 
need to be examined in view of the main dimensions of safety culture as they are not 
necessarily significant on their own (Alahmadi, 2010). Overall responses to the HSOPSC 
items including frequencies and percentages are shown in Appendix 64. Responses to the 
positively worded HSOPSC questionnaire items are shown in Appendix 65 while responses to 
the negatively worded HSOPSC questionnaire items are shown in Appendix 66. As displayed 
in the three appendices (Appendix 64, Appendix 65, Appendix 66), the majority of survey 
respondents tended to agree and strongly agree with positively worded safety climate items. 
On the other hand, the majority of the respondents tended to disagree and strongly disagree 
with negatively worded safety climate items except for items A12, A14 and A16. 
Thus, survey items are grouped according to the safety culture dimension they are intended to 
measure. The survey items with the highest positive response rates were “When a lot of work 
needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the work done” (92%) and “We 
are actively doing things to improve patient safety” (92%). The survey item with the lowest 
positive response rate was “Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel 
file” (20%).	 
There were 14 items of which the positive response rate was 50% or less (A10, A17, C1, C4, 
C6, D1, D2, A14, D7, E1, E2, A8, A12, A16) (Appendix 65 and 66). 
Table 37 displays the responses to the single outcome measure on number of events reported 
in the past 12 months.  
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Table 37: Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Outcome Item “Number of 
Incidents Reported” Descriptive Statistics (n=1310) 
 Number of Events Reported Frequency (n) Percent % 
No incident reports 486 39.9 
1 to 2 incident reports 410 33.7 
3 to 5 incident reports 189 15.5 
6 to 10 incident reports 74 6.1 
11 to 20 incident reports 32 2.6 
21 incident reports or more 26 2.1 
Total 1217 100.0 
Missing 93  
Total 1310  
The first outcome measure “Number of events reported” shows that 40% (n=486) of 
respondents have not reported any adverse events in the past year and that 34% (n=410) have 
reported only one to two events. The lowest percent reported was 2.1% (n=26) for 21 or more 
incident reports. 
Table 38 displays the responses to the single outcome measure on the overall patient safety 
grade.  
Table 38: Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Outcome Item “Overall 
patient safety grade” Descriptive Statistics (n=1310) 
 Overall Patient Safety Grade Frequency (n) Percent % 
Excellent 283 22.5 
Very Good 613 48.8 
Acceptable 329 26.2 
Poor 31 2.5 
Total 1256 100.0 
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 Overall Patient Safety Grade Frequency (n) Percent % 
Missing 54  
Total 1310  
According to the results of the above table, “Overall patient safety grade” was rated as 
excellent or very good by 72% of respondents (n=896), acceptable by 26% (n=329) and poor 
by 2.5% of respondents (n=31). 
Results of the dimension “Overall perceptions of patient safety” in Table 39 show that survey 
respondents generally thought that patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done 
(68%, n=844) and that their procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from 
happening (81%,n=1047) while about 50% of the respondents thought that it is just by chance 
that more serious mistakes do not happen in their hospitals (n=628) and 45% reported that 
they have patient safety problems in their units (n=564).  
In comparison, the results of the dimension “Frequency of events reported”, reported in Table 
39, show that even when no harm has actually occurred to the patient, almost 50% responded 
positively to reporting the events. Still, a significant percentage of these events (74%) were 
not, or rarely, reported (Table 37). 
6.3.3$ Composite$level$results$
As mentioned earlier, the survey items were grouped according to their respective safety 
culture dimensions identified from the original HSOPSC (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). A positive 
response frequency rate was calculated for each item and for each dimension.  
Table 39 shows the mean, standard deviation, percent positive response rate per item and 
percent positive response rate per dimension for the HSOPSC questionnaire.  
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Table 39: Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Questionnaire Items as 
grouped by dimensions 
 
Note: The item number is shown in the first column. An “R” indicates items that are negatively worded, *std 
dev= standard deviation, *% percent positive response rate is shown per item and per dimension 
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Table 39: Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Questionnaire Items as grouped by 
dimensions (continued) 
  
 
Note: The item number is shown in the first column. An “R” indicates items that are negatively worded, 
*std   dev= standard deviation, *% percent positive response rate is shown per item and per dimension 
Table 39 shows the mean positive response rate for the twelve safety culture dimensions.  
They ranged between 34% and 84% with an overall average positive response rate for all 
dimension of 63%. 
Chapter Six: Patient safety climate in Kuwaiti public hospitals 208 
As shown in Table 40, “Teamwork within units”, was the dimension with the highest positive 
response rate (84%). On the other hand, “Non-punitive response to error” was the dimension 
with the lowest positive response rate (34%).  
Areas of strengths for the three hospitals were “Teamwork within units” (84%), 
“Organisational learning-Continuous improvement” (82%) and “Supervisors’/Managers’ 
expectations and actions promoting safety” (77%). Areas in need of improvement included 
“Non-punitive response to error” (34%), “Communication openness” (47%) and “Frequency 
of event reporting” (50%). 
Safety climate profiles of the three hospitals were found to be very similar. Yet, hospital C 
was found to score more favourably on all dimensions especially “Supervisors’/Managers’ 
expectations and actions promoting safety” (84%) and “Management support for patient 
safety” (84%). This issue will be explored further in a Chapter seven. 
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Table 40: Composite-Level Results for All hospitals 
    
6.4" Comparison"of"positive"response"rates"between"Kuwait"and"US"hospitals	 "
The following section summarizes dimension level and item level positive response rates in 
comparison to data from 635 US hospitals that measured patient safety culture using the 
AHRQ HSOPSC (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). The data entry and analysis tool provided by the 
AHRQ was used for creating the comparison tables. The comparison was based on data from 
653 hospitals included in the HSOPSC 2014 comparative database report (Sorra et al., 2014). 
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6.4.1$ Composite$level$results$
Results of our current study paralleled the results of the US hospital database with a few 
exceptions. Dimensions with the highest “Teamwork within units” and lowest positive 
response rates “Non-punitive response to error” for this study and the average for 653 US 
hospitals were the same. The three areas of strength with the highest average percent positive 
responses in US hospitals were: teamwork within units (81 %), Supervisors’/Managers’  
expectations and actions promoting safety (76%) and Organisational learning—Continuous 
improvement (73%) (Sorra et al., 2014). Those were also reported as areas of strength in 
Kuwaiti hospitals -see Table 41.  
“Handoffs and transitions” scored around 65% in our study while it scored much lower (47%) 
in US hospitals and was considered an area in need of improvement. “Frequency of event 
reported” and “Communication openness” were considered areas in need of improvement in 
Kuwaiti hospitals but they scored above 60% in US hospitals. Lastly, “Non-punitive response 
to error” scored the lowest for both Kuwaiti (33%) and US (44%) hospitals. 
Item level results in Appendix 68 shows the positive response rates for each of the survey 
items in comparison to data from 635 US hospitals. 
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Table 41: Composite-level comparative results for Kuwaiti and US hospitals 
database 
 
 
 
 
Composite)Level-Comparative-Results-for-All-hospitals
MIN MAX
1. Teamwork-Within-Units 46% 96%
2. Supervisor/Manager-Expectations-&-Actions-Promoting-Patient-Safety 51% 93%
3. Organizational-Learning))Continuous-Improvement------- 48% 94%
4. Management-Support-for---------------------------------------------------------Patient-Safety 36% 100%
5. Overall-Perceptions-of-Patient-Safety----------------------------------------------------- 30% 96%
6. Feedback-&-Communication-About-Error 42% 90%
7. Communication-Openness 32% 83%
8. Frequency-of-Events-Reported---------------------------------------------------------------- 48% 89%
9. Teamwork-Across-Units 35% 90%
10. Staffing 28% 81%
11. Handoffs-&-Transitions 26% 84%
12. Nonpunitive-Response-to-Error 16% 77%
Database-Hospitals-
Average-----------------------------------------------------------------------
%-Positive
Patient-Safety-Culture-Composites -%-Positive-Response
Note:11)1Composite1scores1are1not1calculated1when1any1item1in1the1composite1has1fewer1than131respondentsC12)1Comparative1results1are1
based1on1data1from16531hospitals1included1in1the1Hospital1Survey1on1Patient1Safety1Culture120141Comparative1Database1Report.1
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%0%
33%
44%
65%
47%
55%
55%
67%
61%
50%
66%
47%
62%
62%
67%
61%
66%
74%
72%
82%
73%
77%
76%
84%
81%
Database
Hospitals
Kuwaiti
Hospital
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6.4.2$ Item$level$results$
Survey items with the highest average percent positive response (86%) were from the 
composite teamwork within units: “People support one another in this unit” and “When a lot 
of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the work done.” The 
same was reported for Kuwaiti hospitals. 
Survey item with the lowest average percent positive response (35 %) was from the composite 
non-punitive response to error: “Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their 
personnel file.” It was reported even lower for Kuwaiti hospitals (20%).  
Across Kuwaiti and US hospitals, most respondents, on average, were positive with more than 
70% of them giving their work area or unit a patient safety grade of “Excellent” or “Very 
Good” and more than 70% of the respondents reported none or one to two events in their 
hospital over the past 12 months (Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2). Thus, event reporting was 
identified as an area for improvement for both.  
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Figure 6.1: Patient safety grade for the three public hospitals in comparison 
with database of US hospitals 
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Figure 6.2: Number of events reported for the three public hospitals in 
comparison with database of US hospitals 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six: Patient safety climate in Kuwaiti public hospitals 215 
 
6.5" Analysis"of"Variance"(ANOVA)"
Univariate analysis was used to explore any significant differences in the positive scores of 
safety climate among the different groups. IBM SPSS Statistics programme (version 24) was 
used to examine the differences for each of the twelve dimensions across the three hospitals. 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used for independent variables with more than 
two groups including hospital sites (3 sites), hospital departments (5 groups), professional 
groups (3 groups), age groups (6 groups) and tenure (6 groups). This provides further 
evidence for discriminant validity (Saraç, 2011). Higher means on a dimension indicate a 
more positive perception of that dimension, and vice versa. Furthermore, post hoc tests were 
utilized to specify which hospitals, departments and groups of health care workers were 
significantly different from others with respect to the mean scores for each item (Field, 2009). 
Levene’s test was performed to examine the homogeneity of variance across different 
variables prior to analysis (Field, 2009). Field (2009) recommends reporting Welch’s test for 
the variables that violated the homogeneity of variance assumption and the Games-Howell 
test for post-hoc comparisons. Independent sample t-tests were used for independent variables 
with two levels (gender and nationality). Lastly, to provide evidence of criterion-related 
validity, regression analyses were conducted to test which independent variables significantly 
predicted the examined dimensions. In addition, correlation analysis was employed to 
investigate the relationships between the safety culture dimensions and the safety outcome 
measures.  
6.5.1$ Hospitals$
A one-way ANOVA was conducted on the twelve patient safety culture dimensions across the 
three hospitals - see Appendix 70. This showed that hospitals had significantly different mean 
scores on eight of the safety culture dimensions (p<0.05), namely; Supervisors’/Managers’ 
expectations and actions (F=16.275, p< 0.001) , Organisational learning (F= 4.965, p< 0.01), 
Hospital management’s support for patient safety (F= 28.541, p<.001), Overall Perceptions of 
Safety (F=26.170 , p<.001), Feedback and communication about error (F= 6.574 , p= p< 
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0.01), Communication openness (F= 4.594, p< 0.01), Staffing (F= 4.509, p< .01), and 
Handoffs and Transitions (F= 7.828, p< 0.001) suggesting further evidence for discriminant 
validity. Further Tukey tests (Post hoc test) were conducted for those eight significant results 
to identify in which hospitals the differences occurred as shown in Appendix 70. It shows that 
hospital C was higher than hospitals A and B in Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and 
action promoting safety, Hospital management’s support for patient safety, Overall 
perceptions of safety, Feedback and communication about error, Communication openness, 
and Handoffs and Transitions. Staffing dimension was higher in hospital C than hospital A 
while Organisational learning and Handoffs were higher in hospital C than hospital B. 
6.5.2$ Hospital$departments$$
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to identify differences between five hospital departments 
- medicine (n=303, 23%), surgery (n=243, 17%), paediatrics (n=172, 13%), laboratory 
(n=113, 9%), and radiology and nuclear medicine (n=126, 10%) on the twelve patient safety 
culture dimensions. The five hospital departments were selected because they formed the 
majority of the study sample (n= 957, 73%) while the remaining departments (n=11) had a 
low number of respondents. Appendix 71 shows the results of ANOVA. The test revealed 
significant results amongst seven dimensions; namely Teamwork within units (F= 3.068, p< 
.05), Hospital management’s support to safety (F= 2.846, P< .05), Overall perceptions of 
patient safety (F= 4.724, P< .01), Communication openness (F= 3.491, P< .01), Frequency of 
events reported (F= 6.252, P< .001), Staffing (F= 4.697, P< .01) and Handoffs and Transitions 
(F= 11.040, P< .001). Further analyses using the Tukey test (Post hoc test) was used at the 
second stage of the ANOVA. It shows that the Radiology and Nuclear Medicine departments 
were lower than the other departments on a number of dimensions especially Frequency of 
events reported and Handoffs and Transitions. Communication openness was the only 
dimension where the Radiology and Nuclear Medicine departments were significantly higher 
than the other departments.  
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6.5.3$ Professional$groups$
The differences between four different professional groups (Nurses, Physicians, Allied Health 
Professionals, Technicians) were tested using separate ANOVAs because they formed the 
majority of the study sample (n= 1,250, 95%). 
Appendix 72 shows the results of ANOVA. The test revealed significant results amongst 
seven dimensions including Organisational learning (F= 12.245, p> .001), Hospital 
management’s support for patient safety (F= 14.191, p> .001), Feedback and communication 
about error (F= 6.399, p> .01), Communication openness (F= 4.320, p> .01), Frequency of 
events reported (F= 11.883, p> .001), Teamwork across units (F= 12.210, p> .001), and 
Handoffs and Transitions (F= 19.649, p> .001). To investigate the differences in detail, post 
hoc comparisons were made using Tukey’s tests. Results showed a significant effect of 
occupational groups on each of the safety culture dimensions. According to post-hoc analysis, 
nurses reported significantly more favourable perceptions about Organisational learning, 
Hospital management’s support for patient safety, Feedback and communication about error, 
Frequency of events reported, Teamwork across units and Handoffs and Transitions, when 
compared to other professional groups such as physicians. Nurses reported higher scores on 
the same dimensions when compared to Allied Health Professionals (AHP) except on the 
dimension Hospital management’s support for safety. Technicians reported similar results to 
nurses and had higher scores when compared to physicians on most of the dimensions. 
Communication openness was the only dimension where nurses reported significantly less 
favourable perceptions when compared to physicians. 
Nurses, physicians, AHP and technicians were similar in their perceptions about Teamwork 
within units, Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and actions promoting safety, Staffing 
levels, Non-punitive response to error and Overall perceptions of patient safety.  
6.5.4$ Age$groups$
The differences between age groups (n=6) were tested. Appendix 73 shows the results of 
ANOVA and the test revealed no significant differences on all dimensions except 
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Organisational learning (F= 2.433, p= .050). In the post-hoc results the age group 35-44 years 
old had significantly lower scores than the 25-34 years old age group.  
6.5.5$ Tenure$in$profession$
The differences between the tenure in profession groups (n=6) were tested. Appendix 74 
shows the results of ANOVA. The test revealed significant results amongst Hospital 
management’s support for patient safety (F= 2.260, p < .05), Overall perceptions of patient 
safety (F= 2.367, p < .05), Handoffs and Transitions (F= 2.652, p < .05) and Non-punitive 
response to error (F= 2.522, p < .05) where usually some groups of higher tenure in 
profession report more positive scores regarding dimensions when compared to groups of 
lower tenures. 
6.6" Independent"sample"t]tests"
Independent sample t-tests were used for independent variables with two levels including 
gender and nationality. 
6.6.1$ Gender$$
Independent sample t-tests showed that females had higher positive mean scores for five 
safety culture dimensions including Teamwork within units (t (911.7) = -2.024, p < .05, two-
tailed), Organisational Learning (t (870.3) = -4.641, p < .001, two-tailed), Feedback and 
communication about errors (t (939.2) = -3.105, p < .01, two-tailed), Teamwork across units (t 
(902.3) = -3.297, p < .01, two-tailed) and Handoffs and Transitions (t (923.3) = -4.490, p < 
.001, two-tailed) - see Appendix 75.  
6.6.2$ Nationality$$
Non-Kuwaitis reported better results amongst five patient safety culture dimensions including 
Supervisors’/ managers’ expectations and actions promoting safety (t (126.8) = -3.268, p < 
.01), Organisational learning (t (128.3) = -3.780, p < .001), Hospital management’s support 
for patient safety (t (126.7) = -7.983, p < .001), Overall perceptions of patient safety (t (128.9) 
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= -2.323, p < .05) and Frequency of events reported (t (140.6) = -5.765, p < .001) - see 
Appendix 76. 
6.7" Multiple"Regression"Analysis"
Multiple regression analysis was used to test the effect of independent variables on patient 
safety climate. Stepwise multiple regressions were conducted to investigate which 
independent variables (hospital site, hospital departments, tenure in hospital, professional 
groups, age, tenure in profession) significantly predicted patient safety culture dimensions. 
The independent variables were entered simultaneously as predictor variables, while patient 
safety culture dimensions were used as dependent variables ( Table 42). 
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Table 42: Variables that predicted level of patient safety culture in Kuwaiti 
hospitals 
  
Hospital site was the most common predictor for most of the dimensions followed by 
professional groups. The remaining independent variables significantly predicted one or more 
of the dimensions. the Handoffs and Transitions model scored the most variance amongst the 
investigated dimensions (Appendix 77). 
The independent variables significantly predicted about 1 to 5% of variance in the twelve 
dimensions. For the regression models, refer to Appendix 78.  
Regression analyses were also performed in order to test the influence of patient safety culture 
dimensions on outcome variables. All independent variables, including the unit level and 
hospital level dimensions, were entered simultaneously. Dependent variables were the two 
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outcome measures “Frequency of events reported” and “Overall perceptions of patient safety” 
and the two single outcome variables “Patient safety grade” and “Number of incidents 
reported.”  
Table 43: Regression analyses of HSOPSC outcome OPPS on safety culture 
dimensions  
 
Seven safety culture dimensions explained a significant level of variance (25%) in overall 
perceptions of safety (R2 = 0.254, F (7,1260) = 61.319, P<0.001) (Table 43). 
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Table 44: Regression analyses of HSOPSC outcome FER on safety culture 
dimensions  
 
Four safety culture dimensions explained a significant level of variance in (14%) frequency of 
incidents reporting (R2 = 0.136, F (4,1228) = 48.372, P<0.001) (Table 44). 
Table 45: Regression analyses of HSOPSC outcome PSG on safety culture 
dimensions  
 
Five safety culture dimensions explained a significant level of variance (27%) in patient 
safety grade (R2 = 0.268, F (5,1219) = 89.159, P<.001) (Table 45). 
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The last model predicted about 1% of variance in number of incidents reported dimension (R2 
= 0.012, F (3,1184) = 4.893, p < .01) (Table 46). 
Table 46: Regression analyses of HSOPSC outcome NER on safety culture 
dimensions  
 
6.8" Correlation"analysis"
In order to test the discriminant validity of the HSOPSC tool, further correlation analysis was 
employed to investigate the relationship between the twelve patient safety dimensions and for 
those dimensions with the two single item outcome variables; namely patient safety grade and 
number of incidents reported. The analysis used Pearson’s r inter-correlation coefficients to 
investigate the correlation between the variables. All the correlations were significant at p < 
0.001 (two-tailed).  
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Table 47: Inter-correlation coefficients between HSOPSC dimensions and two 
safety outcome variables  
 
Table 47 above shows the inter-correlation between the dimensions using Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient. As mentioned previously, correlations between 0.20 to 0.40 suggest a 
moderate relationship between the two variables, below 0.20 would indicate a weak 
relationship between the variables and correlations that are above 0.85 are considered 
exceptionally high and would indicate that the same concepts were being measured using 
different scales (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). Brown (2016) identified “strength” of the 
relationship as a small (± .1), medium (± .3), or large (± .5) effect. The correlation tests 
uncovered several moderate and weak correlations between patient safety culture dimensions. 
They ranged mainly between 0.20 and 0.58, displaying a moderate effect. The correlations 
between hospital management support for patient safety and teamwork across units (r = 0.58, 
p<.001), and between feedback and communication about error and communication openness 
(r = 0.44, p<.001) were found to be higher compared to other scales while the correlations 
between frequency of events reported and non-punitive response to error (r = 0.09, p<.001), 
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and between frequency of events reported and communication openness (r = 0.1, p<.001) 
were found to be lower compared to other scales. The ten safety culture dimensions were 
found to be significantly correlated with three of the outcome variables; namely overall 
perceptions of patient safety, frequency of events reported and patient safety grade. A medium 
effect was seen in the correlations between dimensions of safety culture and patient safety 
grade, as well as overall perceptions of safety. A small effect was seen in the relationship 
between dimensions of safety culture and frequency of event reporting. The outcome variable 
“Number of events reported” was found to be negatively and weakly correlated with most of 
the measures except “Frequency of events reported” where it demonstrated a significant and 
positive correlation. Additionally, a negative correlation was demonstrated between the 
dimensions and the outcome measure patient safety grade.  
In conclusion, the moderate inter-correlations between the various safety culture dimensions 
suggests evidence for the discriminant validity of the HSOPSC tool and that to a certain level 
each dimension measures separate constructs. 
6.9" Open]ended"section"
Inclusion of an open-ended comments section at the end of a structured questionnaire has the 
potential to expose new issues not captured in the closed questions. In addition, it allows 
respondents to elaborate on their responses in more depth.  
6.9.1$ Summary$of$respondents’$responses$to$openTended$comments$section$
Section (I) allowed respondents to provide responses in their own words about patient safety, 
error, or incident reporting. Respondents were directed to comment as follows: “Please feel 
free to write any comments about patient safety, error, or incident reporting in your hospital.” 
Of the 1,310 respondents included, 145 responded to the open-ended comments section 
(11%). Some provided more than one comment with explanations and suggestions, while 
others provided comments without any particular explanation. This resulted in a total of 206 
codes. The majority (89%) left the open comments section blank. One possible explanation 
could be the potential risk to anonymity associated with writing answers on the survey form. 
Another likely reason is the additional time needed to complete the comments’ section in a 
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long survey. The majority of comments were related to areas that needed improvement within 
their units or their hospitals. However, positive comments about the level of patient safety in 
their work areas or about incident reporting in their hospitals were also provided. Overall, 
comments related to patient safety fell into three major themes. The first and most common 
theme included issues related to the healthcare system. Results revealed that most comments 
were related to staffing (n=31,15%), policies and procedures (n= 31,15%) and incident 
reporting (n=26,13%). The second theme was related to concerns that need to be addressed at 
healthcare providers’ level including improved communication (n=19, 9%). The third and 
final theme was related to healthcare consumers. See Appendix 79 for open-ended item 
categories and frequencies. A selection of these comments is provided below in Table 48 
including challenges and improvements. It should be noted that the researcher has preserved 
the comments in their original form without any corrections in an effort not to change the 
original meaning conveyed by respondents. 
Table 48: Qualitative data extracted from the open comments section regarding 
challenges 
Challenges Themes  
 
Comments 
Staffing 
•( Shortage of staff 
o( Staff-patient ratio improvement 
•( Shortage of experienced staff 
 
Improve the staff - patient ratio 
more staff needed with experience 
Policies and Procedures (P&P) 
•( Development of P&P* 
•( Fixed P&P 
•( English language P&P 
 
•( Implementation of P&P 
•( Visitor P&P: strict control of 
visitation times and of visitors 
 
The need for standardised policies for every 
unit 
 
The need for strict follow of P&P to reduce 
errors 
The need for visitation hours control 
Incident Reporting  
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Challenges Themes  
 
Comments 
•( Punitive response to error 
 
 
•( Fear of punishment 
•( Blame culture 
•( Lack of confidentiality 
•( Lack of feedback 
 
Incident Reporting used for punishment not for 
improvement, blaming culture, few things are 
kept secret for protection, reports to go to 
wrong people, there should be certain 
authority. 
Physicians should not be punished for 
reporting incidents 
Incidents are mostly reported by nurses and 
other healthcare workers not interested to 
report incidents, nurses are afraid of 
punishment since they have their own Incident 
Reporting system which is not confidential. 
Lack of feedback on reported incidents 
Communication 
•( Between staff 
o( Improve verbal 
communication 
o( Use of English 
language 
o( Improve written 
communication 
o( Use of English 
language 
 
 
 
•( Staff with patients 
o( Language barrier 
 
Lack of communication, respect and 
encouragement for the staff 
Respect and consider nurses’ opinion on 
patient care 
Patient identification in the request should be 
in English to avoid any problem 
The need to use English language to avoid 
communication problems 
most of the nurses don't speak Arabic and 
depend on Arabic staff when there is an 
aggressive patient 
Staff perceptions about patient safety 
•( Need to develop and maintain patient 
safety  
 
 
•( Need to be staff priority 
 
Patient safety is not well applied in the hospital 
No effective patient safety system, no system 
to compare hospital outcomes with acceptable 
standard 
Patient safety should be staff priority 
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Challenges Themes  
 
Comments 
The need for personal motivation to work on 
patient safety 
Staff wellbeing 
•( Staff security 
 
•( Work hours 
 
Better to have security person in the 
department as the patients are not cooperative 
and difficult to control them 
24 hours security must be made available 
The need for an adequate rest period 
Training and education 
•( Training and education need for 
staff and patients 
 
 
Give more orientation and education to staff on 
patient safety 
Need education on Incident Reporting 
The need for patient safety education for 
patients 
Workload 
•( Work pressure effect 
 
 
don't put extra pressure on staff 
The need to finish surgeries faster due to high 
workload can compromise patient safety 
With long working days, health of the staff is 
affected; two days off in a week is needed. 
Equipment and supplies 
•( Supply and quality 
 
 
 
 
 
Increase the number of medical equipment to 
replace old or partially working equipment 
The need for enough material supply to the 
wards 
Issues with hospital supplies quality 
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Challenges Themes  
 
Comments 
 
Work environment 
•( Perceptions of work environment 
 
 
Feelings of disappointment with working 
environment 
Improving the work environment will improve 
patient safety 
To maintain patient safety good working 
environment and order is required also visitors 
should be controlled. 
Teamwork 
•( Teamwork between staff 
 
Lack of physicians’ cooperation 
*Policies and Procedures (P&P) 
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Table 49: Qualitative data extracted from the open comments section regarding 
improvement efforts 
Improvements Themes  Comments 
Patient safety efforts all staff in the hospital work together to achieve 
patient safety  
Many initiatives to improve patient safety like 
Six Sigma are taking place 
Patient safety is very good in the hospital, 
department is well equipped with professionals 
Incident reporting Error or incident reporting is excellent in our 
unit 
Incident reporting system is well established in 
the hospital. 
Top management support Management is supportive and well organised 
Teamwork across units Excellent coordination with the head, colleagues 
and units of the hospital for patients care and 
safety 
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6.10" Discussion"
The survey findings provided an overview of the current state of patient safety climate in 
Kuwaiti public hospitals. The following section aims to discuss key results. It will attempt to 
identify the main issues that might influence patient safety climate in Kuwaiti hospitals. This 
will offer valuable insights for developing effective improvement strategies to promote patient 
safety.  
The dimension “Teamwork within units” received the highest positive response rate while the 
dimension “Non-punitive response to error” received the lowest rate of positive responses. A 
similar finding was reported in the 2016 HSOPSC user comparative database report, 
published by the AHRQ, which displayed results from 680 hospitals and 447,584 hospital 
staff respondents across the US (Famolaro et al., 2016).  
The following table summarizes dimension level positive response rates for US and Kuwaiti 
hospitals in comparison to data from Oman, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Palestine. 
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Table 50: Average positive response rates across USA, Kuwait, Oman, Lebanon, 
Saudi Arabia, Palestine 
 
There were some differences between the HSOPSC results of Kuwaiti and US hospitals. The 
positive response rates of six dimensions: Teamwork within units, Supervisors’/Managers’ 
expectations and actions promoting patient safety, Organisational learning-continuous 
improvement, Management support for patient safety, Teamwork across units and Handoffs 
and Transitions in Kuwaiti hospitals (84%, 77%, 82%, 74%, 67%, 65% respectively) were 
higher than that of US hospitals (81%, 76%, 73%, 72%, 61%, 47% respectively). This might 
be due to a number of reasons. The National Accreditation Programme was recently 
implemented in the three hospitals. The programme allows trained external peer reviewers to 
evaluate hospitals’ compliance with pre-established standards of care. Given the current 
global emphasis on improving the safety of healthcare services, standards of care have 
reinforced the need for safe systems with implementation of patient safety programmes as a 
minimum required standard. The programme also requires hospitals, as part of their 
accreditation process, to develop a range of policies and procedures to ensure the safety of 
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both patients and employees. Additionally, the programme helped in disseminating 
information about patient safety to staff members during training programmes and educational 
sessions, annual conferences, in newsletters and on websites.  
Furthermore, implementation of accreditation standards is achieved through multidisciplinary 
teams that meet on regular basis and work on reviewing and applying the national standards. 
Thus, accreditation processes have reinforced the interdisciplinary nature of the healthcare 
system. In the author’s view, the above processes have played a major role in emphasizing the 
importance of proper teamwork and communication across every level for patient safety. 
Additionally, the programme stressed the value of top and middle managements’ commitment 
and support through the implementation of the “leadership” standards. This is reflected in the 
results as they highlighted the significant influence that top and middle management support 
for patient safety might have on staff’s perceptions about various safety related aspects.  
With regards to comparisons across the six countries, including the USA (Famolaro et al., 
2016), Oman (Al-Mandhari et al., 2014), Lebanon (El-Jardali et al., 2010), Saudi Arabia 
(Alahmadi, 2010) and Palestine (Hamdan and Saleem, 2013), the dimension that received the 
highest endorsement was teamwork within units followed by organisational learning except in 
Oman and Saudi Arabia where organisational learning received the highest ratings followed 
by teamwork within units. The dimension that received the least rating across all countries 
was non-punitive response to error. Thus, our results mimicked the results of other studies 
conducted. This adds to the validity of our findings.  
The dimension “Teamwork within units” (84%) scored higher than “Teamwork across units” 
(67%) in Kuwaiti hospitals as well as other international hospitals (Table 50 above). This 
might reflect the work dynamics within, and across, units in the three hospitals. It seems that 
some units tend to work independently to achieve their goals. This could be related to a 
number of personal and organisational issues including communication, hierarchy and the 
nature of healthcare delivery. Most clinical units continue to function as isolated groups of 
professionals despite the importance of teamwork in health care (Knox and Simpson, 2004). 
Baker et al. (2006) state that this is partly due to the fact that members of these units come 
from different disciplines and various educational programmes and are seldom trained 
together. Issues related to the impact of teamwork and communication on patient safety have 
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been highlighted during the interviews conducted with key personnel in the three hospitals 
and are discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
Three dimensions in Kuwaiti hospitals were lower than that of US hospitals. These 
dimensions were communication openness (47%, 62% respectively), frequency of events 
reported (50%, 66% respectively) and non-punitive response to error (33%, 44% 
respectively). These results suggest that health care workers in Kuwait are less likely than 
their US counterparts to raise safety issues or concerns or challenge those with more authority 
in addition to their unwillingness to report adverse events for fear of being reported. It is also 
worth noting that unintentional errors are prosecuted in criminal courts in Kuwait and licenses 
of healthcare professionals might be withdrawn.  
The item “Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file” in the 
dimension “Non-punitive response to error” received the lowest positive response rate (20%). 
This is suggestive of a specific area for improvement as staff feel apprehensive to report 
errors or concerns related to patient safety for fear of being penalized. Upon further analysis, 
physicians and allied health professionals were found to be less inclined to report their errors 
than nurses. According to Singer et al. (2009b), doctors experienced more sense of shame 
when they make mistakes. Additionally, physicians believe in loyalty to their colleagues, and 
deem “whistleblowing” as unethical (Kingston et al., 2004). 
Fear of disciplinary action, legal implications and discrimination at the workplace through 
shame and blame have been recognised as main concerns preventing staff from reporting 
errors (Elnitsky et al., 1997, Firth-Cozens, 2002, Singer et al., 2003b, Vincent et al., 1999).  
In a study by Evans et al. (2006), almost two thirds of respondents, including doctors and 
nurses, believed that lack of feedback was a key barrier to reporting incidents. Insufficient 
feedback and communication about errors means that staff are less informed about errors that 
happen, and changes that take place, as a result (Hamdan and Saleem, 2013). According to my 
results, “Feedback and communication about error” was reported to best predict “Frequency 
of incident reporting.” A similar finding was reported in a number of international studies, for 
example, in Sweden (Nordin et al., 2013), Norway (Ballangrud et al., 2012), Scotland (Saraç, 
2011), Lebanon (El-Jardali et al., 2011) and Germany (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) studies. 
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These findings indicate that providing feedback and communicating about errors and safety 
concerns is positively related to the frequency of incident reporting.  
Pfeiffer and Manser (2010) highlight the influence that information sharing and open 
communication about errors may have on incident reporting. They add that more research is 
needed to confirm this association and whether it also accounts for error reporting rates. 
Vincent (2006) recommends that rapid response to incidents helps keep staff engaged and 
understanding that reports are taken seriously. Vincent adds that a reporting system should be 
seen as a holistic method that encompasses “reporting, analysis, learning, feedback and 
action” and argues that most organisations are more concerned with acquiring information on 
incidents while limited attention is devoted to the analysis of information or actions taken as a 
result (Vincent, 2006, p. 91). 
Lack of clear guidelines about incident reporting as in who should report, what to report and 
how to report incidents has been recognised as another factor that leads to confusion about 
reporting incidents amongst staff. The increased workload and the belief that incident 
reporting offers limited contribution to improving safety are additional barriers to reporting 
incidents (Firth-Cozens et al., 2001).  
The above issues were also indicated by staff in their comments as they repeatedly mentioned 
the presence of a blame culture, a punitive response to error, lack of feedback after reporting 
incidents, lack of policies and procedures and their fear of punishment. Nurses reported less 
positive perceptions about communication openness in comparison to physicians (p < .01).  
This may indicate that nurses in Kuwaiti hospitals are unwilling to discuss adverse events, ask 
questions, raise safety concerns or challenge those with more authority. Such a reluctance to 
speak up can be linked to staff’s fear of the negative repercussions that may result, as most 
nurses come from ethnic minority populations. Thomas et al. (2003) reported a similar finding 
where, relative to physicians, nurses reported a difficulty in speaking up. This was attributed 
to fundamental differences between nurses and doctors in authority, responsibilities, training, 
and nursing and physician cultures. This issue will be further expanded in Chapter seven.  
Our results endorse findings by other researchers regarding the under reporting of errors. 
Sexton et al. (2000) conducted a cross-sectional survey of urban teaching and non-teaching 
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hospitals in the United States, Israel, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy and more than half of 
the survey respondents reported that they faced difficulties discussing errors because of 
personal reputation, fear of disciplinary actions and risks of malpractice suits. Thus, 
considerable effort must be invested in reassuring staff that the main objective of reporting 
incidents is improvement and not punishment. still, having a low positive response rate to 
“Non-punitive response to errors”, “Communication openness” and “Frequency of events 
reported” while having a high positive response rate to “Hospital management support” and 
“Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and actions promoting patient safety” is questionable. 
This might imply that no priority is properly given to incident reporting in the three hospitals 
and that a culture of shame and fear still exists. This might also be reflected in the outcome 
item “Number of events reported” as it shows that 40% of respondents have not reported any 
adverse events in the past year and 34% had reported only one to two events.  
There was a discrepancy in the result of the outcome measure “Frequency of events reported” 
(50%) and the “Non-punitive response to errors” (34%). This may reflect the internal conflict 
that hospital staff have between their desire to report errors on one hand, and the predominant 
culture of blame and shame on the other hand. When employees feel confident to openly 
discuss and report errors without fear of shame or blame in a non-punitive environment, this 
might ultimately lead to better event reporting and consequently a safer hospital (Smits et al., 
2009b). Organisational support in the form of properly constructed reporting structures, 
systemic data collection and governance are essential requirements for incident reporting 
(Alahmadi, 2010, El-Jardali et al., 2014, Wong et al., 2002).  
The IOM recommends that healthcare organisations enhance their safety culture through 
building safety into their processes of care and moving from a culture where errors are viewed 
as personal failures towards one in which errors are considered as opportunities for 
improvement (Kohn et al., 2000). Studies show that under-reporting of errors included 
instances where actual harm has occurred but was more common when no harm has occurred 
and the incident was a close call or a near miss (Alahmadi, 2010, Vincent and Reason, 1999, 
Weingart et al., 2000). As argued by Barach and Small (2000), adverse events and near misses 
are both preceded by the same patterns of triggers of failure therefore near misses are 
powerful signals of hazards in systems. Low accident rates in high hazard industries may be 
attributed to following a proactive, preventive approach through reporting systems (Roberts 
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and Rousseau, 1989) while most efforts to improve safety in healthcare are reactive in nature 
(Alahmadi, 2010, Sorra and Nieva, 2004). Nevertheless, literature highlighting the importance 
of reporting near misses is not yet transformed to attitudinal or behavioural changes. Acts of 
omission have been linked in twice as many adverse events as acts of commission but around 
80% of doctors believed they should always report when a patient gets the wrong treatment 
compared with only 57% when a patient does not receive necessary treatment (Wilson et al., 
1995). Further research on professional attitudes and barriers to incident reporting is 
necessary for developing an appropriate incident reporting system in Kuwaiti hospitals.  
As Piotrowski and Hinshaw (2002) conclude, the commitment of leadership to improving 
patient safety through supporting learning from errors, encouraging teamwork, using a 
systems’ approach for reporting and analysing adverse events in a blame-free environment, 
identifying latent hazards and recognising workers as key players in improving safety, rather 
than causing errors, are features of a strong and proactive safety culture. 
Perceptions of patient safety climate were found to be different between the different 
hospitals, hospital departments and units and professional groups. These results provide 
further evidence for the discriminant validity of the HSOPSC questionnaire (Saraç, 2011). 
They also accord with other studies that reported significant differences across hospitals 
(Sexton et al., 2006, Singer et al., 2003, Singer et al., 2009b), clinical departments and 
professional groups (Cooper et al., 2008, Haugen et al., 2010, Huang et al., 2007, Olsen, 
2007, Olsen, 2008). Singer et al. (2009b) argue that a better understanding of the differences 
between distinct work areas and disciplines in hospitals can help in the design and 
implementation of more effective safety interventions.  
Differences across the three hospitals were reported on a number of safety climate 
dimensions. Hospital site was also reported to be a significant predictor of safety climate in 
these hospitals. Hospital C reported better perceptions of supervisors’/managers’ expectations 
and actions and hospital management’s support to patient safety amongst other dimensions in 
comparison to Hospital A and B. Interviews with key personnel (discussed in more detail in 
Chapter seven) revealed a number of factors that might have led to more positive perceptions 
of safety climate in Hospital C compared to the other two hospitals. Such factors include top 
and middle management support and commitment to patient safety, open communication 
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about safety concerns and feedback and communication about changes that take place as a 
result of safety incidents. Reasons behind this may be attributed to a number of factors. 
Hospital C is a specialist hospital and an internationally accredited training centre. It is 
involved in the National Accreditation Programme and received accreditation with excellence. 
In addition, the centre targets highly qualified staff who received their training in the UK, US 
and Canada. This resulted in the exposure of staff to different training programmes and 
quality improvement initiatives that may greatly impact the perceptions of staff about patient 
safety. Additionally, the hospital is smaller in size with fewer beds in comparison to the other 
two hospitals which may result in better perceptions of patient safety climate amongst staff 
(El-Jardali, 2003, El-Jardali et al., 2010, Nordin et al., 2013). Larger organisations have been 
argued to be less receptive to employees’ needs and concerns and may have a weak 
organisational culture (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1993). 
Another finding indicated that medical, surgical, paediatrics and laboratory departments 
across the three hospitals were more likely to report their errors than the radiology and nuclear 
medicine departments. This could be explained by the fact that more errors may actually 
occur within these departments due to their high workload and their greater susceptibility to 
making errors as a result. Also, the presence of a higher ratio of nurses in these departments, 
who according to research, are more inclined to report their errors than other staff may also 
help to explain this difference (Evans et al., 2006, Kingston et al., 2004). Yet, the radiology 
and nuclear medicine departments were found to be more open to raising safety issues than 
medical, surgical, paediatrics and laboratory departments. This may be due to the smaller size 
of the department in comparison to the others with shorter paths of decision making and better 
communication and cooperation amongst their staff. Interview data provided further 
clarification to this point as the radiology and nuclear medicine departments were described 
by interviewees as having an open communication culture in relation to safety issues. 
Additionally, the other departments are larger in size and employ a variety of professional 
groups and inter-professional communication between these different groups, as will be 
discussed later, presents a significant barrier that may negatively impact patient safety. 
The professional group of respondents was another significant predictor of safety climate. 
Nurses, as well as technicians, had more favourable perceptions about differing aspects of 
patient safety while physicians and allied health professionals were found to be more critical 
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of the same aspects of patient safety climate. Nie et al. (2013) reported similar findings, as 
nurses’ perceptions about patient safety culture were higher than physicians perceptions. 
Cook et al. (2004) reports that physicians, administrators and nurses considered patient safety 
as a nurse responsibility. Also the amount of time nurses spend communicating with patients 
gives rise to more opportunities for nurses to deal with patient safety issues (Grant et al., 
2006). Nurses also undergo extensive patient safety training as part of their continuous 
professional development in Kuwaiti hospitals leading to being better informed about patient 
safety aspects.  
In my PhD thesis, physicians were less positive than nurses on a number of dimensions 
including hospital management’s commitment to safety. The extent of variation in safety 
climate in units within two academic medical centres was assessed and physicians’ 
perceptions were reported to be lower than nurses on a number of similar dimensions 
(Campbell et al., 2010, Pronovost et al., 2006b). In contrast, a number of studies examined 
differences in safety climate by clinical discipline and demonstrated that physicians had rather 
more positive perceptions of safety in comparison to nurses and other clinical personnel 
(Algahtani, 2015, Makary et al., 2006, Singer et al., 2009b, Thomas et al., 2003). It can be 
argued that differences in safety climate perceptions between nurses and physicians may be 
attributed to differences related to the local hospital environment. If physicians perceive the 
level of patient safety more negatively than nurses, then physicians may be more likely to 
recognise a need to implement improvement strategies. Still, the lower composite scores of 
physicians and allied health professionals make them suitable candidates for future 
educational and other improvement interventions. 
 It was also identified that females had more positive perceptions of safety climate on a 
number of dimensions in comparison to males. This may be partly related to the fact that 
nurses in Kuwaiti health care settings are predominantly females (63%) and this may reflect 
nurses’ views of safety climate. Four of the dimensions were viewed positively by nurses and 
females. It was also shown that respondents with longer tenure within health care scored 
higher on a number of dimensions than those with shorter tenure; specifically, five years and 
below. Nordin et al. (2013) explain that this may be related to their shorter experience and 
their lower level of adaptation to the existing culture, and thus have a more critical attitude to 
the lack of safety. On the other hand, El-Jardali et al. (2011) reported that experienced staff 
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scored lower for the outcome measure “Overall perceptions of patient safety” and argues that 
with experience, staff become more aware and critical of the safety practices undertaken in 
their institutions.  
Additionally, non-Kuwaitis, comprising 91% of the study population, were more positive on 
five dimensions, including supervisors’/managers’ expectations and actions promoting patient 
safety, organisational learning, hospital management’s commitment to safety, overall 
perceptions of patient safety and frequency of events reported, in comparison to Kuwaitis. 
There are a number of possible explanations for this finding including their fear of being 
recognised and the negative implications that could result. Another explanation is that 
Kuwaiti physicians and nurses are known to openly express and discuss their negative views 
of the Kuwaiti healthcare system without fear of being investigated or penalized.  
When developing safety initiatives, it is important for leaders to recognise which dimensions 
are most closely linked with better safety perceptions (Brown, 2016). Safety climate 
dimensions explained the highest amount of variance in outcome measures “Patient safety 
grade” (27%) and “Overall perceptions of patient safety” (25%). This finding is replicated in a 
study conducted in Scotland (Saraç, 2011) and Norway (Olsen, 2008). Hospital’s 
management support was reported to be the most significant predictor of both outcome 
measures. This finding is consistent with that of Nordin et al. (2013) and El-Jardali et al. 
(2011). Frequency of events reported was closely linked to more positive responses toward 
feedback and communication about error followed by hospital management support for 
patient safety. This confirms the importance of leaders in creating and supporting an 
environment that is conducive to patient safety and the value of sharing insights and concerns 
and informing staff about any changes that are put in place as a result of incidents reported. 
Staff’s perceptions of patient safety at the hospital and unit level are influenced by the degree 
of support that they feel by their management thus leaders should also consider encouraging 
staff through different means and various communication channels. 
Overall, the constant influences of safety climate dimensions on “Patient safety grade”, 
“Frequency of event reporting” and “Overall perceptions of patient safety”, as Olsen (2008) 
and Saraç (2011) argue, support the validity of both safety culture dimensions and safety 
outcome measures. However, the outcome variable “Number of incidents reported” was 
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influenced by only three dimensions and was reported to be weakly and negatively correlated 
to the rest of the measures. This highlights the weak influence that this variable exhibits in 
comparison to the other measures. Saraç (2011) provides an explanation for the relatively 
higher correlations between the three other outcome measures and the rest of the HSOPSC 
scales and the weak correlation between the number of incidents reported as it might suggest 
that the three outcome measures are in fact another dimension of safety culture rather than 
separate outcome measures. Thus, it was recommended to adopt the “Number of incidents 
reported”  item as a change measure rather than as a criterion variable to assess the predictive 
validity of the HSOPSC safety culture dimensions (Olsen, 2008, Saraç, 2011).  
Correlation results showed that the significant moderate correlations between hospital 
management support to safety and teamwork across units, and between feedback and 
communication about error and communication openness, were higher compared to other 
scales. This is not surprising since the dimensions feedback and communication about error 
and communication openness merged into a single dimension in a number of studies including 
Scottish (Sarac et al., 2010) German (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) and English (Waterson et al., 
2010) studies. Hospital management support for safety and teamwork across units were 
merged into one dimension in the Turkish study (Bodur and Filiz, 2010). This may be 
attributed to the significant degree of overlap in the content of the safety culture dimensions, 
as items in certain dimensions tend to load onto differently labeled dimensions. 
The correlations between frequency of events reported and non-punitive response to error and 
communication openness were found to be lower compared to other scales. This may reflect 
the current state of safety climate where reporting errors is stressed through different channels 
of communication yet the predominant culture is of blame, shame and silence towards raising 
safety concerns. This implies that there are contradicting messages and the emphasis on 
reporting errors is yet to be translated into action. 
In summary, the above findings can offer valuable insights for developing effective 
improvement strategies to promote patient safety. A systematic review identified interventions 
used to promote safety culture or climate in acute care settings. The interventions included 
executive walk rounds or interdisciplinary rounds, multicomponent, unit-based interventions; 
and team training or communication initiatives that target clinical microsystems (for example, 
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teams, or units) (Weaver et al., 2013). Team training covers a set of structured methods for 
maximizing teamwork processes, such as communication, cooperation, collaboration, and 
leadership (Salas et al., 2008b). The review concluded that evidence to support the potential 
effectiveness of interventions to promote safety culture is emerging. Table (51) includes 
examples of patient safety interventions. 
Table 51: Examples of patient safety interventions 
Examples of patient safety interventions Study reference (Author, year) 
Executive walk rounds and interdisciplinary rounding  
 
(O'leary et al., 2011) 
(Frankel et al., 2008) 
National and local safety programmes: 
•( 1000 lives campaign in NHS Wales 
 
•( The Scottish Patient Safety Programme (SPSP)  
 
(Cooper et al., 2015) 
(Haraden and Leitch, 2011) 
Team training and team communication tools  
 
(Donahue et al., 2011) 
(Riley et al., 2011) 
(Mayer et al., 2011) 
Multi-faceted unit-based programmes:  
•( Comprehensive Unit-Based Safety Program (CUSP)  
 
 
(Sexton et al., 2011)  
(Timmel et al., 2010) 
Organisational learning interventions: 
•( Morbidity and mortality meetings 
 
 
(Szekendi et al., 2010) 
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Examples of patient safety interventions Study reference (Author, year) 
•( Incident reporting (Burlison et al., 2016) 
(Muething et al., 2012) 
Other patient safety culture strategies: 
•( Surgical safety checklists  
 
•( Improvement approach strategies  
 
(Haynes et al., 2011) 
(Benning et al., 2011) 
The effectiveness of different quality and safety improvement initiatives and interventions has 
been tested using different safety climate tools (Blegen et al., 2010, Ford et al., 2014, Jackson 
et al., 2010). The impact of a multidisciplinary teamwork and communication intervention to 
improve unit-based safety culture with a before-after design has been determined using the 
HSOPSC (Blegen et al., 2010).  Also, the implementation of a multifaceted unit-based safety 
programme was tested using the safety climate scale. Safety assessments highlighted a 
number of concerns including the lack of trained patient transport teams, medication errors, 
and poor communication among ICU members. Staff’s safety concerns were discussed with 
senior executives and led to funding of a patient transport team and a point of care pharmacist 
to facilitate medication ordering and distribution. Also, a short-term goals sheet was 
implemented to improve communication among ICU team members and with family 
members. This, as a result, produced increases in scores on safety culture, decreases in 
medication errors on transfer and improvements in length of stay in intensive care units 
(Pronovost et al., 2005b).  
In addition, links between different aspects of safety culture and incident reporting behaviour 
were examined (Patterson and Pace, 2016, Richter et al., 2015). Implementation of a 
voluntary non-punitive incident reporting system in neonatal ICUs was assessed with before 
and after design. The number of self-reported incidents was found to be increased following 
the intervention and positively associated with the safety climate dimension of non-punitive 
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response to error (Snijders et al., 2009). The impact of accreditation in a university hospital 
was studied through a cross-sectional retrospective and prospective study using the HSOPSC 
in Saudi Arabia (Al-Awa et al., 2012) and in Lebanon (El-Jardali et al., 2011). It can also be 
used for benchmarking the strengths of safety cultures across time and between organisations 
on national and international levels (Blegen et al., 2009). 
Morello et al. (2013) conducted a systematic review to critically assess the evidence for the 
effectiveness of patient safety culture strategies for improving patient safety climate in 
hospitals. The strategies targeted a diverse range of issues, including leadership, 
communication and teamwork, identification of safety concerns, reporting of near misses and 
reliability. The systematic review found limited evidence to support the effectiveness of a 
variety of in-hospital patient safety culture strategies with possible positive effects for 
leadership walk rounds and multifaceted, unit-based interventions on survey measures of 
safety climate. The review did not assess effects on patient outcomes or care processes.  
6.11" Strengths"and"limitations"
The response rate 87%, (n= 1,310), sample size (n=1,511) and stratified random sampling 
techniques are among the strengths of the study. Another strength is the HSOPSC tool as it is 
a comprehensive measure of safety climate that assesses a range of key dimensions related to 
patient safety, used worldwide and translated into many languages. Additionally, the inclusion 
of different types of hospitals (general, specialist, urban, rural) and various groups of 
healthcare staff working across many departments allows for the generalizability of the 
findings.  
6.11.1$SelfTreported$outcome$measures$
In my PhD thesis, it was not possible to validate survey results against objective safety 
outcome data (observational studies, hospital records, incident reporting systems) as the 
researcher had no access to such data. This is a common problem in patient safety climate 
research (Wentzell, 2008).Thus, self-reported measures were employed to assess the 
relationships between safety constructs. Still, data on perceptions of patient safety climate and 
on patient safety outcomes were collected from one source. Consequently, common method 
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bias, biased recall, and social desirability may potentially affect the results (Cooper and 
Phillips, 2004, Podsakoff et al., 2003). Also, careful consideration is needed when interpreting 
the results of the regression analyses as the potential for common-method-bias may inflate the 
results of the relationships between the variables (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010, Podsakoff et al., 
2003). The problematic nature of objective data has been debated in the literature (Cooper and 
Phillips, 2004, Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010). In an attempt, by the researcher, to control for the 
mentioned effects, survey respondents were assured of their anonymity and were guaranteed 
that all their individual responses would be treated in strict confidence. Saraç (2011) 
recommended following a mixed methods’ approach to control for the effects of using data 
collected from the same source. However, in our case, it was not possible to obtain the 
outcome variables from different sources due to the time and cost restrictions.  
6.11.2$CrossTsectional$design$
My PhD thesis employed a cross-sectional design which is considered another methodological 
limitation. Despite being cost-effective and time efficient, Ausserhofer (2012) argues that 
such a design limits the assessment of causal relationships as all variables are assessed at one 
point in time. It offers more of a correlational relationship  between study variables (Mann, 
2003). Longitudinal studies of safety perceptions and outcomes employed to investigate 
causality would allow the researcher to draw stronger conclusions (Beus et al., 2010, Cooper 
and Phillips, 2004, Neal and Griffin, 2006). 
6.11.3$Acquiescence$bias$
The HSOPSC has been reported to carry the risk of acquiescence bias. Schuman and Scott 
(1989) defined acquiescence bias as "a presumed tendency for respondents to agree with 
attitude statements presented to them" (p.14). In a study by Moghri et al. (2013), the uneven 
distribution of positively and negatively worded items among the twelve dimensions of the 
HSOPSC was tested for the risk of acquiescence bias. The authors concluded that the 
HSOPSC carries a risk of acquiescence bias which may lead to inflated composites of patient 
safety culture dimensions. They conclude that balancing the number of positive and negative 
worded items in each composite could lessen bias and provide a more valid estimation of 
different elements of patient safety culture.  
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6.11.4$NonTrespondents$
Differences between respondents and non-respondents were not examined. It might be safe to 
assume that respondents had higher perceptions of safety climate compared to non-
respondents. This may be due to their participation in safety-related initiatives and their safety 
motivation. A number of strategies were followed to handle the issue of non-response. As the 
researcher recognised the value of attaining organisational support for the study, attempts 
were made to obtain endorsement letters from different levels in the MOH including the 
under-secretary general, the Quality and Accreditation Directorate and the head of safety and 
risk management department. The importance of local support was stressed through 
scheduling a number of meetings with hospital management, medical and nursing directors in 
the three hospitals. An outline of the study was presented to them with an open discussion 
about their expectations and concerns. They were handed customized packets including the 
study proposal, data collection protocol and ethical approvals. Hospital management were 
keen to support this research because they were generally concerned about the level of patient 
safety in their hospitals and the researcher offered to deliver confidential feedback reports to 
the three hospitals. As a result, internal memos were sent to encourage staff to participate in 
the study. This, collectively, resulted in further cooperation at both hospital and individual 
levels and led to maximization of the response rate in the three hospitals. 
6.11.5$Aggregation$of$data$
Data from the three hospitals were merged during the analysis phase despite the fact that data 
came from hospitals with different characteristics. However, the researcher conducted 
separate statistical analysis for the three hospitals before eventually merging the data. Overall, 
there were no significant differences in perceptions except in Hospital C as previously 
mentioned. This issue will be explored further in Chapter seven. 
6.12" Conclusion"
The present study establishes a foundation for an open dialogue about patient safety issues 
amongst healthcare staff in Kuwaiti hospitals. The current state of safety climate offers 
valuable insights for developing and implementing effective strategies to promote 
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improvements in patient safety areas including communication openness, error reporting and 
responses to errors. Efforts should be directed towards creating an environment that supports 
active questioning and sharing of insights and concerns about safety in addition to proactively 
identifying and eliminating errors to significantly improve patient and staff safety as well as 
eliminating the prevalent culture of blame and shame. 
To build a strong and proactive safety culture, the visible and explicit commitment of the 
chief executives and senior managers is crucial. Managers in public hospitals must adopt a 
leadership role and personally lead the improvement process, communicating the defined 
vision and encouraging the active participation of different parties as well as providing 
directions and guidance to maximize employees’ potential. This can only be achieved through 
fostering open reporting, commitment to learning from errors and encouraging teamwork and 
open communication between staff through strong multidisciplinary teams in addition to 
training and education of healthcare staff on patient safety as a key success factor (Conway 
and Weingart, 2005, Kagan and Barnoy, 2008, Künzle, 2010).  
6.13" Summary"
In summary, this phase of my study involved an assessment of the prevailing state of safety 
climate in three public hospitals in Kuwait using the HSOPSC survey data. The findings 
suggest that the reporting climate in Kuwaiti hospitals is a major concern for healthcare 
workers with a predominant culture of blame, fear of reprisals and lack of openness in relation 
to patient safety. 
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7" Chapter"Seven:"Interviews"with"key"stakeholders"
7.1" Introduction"
Building on the survey results discussed in Chapter six, this study was designed to extend the 
examination of the state of patient safety climate in Kuwaiti public hospitals by conducting 
interviews with key stakeholders. Owing to the potentially sensitive nature of such a topic for 
discussion, face-to-face individual interviews were chosen as the best methodological 
approach to further explore the themes highlighted in the survey results. Interviews will add 
rich insight into hospital employees' perceptions of safety culture. This allows a 
comprehensive understanding of the factors that might affect patient safety in the three 
hospitals in addition to allowing an exploration of emerging issues in more detail.  
7.2" Research"design"
At this stage, an exploratory, qualitative approach to the current research study was adopted to 
add a contextual element to the survey findings and capture the depth and complexity of 
emerging issues. Qualitative research has been defined as “research that is intended to help 
you better understand (1) the meanings and perspectives of the people you study—seeing the 
world from their point of view, rather than simply from your own; (2) how these perspectives 
are shaped by, and shape, their physical, social, and cultural contexts; and (3) the specific 
processes that are involved in maintaining or altering these phenomena and relationships” 
(Maxwell, 2012, p.viii). Generic quantitative measures of safety culture and climate have 
been viewed as being of limited value for a sector as complex and fast changing as healthcare 
(Cox and Flin, 1998, Flin, 2007, Guldenmund, 2000). Qualitative methods allow researchers 
to move beyond the limitations of structured questionnaires to open-ended questions that 
allow respondents to explain their perceptions and experiences in their own words (Andrew, 
2014). One of the fundamental features of qualitative research is the use of the researcher as a 
primary tool actively taking part in the study design (Creswell, 2013). Morgan-Trimmer and 
Wood (2016) add that qualitative approaches have the flexibility to capture unexpected 
findings which may further contribute to the overall understanding of how things operate in a 
particular setting. They also reveal associations among concepts and behaviours in addition to 
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generating and refining theory (Crabtree and Miller, 1999, Miles and Huberman, 1994). Yet, 
qualitative data may be difficult to interpret, and can be susceptible to bias (Andrew, 2014).  
Qualitative methods are increasingly used in health services research (Shortell, 1999). 
Interviews, observations and focus groups are commonly used qualitative methods (Bradley et 
al., 2007) with interviews and focus groups the most common methods used (Legard et al., 
2003). Interviews have been defined as “literally an interview, an inter change of views 
between two persons” (Brinkman and Kvale, 2009, p.2). Interviews can help researchers in 
exploring “openly about situational meanings or motives for action, or collecting everyday 
theories and self-interpretations in a differentiated and open way” (Hopf, 2004, p.203). There 
are three fundamental types of research interview ranging from the very structured, through 
the semi-structured, to the unstructured or conversational (Bryman, 2015). Semi-structured 
interviews are the most common data-collection method in qualitative health research 
(Marshall and Rossman, 2014). They are characterized by increasing levels of flexibility and 
absence of structure (Edwards and Holland, 2013). Louise Barriball and While (1994) 
describe semi-structured interviews as suitable for the exploration of respondents’ perceptions 
and views about complex and sensitive issues in addition to enabling the probing for more 
information and explanation of responses. According to Merriam and Tisdell (2015), the 
researcher will continue to interview and probe until he feels no further data can be acquired. 
Semi-structured interviews consist of main questions that help the researcher define the areas 
to be explored. At the same time, they permit the interviewer or interviewee to divert from the 
main issues in order to follow an idea or response in more detail (Britten, 2007). Gill et al. 
(2008) emphasize the flexibility of this approach as it allows the uncovering of information 
that is important to participants but may not have been previously thought of as significant by 
the researcher. 
In summary, semi-structured interviews will be conducted with key stakeholders in order to 
gain a deeper understanding about the perceptions of healthcare workers regarding factors 
affecting patient safety practices in Kuwaiti hospitals. Moreover, they will assess the 
interviewees’ perceptions about the potential usefulness of the survey approach as a safety 
improvement strategy and to identify facilitators and barriers to patient safety in Kuwaiti 
hospitals.  
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7.3" Study"setting"and"sample"
The locations for the study were the three public hospitals that were involved in the second 
phase of data collection (survey). The approximate duration of the interview process, 
including getting agreements of the MOH and the three hospitals’ boards, was approximately 
three months. Interviews were conducted in private meeting rooms with a number of 
healthcare workers at these hospitals during the time period from November to December of 
2016.  
7.3.1$ Study$sample$$
The population for the study was a sample of healthcare workers from the three hospitals A, B 
and C. The sample included six doctors and nurses. (look Table 52). 
Table 52: Interviews sample 
Staff category Hospital A Hospital B Hospital C 
Doctor 1 - 1 
Nurse 1 1 2 
7.3.2$ Sampling$procedures$
Purposive sampling, a form of non-probability sampling, was used in this phase (Tongco, 
2007). A purposive sample is based on a specific purpose rather than random selection. 
Selection of participants who are believed to be information-rich will build a deep and 
complete understanding of issues under investigation (Burns and Grove, 2001). Rubin and 
Rubin (2011) suggested a number of guidelines for selecting key informants including being: 
knowledgeable about the issue(s) being studied; representative of the range of point of views; 
and willing to talk. An essential component of a purposive sampling strategy is inclusion 
criteria (Merriam, 1998). Staff who satisfied the following criteria were considered for 
inclusion: frontline clinical staff who had worked in the hospital for at least twelve months; 
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were members in their hospitals’ patient safety and risk management committee; participated 
in the quantitative phase; and were able to speak English. The reasons for selecting doctors 
and nurses were: firstly, the patient safety and risk management committees were mainly 
composed of doctors and nurses; secondly, those two groups composed the majority of the 
study sample in the three hospitals; thirdly, the time limitation did not allow the researcher to 
include other professional groups such as technicians. Healthcare staff who met the inclusion 
criteria were provided with information about the research and were invited to participate. 
7.3.3$ Sample$size$$
The sample size for the qualitative element was based on the guiding principle of 
completeness (Schutt, 2012). In order to ensure that the purposive sample adequately 
represents the setting or issue involved, Rubin and Rubin (2011) suggest continuing to select 
interviewees until two criterions are satisfied: completeness and saturation. Completeness is 
achieved once the gained information provides an overall sense of meaning to a concept, 
theme and process and adequately answers the research question while saturation is reached 
when you gain the confidence that the subsequent interviews will add no new substantive 
information to your knowledge (Rubin and Rubin, 2011). Sandelowski (1995) argues that 
determining the adequacy of sample size in qualitative research is eventually a matter of 
judgment and experience in the assessment of the quality of gained information against its 
uses, the particular methodology employed, and the research outcome intended. He adds that 
sample size is neither too large nor too small as long as it leads to adding “new and richly 
textured understanding of experience” (p.153). Six frontline clinical staff members met the 
inclusion criteria and were chosen to participate in the study. The participants included two 
doctors and four nurses. 
7.4" Ethical"approval"
As previously mentioned, ethical approval was sought prior to conducting the interviews in 
the selected hospitals (see copies of ethics approval in Appendix 7 and Appendix 8). The 
relevant forms including the ethical approvals were also submitted to the three hospital boards 
for further approval to start the interview process.  
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Participation in the study was on a voluntary basis and each participant was provided with a 
participant information sheet (PIS) and an informed consent form (Appendix 80 and 
Appendix 81. Participants were also given the researcher’s contact details, should they later 
have any questions about the research.  
7.5" Informed"Consent"and"Confidentiality""
Informed consent was explained by the researcher and reviewed and signed by the participant 
before starting the interview (Appendix 81). The form provides a short summary of the 
purpose and aims of the study. It states that participation in the study is on a voluntary basis 
and that the information obtained will be treated with complete confidentiality. It also 
confirms the ability of the interviewee to withdraw at any time without penalty and without 
providing a reason. Participants were also informed that the discussions would be audiotaped, 
unless any participant chooses not to be audiotaped, and that the recordings would be 
destroyed after transcription of the interviews. Participants were also informed that the 
recorder, at any time during the interview, can be turned off at the request of the interviewee 
and that the participant can stop the interview at any time without any risk. The anonymity 
and confidentiality of interviewees was assured at all times. They were informed that the data 
would be de-identified including direct quotations that might be used in this research and 
would not be traceable back to the individual participants.  
7.6" Data"collection"method""
After obtaining the approvals from the MOH and hospital councils, the researcher consulted 
the Head of the Patient Safety and Risk Management Committee in each hospital about 
potential participants who met the inclusion criteria. Around three participants were recruited 
from each hospital. Following that, the researcher sent an invitation letter with the participant 
information sheet to the six participants and they were given a period of one week to read the 
PIS and to decide whether they were willing to participate. All invitees expressed their 
readiness to participate in the study and an appropriate time for conducting the interviews was 
set. Semi-structured interviews were conducted and were based on the HSOPSC questionnaire 
results of each hospital. The two most positive and the two least positive scoring dimensions, 
including an item for each representative dimension, were derived from the survey data. Since 
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the safety climate profiles of the three hospitals were found to be very alike and, in order to 
allow comparisons between the three hospitals, the same dimensions were presented to 
members of each hospital with scores based on their own hospital data. In addition, two extra 
dimensions that were shown to score higher in Hospital C compared to the other two hospitals 
were added (Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and actions supporting patient safety 
(SMEA) (84%), Management support for patient safety (MS) (84%) (look Table 53).  
Table 53: Hospital C versus hospital A and B positive response rate results for 
the dimensions SMEA and MS 
Hospital MS SMEA 
Hospital A 71% 73% 
Hospital B 70% 76% 
Hospital C 84% 84% 
•( Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and actions (SMEA), Hospital management’s commitment to safety 
(MS) 
The interviews started with a discussion in relation to the importance of patient safety in 
general, and patient safety measurement in particular. The aim of this phase was to capture the 
interviewees’ views and perceptions around those points in addition to facilitating the 
discussions in the next phase. Next, each participant was presented with a description of the 
dimension and item selected for the interview. They were also asked to express their opinions 
regarding their hospital’s survey results and whether they fit with their own views and 
perceptions. They were next asked if the selected dimension affects patient safety and in what 
ways. They were then asked about their suggestions for improving the current situation in 
their hospitals (see Appendix 82 for interview schedule). It should be noted that the selected 
dimensions were all unit level dimensions and one hospital level dimension (Management 
support for patient safety). Finally, participants were asked about the facilitators and barriers 
that they perceived as most crucial to patient safety (Appendix 82). 
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During the interview process itself, the researcher was prepared with a list of the main issues 
related to each hospital’s patient safety climate. Face-to-face, semi-structured interviews were 
held in a quiet and private meeting room that was booked for that purpose. Interviews lasted 
on average between 45-50 minutes and were audio-recorded. A digital audio recording device 
was used to record the interviews, with a second back-up recording device. The heavy 
workload and time limitations of the interviewees were acknowledged. The researcher kept a 
reflective journal through the process of data collection and analysis and notes were taken 
during and after the interview process. The journal was used in the analysis phase. The 
interviews were conducted by the researcher mainly in English as it is the official language 
used in Kuwaiti public hospitals. The researcher started the interview by introducing herself 
and the study aims and objectives. Each element of the interview process was thoroughly 
explained to the interviewee. The interviewer made sure that each participant understood the 
consent form before signing and submitting the form to the researcher. The interviewer used 
prompts to encourage respondents to provide enough depth to the issues discussed and to 
explore some of the issues that the interviewee mentioned during the course of the interview. 
Occasionally, certain participants felt more comfortable expressing their opinions and 
experiences in Arabic language. Those interviews were subsequently translated into English. 
The translation process was conducted by the author and revised by a bilingual translator. To 
increase the rigour of the current study, at the end of each interview, the researcher confirmed 
her understanding of the participant’s point of view by reviewing the issues that had been 
discussed.  
7.7" Data"analysis"
The process of data analysis in qualitative research begins during the data collection process 
and continues throughout all phases of research (Pope et al., 2000). Analyses of the interviews 
were performed in several stages. Initially, the data were transcribed and checked against the 
audio-recordings to prepare them for the analysis phase. Interpretation of the data began with 
a thorough reading of the transcripts by two independent researchers. The aim of this phase is 
to familiarize the researchers with the data and to gain a more comprehensive understanding 
of the key arguments made by the interviewees. This provided the opportunity to take note of 
potential themes in the data. The similarities in the safety climate profiles of the three 
hospitals with related issues and concerns allowed the researcher to make a decision about 
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aggregating the data. Next, a close examination of each individual dimension with its related 
questions was undertaken by the researcher to identify any repeated patterns of data or 
common themes (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006) that emerge as being important to the 
description of the phenomenon (Braun and Clarke, 2006, Daly et al., 1997). The process 
involves “careful reading and re-reading of the data” (Rice and Ezzy, 1999, p.258). There are 
two primary methods of identifying themes within the data: inductive and deductive 
approaches. The deductive researcher as described by Creswell et al. (2011b) “works from the 
‘top down’, from a theory to hypotheses to data to add to or contradict the theory” (p.41). The 
inductive researcher, on the other hand, works from the “bottom-up, using the participants’ 
views to build broader themes and generate a theory interconnecting the themes” (p. 41). In 
my PhD thesis, the researcher followed a data driven or an inductive approach.  
Lastly, common responses and differences obtained across the three hospitals were 
summarized. Content was categorized based on major themes and subgroups within the 
themes. Excerpts that fell into a specific theme were tabulated while those that did not fall 
into a particular theme were tabulated into a section entitled “other.” A comparison was made 
between the researchers to check the credibility and dependability of the author. Finally, the 
barriers and facilitators to patient safety were summarized and tabulated in a table. 
7.8" Results""
Four main themes were extracted from the transcriptions of the interviews. The first theme 
was related to issues needing to be improved at the individual level. The second theme was 
related to issues needing to be addressed at the unit level. The third theme was related to 
issues needing to be improved at the hospital level. The fourth theme is related to external 
factors that influence patient safety in hospitals. These themes consist of 17 interrelated sub-
themes which complement each other and collectively describe the state of safety culture in 
Kuwaiti public hospitals and provide suggestions for improvement. Since the three hospitals 
have similar safety climate profiles as obtained from the survey, it was decided to aggregate 
the data (Table 40 on page 209).  
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It should be noted that the researcher has preserved the transcripts in their original form 
without any corrections in an effort not to change the original meaning conveyed by 
interviewees. 
7.8.1$ Interviewees$demographics$
The participants came from different cultures and backgrounds. Three were from Egypt and 
three from India. This matches the most commonly reported non-Kuwaiti nationalities in the 
survey phase.  
Participants’ age groups, profession and years of experience in their hospitals were different. 
Four participants were aged between 35 and 44 years old. Two of the participants were 
between 45 and 54 years of age. Three participants had worked for a period of four to six 
years in their hospitals while three had worked for fewer than three years.  
All participants volunteered to participate in the interviews and were clearly enthusiastic 
about expressing their views around patient safety and sharing potential solutions to safety 
issues and concerns. They openly expressed their perceptions about patient safety in their 
work areas and in their hospitals as a whole. This helped to reveal important issues and 
concerns related to safety of patients and workers as well. Each participant had a unique input 
to the research data but interviewees had shared perceptions and similar views. The following 
table includes the participant codes for excerpts. 
Table 54: Interviewees Demographics and Codes for extracted excerpts 
Interviewee No. Staff category Gender Interviewee code 
1 Doctor Male Participant 1 
2 Nurse Female Participant 2 
3 Nurse Female Participant 3 
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Interviewee No. Staff category Gender Interviewee code 
4 Doctor Female Participant 4 
5 Nurse Female Participant 5 
6 Nurse Female Participant 6 
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7.8.2$ Interview$findings$
The following table summarizes the main themes, sub-themes and main issues revealed at the 
sub-themes level (Table 55). 
Table 55: Themes, sub-themes and main issues  
Themes Sub-themes 
 
Main issues at sub-themes 
Individual Level Staff perceptions about patient 
safety  
Lack of seriousness towards patient safety 
Importance of patient safety assessment 
Staff safety and security  Staff safety issues and their impact on 
patient safety 
Staff security issues and their impact on 
patient safety 
Reporting errors  Consequences of reporting errors 
Under-reporting of errors 
Patient awareness about patient 
safety 
Patients’ awareness about the importance 
of patient safety 
Unit Level Teamwork and communication 
between different professions  
Influence of different professional groups 
on teamwork and communication 
Teamwork and communication 
between different cultural groups 
The effect of a multicultural workforce on 
teamwork and communication 
Teamwork and communication 
between different departments  
Teamwork and communication across 
units 
Handovers  Issues with handover 
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Themes Sub-themes 
 
Main issues at sub-themes 
Role of supervisors Level of support between different units 
Speaking up 
Need for support and involvement of 
supervisors 
Need for feedback and communication 
Hospital Level Top management support 
  
Need for top management support and 
involvement in patient safety 
Issues with execution of decisions related 
to patient safety 
The need for a non-punitive approach to 
errors 
Need for more resources 
Communication  
 
Communication issues between middle 
and senior management 
Need for effective communication 
channels 
Need for feedback and communication 
Training and Education 
  
Need for top management participation 
Need for training and education on 
incident reporting, communication and 
teamwork 
Working environment  
 
Staffing issues 
Need for adequate supplies and facilities 
Workload issues 
Information technology Medical records issues 
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Themes Sub-themes 
 
Main issues at sub-themes 
  Need for electronic incident reporting 
system 
Need for electronic medical records  
Policies and procedures 
 
Concerns over the execution of policies 
Need for fixed policies on written and 
verbal communication 
Organisational 
Level 
Accreditation Role of accreditation 
Ministry of Health Need for ministerial decrees and decisions 
7.9" Individual"level"
The first theme is about issues that need to be addressed at the individual level including staff 
and patients. The theme consists of four inter-related sub-themes that provide a better 
understanding of staff perceptions at the individual level. Participants described their 
perceptions about patient safety in the first sub-theme. Staff safety and security concerns and 
their impact on patient safety were raised in the second sub-theme. In the third, participants 
talked about their concerns regarding reporting errors. Patient awareness about patient safety 
was discussed in the fourth sub-theme. 
7.9.1$ Staff$perceptions$about$patient$safety$
Staff perceptions at the individual level revealed concerns about their colleagues’ lack of 
seriousness towards patient safety. Opinions differed as to whether this was related to staffs’ 
own ignorance of the implications of their actions on patients or their resistance and 
unwillingness to change. The following comments illustrate the types of points raised:  
Even for the critical care areas, sometimes, they don't change their dress...the same 
uniform from home, take care of the patient, and sometimes they will be wearing a.... 
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But it will not protect them to that extent. Their hair is exposed, their hands are 
exposed, their feet are exposed. (Participant 2)  
Others linked it to their work overload and unavailability of time.  
All participants agreed on the value of assessing patient safety in their organisations to offer a 
baseline measure of the current state of safety climate upon which further measurements can 
be based: 
It shows how important the safety is and how important it is for the staff to be aware 
of its culture. (Participant 5) 
While others emphasized its importance as part of the accreditation programme requirements 
and their hospitals’ strategic plan: 
Firstly; because it's part of the accreditation programme, secondly; it's part of the 
hospital's strategic plan, thirdly; it's part of the quality commitments on which our 
work is based. (Participant 4) 
Others noted the role of these assessments in raising awareness of staff members about patient 
safety and initiating discussions about its importance. Still, some were critical of its 
usefulness if results were not implemented: 
One can conduct a research but eventually fails to apply the results, although he wants 
to. Should we guarantee that the results will be applied, I believe the influence will be 
great. (Participant 1) 
Finally, interviewees highlighted the importance of feedback and communication about 
assessment results in setting future improvement goals and creating a sense of engagement 
among the staff. 
7.9.2$ Staff$safety$and$security$
In this sub-theme, interviewees frequently said that staff safety was overlooked. 
Nothing is mentioned in relation to safety of the staff…The type of safety they pay 
attention to is that of the patient or the visitors not of staff. (Participant 3) 
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Furthermore, interviewees repeatedly mentioned that staff security was also overlooked.  
Insecure feeling ...they don't feel that they are 100% safe working there. (Participant 
2)  
Other respondents stressed its impact on patient safety. 
If the staff feel secure and well treated, they will certainly give their best in their work 
and focus on preserving the patient’s rights. If satisfied, we will definitely be more 
psychologically prepared to fully serve the patients. (Participant 3) 
7.9.3$ Reporting$errors$
Hospital staff perceived that, when mistakes happen, there would be a punitive approach from 
hospital management and a climate of blame and shame towards them. Thus, respondents 
indicated that a high level of concern exists amongst staff regarding the consequences of 
reporting incidents including mistakes being kept in their personal files: 
 The common misconception that these mistakes will be used against the staff in their 
personal file or they will be punished. (Participant 3) 
One participant demanded a punitive approach to handling mistakes: 
We should follow punishment methods, as human beings we make mistakes, but when 
we are aware that we will be punished for these mistakes, like a wrong injection for 
example, whether by losing my position or salary deductions, we will definitely be 
more careful...when a red light is ignored and a punishment takes place, no one else 
will repeat that mistake. (Participant 3) 
As a result, staff are hesitant to report their mistakes:  
72% are worried concerning reporting their mistakes. and as a result, incident 
reporting is absent in some department. We also might still be unaware of the incident 
until we hear of it in an unofficial way. (Participant 3) 
This was perceived to be higher among non-Kuwaiti nationals: 
The majority of the hospital staff are foreigners …most worried about losing their 
jobs. (Participant 4) 
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Also, it was viewed to be common among older compared to newly appointed staff members: 
There is a difference in their perception also. The new staff, they are. I personally feel 
they are much more aware of reporting, and the importance of reporting and they don't 
take it too much of a negative sense…But the staff, who were there previously, they 
still have a kind of rigid mind…Oh, they are resistant. (Participant 2) 
Under-reporting was viewed to have an impact on the safety of patients: 
They are not writing incidents we will not know, how, what did happen for the 
patient… if the, the staff are worried from this negative consequences of reporting, 
that type thinking means it will definitely lead to mistakes and affect the patient safety. 
(Participant 6)  
Others were concerned with the process of incident reporting. Staff mentioned some 
individual constraints that may have an effect on staffs’ reporting behaviour such as lack of 
time: 
 Time consuming for the time needed for papers preparation, reports collecting and so 
on. (Participant 4) 
7.9.4$ Patient$awareness$about$patient$safety$
Concerns were raised in relation to patients’ awareness of the importance of patient safety 
procedures. Respondents indicated: 
Patients might not be aware of the importance of these procedures. (Participant 3) 
Their lack of awareness might impact their cooperation with staff members. They also 
indicated that when patients feel safe, this leads to their satisfaction with the service they are 
receiving: 
As long as the patient feels secure he will definitely be satisfied with his care along 
with a better position for healthcare providers from his point of view also less stress, 
complaints and complications accordingly. (Participant 1) 
Respondents pointed out a need for education and awareness programmes for patients.  
" "
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7.11" Unit"Level"
The second theme reveals staff perceptions at unit level. It consists of five interrelated sub-
themes that provide a better understanding about the influence of team level factors on patient 
safety. The first sub-theme describes teamwork and communication between different 
professions. The second sub-theme features the importance of teamwork and communication 
between staff members of different cultural backgrounds. Teamwork and communication 
between departments is discussed in the third sub-theme while the fourth sub-theme describes 
handovers. The fifth sub-theme discusses the role of supervisors in supporting patient safety.  
Participants expressed a high level of agreement about teamwork within hospital units. They 
repeatedly stressed its importance to patient safety. For example:  
When working together as a team, we won't only make sure that the quality and safety 
won't be below a certain level that we have agreed upon, but also try to exceed that 
level. (Participant 3)  
A number of them offered examples of teamwork in their hospitals: 
See the effect of teamwork clearly on patients’ safety through prescriptions serving 
and during operations. (Participant 4) 
The positive impact of effective communication on patient safety was repeatedly mentioned 
by participants: 
If a good communication is present, it will show up in the form of the effective 
cooperation, rapid and accurate data reporting, avoiding misunderstandings and 
reflects positively on the patients’ safety. (Participant 3) 
While the importance of communication between team members has been highlighted by 
respondents: 
In the teamwork itself, the most important part is communication. (Participant 2) 
Some participants indicated that the lack of teamwork affects communication and 
subsequently affects patient safety negatively: 
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It certainly does. As a massive part of communications can be lost as long as we have 
a lack of teamwork. Miscommunication represents a major percentage of mistakes. 
(Participant 1) 
7.11.1$$Teamwork$and$communication$between$different$professions$
Comments in the first sub-theme focused on the need for teamwork and communication 
improvement between different staff members. Concerns were expressed amongst the 
interviewees about the influence of different professional groups on teamwork and 
communication:  
Of course, we all work for the good outcome of the patient, but still. When there are, 
you know, differences in ideas or different groups in a team itself, it will affect the 
patient safety. (Participant 2) 
While most participants felt that teamwork within the same professional group was better than 
across professional groups as one participant commented: 
But usually, nurses form a cooperative team among themselves and so do technicians 
and doctors. But when it comes to cooperation between all these categories, according 
to my own experience in different meetings, can go down to 70%. (Participant 1)  
Comments indicated that professional groups need to try harder to collaborate. According to 
interviewees, nurses experienced lack of respect from other professionals: 
Sometimes this happens between staff and doctors or even the head of units addresses 
us in an inappropriate way... Based on my previous experience as an ICU nurse, I have 
tried complaining to the head nurse and the ADN, but no actions have been taken 
allowing those getting away with mistakes to repeat them and us giving up 
complaining desperately. (Participant 3) 
Also, lack of empowerment to nurses was strongly mentioned: 
Even if the nurses has the knowledge, they feel inferior. Feeling of empowerment is 
not there. (Participant 2) 
Also, a number of participants were critical of doctors’ attitudes: 
Doctors have an ego issue. They believe they can never be mistaken. (Participant 3) 
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This lack of respect and disregard for nurses’ opinions might lead to a negative impact on 
patient safety: 
This may get the nurse to stop reminding the doctor of committing to these rules 
leading to a negative influence on patients’ safety. (Participant 1) 
Such a relationship might be attributed to a number of reasons including the shortage of inter-
departmental meetings. 
I think that may be due to the lack of joined meetings between the different working 
categories...they are even separated in the departmental and morning meetings. 
(Participant 1)  
7.11.2$$Teamwork$and$communication$between$different$cultural$groups$
The second sub-theme describes the effect of a multicultural workforce on teamwork and 
communication between staff members. The majority of respondents explicitly referred to this 
issue: 
Communication problems…specially with individuals from different backgrounds and 
speaking different languages. (Participant 1)  
The presence of a language barrier impacts effective communication as frequently mentioned 
by respondents: 
That we are of different nationalities and speaking different languages that might 
create some sort of a knowledge and language barrier. (Participant 3) 
English is the official language of communication in public hospitals. Still, it was reported 
that staff members with similar backgrounds spoke their language of origin during duty hours. 
Interviewees felt that it had a negative impact on other staff members and on patient safety:  
We have a common official language. So, in the duty time, at least for doing, for 
discussing the duty things, .... whatever regarding patient at all, we need to talk official 
language. (Participant 6)  
Others expressed their feelings of ease when openly communicating with colleagues from 
similar cultural backgrounds:  
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There is that incident where the doctor prescribed a 25 mg dose of a certain type of 
tablets which should typically be 0.25 mg and it was corrected by the 
nurse…Although it might be because they are foreigners, otherwise it wouldn't have 
been the same. (Participant 4) 
One interviewee questioned the effect of local culture on teamwork: 
We aren't familiar enough with teamwork and generally because since childhood, we 
haven't gotten to learn how to work together as a team, but on our own. We never got 
to conduct a research as a team in school, teaching us that opinions can vary and 
eventually we can find a common ground. I think that's why. (Participant 1) 
The need for psychological support for staff from different cultures was mentioned by a 
number of respondents: 
There is a need for psychological support to staff from different cultures. (Participant 
5)  
7.11.3$Teamwork$and$communication$between$different$departments$
Comments in the third sub-theme were around teamwork and communication between 
different departments. A number of interviewees were critical of teamwork across units: 
Inside the department, there is absolute teamwork...interdepartmental teamwork is 
less. (Participant 2) 
Suggestions were offered by the participants on how to improve teamwork and 
communication across staff members including social events: 
Having gatherings… Break the ice between the workers definitely improve the 
relationships. (Participant 2)  
7.11.4$Handovers$
This sub-theme describes handovers as another communication concern that was raised by 
participants. Respondents indicated that the quality of handover affects patient safety: 
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A wrongly reported information from a staff to another can result of mistakes.  A 
patient handover with incomplete data and similar cases can also result in mistakes 
may negatively affect patients’ safety. (Participant 1) 
They also stressed the need for proper handover of patients through effective communication.  
7.11.5$$Role$of$supervisors$
The fifth sub-theme relates to the role of supervisors in supporting teamwork and 
communication between team members. Participants expressed a high level of agreement 
concerning their supervisors’ support for patient safety: 
With our supervisor, yeah, 100%, you know, satisfied with it. Because whatever we 
do, we are being appreciated. (Participant 2)  
Nonetheless, they expressed their concerns regarding the fluctuating level of support between 
different units depending on the commitment of their supervisors:  
 But still not in all departments to be honest. if we look at the nuclear department, they 
are extremely strict regarding the procedures. on the other hand, in the radiology 
department, this percentage can go down to 5%. (Participant 3) 
Still, most of the interviewees perceived a difficulty amongst staff to speak up or question 
their supervisors about safety issues or concerns: 
That we don't feel free to argue with our supervisors and we just have to listen to them 
at the end, even if we don't share the same opinion. (Participant 3) 
Fear of negative repercussions as a result of active questioning, especially among newly 
appointed staff, was repeatedly stated: 
They don't want to put themselves into trouble, going and questioning. Unless, in other 
ways, they know that this is, you know, 100% mistake. (Participant 2)  
Participants stressed the importance of the “visibility” of support and involvement of their 
supervisors in patient safety: 
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I think they do support it, but they are not continuously present to show that support 
and give the impression that patients’ safety procedures must be applied. Their 
personal presence is not a necessity as they might assign someone specifically for this 
task who mustn't be only satisfied by being informed about our strategic plan and its 
goals, but also takes effective actions to help us achieve these goals. (Participant 3)  
The majority of participants focused on the incident reporting system as a valuable tool for 
organisational learning and stressed the influence of middle management support on 
encouraging reporting:  
It requires a confidence of the staff…From their head of the department and from their 
team leaders, that this will be like confidential… this person is not going to be blamed 
or punished based on this. (Participant 2)  
Finally, participants were asked about their suggestions on how to improve supervisors’ 
support for patient safety. One respondent suggested including participation in patient safety 
activities as part of their supervisors’ appraisals while another proposed that if supervisors are 
more involved in patient safety activities, they will ultimately support it. Such involvement 
can be re-enforced by ministerial and top management support and involvement: 
The ministry must take it upon themselves to introduce the heads of units to the 
importance of the patients’ safety, however when we do it they miss our sessions, send 
representatives and attend personally once a month or 3 times a year, which requires 
the interference of the ministry. (Participant 3)  
7.12" Hospital"level"
Six main issues were identified at the hospital including top management support, 
communication, training and education, working environment, information technology and 
policy and procedures. These issues supplement each other and help in understanding issues 
around safety culture in Kuwaiti hospitals.  
7.12.1$Top$management$support$
The crucial role of organisational commitment to safety has been stressed by respondents in 
the first sub-theme. This included whether hospital management provides a work climate that 
supports patient safety and considers it a top priority. Interviewees emphasized the positive 
effect that top management can have on patient safety: 
Chapter Seven: Interviews with key stakeholders 270 
I think it greatly depends on the chairman, and how important he thinks is the patients’ 
safety. (Participant 1) 
Participants gave several examples of hospital managements’ support for patient safety 
including safety walk rounds, availability of resources and policies and procedures they 
determine to support safety related issues: 
Hospital management gives real importance for patient safety. (Participant 2)  
Still, they mentioned that this kind of support is only perceptible to middle management and 
is not propagated to front line staff. They also stressed the importance of “visible” top 
management support and involvement through setting an example for the staff at the sharp 
end:  
I think through their personal presence to show their support and to give that 
impression. (Participant 3)  
Participants recommended certain steps that might improve top management visibility 
including safety walk rounds and face to face meetings: 
 If they try to go for these safety walk rounds on their own, they will definitely give 
everyone the impression that safety matters. (Participant 3) 
Some respondents expressed their disappointment with the level of support for patient safety:  
Top management support is not strong enough to meet our expectations when it comes 
to an important issue like the patient safety. (Participant 1)  
While others repeatedly doubted their managements’ seriousness in executing decisions 
related to patient safety: 
Decisions are indeed made, but they still need to be more serious about their 
execution. (Participant 1)  
Some respondents recognised their hospitals’ efforts towards adopting a learning approach 
and implementing IRS as an improvement tool. The need for top management involvement in 
incident reporting has been emphasized: 
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The higher the authorities of the hospital are involved to have a more effective role 
and to be more aware of the current situation, the more this will lead to a better 
decision making. (Participant 1)  
Still, a punitive approach to reporting incidents was perceived by staff as the most likely 
action to emerge from hospital management: 
When there is a massive drop in the number of workers reporting incidents… the only 
cause we can see is their worry, as they might get blamed for it. (Participant 1) 
Thus, hospital support for encouraging incident reporting has been stressed:  
Something has to be done, to put into their mind that, this is not kept in their personal 
file, and no action on them, this resistance has to be brought down. (Participant 2) 
Also, respondents stressed the importance of top management involvement in training 
activities. Participants believed that the show of interest by top management might have an 
impact on staffs’ motivation and participation which could result in more prioritization of 
safety related issues by members of staff. 
The need for more resources to support patient safety efforts was indicated by a number of 
respondents: 
That is why I think providing the resources is crucial for patients’ safety. (Participant 
1)  
Finally, incentives, safety star awards and safety bulletin boards were suggested as additional 
measures to create a more positive perception of top management. 
7.12.2$Communication$
In the second sub-theme, participants expressed their criticisms about the communication 
between middle and senior management as they depend mainly on quality officers to facilitate 
their actions: 
I think the effective and continuous communication between the hospital management 
and the departments management, without depending only on the communication of 
the quality officers. (Participant 1) 
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In addition, dissatisfaction about management team’s ineffective use of communication 
channels was frequently reported. Moreover, the need for effective communication channels, 
whether internal or external, to convey messages to staff was frequently mentioned by 
respondents: 
For example, if we had a risk management meeting and came up with new 
recommendation, the unit heads and the staff members must be informed with these 
recommendations as soon as possible. (Participant 1)  
The importance of effective communication on the implementation of patient safety policies 
was frequently stated: 
When all people are aware of the policy, they will speak the same language & they 
will see a common goal...so currently people are aware and this results in a higher 
implementation. (Participant 4) 
The importance of feedback and communication about changes has been repeatedly 
mentioned: 
The quality committee must discuss these things on the next morning with the 
chairman and the staff members in the departmental meeting in addition to discussing 
the feedback for this process. (Participant 4) 
7.12.3$Training$and$education$
In this sub-theme, respondents highlighted the importance of patient safety training and 
education. However, they expressed their concerns as they find it difficult to get staff to 
attend: 
It is of great difficulty to gather one unit let alone all the unit heads for a lecture. 
(Participant 1)  
Top management participation and involvement in safety related activities was recommended 
by staff. 
Suggestions on improving organisational learning were mainly focused on training and 
education of staff on reporting incidents:  
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We have tried different methods, we mentioned it many times in the incident reporting 
meeting, we gave lectures on its importance and we also gave them feedback stressing 
the fact that these reports are not simply ignored. (Participant 1) 
In addition, training and education of staff on teamwork and communication was suggested: 
We can improve communication by educating them, if no one is completed with 
knowledge and all in this world. Everyone here, everyone knows little. (Participant 6)  
7.12.4$Working$environment$
Respondents identified issues that were grouped under the working environment sub-theme.  
In this sub-theme, respondents indicated the difficulties they face when trying to carry out the 
task of educating staff about patient safety alongside their normal duties and demanded that 
their hospitals employ dedicated safety personnel to spread awareness about patient safety: 
Having somebody who does this as their main task, would make a difference… a 
dedicated person to qualifying the new comers and introducing them to patients safety 
procedures. (Participant 3) 
Respondents pointed out the need for adequate supplies and facilities. While others 
questioned the ability of staff to follow safety precautions when supplies were deficient 
There was a swine flu outbreak and infection going on at the point of them, swine flu. 
That time, two of the sisters got infected as well as their children…there should be 
some facility for the staff to, you know, at least when they take care of such very 
infectious patients. They should be having a bath from here at least and then to go 
home. (Participant 2)  
Others mentioned their workload and indicated that they needed a better work environment 
with less stress: 
The number of patients per hour. That's a massive problem for the OPD department. 
(Participant 4) 
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7.12.5$Information$technology$
In this sub-theme, respondent described their dissatisfaction with the current system of 
medical records: 
These files are a mess most of the time. To find a paper, it is so difficult and if you 
find, if you find the file of a patient who had been cared for three weeks. (Participant 
2)  
The need for an electronic medical record system has been mentioned by participants. Also, 
the need for an electronic incident reporting system has been reported: 
Electronic incident reporting system so I don't waste any time with papers. This way 
anyone can write the report and submit it timely, which is far better the manual way in 
my opinion… It's going to help a lot. (Participant 4)  
7.12.6$Policies$and$procedures$
In this sub-theme, participants highlighted the role of patient safety policies in creating a 
climate of safety for their patients. Yet, more comments showed their concerns over the 
execution of such policies:  
Decisions are indeed made, but we still need to be more serious about their execution. 
(Participant 1)  
The need for fixed policies on written and verbal communication was frequently raised by a 
number of respondents: 
A solid form of communications with fixed standards to guarantee that the data will be 
completely reported with no misunderstanding. (Participant 1) 
Language differences were reported as barriers to effective communication between staff 
members. As one respondent stated:  
Some Arabic letters are sent to units with a majority of English speakers. (Participant 
1) 
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English language is the official spoken and written language of communication in the 
Ministry of Health. Still, there is no communicated policy on the language of communication 
between staff members.  
7.13" External"factors"
This theme is related to the role of external organisational factors that contribute to the safety 
of patients including regulatory and governmental influences. The majority of respondents 
explicitly referred to the role of accreditation in pushing the patient safety agenda forward. 
Views surfaced mainly in relation to the influence of accreditation requirements on enhancing 
teamwork and communication across hospital levels: 
Is an amazing example of teamwork and self-assessment teams meetings where joined 
policies are created through team work. (Participant 4)  
One participant was critical of that influence as he clearly stated: 
At the beginning, all the staff were extremely cooperative for the sake of 
accreditation…However once we got accredited, they have gotten less serious. 
(Participant 1)  
Interestingly, participants acknowledged the value of putting pressure on their top 
management from higher authorities in the ministry. As they mentioned the need for more 
ministerial decrees and decisions that oblige staff at all levels to commit to patient safety: 
I think the ministry's interference can help. I don't want to say they should go for 
punishment and rewarding methods, but there has to committing decisions. I can't say 
in what way for sure, but there has to be. They would make a huge difference. 
(Participant 1)  
7.14" Discussion"of"interviews"
There is a growing body of literature that recognises the importance of exploring healthcare 
professionals’ perceptions of the quality and safety of healthcare settings (Clancy, 2011, 
Gallego et al., 2012, Gauld and Horsburgh, 2014, Helling et al., 2007). A range of assessment 
tools have been developed to explore various aspects of the culture of healthcare 
settings especially around patient safety (Sexton et al., 2006). The assessment of safety 
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climate within healthcare organisations is largely through the use of structured questionnaires. 
In contrast, there is much less literature about the use of qualitative methods to examine safety 
culture (Runciman et al., 2008). 
In my PhD thesis, survey findings assessed the safety climate of three public hospitals. This 
provided a snapshot of the prevailing state of safety climate (Mearns et al., 2001). Building on 
these survey findings, an additional in-depth component was achieved through semi-
structured interviews. The data derived from the interviews supported the survey findings. 
At the individual level, staff perceptions revealed concerns over their own safety and security. 
They explicitly referred to the effects of their wellbeing on patient safety. Staff safety was 
persistently reported as being overlooked. As health care workers carry a high risk of 
workplace injuries, looking after their well-being has been suggested to result in safer and 
better quality patient care (Yassi and Hancock, 2005).  Participants were critical of the 
attention given to incidents affecting patients as opposed to workers’ incidents. Also, staff 
were concerned about their own safety as they had a feeling of insecurity towards patients and 
their relatives. As argued by Flin (2007), healthcare includes risks of harm both to patients as 
well as for workers, and workers’ well-being can affect the rates of adverse events for 
patients. Thus, the effects of hospital safety culture should be examined for both patients and 
healthcare staff. Patient awareness of patient safety practices was suggested by most 
participants in order to increase patient satisfaction. Participants also highlighted the value of 
assessing patient safety in their organisations to provide a baseline measure of the current 
state of safety climate upon which further measurements can be based. Others noted the role 
of these assessment in raising the awareness of staff members about patient safety and 
initiating discussions about its importance.  
7.14.1$Teamwork$and$communication$
At the unit level, comments highlighted the importance of teamwork and communication 
between team members. The quantitative and qualitative findings agreed for the dimension 
“Teamwork within units.” The survey findings revealed that “Teamwork within units” had the 
highest percent positive response rate with 92% reflecting a positive perception of teamwork. 
Interviews revealed that respondents were positive about teamwork within their units.  
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An increasing area of research recognises the critical relationship between teamwork and 
safety in healthcare (Firth-Cozens, 2001, Firth-Cozens and Mowbray, 2001). Moreover, 
effective communication and coordination between team members are recognised as vital 
elements for improving the safety of acute medical settings (Baggs et al., 1999, Reader et al., 
2006). Healthcare organisations are multicultural and encompass an extensive variety of 
professions, teams and subgroups. Respondents highlighted that teamwork within different 
professional groups was higher than across professional groups. Leape et al. (2009) argue that 
health care professionals including doctors and nurses focus on their own performance and 
communicate with others in a fragmented and inefficient way that may lead to impediment of 
teamwork.  
Multiculturalism is a dominant feature of the healthcare system in Kuwait, as in other Gulf 
countries. The expatriate workforce comprises more than 60% of the total (Kuwait Central 
Statistical Bureau, 2014). This reflects a great reliance on workers with diverse cultural and 
linguistic backgrounds (WHO, 2014b). Concerns were expressed over the challenges that this 
poses to effective communication and collaboration between different healthcare workers. In 
the literature, cultural and language differences were highlighted as barriers to effective 
communication (Schyve, 2007). In addition, these differences were reported to compromise 
the quality and safety of health care provided to patients (Brown and Busman, 2003, 
Johnstone and Kanitsaki, 2006). Many of the concerns raised can be linked to the presence of 
cultural and language barriers between staff members.  However, comments were not 
explicitly about cultural differences. Surprisingly, the literature suffers from a lack of clarity 
regarding the influence of multiculturalism on patient safety (Almutairi et al., 2013). In a 
study by Algahtani (2015), an internationally validated tool was adopted, translated and tested 
in Saudi Arabia. A “Multicultural Workplace” dimension was added and validated to 
investigate the influence of different cultures on the work environment. The new dimension 
was found to be relevant to other valid dimensions of the tool such as teamwork, safety 
climate and job satisfaction, supporting its importance and relevance to safety in operating 
theatres. Ochieng and Price (2010) add that organisations need to demonstrate an awareness 
of cultural variation and cultural sensitivity for more effective cross-cultural communication. 
Almutairi et al. (2013) adds that cultural diversity of the healthcare workforce and cross-
cultural communication issues pose risks to patient safety. As a result, cultural competence of 
health care providers, through well-structured education programmes, becomes a necessity to 
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bridge the gap between the different cultures and languages of patients and providers to 
improve quality and safety of health care delivery.  
The need for teamwork and communication between staff members was emphasized during 
the interviews. They found that across team communication was the most demanding. 
Nembhard and Edmondson (2006) support this point as they reported that cross-disciplinary 
teamwork was difficult to carry out in practice. Salas et al. (2008a) stressed that 
communication is one of the fundamental requirements of teamwork. Additionally, (Pearson 
and Nelson, 2003) argue that effective interaction among team members can stimulate the 
formation of a strong team culture. Multicultural teams are particularly prone to 
communication problems that can impact on team cohesion (Ochieng and Price, 2010).  
It was suggested that effective communication across different staff members can be achieved 
through proper internal (emails and newsletters) and external communication channels 
(workshops and meetings). Implementation of standardised communication policies and 
measures has been stressed in the literature (Clark et al., 2009, Pronovost et al., 2003b). The 
majority of interviewees expressed concerns over the lack of formal communication policies 
leading to ineffective communication between staff members. Thus, fixed standards of cross-
cultural communication were also suggested.  
Interviewees explicitly referred to effective communication as not only sending messages but 
also ensuring that messages are received and understood by staff members. They add that 
barriers to effective communication, including handovers, could lead to staff failing to 
exchange important information about patients and ultimately affecting their safety. Concern 
over communication failures leading to inadvertent patient harm has been expressed by many 
researchers (Baker et al., 2004, Leonard et al., 2004, Lingard et al., 2004, Sutcliffe et al., 
2004). The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organisations reported that 60% 
of sentinel events had communication failure as the root cause (JCAHO, 2005). Interviewees 
suggested multi-disciplinary meetings and social events to strengthen communication. Team 
leadership (Burke et al., 2004, Sexton et al., 2000), implementation of protocols that support 
communication across hierarchies (Lingard et al., 2005, Pronovost et al., 2003b),  running 
meetings and team-based training (Burke et al., 2004, Undre et al., 2006) are recognised as 
effective communication strategies. A common view amongst interviewees was that this 
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improves communication flow between healthcare providers working across hospitals, and 
between management and service providers. 
7.14.2$Communication$openness$
Additionally, creating a safe environment where team members feel free to speak up if they 
have any safety issues or concerns is crucial (Leonard et al., 2004). Perceptions surfaced 
mainly in relation to staffs’ inability to voice their concerns. Such reluctance to speak up was 
attributed to the fear of negative implications that may result. The interpersonal climate in 
hospitals prevents speaking up with questions and concerns that might contribute to catching 
and correcting errors before patients are affected (Edmondson (1996). Moreover, the culture 
of medicine discourages the admission of errors by health care professionals (Edmondson, 
2004).  
Hierarchy was viewed by a number of interviewees as having a negative impact on 
communication openness between different professional groups. They reported being unable 
to raise safety concerns with their supervisors. Unfortunately, this reluctance can adversely 
affect patient care. As an example, communication failures can arise from junior team 
members being hesitant to communicate openly with senior team members because of their 
fear of seeming incompetent or being rejected (Edmondson, 1999).  
In a cross-sectional survey of ICU nurses and doctors in four UK hospitals conducted by 
Reader et al. (2007), nurses reported lower levels of communication openness between nurses 
and doctors. This was also reflected in nurses’ comments. Trainee doctors also reported lower 
levels of communication openness compared with senior doctors (Reader et al., 2007).  
Hassen and Lindenberger (1993) explain that the current system of hierarchy, with multiple 
levels of authority along strict departmental lines and departmentalized problems and 
solutions, leads to poor communication among different groups.  
Status hierarchy strongly exists in medicine, making it challenging to speak across 
professional boundaries for collaborative learning (Edmondson, 2003). Physicians have a 
strong professional identity and value their professional autonomy (Schulz and Harrison, 
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1986). According to Sexton et al. (2000), 55% of consultant surgeons were least likely to 
support flat hierarchies while 94% of cockpit staff in the airline industry advocated flat 
hierarchies. Physicians feel uncomfortable being “part of the team” rather than “the sole 
decision maker” (Parker and Wertheimer, 1997, p.451). This culture of autonomy that is 
instilled by medical training can reduce professionals’ tendencies to learn to communicate, 
collaborate and distribute authority (Nembhard and Edmondson, 2006). Additionally, 
Freidson (1974) argues that the medical profession still retains its dominance over other 
healthcare professionals despite the challenges physicians are faced with. 40 years later, his 
opinion still holds true (Manners, 2017). A number of participants were critical of doctors’ 
attitudes towards other staff members including their lack of respect for nurses’ opinions. 
This, ultimately, was perceived as leading to suppression of input from team members. As a 
result, opportunities for enhanced and collaborative learning are reduced (Edmondson, 
2002b).  
In Middle Eastern hospitals, a culture of “Medical Dominance” still affects the work 
environment and the inter-professional relationships between doctors and nurses (Alkorashy, 
2013, TCWG, 2011). Nurses often voiced their feelings of inferiority to other professional 
groups, especially doctors. Physicians tend to view nursing professionals as of a lower 
hierarchy with their main role being limited to carrying out doctors’ orders with no right to 
discuss any decisions related to the patient’s condition. This confirms previous findings in 
literature (Adamson et al., 1995, TCWG, 2011). A study conducted by Al-Enezi et al. (2009) 
in five general hospitals in Kuwait explored the factors that influence the job satisfaction of 
nurses of multicultural backgrounds. The study concluded that nurses were not appreciated by 
colleagues and had a feeling of isolation in the work environment.  
In this study, nurses demanded more empowerment and authority. Zabada et al. (1998) add 
that hospitals are hierarchical organisations by their nature and exemplify highly bureaucratic 
and authoritarian cultures that are resistant to employee empowerment.  Anecdotal 
information gathered from expatriate health care workers suggests that Kuwait’s health care 
system is physician centered and highly authoritarian. As a result, empowering employees 
opposes the nature of the Kuwaiti culture, which can be characterized as a ‘top-down 
hierarchical structure’ (Aladwani, 2002). Employee empowerment is a recognised 
management technique that will lead to a more open and collaborative culture that values its 
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employees and their views (Armellino et al., 2010). Furthermore, an empowering work 
environment for registered nurses has been linked to a safer climate (Armstrong and 
Laschinger, 2006). 
The combined findings of the survey and interviews reflect that open communication between 
health care professionals about errors is deficient. This mirrors other studies conducted in 
different Arabic hospitals where communication openness was identified as an area in need of 
improvement including Libya, Qatar, Egypt, Palestine and Jordan, (Aboul-Fotouh et al., 2012, 
Al-Ishaq, 2008, Hamdan and Saleem, 2013, Rages, 2014, Suliman, 2015). In teams where a 
leader is supportive and receptive to questions and challenges and offers greater psychological 
safety to team members (Nembhard and Edmondson, 2006), a climate of openness is created 
with errors openly reported and discussed (Edmondson, 1996, Edmondson, 2004).  
7.14.3$Organisational$learningTcontinuous$improvement$
The majority of interviewees stressed the importance of incident reporting as a valuable tool 
for organisational learning and promoting employees’ engagement in safety issues. Adverse 
events are one of the most powerful reasons for health care organisations to engage in 
organisational learning and improve patient care (Ratnapalan and Uleryk, 2014). A more 
positive patient safety culture is reported to be associated with fewer adverse events in 
hospitals (Mardon et al., 2010). Reason (1997, p.119) believed that collecting and analysing 
near misses gives “free lessons” to promote the development of defences in the system to 
protect against more serious occurrences in the future.  
However, learning from failures in health care organisations is obstructed by barriers such as 
a lack of psychological safety and a culture where errors are viewed as a sign of incompetence 
(Levinthal and March, 1993). In Kuwaiti hospitals, psychological safety is evidently lacking 
and a supportive work environment in which members feel they can question current 
practices, express concerns and disclose mistakes without suffering punishment is missing.  
Other barriers to reporting including bureaucracy, poor communication, a lack of feedback 
mechanisms, a lack of openness and a centralised authority have also been reported in the 
literature (Michael, 1973). Some discussed individual constraints that may affect staffs’ 
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reporting behaviour, such as lack of time. Also, respondents expressed their concerns 
regarding the consequences of reporting incidents. Some felt unwilling to report events in 
which they themselves may have played a significant part while others expressed concerns 
about the confidentiality of incident reports. Some felt the need for empowering staff in 
lower-status positions to allow them to speak up and encourage their participation. 
Suppressing the input of team members reduces the opportunities for organisational learning 
(Edmondson, 2002b). While others raised concerns over the feedback received based on the 
incident reports. Interviewees were critical of the lack of feedback and pointed out that this 
might lead to staff perceiving it as additional paperwork and that they will eventually lose 
interest and motivation to report further incidents. They highlighted a number of potential 
outcomes including lack of learning and sharing and failure in detecting future incidents. This 
will ultimately affect hospitals’ improvement efforts.  
7.14.4$NonTpunitive$response$to$error$
Interview findings indicated that a punitive response to error and a climate of blame and 
shame were the most likely reactions towards health care staff when patient safety problems 
were reported. Staff were concerned about their personal reputation among their colleagues 
and threats to their job security. This, in consequence, led staff to avoid reporting their own, 
or others, mistakes. They felt that this would potentially lead to under-reporting of incidents, 
loss of many learning opportunities and the failure to detect any future incidents.  
Survey results indicated that the dimension “Non-punitive response to error” was the least 
positive dimension with more than 60% of hospital staff reporting unfavourable responses. 
Non-punitive response to error was also reported to need improvement in Libya, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan and Oman, (Aboul-Fotouh et al., 2012, Al-Ishaq, 
2008, Al-Mandhari et al., 2014, Alahmadi, 2010, El-Jardali et al., 2010, Hamdan and Saleem, 
2013, Rages, 2014, Suliman, 2015). Internationally, USA (Sorra et al., 2014), Belgium 
(Hellings et al., 2010), Turkey (Bodur and Filiz, 2010), France (Occelli et al., 2013) and Iran 
(Arabloo et al., 2012) had similar results. Findings in the previous studies showed that health 
care workers perceived the dimension “Non-punitive response to errors” negatively in their 
work areas. They were afraid of the negative implications associated with errors including 
losing their jobs or being subject to disciplinary action by licensing boards (Alahmadi, 2010, 
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Mrayyan et al., 2007). Others reported that they faced difficulties discussing errors because of 
the risk of malpractice suits, threats to job security and the high expectations of the patients’ 
family or society (Sexton et al., 2000).  
As a result, it is the patients who are most likely to suffer in an organisational culture where 
healthcare providers are unable to speak up for fear of being punished or their careers affected 
as a result (Gauld and Horsburgh, 2014). According to Seys et al. (2013), adverse events 
within health care settings can lead to two victims; the patient and family are the first victim 
while the health care professional is classified as the second victim. Following an adverse 
event, feelings of guilt, anger and psychological distress are the most common symptoms of 
the second victim with no supportive interventions in the aftermath of adverse events, often 
resulting in them suffering in silence.  
The challenge is to shift from a “blame and shame”, “punitive culture” to a “no blame”, “just 
culture” where staff feel comfortable revealing errors while professional accountability is still 
maintained (Petschonek et al., 2013). Promoting a blame-free environment is considered a key 
approach for improving error reporting amongst staff (Arabloo et al., 2012). The focus of 
organisations should be shifted from individual accountability to the development of a 
systems based approach to reporting errors without blame (McFadden et al., 2006).  
7.14.5$Management$support$
A key strategy document on patient safety in the NHS, “An organisation with a memory”, was 
published in 2000 by the UK Department of Health (2000). It recommended that the NHS 
adopts a learning approach and creates a culture in which staff feel they can report errors, 
mistakes and adverse events without fear of retribution thus reducing the burden of the 
estimated 850,000 adverse events which occur in its hospitals each year. This requires the 
engagement and commitment of all NHS staff and the boards of NHS organisations.	   
The influence of top and middle management support in setting a context for organisational 
learning has been stressed by the majority of interviewees. To facilitate organisational 
learning, there is a need for a leadership that acknowledges failures as certain to happen and 
as a result proactively builds context-specific strategies to prevent them from happening again 
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and promotes a culture of safety for admitting and reporting errors (Christensen et al., 2000). 
A study conducted by Ginsburg et al. (2010) on 49 hospitals in Canada found that the 
organisational leadership for patient safety exerts a positive influence on organisational 
learning from patient safety incidences within hospitals. Carroll and Edmondson (2002) point 
to the importance of leadership from senior, middle management and local levels to create a 
sense of shared purpose. Senior management and executive leaders are the visionaries of the 
organisation and they set the tone for organisational learning. They must work to create an 
environment of psychological safety that encourages open communication and active 
questioning and sharing of concerns (Edmondson, 1999, Edmondson, 2004).  
While senior managers can create an organisation’s vision and strategy, without the 
commitment of middle management nothing can be implemented (Senge, 1996). Middle 
management plays a more important role in organisational learning as they serve as the bridge 
that links top management with frontline staff (Nonaka et al., 2000). They guide, encourage 
and support practical learning and help in ensuring psychological safety among staff (Conway 
and Weingart, 2005). Additionally, they have been viewed as the key to creating and 
promoting a vision and strategy for safety culture, in addition to instilling in their employees 
motivation and involvement in implementing improvement programmes at the departmental 
and individual level (Kagan and Barnoy, 2008, Ruchlin et al., 2004).  
Employees’ perceptions of the safety practices of their immediate supervisor, and employees’ 
perceptions of the general priority assigned within their organisational unit to the issue of 
safety are two commonly identified dimensions of safety climate in the literature (Flin et al., 
2000, Hofmann and Stetzer, 1998, Zohar, 2002). Katz-Navon et al. (2005) explain that 
managerial practices demonstrate to employees the degree to which their supervisor is 
committed to safety. Supervisors set the tone for safety by emphasizing certain safety-related 
activities and methods (Zohar, 2002) and their safety practices that emphasize the importance 
of safety can have a positive influence on safety performance (Barling et al., 2002, Thompson 
et al., 1998, Zohar, 2002). Managerial practices that undermine organisational safety as 
perceived by employees led to low safety performance (Katz-Navon et al., 2005). Zohar and 
Luria (2005) point out that safety behaviours are primarily determined by supervisory 
practices promoting safety while top management commitment to safety has a limited direct 
effect on worker behaviours.  
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As discussed earlier, interviewees criticised the varying degrees of priority assigned to patient 
safety between different hospital units. Some relate that to the interest and engagement of 
departmental and unit heads in safety-related activities. Zohar and Luria (2005) point out that 
top managers are responsible for most policy making and the establishment of procedures to 
enable policy implementation, whereas supervisors are concerned with the execution of these 
procedures. They argue that group-level variation in a single organisation can be attributable 
to the discretion of supervisors in implementing formal procedures associated with competing 
demands like safety versus productivity. The degree of priority given to patient safety, as 
explained by Zohar (2000), refers to employee expectations and behaviours concerning the 
balance maintained between work pace, workload, and pressures for productivity and safety. 
This balance depends on whether safety is given precedence within a unit over other 
competing demands such as speed or productivity and whether safety is part of the 
organisation’s goal-setting and reward systems (Katz-Navon et al., 2005).  They add that 
these perceptions may differ in different organisational units as a result of the unit’s group 
dynamics and its various activities. High safety priority within a unit means that safety must 
be encouraged and given priority over work speed and productivity. This, in effect, can 
potentially motivate employees to behave safely. While a low safety priority conveys that 
safety-related policies and procedures may be ignored or inadequately followed without 
consequences (Fahlbruch and Wilpert, 1999). 
Further, the literature continuously highlights the role of leadership in achieving a supportive 
(Ruchlin et al., 2004), non-punitive, just, safety culture (Cohen et al., 2008). Leape et al. 
(2009) argue that hospital chief executives must make safety a leading priority and devote the 
required resources to patient safety improvement initiatives. Also, leadership has been 
described as a critical element in the introduction of safety into healthcare settings (Ruchlin et 
al., 2004) but little research has been carried out into leadership and safety in healthcare 
settings in comparison to other industries where research into effective safety management 
has been the centre of attention for a number of years (Flin and Yule, 2004b). 
Flin and Yule (2004b) highlight the leading influence that senior management has on an 
organisation’s safety culture. They also stress the need for middle managers to be involved in 
safety and to promote open communication. Dissatisfaction was expressed among 
interviewees regarding the visibility of top and middle management, and their ineffective use 
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of communication channels. Moreover, concerns were expressed by a number of respondent 
about the cultural divide between clinical and managerial leadership which might affect 
efforts towards improving the safety of healthcare organisations.  Thus, a major challenge that 
faces hospital leaders is bringing together clinical and management professionals and aligning 
them towards a common goal (Ferlie and Shortell, 2001). 
The value of the active support and participation of both clinical and managerial leadership 
was stressed by all participants. They added that senior leadership’s willingness to participate 
in patient safety efforts sends clear indications to others that patient safety is valued and 
important. They also emphasized the need for a visible commitment to safety and effective 
and open communication channels across all levels. Dirik and Seren Intepeler (2017)  argue 
that negative perceptions of senior management can be broken down through building a 
connection between senior management and the personnel in units. This connection can be 
accomplished through forming a network that supports electronic information sharing, in 
meetings and making information sharing visits. Visits, such as safety walk rounds, have been 
stressed by a number of respondents as a mean to strengthen the awareness of staff about 
patient safety. Danielsson et al. (2015) add that leadership visits to improve patient safety 
have been found to increase the awareness and participation of staff in patient safety in 
addition to strengthening the open communication between administration and personnel.  
Many respondents stressed the importance of executing policies and procedures related to 
safety as they face difficulties with their implementation because some employees do not take 
them seriously. They add that the execution of policies and procedures requires the support of 
top and middle management. Managerial practices at both organisational and unit levels were 
frequently mentioned during the interviews. Moreover, such practices were found to be 
associated in hospital safety climate studies (Hellings et al., 2007, Smits et al., 2008). The 
execution of policies and procedures at group level gives a more truthful reflection of safety 
climate that employees refer to, when deciding which safety behaviours are more rewarding 
regarding competing goals such as production versus safety (Zohar & Luria, 2005).  
The importance of empowering personnel through involvement, motivation, and rewards has 
been mentioned by participants. Also, to improve the effectiveness of a safety management 
system and its practices in reducing accident rates and improving safety performance, 
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organisations should be concerned about promoting and enhancing worker engagement 
(Wachter and Yorio, 2014). An incident reporting system that allows staff to have easy access 
for reporting incidents in a confidential manner and a non-punitive approach is essential. This 
will lead to more engagement, enhanced learning and systemic improvements. Most 
participants demanded more training and education of staff in addition to increasing the 
periodicity of the risk management committees. Others recommended an electronic incident 
reporting system as an alternative to the current paper based system to increase staffs’ 
participation. 
Leaders in hospitals need to define a common vision and strategy of safety. In addition, they 
must communicate that vision across all levels of the organisation and encourage the active 
participation of different parties through strong multidisciplinary teams. Additionally, 
healthcare leaders should foster an organisational culture that promotes shared learning, 
communication openness, non-punitive culture and reward of individuals who detect serious 
mistakes (Goh et al., 2013). Moreover, organisational support structures such as providing 
training for all professional levels and knowledge of working in teams and communicating 
effectively through different channels and tools are vital. Team meetings, feedback and 
participation and training leaders on how to create an atmosphere of psychological safety 
(Edmondson, 2002a) will empower employees to take on more responsibility and become 
more proactive in safety related activities. Ratnapalan and Uleryk (2014) stated that “Safe 
patient care is facilitated by individual professional learning; inter-professional team learning 
and system based organisational learning” (p.24). Participation can be positively reinforced by 
reward and recognition systems, which emphasize the achievement of strategic goals of 
patient safety. This will support the implementation of patient safety programmes and help 
overcome staff resistance and ensure their participation.  
7.14.6$External$factors$
The influence of accreditation has been recognised by respondents as facilitating managers’ 
support and involvement in patient safety. Rasmussen (2000) recognises the influence of 
regulatory and governmental agencies in setting institutions’ priorities through legislation and 
policy. The role of contributing external factors, such as regulatory and governmental 
pressure, to safety of care was frequently mentioned by interviewees  as well as being 
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highlighted in the literature (Carayon, 2011). Improvement efforts can be greatly enhanced, as 
some respondents stressed, by the involvement of the MOH in exerting pressure over 
hospitals’ management. 
7.14.7$Hospital$C$
It was evident that the overall perceptions of Hospital C’s health care staff were more positive 
in all safety climate dimensions than the staff of the other two hospitals as previously 
discussed in Chapter six. This could be due to many reasons including the influence of a 
strong and visible leadership, including the top and middle management, on patient safety 
issues. Interviewees reported an open communication about safety issues and concerns across 
all levels and the constant feedback about changes that take place as a result. Other reasons 
may be attributed to Hospital C being a specialist hospital that is involved in the National 
Accreditation Programme and received accreditation with excellence with highly qualified 
staff.  The hospital also has an ongoing safety training programme and many quality 
improvement initiatives. This may greatly impact on the perceptions of staff regarding patient 
safety. Additionally, the hospital is smaller in size compared to the other two hospitals which 
may result in better perceptions of patient safety climate amongst staff (El-Jardali, 2003, 
Nordin et al., 2013).  
In summary, our results reinforce Zohar’s multilevel model of safety climate. Zohar and Luria 
(2005) reveal the global alignment of organisation-level and group-level climates, and that the 
effect of organisation climate on safety behaviour is entirely mediated by group climate level.  
7.15" Strengths"and"limitations""
Interviews were employed as a complementary approach to draw a more universal picture of 
the safety culture in Kuwait’s public hospitals. This study provided valuable insights into the 
survey findings and revealed various aspects of safety culture at different organisational 
levels. The interview process covered three phases; the pre-interview phase, the interviews 
and post interview discussions. The pre-interview phase aimed to encourage respondents to 
talk about patient safety to build rapport and help the interviewees to open up. While the post 
interview discussions aimed to seek interviewees perceptions about the broader picture of 
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safety culture in Kuwaiti hospitals. This was reflected in the findings as they covered most of 
the common safety constructs mentioned in the literature as well as in the HSOPSC tool. As a 
result, the findings might inform practice and policy in other contexts.  
This study had a number of challenges such as time available for conducting the interviews 
and the number of interviewees. The reason for the small number of participants was the 
researcher’s limited time frame in addition to key informants’ time restrictions and work 
pressures. Participation was on a voluntary basis. This is a potential limitation as the 
interviewees might represent staff members interested in discussing safety related issues in 
addition to being part of risk management committees with direct involvement in safety 
related activities. Also, the sample was composed of non-Kuwaiti participants. Therefore, it 
might not represent the range of views of health care staff in Kuwaiti public hospitals. These 
limitations may affect the generalizability of the findings to other public and private hospitals.  
Despite the researcher’s efforts to explain the nature of her research and to ensure the 
confidentiality of the data and her independence from the MOH, it might be argued that being 
a Kuwaiti, could have had an influence on non-Kuwaiti interviewees with regard to openness 
and the depth of information provided. Interviewees’ open communication about sensitive 
topics, the in-depth information provided and their voluntary participation suggests that this 
effect was minimal.  
The interview agenda was based on the results of the safety climate survey. Another limitation 
might be the possible priming effect (Tulving and Schacter, 1990) of those results on the 
overall findings of the interviews. Nevertheless, since the main purpose of the interviews was 
to get a deeper understanding of the survey results, it was important to include them in the 
interview schedule. The overall findings of the interviews clearly show that interviewees were 
not limited in their discussions to those items identified from the survey but commented on 
various safety related issues at different organisational levels. 
An additional limitation is that the interview was conducted in English. All interviewees 
speak English as a second language. This could be a limiting factor in fully expressing their 
perceptions although in most instances the interviewee asked the researcher if they could 
explain what they meant in Arabic or they would shift between both languages when they 
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faced a difficulty in expressing what they meant in English. They were given the freedom to 
do that without any interruption. Those sections in Arabic were translated to English during 
the transcription process. 
Despite the above limitations, this study provided a deeper understanding of safety culture in 
public hospitals in Kuwait and improved interpretation of the survey findings.  
7.16" Conclusion"
My PhD thesis stresses the critical role that management commitment to safety, both at 
organisational and unit levels, has on safety-related outcomes. This support can be achieved 
through creating a shared vision and an urgency for change, maintaining open and effective 
communication within and across teams, educating personnel, adopting a non-punitive 
approach to reporting healthcare errors and providing adequate resources to support patient 
safety. Also, individual and organisational factors including teamwork, communication and 
respect between team members, and speaking up were the main issues discussed by 
participants as directly affecting patient safety.  
In conclusion, the data obtained from this study supports the multilevel conceptualization of 
safety culture. 
7.17" Summary"
In summary, main issues arising from survey findings were further investigated with key 
personnel. This also included the potential usefulness of the survey approach as an 
improvement strategy in addition to identifying their views about facilitators and barriers that 
might affect patient safety in Kuwaiti hospitals. The interviews provide rich insight into 
employees perceptions of safety in their work areas and highlighted four main themes that 
reflected different organisational levels including individual, unit and hospital levels in 
addition to external organisational factors. The role of management commitment to safety, 
both at hospital and unit levels, was greatly stressed in relation to safety outcomes. 
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8" Chapter"Eight:"General"Discussion"and"Conclusions"
8.1" Introduction"
The primary aim of this thesis was to investigate patient safety climate in Kuwaiti public 
hospitals. This chapter has five main parts. Firstly, a review of the main research findings in 
relation to current literature will cover five sub-sections. The first section will cover the key 
findings from the systematic review (Chapter Four). The second will review the psychometric 
assessment of the HSOPSC tool (Chapter five). The third will discuss the findings of the 
cross-sectional survey conducted using the HSOPSC tool (Chapter Six) The final section will 
discuss the findings of the interview study (Chapter Seven). Secondly, strengths and 
limitations of this thesis will be examined. Thirdly, the theoretical and practical implications 
of the emerging findings will be considered. Fourthly, directions for future research will be 
recommended including a model of safety that is proposed based on the existing knowledge 
base and the current research findings. Finally, conclusions and recommendations will be 
presented. 
8.2" Main"research"findings"
This study aimed to assess the patient safety climate in Kuwait’s Public Hospitals. The main 
objectives of the study were:  
1.( To identify a potentially suitable safety climate tool to be employed in my PhD thesis.  
2.( To test the psychometric properties of the identified tool in a sample of Kuwaiti public 
hospitals. 
3.( To provide a measure of the prevailing safety climate in Kuwaiti public hospitals.  
4.( To explore with key stakeholders the main findings of the safety climate survey and 
identify the potential barriers and facilitators to safety improvement initiatives in 
Kuwaiti public hospitals.  
A systematic review of the literature was completed and a suitable safety climate tool was 
identified, its psychometric properties were tested and an optimum model of the HSOPSC for 
assessing safety climate in a Kuwaiti context was developed. Using the same data set, an 
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examination of the current state of safety climate was undertaken. Interviews complemented 
the results of the safety climate survey. Based on the overall findings, a theoretical model 
informing a systems approach to improving safety culture theory and research is proposed for 
future research. 
8.3" Identifying"a"suitable"safety"climate"tool"(systematic"review"findings)"
A systematic review of questionnaire studies designed to measure safety climate in acute 
hospital settings was undertaken. An assessment of the reported psychometric properties 
(content validity, criterion validity, construct validity and internal reliability) of the identified 
tools was performed in addition to reviewing other characteristics including reported safety 
climate dimensions and theoretical basis. The methodological quality of included studies was 
assessed. A number of questionnaires, designed to assess healthcare workers’ perceptions of 
different aspects of safety climate in hospitals, were identified through the different stages of 
the review process. Detailed inspection of these tools revealed substantial variation in the 
concepts of safety culture and climate, their associated dimensions and amount of evidence 
about their theoretical basis. The methodological rigour associated with the design of the 
identified measures and the standard reporting of their psychometric properties was shown to 
be variable.  
Epistemological and theoretical roots that underlie the development of tools were overlooked 
by researchers (Halligan and Zecevic, 2011) with more emphasis on measurement rather than 
more conceptual advancement (Palmieri, 2010). A substantial degree of inconsistency in the 
theoretical basis of tools used in industry and in healthcare has been clearly noted in the 
literature. Lack of a “unified theoretical foundation” has been suggested for the inconsistency 
owing to the diversity of industrial settings studied (Flin, 2007, p.658).  
None of the reviewed tools offered a satisfactory explanation about their guiding theoretical 
framework nor do they clearly outline the proposed relationships between safety climate and 
safety outcomes. The theoretical basis of some of the reviewed tools was derived from 
industrial settings with different organisational structures and cultures than healthcare 
organisations. As a result, evidence on the construct validity of identified tools is 
questionable. This makes it difficult to evaluate how well questionnaires actually measure 
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safety climate and limit the effective use of their findings for organisational learning and 
improvement purposes (Halligan and Zecevic, 2011, Reiman et al., 2013). 
The wide range of dimensions incorporated into safety climate surveys has been attributed to 
the absence of clarity in defining the constructs of safety culture and climate in addition to 
that of patient safety culture (Ginsburg et al., 2013). Despite that, consistency regarding 
thematic areas was high. Seven dimensions were addressed by the majority of reviewed tools 
including: top management support, safety systems, safety attitudes and behaviours of staff, 
reporting incidents, communication openness, organisational learning and teamwork. Our 
findings confirm that common dimensions including communication, teamwork and 
leadership support for patient safety might be regarded as “core dimensions” of patient safety 
culture (Singla et al., 2006). Still, the literature fails to acknowledge the influence of local 
cultural factors on safety climate. The impact of the physical environment of a hospital 
facility, including its technology and equipment was also overlooked in the design of safety 
climate tools (Carayon et al., 2006). 
Thorough scientific approaches should be followed when developing or adapting safety 
climate tools, to ensure tools’ applicability, reliability and validity (Manser et al., 2016). 
Failure to do so may be responsible for the inconsistent findings in literature (Colla et al., 
2005, Flin et al., 2000, Guldenmund, 2000, Palmieri, 2010). Thus, establishing the 
psychometric properties of safety climate tools has been greatly stressed by researchers (Colla 
et al., 2005, Flin, 2007, Flin et al., 2006, Nieva and Sorra, 2003). However, studies still lack 
the proper reporting of psychometric properties (Colla et al., 2005, Flin, 2007, Flin et al., 
2006, Nieva and Sorra, 2003) with considerable variation regarding methods and standards 
applied in the reporting process (Manser et al., 2016). This discrepancy could be attributed to 
lack of methodological rigor and resources required to appropriately develop and 
psychometrically assess safety climate tools (Singla et al., 2006). The numbers of identified 
tools that did not meet the inclusion criteria reflects this and show that many tools exist to 
measure safety climate in healthcare, but methodological challenges limit their use as 
appropriate measures.  
The contextual specificity of the construct of safety culture (Coyle et al., 1995) reveals the 
need for further investigations, including appropriate validation, of safety climate tools before 
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extending their use in different contexts (Manser et al., 2016). This was evident in a number 
of reported adaptations of a safety climate tool used in different contexts (Haugen et al., 2010, 
Nie et al., 2013, Perneger et al., 2014, Waterson et al., 2010, Zhu et al., 2014) where they 
performed less well than the original tool. Psychometric assessment cannot fully characterize 
safety climate tools. Other methods, including cognitive testing, provide additional 
information (Singla et al., 2006).  
A number of comprehensive reviews of safety climate tools in healthcare showed that the 
HSOPSC and SAQ were repeatedly recommended by researchers (Flin et al., 2006, Halligan 
and Zecevic, 2011, Jackson et al., 2010, Singla et al., 2006). Results of our systematic review 
seem to mirror the findings of previous studies. Three out of five included studies (Sexton et 
al., 2006, Sorra and Dyer, 2010, Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007) were rated as ‘good’ quality 
papers and their tools, including HSOPSC, SAQ and SOS, reported robust psychometric 
properties. HSOPSC was finally chosen as the most appropriate tool for our study. Given the 
workload, time limitations and availability of healthcare staff, the length of the HSOPSC tool 
and its potential impact on survey completion rates should be considered.  
8.4" Conducting"psychometric"assessment"of"the"HSOPSC"tool"in"Kuwait"
The HSOPSC questionnaire was used to collect data for two purposes. Firstly, to examine the 
psychometric properties of HSOPSC in a Kuwaiti context. Secondly, to assess the current 
state of safety climate in the selected hospitals. A modified version of the HSOPSC was used 
to conduct the survey using a sample of healthcare staff (n=1,511) with an 87% (n=1,310) 
response rate.  
Psychometric assessment involved three main phases. The first phase investigated the 
suitability of the original HSOPSC 12 factor model for Kuwaiti data. The second phase 
examined whether an alternative factor model would fit the Kuwaiti data better. The third and 
final phase involved CFA and reliability analysis to test the fit of the alternative model. Next, 
the suitability of the original HSOPSC 12 factor model for the Kuwaiti data was examined.  
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8.4.1$ Testing$the$original$model$
Using CFA and reliability analysis, the suitability of the original HSOPSC model for Kuwaiti 
data was tested using the whole sample (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). Results revealed an 
unsatisfactory fit of the original HSOPSC model for Kuwaiti data. Different international 
studies (Alonazi, 2011, Najjar et al., 2013a, Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010, Waterson et al., 2010) 
reported similar findings. The majority of dimensions reported a lower internal consistency 
for the Kuwaiti data compared to the USA data. Similar results were also reported in other 
international studies (Alonazi, 2011, Bodur and Filiz, 2010, Famolaro et al., 2016, Najjar et 
al., 2013a, Sarac et al., 2010, Sorra and Nieva, 2004, Waterson et al., 2010).  
8.4.2$ Developing$an$optimal$model$
An EFA in addition to CFA and reliability analysis were used to investigate an alternative 
factor structure which might be more appropriate for the Kuwaiti context. Investigation of all 
possible solutions was undertaken. An optimal eight-factor model with 22 safety climate 
items was identified. The optimal model of my PhD thesis is in line with other international 
studies (Alonazi, 2011, Waterson et al., 2010). Four dimensions were either dropped or 
merged with other factors into a single dimension. In my PhD thesis, the same dimensions 
reported low reliability using the original HSOPSC in addition to other international studies 
(Alonazi, 2011, Saraç, 2011, Waterson et al., 2010).  
The optimal model of my PhD thesis was confirmed using CFA with good model fit indices. 
This was consistent with the CFA results of the USA (Sorra and Nieva, 2004), Saudi Arabia 
(Alonazi, 2011), Palestine (Najjar et al., 2013a), UK (Waterson et al., 2010) and Scotland 
(Sarac et al., 2011) optimal models. Additionally, reliability analysis was performed using the 
whole sample with Cronbach’s Alpha value reported to be ≥ 0.60 for all factors. Therefore, 
the internal consistency was acceptable for the 8 Factors solution.   
8.4.2.1& Optimal&factor&models&
Different factor structures were identified as optimal models in different countries including 
UK (Waterson et al., 2010), Turkey (Bodur and Filiz, 2010), Saudi Arabia (Alonazi, 2011), 
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Palestine (Najjar et al., 2013a), Belgium (Smits et al., 2008) and Switzerland (Pfeiffer and 
Manser, 2010). This discrepancy in results can be attributed to many factors including 
different survey methods and various psychometric techniques used in addition to the many 
modifications made to adapt the original tool to different healthcare settings (Sarac et al., 
2011). Neglect of crucial elements, including context, processes and actors involved, when 
attempting to adapt an instrument in a different setting might lead to conflicting results and 
might weaken the validity of the instrument (Hedsköld et al., 2013).  
A number of dimensions seem to be common among optimal factor models across different 
countries. Table 56 shows the factor structure of the optimal model of my PhD thesis 
compared with optimal models that were developed in Saudi Arabia, Palestine, England, 
Scotland, Netherlands, Turkey and Switzerland in addition to the original USA HSOPSC 
questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). This comparison is aimed at identifying a common set 
of patient safety culture dimensions across different countries.  
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Table 56: Dimensions of HSOPSC for USA (US), Kuwait (KWT), Saudi Arabia (SA), Palestine (PAL), England (ENG), Scotland 
(SCO), Netherlands (NL), Switzerland (Swiss) and Turkey (TUR) factor models 
HSOPSC 
Dimensions 
 
US 
(Sorra 
and 
Nieva, 
2004) 
KWT SA 
(Alonazi, 
2011) 
PAL 
(Najjar et al., 
2013a) 
ENG 
(Waterson 
et al., 
2010) 
SCO 
(Saraç, 2011) 
NL 
(Smits et al., 
2008) 
TUR 
(Bodur and 
Filiz, 2010) 
SWISS 
(Pfeiffer and 
Manser, 2010) 
Supervisor/manager 
expectations and 
actions promoting 
safety  
√ √ √ √ √ √ - - √ 
Organisational 
learning— 
continuous 
improvement  
√ - √ √ - √ √ √ √  
With 
Teamwork 
within units 
Teamwork within 
hospital units  
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ - 
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HSOPSC 
Dimensions 
 
US 
(Sorra 
and 
Nieva, 
2004) 
KWT SA 
(Alonazi, 
2011) 
PAL 
(Najjar et al., 
2013a) 
ENG 
(Waterson 
et al., 
2010) 
SCO 
(Saraç, 2011) 
NL 
(Smits et al., 
2008) 
TUR 
(Bodur and 
Filiz, 2010) 
SWISS 
(Pfeiffer and 
Manser, 2010) 
Communication 
openness  
 
√ √ √ - √ - √ √ - 
Feedback and 
communication 
about error  
√ - - √  
With 
Communication 
Openness 
√ √  
With 
Communication 
Openness 
√  
With 
Organisational 
learning— 
continuous 
improvement 
√ With 
Supervisor 
expectations 
and actions 
promoting 
patient 
safety  
√  
With 
Communication 
Openness 
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HSOPSC 
Dimensions 
 
US 
(Sorra 
and 
Nieva, 
2004) 
KWT SA 
(Alonazi, 
2011) 
PAL 
(Najjar et al., 
2013a) 
ENG 
(Waterson 
et al., 
2010) 
SCO 
(Saraç, 2011) 
NL 
(Smits et al., 
2008) 
TUR 
(Bodur and 
Filiz, 2010) 
SWISS 
(Pfeiffer and 
Manser, 2010) 
Non-punitive 
response to error  
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Staffing  √ - √ √ - - √ √ - 
Hospital 
management 
support for patient 
safety 
 
√ √ - √ - √ √ √  
With 
Teamwork 
across units 
√  
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HSOPSC 
Dimensions 
 
US 
(Sorra 
and 
Nieva, 
2004) 
KWT SA 
(Alonazi, 
2011) 
PAL 
(Najjar et al., 
2013a) 
ENG 
(Waterson 
et al., 
2010) 
SCO 
(Saraç, 2011) 
NL 
(Smits et al., 
2008) 
TUR 
(Bodur and 
Filiz, 2010) 
SWISS 
(Pfeiffer and 
Manser, 2010) 
Teamwork across 
hospital units  
 
√ √ - √ √ √ √ - - 
Hospital handoffs 
and transitions  
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  
With 
Teamwork 
across units 
Frequency of 
incident reporting  
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
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HSOPSC 
Dimensions 
 
US 
(Sorra 
and 
Nieva, 
2004) 
KWT SA 
(Alonazi, 
2011) 
PAL 
(Najjar et al., 
2013a) 
ENG 
(Waterson 
et al., 
2010) 
SCO 
(Saraç, 2011) 
NL 
(Smits et al., 
2008) 
TUR 
(Bodur and 
Filiz, 2010) 
SWISS 
(Pfeiffer and 
Manser, 2010) 
Overall perceptions 
of patient safety  
√ - - √ √  
With 
Staffing 
√  
With Staffing 
√ √ √  
With Staffing 
Number of optimal 
model factors 
12 8 8 11 9 10 11 10 8 
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Six studies reported different dimensions combined into one dimension. A significant degree 
of overlap in the content of the safety culture dimensions exists. As a result, included items in 
certain dimensions tend to load onto differently labeled dimensions. “Feedback and 
communication about error” and “Communication openness” were grouped into one 
dimension in the Palestinian, Swiss and Scottish studies respectively (Najjar et al., 2013a, 
Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010, Saraç, 2011). This result is expected. Both dimensions are closely 
related. Feedback and communication with staff about errors and discussing ways to prevent 
them are linked to allowing staff to freely speak up, if they see something that might 
negatively affect patient care. “Feedback and communication about error” also combined into 
one dimension with “Organisational learning – continuous improvement” in the Dutch study 
(Smits et al., 2008). The same result is also expected since both dimensions are related and, as 
a result, items load on the same dimension. Feedback and communication with staff about 
errors and improvements and changes that are implemented based on errors are connected. 
Smits et al. (2008) argues that both dimensions might have merged in the original study if a 
factor extraction was forced at 11 factors. “Feedback and communication about error” also 
combined “Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and actions promoting safety” in the Turkish 
study (Bodur and Filiz, 2010). Feedback and communication with staff about errors and 
improvements that take place as a result of errors and actions of Supervisors’/Managers’ that 
promote patient safety are interlinked thus it is not surprising that items loaded on one factor 
in this study. 
“Staffing” and “Overall perceptions of patient safety” were grouped as one dimension in the 
UK (Waterson et al., 2010), Swiss (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) and Scottish study (Sarac et 
al., 2011).  
The dimension of “Organisational learning—Continuous improvement” merged with 
“Teamwork within units” while “Handoffs and transitions” merged with “Teamwork across 
units” in the Swiss study (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010). Pfeiffer and Manser (2010) recommend 
further investigation about whether “Handoffs and transitions” dimension should be 
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considered as an aspect of the dimension “Teamwork across units” as they show high 
intercorrelations in addition to loading on the same factor. 
“Teamwork across units” and “Management Support for Patient Safety” were merged into 
one dimension in  the Turkish study (Bodur and Filiz, 2010). 
It should be noted that there are a number of common dimensions that were emerging rather 
consistently across international settings despite the lack of confirmation of the original factor 
structure of the HSOPSC in numerous studies. Those dimensions include:  
•! Hospital management support for patient safety  
•! Supervisor expectation and action promoting patient safety. 
•! Teamwork within units.  
•! Teamwork across units.  
•! Handoffs and transitions.  
•! Non-punitive response to error.   
•! Frequency of event reported.  
•! Communication openness.  
•! Organisational learning—Continuous improvement  
Table 57 shows the item composition of each factor of the optimal model of my PhD thesis 
compared with optimal models that were developed in Saudi Arabia, Palestine, England, 
Netherlands, Turkey and Switzerland in addition to the original USA HSOPSC questionnaire 
(Sorra and Nieva, 2004). This comparison is aimed at identifying a common set of patient 
safety climate items across different countries. 
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Table 57: Item composition of dimensions of HSOPSC for USA (US), Kuwait (KWT), Saudi Arabia (SA), Palestine (PAL), 
England (ENG), Netherlands (NL), Switzerland (Swiss) and Turkey (TUR) factor models 
HSOPSC Factors USA 
(Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) 
Kuwait SA 
(Alonazi, 
2011) 
ENG 
(Waterson et 
al., 2010) 
PAL 
(Najjar et al., 
2013a) 
SWISS 
(Pfeiffer and 
Manser, 
2010) 
NL 
(Smits et al., 
2008) 
TUR 
(Bodur 
and 
Filiz, 
2010) 
Supervisor/Manager 
Expectations and 
Actions Promoting 
Patient Safety 
B1-B2-B3-
B4 
B1-B2 B1-B2 B1-B2 B1-B2-B3-
B4 
B1-B2-B3-
B4 
B1-B2-B3-
B4 
‡ 
Frequency of Events 
Reported 
E1-E2-E3* E1-E2-E3 E1-E2-E3 E1-E2-E3 E1-E2-E3 E1-E2-E3 E1-E2-E3 E1-
E2-E3 
Handoffs and 
Transitions 
D3-D5-D7-
D11* 
D3-D5- D7- 
D6** 
D5- D7-
D11- 
D6** 
D3-D5-D7-
D11 
D3-D5-D7-
D11 
‡ D5 -D11 D3-
D5-
D7-
D11 
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HSOPSC Factors USA 
(Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) 
Kuwait SA 
(Alonazi, 
2011) 
ENG 
(Waterson et 
al., 2010) 
PAL 
(Najjar et al., 
2013a) 
SWISS 
(Pfeiffer and 
Manser, 
2010) 
NL 
(Smits et al., 
2008) 
TUR 
(Bodur 
and 
Filiz, 
2010) 
Non-punitive 
Response to Errors 
A8-A12-
A16 
A8-A12-
A16 
A8-A12-
A16 
A8-A16 A8-A12-
A16 
A8-A12-
A16 
A8-A12-
A16 
A8-
A12-
A16 
Teamwork Across 
Units 
D2-D4-D6-
D10* 
D2-D4 - D2-D4-D6-
D10 
D2-D4-D6-
D10 
D2-D4-D6-
D10-D3**-
D7** 
D2-D4-D10- 
D3**-D7** 
‡ 
Teamwork Within 
Units 
A1-A3-A4-
A11 
A1-A3-A4 A1-A3-A4 A1-A3-A4 A1-A3-A4-
A11 
A1-A3-A4- 
A6-A9-
A13‡ 
A1-A3-A4-
A11 
A1-
A3-
A4-
A11 
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HSOPSC Factors USA 
(Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) 
Kuwait SA 
(Alonazi, 
2011) 
ENG 
(Waterson et 
al., 2010) 
PAL 
(Najjar et al., 
2013a) 
SWISS 
(Pfeiffer and 
Manser, 
2010) 
NL 
(Smits et al., 
2008) 
TUR 
(Bodur 
and 
Filiz, 
2010) 
Communication 
Openness 
C2-C4-C6 C2-C4-C6 C2-C4 C2-C4-C6 C2-C4- 
C3-C5‡ 
‡ C2-C4-C6 C2-
C4-C6 
Management 
Support for Patient 
Safety 
D1-D8-D9* D1-D8 - - D1-D8-D9 D1-D8-D9 D1-D8-D9 D1-
D8-D9 
Organisational 
learning— 
continuous 
improvement 
A6-A9-A13 - A6-A9-A13- 
D8** 
- A6-A9-A13 ‡ ‡ A6-
A9-
A13 
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HSOPSC Factors USA 
(Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) 
Kuwait SA 
(Alonazi, 
2011) 
ENG 
(Waterson et 
al., 2010) 
PAL 
(Najjar et al., 
2013a) 
SWISS 
(Pfeiffer and 
Manser, 
2010) 
NL 
(Smits et al., 
2008) 
TUR 
(Bodur 
and 
Filiz, 
2010) 
Feedback and 
communication 
about error 
 
C1-C3-C5 - - C1-C3-C5 ‡ C1-C3-C5- 
 C2-C4-C6‡ 
C1-C3-C5 
 A6-A9-A13 
C1-
C3-
C5- 
 B1-
B2-
B3-
B4‡ 
 
Staffing A2-A5-A7-
A14 
- A5-A7 A2-A14- 
A10-A17‡ 
A2-A5-A14 A2-A5-A14 
 -A10-A17-
A18‡ 
A2-A5-A7 A2-
A5-
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HSOPSC Factors USA 
(Sorra and 
Nieva, 2004) 
Kuwait SA 
(Alonazi, 
2011) 
ENG 
(Waterson et 
al., 2010) 
PAL 
(Najjar et al., 
2013a) 
SWISS 
(Pfeiffer and 
Manser, 
2010) 
NL 
(Smits et al., 
2008) 
TUR 
(Bodur 
and 
Filiz, 
2010) 
A7-
A14 
Overall perceptions 
of safety 
A10-A15-
A17-A18 
- - ‡ A15-A17-
A18 
‡ A10-A17-
A18-A14** 
A10-
A15-
A17-
A18 
No of factors 12 8 8 9 11 8 11 10 
*For comparison reasons, items with the letter F have been changed to letter D and items with the letter D have been changed to letter E as the modified version used in 
our study, ‡ denotes a merged dimension, ** denotes a moved item from  a different dimension
Chapter Eight: General Discussion and Conclusions                                                                                     309 
 
 
As shown in Table 57, different adaptations of the HSOPSC did not confirm the original 
factor structure of the HSOPSC (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). Still, some dimensions corresponded 
to the ones proposed in the original HSOPSC model and items were repeated across the 
different studies. It should be noted that not all studies reported their optimum factor model 
structure. As a result, this created a difficulty in identifying the structure of the common 
dimensions across different countries 
8.5$ Using$the$HSOPSC$tool$for$safety$climate$assessment$
This phase of the study involved an assessment of the prevailing state of safety climate in 
three public hospitals in Kuwait using the HSOPSC survey data. The majority of survey 
respondents were from medical, surgical and pediatric units (55%, n=718) and were nurses 
(60%, n=754) females (63%, n=808) and Non-Kuwaitis (91%, n=1168). The sample was 
relatively young as the majority of participants (82%, n=1060) were between 25-44 years of 
age. Of those who returned the survey, 11% (n=145) responded to the open-ended comments 
section about patient safety, error, or incident reporting. 
The dimensions “Teamwork within units” (84%), “Organisational learning-continuous 
improvement” (82%), “Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and actions promoting safety” 
(77%) and “Management support for patient safety” (74%) were identified as strongly 
positive areas for the three hospitals. The potential positive impact of the National 
Accreditation Programme on safety climate in the three hospitals has been considered. The 
accreditation process has been highlighted as an effective framework for the introduction of 
change (Pomey et al., 2010). Kuwait is one of the first countries in the Gulf region to 
implement a hospital accreditation programme. Hospitals invested greatly to complete 
accreditation cycles. Preparations for accreditation were mostly conducted by self-assessment 
teams that were specifically formed for the accreditation process. This created the opportunity 
for staff from different work areas, specialities, professional groups and sites to communicate 
and work to overcome their differences as being part of one organisation. Employee opinions, 
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engagement and satisfaction was sought. Involvement in quality and safety activities and 
programmes was encouraged. There was a significant shift to safer procedures and practices 
for patients as well as employees. Explicit commitment from top and middle management was 
mandated through “leadership” standards. Organisational learning has been promoted through 
training and education programmes and effective communication channels that encouraged 
efficient flow of information throughout the organisation. The introduction of healthcare 
standards, through an accreditation programme, has been reported to result in improved 
perceptions of teamwork and participation in decision making (Salmon et al., 2003). 
Improvements in the organisational working environment were also reported (Aiken et al., 
2008). In a multicultural, multi-language university hospital in Saudi Arabia, accreditation 
was reported to result in improved perception of the quality of patient care and patient safety 
and promoted good safety practices (Al-Awa et al., 2012, Al-Awa et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
accreditation was viewed as an effective intervention to push efforts to reduce healthcare 
errors (Hosford, 2008). Greenfield et al. (2012) argues that healthcare accreditation standards 
are promoted as an essential means of improving clinical practice and organisational 
performance. However, there is a lack of robust empirical evidence investigating impacts of 
healthcare accreditation standards and more research is needed.  
The dimensions “Non-punitive response to error” (34%), “Communication openness” (47%) 
and “Frequency of event reporting” (50%) were identified as areas in need of improvement. 
These findings suggest that the reporting climate in Kuwaiti hospitals is a major concern for 
healthcare workers. Correlations between “Frequency of events reported” and “Non-punitive 
response to error” and “Communication openness” were found to be lower compared to other 
scales. This may reflect the current state of safety climate of contradicting messages. A 
predominant culture of blame, fear of reprisals and lack of openness in relation to patient 
safety exists, while reporting errors is a rhetoric that is stressed through different channels of 
communication. The results illustrate the internal struggle that hospital staff have between 
their wish to report errors and the predominant culture of blame and shame. Lack of feedback 
after reporting incidents was another concern that was raised. Such unfavourable cultural and 
organisational factors prevent healthcare environments from creating an open climate for 
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reporting and may lead to underreporting of adverse events. Healthcare organisations in 
Kuwait must acknowledge human vulnerability while fostering a non-punitive and learning 
culture. Employees must feel confident to openly discuss, report and learn from errors. 
Moving away from a punitive approach to errors should be balanced with individual 
accountability. Strictly punitive or non-punitive approaches to safety are associated with 
negative consequences (Petschonek et al., 2013). A growing support for embracing a just 
culture is viewed as an appropriate response that strikes a balance between the two 
approaches (Vogelsmeier et al., 2010). Just culture stresses shared accountability between 
leaders and staff to support the disclosure of error and organisational learning from mistakes 
(Singer et al., 2009b). Current approaches to just culture argue for a sharp line between 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviours while Dekker (2009) highlights that the critical 
question is not where to draw the line, but who gets to draw it.  
 Managers must approach incidents effectively with timely feedback and use data 
appropriately to modify policy and practice. Providing feedback and communicating about 
errors and safety concerns was positively related to the frequency of event reporting. A 
similar finding was reported in a number of international studies including Swedish (Nordin et 
al., 2013), Norway (Ballangrud et al., 2012), Scottish (Saraç, 2011), Lebanese (El-Jardali et 
al., 2011) and German (Pfeiffer and Manser, 2010) studies.  
In comparison to international studies, the dimensions “Teamwork within units” and 
“Organisational learning-continuous improvement” received the highest positive response 
rates while the dimension “Non-punitive response to error” received the lowest rate of 
positive responses across six countries, including the USA (Famolaro et al., 2016), Oman (Al-
Mandhari et al., 2014), Lebanon (El-Jardali et al., 2010), Saudi Arabia (Alahmadi, 2010) and 
Palestine (Hamdan and Saleem, 2013). Two additional dimensions, “Communication 
openness” and “Frequency of events reported”, were lower in Kuwaiti hospitals compared to 
US hospitals. Other hospitals reported similar results (Al-Mandhari et al., 2014, El-Jardali et 
al., 2010, Hamdan and Saleem, 2013). This confirms our results and adds to the construct 
validity of the tool.  
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A better understanding of the differences between hospitals’ professional groups, work areas 
and sites can help in the design and implementation of more effective safety programmes and 
targeted interventions. Nurses were found to be more inclined to report their errors than other 
healthcare professionals including physicians. They were, however, less inclined to openly 
discuss safety issues and concerns. Since most nurses come from ethnic minority populations, 
this observation might be linked to their fear of the negative repercussions that may result 
from raising safety concerns to their coworkers. Nonetheless, they felt more protected when 
they anonymously report incidents.  
A significant observation is the high positive response rate to “Hospital management support” 
and “Supervisors’/managers’ expectations and actions promoting patient safety” despite the 
low positive response to “Non-punitive response to error” and “Frequency of events 
reported.” This might indicate that staff still feel supported by their managers and supervisors 
despite the presence of a punitive environment. It might also indicate that incident reporting is 
overlooked by top and middle managers in the three hospitals. It is also reflected in the 
outcome measure “Number of incidents reported” as it shows that 74% of respondents 
reported two incidents or less in the past year.  
Physicians were less positive than nurses on a number of dimensions including hospital 
management’s commitment to safety. This indicates that physicians acknowledge the need for 
improvement strategies.  
Management’s commitment to safety is a key factor affecting the success of an organisation’s 
safety programmes (Zohar, 1980). Zohar’s Multilevel Model of Safety Climate highlights the 
influence of managerial commitment at different levels of the organisation on staffs 
perceptions about priority given to safety (Zohar, 2000, Zohar and Luria, 2005). This 
commitment can be manifested through management participation in safety committees, 
establishing written safety procedures and policies, training programmes and consideration of 
safety in every aspect of the work environment (Vredenburgh, 2002). Leadership support is 
also critical for the success of an incident reporting system (Hwang et al., 2012) and leaders, 
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both clinical and managerial, must lead by example and reveal their willingness to use the 
system and make it safe to report and to lead on actions and feedback changes.  
Differences across the three hospital sites were reported on a number of safety climate 
dimensions. Hospital C reported better perceptions of supervisors’/managers’ expectations 
and actions and hospital management’s commitment in comparison to Hospital A and B. Top 
and middle management support and commitment to patient safety in Hospital C was evident 
through fostering a better climate of open communication and learning about safety with 
feedback and communication about changes that take place as a result of safety incidents. 
More respondents in Hospital C compared with hospitals A and B reported that hospital 
management think that patient safety is a top priority, provide a supportive work environment, 
are proactive in identifying and eliminating errors, do not overlook safety problems and are 
supportive of staffs’ compliance to established safety procedures. The HSOPSC tool was 
found to differentiate staffs’ perceptions of safety based on the three hospitals, professional 
groups in addition to work areas. This confirms the discriminant validity of the tool. 
“Hospital’s management support” was reported to be the most significant predictor of “Patient 
safety grade” and “Overall perceptions of patient safety.” This finding is consistent with the 
literature (El-Jardali et al., 2011, Nordin et al., 2013). It was also found to be a significant 
predictor of staffs’ “Frequency of events reported.” Overall, this reinforces the notion that 
staff’s perceptions of patient safety at the hospital and unit level are affected by the level of 
support that they feel from their management. 
8.6$ Interview$findings$
To gain a better sense of the underlying safety culture in a particular setting, it is 
recommended to supplement quantitative methods with qualitative approaches in safety 
culture research (Flin, 2007, Flin et al., 2006, Halligan and Zecevic, 2011, Runciman et al., 
2008, Singer et al., 2009b). This part of my study was designed to further investigate safety 
perceptions of key personnel, namely doctors and nurses, regarding main issues arising from 
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survey findings, the potential usefulness of the survey approach as an improvement strategy in 
addition to identifying their views about facilitators and barriers that might affect patient 
safety in Kuwaiti hospitals. Not only did the interviews provide rich insight into employees' 
perceptions of safety in their work areas but they also reflected the broader views of working 
for public hospitals in Kuwait and their perceived safety culture. Four main themes were 
identified from the interviews. They reflected different organisational levels including 
individual, unit and hospital levels in addition to external organisational factors. The role of 
management commitment to safety, both at hospital and unit levels, was greatly stressed in 
relation to safety outcomes. At the individual level, staff revealed concerns regarding the 
impact of their safety and wellbeing on patient safety outcomes. At the unit level, the 
importance of teamwork and communication between team members was emphasised. 
Communication issues between different healthcare professionals were linked to cultural, 
professional and hierarchical differences. Specifically, most of the concerns raised were 
perceived to be related to the presence of cultural and language barriers between staff 
members.  
Additionally, perceptions surfaced mainly in relation to the inability of staff, especially 
nurses, to raise safety issues and concerns to their supervisors due to their fear of negative 
implications. Such barriers were perceived to influence and restrain the extent and quality of 
communication openness between staff members and affect teamwork leading to errors and 
mistakes. Also, the suppression of input from team members reduces chances for 
collaborative learning. Transparency through uninhibited sharing of information is viewed as 
the most important single attribute of a culture of safety (Leape et al., 2009). Its absence 
inhibits learning from mistakes and distorts teamwork in addition to putting the patients at 
risk.  
The role of the supervisors has been repeatedly stressed in relation to teamwork and 
communication openness within their units. Supervisors set the tone for safety (Zohar, 2002). 
As a result, employees’ perceptions of the safety practices of their supervisors reflect the 
degree to which their supervisors are committed to safety. This can have a positive influence 
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on safety performance (Barling et al., 2002, Thompson et al., 1998, Zohar, 2002). 
Supervisors’ involvement through leading teams, implementing protocols that support 
effective communication across hierarchies, training and running meetings has been stated as 
necessary in order to improve the safety-related perceptions of staff. 
Incident reporting was perceived as a valuable tool for organisational learning and promoting 
employees’ engagement in safety issues. Presence of a punitive environment and lack of 
psychological safety were viewed as barriers to reporting incidents. Interviewees questioned 
the confidentiality of the system and were critical of the feedback received based on incidents 
reported. Loss of interest and motivation to report further incidents was perceived to result 
and to lead to under-reporting behaviour and lost opportunities for learning. A discrepancy 
between actual and reported incidents might result and impact the validity of objective data 
(Williams et al., 2008). Suggestions were focused on improving the system through 
empowering employees, providing prompt feedback and implementing an electronic incident 
reporting system. Improving patient safety by using an electronic incident reporting system 
was perceived as a potential alternative to the current paper based system. It was reported that 
electronic incident reporting systems raised many challenges including security of 
information (Walsh and Antony, 2007). Learning from previous experiences of others about 
challenges and gaps associated with electronic incident reporting systems implementation is 
important when attempting to adopt such a technology.  
Influence of top management in setting a non-punitive context for facilitating reporting and 
organisational learning was stressed by the majority of interviewees. Management 
commitment to safety was reported as the most common safety climate theme in healthcare 
(Flin et al., 2006). At the hospital level, the influence of top management on safety was 
stressed by the majority of interviewees. Visibility of top management coupled with efficient 
use of communication channels was stated as necessary. Participation of both clinical and 
managerial leadership in patient safety efforts was greatly stressed as it sends a strong 
message to staff that safety is a priority.  
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Execution of policies and procedures related to safety was viewed as vital as difficulties were 
faced with employees’ not taking them seriously. In addition, effective communication 
strategies within and across teams, providing adequate resources and conducting training and 
education to support patient safety was seen as essential. Finally, the effects of external 
factors, including accreditation and governmental influences, on safety at different levels were 
acknowledged. The data derived from interview findings supported the survey findings.  
8.7$ General$limitations$and$strengths$
8.7.1% Limitations%
There are several limitations to this study.  
8.7.1.1% Time%challenges%
The researcher encountered some challenges during the data collection phase. For example, 
the summer holidays of staff and Ramadan commencing during the same period. Ethics 
review by the MOH and obtaining the necessary permission to conduct the survey and 
interviews in the three public hospitals took longer than expected. 
Another significant challenge was the time available for data collection as the researcher had 
to survey and interview participants in three different hospitals.  
8.7.1.2% Staff%participation%
A practical challenge of this study was getting a high survey response rate among hospital 
staff at three different hospitals. The researcher gained support and approval at different 
organisational levels including the MOH, hospital management and unit levels. An upcoming 
accreditation was an advantage to the researcher. Delivery of confidential feedback reports to 
the three hospitals was also offered. This, collectively, resulted in maximization of the 
response rate in the three hospitals. 
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8.7.1.3% English%language%
The survey and interviews were conducted in English. This is another limitation as the 
majority of the staff speak English as a second language and might have faced challenges 
understanding the questions, particularly the reverse worded items in the HSOPSC 
questionnaire. It was decided not to translate the HSOPSC to Arabic for several reasons. It 
was anticipated that the English version of the HSOPSC would be suitable for the study 
population since most of the staff come from medical and technical schools in Kuwait as well 
as other Arab and foreign countries where teaching is conducted in English. Additionally, 
patient safety is a relatively new concept in Kuwait as well as other Arab countries. Thus, 
many of the safety terms are still used in English (adverse event, incident report) and 
translation might have faced linguistic and conceptual difficulties. The researcher was also 
aiming to conduct international comparisons. Finally, the researcher was limited in time and 
resources. Therefore, the English version of the HSOPSC was found to be a suitable option 
especially after the expert panel recommendations.  
8.7.2% %Strengths%
8.7.2.1% Systematic%review%
One of the main strengths of this study is the use of a systematic review to identify a suitable 
tool. The review followed a thorough search strategy, data extraction and quality appraisal 
process, with at least two independent reviewers involved in each step of the process. The 
systematic review offered the author a scan of available safety climate tools in literature with 
an in-depth understanding of the included hospital measures. It eventually led to the 
identification of the HSOPSC as an appropriate candidate. 
 
Chapter Eight: General Discussion and Conclusions                                                                                     318 
 
8.7.2.2% Multimethod%approach%
Another key strength of this study is the use of a multimethod approach to investigate safety 
culture by combining the generalisability of a quantitative questionnaire with the depth of a 
qualitative interview approach. This allowed a comprehensive and thorough understanding of 
the social construct of safety culture and provided additional contextual insight. After a small 
pilot study, three hospitals were included for data collection, and 1,310 completed 
questionnaires were returned and analysed (87% response rate). The sample also included the 
majority of staff groups. Therefore, the data were confirmed using a large representative 
sample. Following that, descriptive and psychometric data analyses were performed. The 
large sample size also allowed the dataset to be split and factor analysis to be undertaken. A 
rigorous strategy of psychometric assessment was followed according to recommended 
practice, with the combined strengths of both EFA and CFA analytical techniques. All 
parameter estimates required for the reader to make valid interpretations of the results were 
reported. Analysing the survey data before conducting the qualitative interviews helped offset 
the weaknesses associated with each approach and enriched the study by allowing the findings 
to build on, and validate, each other. In summary, the multimethod approach provided a 
deeper understanding of problem areas in the safety culture of Kuwaiti public hospitals with 
potential ways of addressing them in addition to improving our interpretation of the survey 
findings.  
8.8$ Theoretical$and$Practical$Implications$
This study contributes to the assessment of patient safety climate in Kuwaiti hospitals in three 
ways: contribution to current knowledge, implications for practice and implications for policy. 
They will be discussed in light of key findings presented in this thesis and current literature. 
8.8.1% Contributions%to%current%knowledge%%
Compared to other fields, the measurement of safety culture and climate in healthcare is still 
at an early stage of development (Flin, 2007, Zohar, 1980). Waterson et al. (2010) warn 
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against generalizing about safety culture and climate across healthcare organisations, due to 
their different characteristics, work practices and systems of hierarchy. Thus, safety climate 
data must be interpreted with caution.  
This is the first study to offer an assessment of an American safety climate tool using data 
from Kuwait. Results clearly indicate the need for caution when using the original version of 
the HSOPSC questionnaire (Sorra and Nieva, 2004) and highlight the importance of 
appropriate validation of safety climate surveys before applying them to different populations 
and healthcare contexts than those in which they were originally developed.  
My PhD thesis also shows the original composition of the HSOPSC dimensions was not 
confirmed in most studies. When compared to the USA, the HSOPSC questionnaire may be 
assessing different dimensions of safety culture across different countries including Kuwait 
(Sorra and Nieva, 2004). This study provided a comparative database regarding the use of the 
HSOPSC questionnaire internationally and nine common dimensions and items were 
identified when comparing the different studies that reported their optimum models. 
The standardised form used in the systematic review for assessing the quality of climate 
questionnaire studies, including reported psychometrics, may be used as a checklist for 
researchers and hospital administrators in search of a suitable safety climate tool (Appendix 3 
& 4). Qualitative approaches should not be overlooked as they provide rich insight into 
locally held attitudes and perceptions related to patient safety (Singla et al., 2006).  
8.8.2% Implications%for%practice%%
The tested and validated version of the HSOPSC is offered as an appropriate tool to assess the 
level of safety climate in Kuwaiti hospitals. This will allow hospitals to conduct regular 
assessments of safety climate and benchmark change. It can also highlight areas of strength 
and areas in need of improvement and can be used to evaluate safety interventions over time. 
The tool can be used as part of the accreditation process of hospitals. It can provide feedback 
reports for management and staff. Those reports can initiate open discussions in formal and 
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informal meetings. The tool can be combined with a qualitative element to add rich insight 
into employees' perceptions about safety culture. Developing or adapting tools that can 
facilitate team discussions about patient safety issues can be useful as a self-reflection, 
communication and education exercise (Wallis and Dovey, 2011). They can help in raising 
awareness about patient safety, stimulating discussion about the strengths and weaknesses of 
patient safety culture within their work areas, revealing any differences in perceptions 
between team members and monitor changes over time (Ashcroft et al., 2005). A better 
understanding of the differences in safety climate between distinct work areas and disciplines 
in hospitals can help in the design and implementation of more effective and targeted safety 
interventions including training and education.  
8.8.3% Implications%for%policy%
This study established baseline knowledge since limited information is available on safety 
climate in Kuwaiti hospitals. Kuwait’s healthcare system is facing many challenges relating to 
safety of its patients. Findings of my PhD thesis can help inform future decisions and 
structure future strategies that will be adopted by policy makers particularly in Kuwait and 
similar Gulf countries. It is important for policy makers and hospital managers to develop 
strategies and policies to adopt a system based approach and to replace the traditional culture 
of shame and blame with a non-punitive, learning and just culture where staff feel they can 
report errors and adverse events without fear of retribution or blame. MOH could work with 
the judicial system on securing legal immunity for those who report incidents. Policy makers 
can aim to create a reporting system at the national level where hospital boards feel obliged to 
act and frontline staff feel bound to report incidents. In March 2017, Italy passed a new 
comprehensive law on patient safety and healthcare professionals’ responsibilities. It 
recognises patient safety as a fundamental right for everyone accessing health services and a 
primary goal of the national healthcare service. It helps to protect healthcare professionals 
from prosecution even if there is an adverse outcome with action against healthcare 
professionals only possible in cases of malice or gross negligence (Bellandi et al., 2017).  
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As multiculturalism is a dominant feature of the Kuwaiti healthcare sector, it is recommended 
to develop new policies to improve communication and collaboration and to reduce 
hierarchical and cultural barriers between different healthcare professionals. The findings of 
this research clearly point to issues related to the Non-Kuwaiti workforce. The Kuwaiti MOH 
could consider and address these issues. This is a potential recommendation that could be 
explored in more detail in future studies. 
More attention should be paid to providing a safe and secure environment for staff. MOH can 
coordinate with the Ministry of Interiors to provide more protection and instil a sense of 
security for staff. Further consideration should be given to staff safety through creating 
policies that focus on creating a safe environment for patients, staff and visitors. This includes 
coordinating with the Ministry of Information to create awareness and promote the 
importance of patient and staff safety in healthcare institutions. 
There is a drive within healthcare systems globally to focus on health information technology 
(Haux, 2006). Additional consideration can be given to introduction or review of current 
strategies around electronic medical records and incident reporting systems. 
There is an evident need for strategies to focus on patient safety education and training as a 
system property. Incorporating patient safety into healthcare professionals’ curriculum has 
been stressed as a key priority (WHO, 2009b). Knowledge about the most appropriate way to 
introduce and teach patient safety in current medical school curricula in order to achieve 
improvements in outcomes, is still being investigated (Nie et al., 2011). The MOH has 
recently integrated patient safety into the medical curriculum of Kuwait’s medical school in 
order to increase the awareness of medical students about patient safety at the undergraduate 
level based on WHO patient safety curriculum (WHO, 2009b). Arguably, current patient 
safety curricula focus mainly on error reduction approaches (known as Safety-I) rather than 
also learning about wider systems approaches that stress the system’s ability to succeed under 
changing conditions (known as Safety-II) (Hollnagel et al., 2015, Vosper et al., 2017). Human 
factors and ergonomics (HFE) is defined as “the scientific discipline concerned with the 
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understanding of interactions among humans and other elements of a system, and the 
profession that applies theory, principles, data, and other methods to design in order to 
optimize human well-being and overall system performance” (International Ergonomics 
Association, 2000). HFE has been overlooked in healthcare education and practice and its 
incorporation into undergraduate curricula, postgraduate training and healthcare improvement 
programmes could potentially enhance both the safety and wellbeing outcomes of the system 
and the individuals interacting with the system (Vosper et al., 2017). There is a need to 
develop new safety policies and standardised procedures based on current evidence-based 
practices including HFE.  
8.9$ Directions$for$future$research$$
Based on the findings of my PhD thesis, several areas for future research have emerged.  
Further research is needed to resolve the controversies in the definitions and dimensions of 
safety culture and climate (Pronovost et al., 2009). There is also a need to establish a 
fundamental set of universal dimensions in healthcare (Flin, 2007). There is an evident lack of 
safety culture and climate theories in healthcare. Thus, another important challenge for the 
future direction of safety science is to focus on developing theoretical models and “study the 
link between culture, behaviours, and patient outcomes” (Pronovost et al., 2009, p. 336). The 
influence of safety climate on patient and worker safety outcomes is not yet clear (Flin, 2007). 
Thus, there is a need for more research to understand how safety culture or climate impacts on 
outcomes (Wilson, 2007). No research has been able to test the predictive validity of the 
HSOPSC by relating climate scores to outcome measures (Sarac et al., 2010) and so further 
research is needed to study the predictive validity of the tool and the criterion validity. 
Substantial methodological advances with respect to psychometric assessment are required to 
overcome the variability in psychometric testing and reporting. More validation studies of 
safety climate questionnaires that are based on Flin’s standard psychometric criteria are 
needed to ensure a standardised and comprehensive scientific approach (Flin, 2007). The 
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availability of standard safety climate data across countries and industries will help in 
conducting international and cross industry comparisons and identifying any possible 
discrepancies.  
More studies on patient safety climate assessment in Kuwait are needed using the validated 
version of the HSOPSC questionnaire developed in my PhD thesis. This will help to provide a 
better understanding of the safety climate in Kuwait.  
As there are reported challenges in obtaining accurate data about adverse events, future 
research should also focus on identifying research methods to obtain valid and objective 
safety outcome data in healthcare (Williams et al., 2008).  
For further progress towards patient and worker safety, future studies should examine the 
impact of cultural and contextual factors on safety culture (Waterson et al., 2010). In addition, 
investigation of the influence of national culture on the construct of safety culture is needed 
(Al-Mandhari et al., 2014). The influence of cultural diversity of health care workforce on the 
perceptions of safety should also be studied (Almutairi, 2012). Waterson (2014) states that the 
field of patient safety culture should move beyond the limited range of systems factors 
covered within climate surveys towards the involvement of other methods to culture and 
safety (e.g., qualitative studies, observations) used on their own or in mixed methods 
approaches. Additional research is needed to explore the benefits of qualitative methods (e.g., 
focus groups, interviews) as a precursor and basis for the development of quantitative climate 
measures (Bennett et al., 2015, Flin et al., 2006). Involvement of under-represented groups 
such as managers and administrators in addition to patients and their carers in safety 
culture/climate studies can add additional perspectives (Waterson, 2014). Recently, Safety-II 
is a growing area of research that is around means to improve the resilience of healthcare 
organisations (Hollnagel et al., 2015). Its principles include facilitating everyday 
performance, anticipating changes and events and maintaining an adaptive ability to respond 
effectively to unavoidable circumstances (Finkel and Tlamim, 2011).  
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8.10$ Proposed$conceptual$model$informing$a$systems$approach$to$improving$
safety$culture$theory$and$practice$
As discussed earlier, safety climate has been viewed as a leading indicator of safety 
performance. Safety climate measures are frequently used to reflect the level of general safety 
in an organisation. However, those measures do not allow for a detailed analysis of where 
safety problems lie or what the exact causes are. Also, safety climate measures have often 
been viewed as insufficient on their own, as they are based on measuring only front line 
employees’ perceptions and tend to neglect the broader social, technical, physical, 
organisational, regulatory and political environments that patients and employees interact with 
(Murphy et al., 2015b). Macroergonomics, according to Murphy et al. (2015b), is a sub-
discipline of the science of HFE which allows for that broader analysis through an inspection 
of all aspects of the work system. It aims to research, develop, and apply principles of 
ergonomic and organisational design to work systems at a macro-level (Hendrick and Kleiner, 
1999). Murphy et al. (2014) add that safety is an emergent outcome of a work system with 
multiple interacting components (e.g., personnel, technological) that cooperate to carry the 
responsibility of keeping the whole system and its workers safe. 
Macroergonomic methods, such as SEIPS model, allows for that detailed analysis through an 
assessment of the overall work system i.e. taking a systems approach to understanding more 
about the interacting system elements that contribute to a safe (or unsafe) working 
environment (Murphy et al., 2015a).  
Based on the research findings of my PhD thesis and the literature, a preliminary 
sociotechnical system framework was developed that aims to extend the examination of the 
construct of safety climate beyond the domains and items (e.g. attitudes and behaviours, team 
working, communication, leadership) that typically inform safety climate theory and 
questionnaire development in order to include wider care system factors which influence the 
prevailing safety culture/climate (e.g. design of work tasks, technologies or physical 
environments or external political and economic factors).  The framework aims to broaden the 
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scope of safety climate assessment using a systems wide approach that not only takes social 
aspects like teamwork and communication into consideration, but also other system elements 
that staff and patients interact with such as tools and technology, tasks and external 
environmental factors, as political, regulatory and economic pressures all of which may have 
a negative or positive influence on safety outcomes and the performance of organisations. 
According to Carayon et al. (2015), understanding the environmental, organisational and 
work system factors that contribute to safety in the workplace will help to develop more 
effective safety interventions – a key goal of participation in safety climate outcomes.  
The SEIPS model was used as a basis for our framework. As described in Chapter two, the 
SEIPS model describes the important system components (person, tasks, tools and 
technologies, physical environment, organisation) and their relationships, as well as their 
impact on patient, employee and organisational outcomes (Carayon et al., 2006, Holden et al., 
2013). It is argued that safety climate measurement needs to be supplemented with this type 
of a Macroergonomics approach so that we can identify specific aspects within an 
organisation that negatively and positively affect the safety perception of workers’ in that 
organisation (Murphy et al., 2015b).  
The framework consists of three aspects: (1) A participatory co-design approach, (2) A 
system’s approach, (3) Outcomes. The first element of the framework is worker participation 
and involvement in highlighting system wide safety issues of direct relevance to safety 
climate survey design. Direct participation by both employees and managers in raising, 
addressing and prioritizing safety problems is needed to guarantee their involvement and 
engagement in safety in addition to adding an important contextual element that goes beyond 
the published evidence base supporting questionnaire development i.e. the local workforce are 
experts in how safety work is understood and undertaken (or otherwise) and so we need to 
capture their perspectives and experiences to inform more effective design of climate 
questionnaires. Also, this model focuses on how the design characteristics of different 
elements in hospitals and how their interactions affect processes and outcomes of care. 
Inappropriate design or interactions of any of the five elements can potentially affect patient 
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safety (Gurses et al., 2012). The five elements covering the work system include people who 
are involved in the care process (e.g., patients, physicians, pharmacist), the different tasks to 
be performed by people and the tools and technology needed to perform those tasks, the 
physical environment in which tasks take place and the structural design of an organisation 
that influence the processes of care, which as stated arguably go beyond the work based safety 
issues typically included in existing climate questionnaires (Carayon, 2006, Carayon et al., 
2014). Encompassing the work system are boxes to represent the influence of the internal 
environment and external influences. The internal environment is comprised of the team and 
social relationships (e.g., teamwork, communication), psychosocial factors (e.g., job 
demands), and organisational and safety culture. The external environment represents the 
impact of the wider socio-political and cultural influences and other factors on safety related 
practices (Murphy et al., 2014). Policy, regulation and accreditation have been recognised as 
external factors that might determine the priority given to safety at the organisational level 
(Saraç, 2011, Zohar and Luria, 2005). Any imbalances at the hospital level and unit level can 
affect the process of care and may lead to adverse events. The design and characteristics of 
the work system elements influence the level of safety climate within the organisation, which 
then impacts on the employees’ attitudes and behaviours and their shared perceptions of work 
practices (Murphy et al., 2014). It is hoped that this model helps to identify elements where 
safety threats exist and develop system redesign interventions based on that. This framework 
can form part of a future agenda for research and can be used to prompt further empirical and 
conceptual investigation. 
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Figure 8.1: A Preliminary conceptual model informing a systems approach to improving safety culture theory and practice 
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8.11$ Conclusion$
In recent years, there has been an increasing recognition of the importance of safety culture in 
improving patient safety and its impact on safety outcomes. This has led to an increasing 
number of studies that attempt to define and assess safety climate in different healthcare 
settings. My PhD thesis is the first validation study of a standardised safety climate measure 
in a Kuwaiti healthcare setting. The study assessed the psychometric properties of the 
HSOPSC questionnaire and constructed an optimal model for assessing patient safety climate 
in Kuwaiti hospitals. The results of this study highlight the need for appropriate validation of 
safety climate questionnaires before extending their use in different healthcare settings. In 
addition, safety climate assessments can suggest areas requiring improvement and as a result, 
should enable organisations to develop targeted efforts with more efficient use of resources. 
As such, this study provided new knowledge about areas of strengths and weaknesses in 
safety climate within Kuwaiti public hospitals. A significant amount of work is needed to 
improve the current safety climate. Hospital leaders’ visible support and explicit commitment 
to safety is needed through defining a common vision and strategy with efforts directed 
towards creating an environment that supports active questioning and sharing of insights 
about safety in addition to eliminating the prevalent culture of blame and shame and 
encouraging reporting of errors and adverse events. This will empower employees to take on 
more responsibility and become more proactively involved in safety related activities. 
Organisational support in the form of policies, resources and reporting structures is essential. 
Moreover, safety climate surveys should always be complemented with other research 
methods, such as interviews or focus groups to help draw an overall picture of safety practices 
in a particular setting. The interviews provided further understanding of the survey findings 
and enabled a multilevel conceptualization of safety culture.  
The existing healthcare sector is complex and is characterized by multiple players including 
different healthcare settings, public and private healthcare providers, healthcare professionals, 
and consumer groups. Adding to such complexity is the recent rise in regulatory agencies and 
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strategies. It is recommended that further research should focus on the contextual factors 
associated with different healthcare settings in order to build frameworks based on strong 
theoretical roots to guide safety culture research. In choosing a suitable instrument, hospital 
care providers should be guided by a combination of factors including intended purpose, 
target population and setting, resources available and reported psychometric properties. The 
outcomes of this study aim to provide guidance to policymakers, survey users and safety 
researchers to enable them to make more informed decisions when selecting an appropriate 
safety climate tool. Additionally, my PhD thesis helps extend our knowledge of safety climate 
measurement in healthcare organisations and offers a promising foundation for safety culture 
dimensions in healthcare. Furthermore, my PhD thesis created a basis for measuring the 
patient safety climate in Kuwaiti hospitals and hoped to contribute towards policy in Kuwait 
and ultimately towards building a safer environment for both patients and employees in 
Kuwaiti hospitals. Finally, this knowledge can be transferred to other countries with similar 
social and cultural contexts. 
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8.12$ Recommendations$
It is clear that implementing the following suggested changes will need time, resources and 
willingness of the Kuwait MOH, hospital managers and frontline staff to implement them. 
•! Senior management and frontline personnel should work to build a connection and 
overcome the gaps in communication. This connection could be accomplished through 
building effective communication networks that support electronic information 
sharing and regular formal and informal meetings. Safety walk rounds help managers 
engage with the front-line staff in informal conversations around patient safety issues 
(O'leary et al., 2011). Introducing regular safety meetings with staff across all levels of 
the organisation might be beneficial (Dirik and Seren Intepeler, 2017). 
•! Standardised verbal and written communication policies are essential to improve 
communication and collaboration within and across units of hospitals with 
development of structured communication for hand-off and transition of patients 
between different units (Clark et al., 2009, Pronovost et al., 2003b). 
•! Social events could be introduced to strengthen communication and collaboration 
across all levels. 
•! Hospital managers could support easy access, confidentiality and prompt analysis and 
feedback about errors reported to help in increasing staff’s participation in the incident 
reporting system (Edmondson, 2002).   
•! An electronic incident reporting system could be implemented and tested as an 
alternative to the current paper based system (Walsh and Antony, 2007). 
•! Training programmes for hospital managers and unit level supervisors could be 
provided to encourage them to develop their skills at recognising and rewarding safety 
behaviour (Riley et al., 2011). Safety standards could be part of appraisal of hospital 
managers to increase their commitment to safety and reduce the variation in the 
implementation of safety practices and interventions. 
•! Hospitals could conduct local workshops and offer continuous professional education 
about patient safety to staff.  
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•! Training on communication skills and teamwork should be conducted on a regular 
basis to improve communication, collaboration and respect.  
•! Targeted interventions are needed such as more focus on educating nurses to openly 
discuss safety issues with support from both clinical and managerial leaders.  
•! The current medical curriculum in Kuwait could be reviewed and updated to be based 
on the latest in evidence-based safety science and Human Factors theory and practices 
(Vosper et al., 2017). 
•! Awareness programmes about patient safety for both staff and patients could be 
introduced. 
•! Review and strict application of visitation times policy to avoid unnecessary 
disruptions of staff and patients is indicated. 
•! In choosing a suitable instrument to monitor safety climate, hospital care providers 
should be guided by a combination of factors including intended purpose, target 
population and setting, resources available and reported psychometric properties.  
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CINAHL%and%PsycINFO%Search%strategy%Summary:%
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personnel)  
 
Acknowledgements: 
-! Not available 
 
Appendices                                                                                                                                                 401 
 
Appendix 2: Prospero protocol and PRISMA checklist 
 
Appendices                                                                                                                                                 402 
 
 
 
Appendices                                                                                                                                                 403 
 
 
 
Appendices                                                                                                                                                 404 
 
 
 
Appendices                                                                                                                                                 405 
 
 
)  
Appendices                                                                                                                                                 406 
 
PRISMA Checklist 
Section/topic  # Checklist item  Reported on page #  
TITLE   
Title  1 Assessing safety climate in acute hospital settings: a systematic review of the adequacy 
of the psychometric properties of survey measurement tools 
 
ABSTRACT   
Structured summary  2 Background: 
The perceived importance of safety culture in improving patient safety and its impact on 
patient outcomes has led to a growing interest in the assessment of safety climate in 
healthcare organisations; however, the rigour with which safety climate tools were 
developed and psychometrically tested was shown to be variable. This paper aims to 
identify and review questionnaire studies designed to measure safety climate in acute 
hospital settings, in order to assess the adequacy of reported psychometric properties of 
identified tools.  
Methods: 
A systematic review of published empirical literature was undertaken to examine 
sample characteristics and instrument details including safety climate dimensions, 
origin and theoretical basis, and extent of psychometric evaluation (content validity, 
criterion validity, construct validity and internal reliability).  
Results: 
Five questionnaire tools, designed for general evaluation of safety climate in acute 
hospital settings, were included. Detailed inspection revealed ambiguity around 
concepts of safety culture and climate, safety climate dimensions and the 
methodological rigour associated with the design of these measures. Standard reporting 
of the psychometric properties of developed questionnaires was variable, although 
evidence of an improving trend in the quality of the reported psychometric properties of 
studies was noted. Evidence of the theoretical underpinnings of climate tools was 
limited, while a lack of clarity in the relationship between safety culture and patient 
outcome measures still exists. 
Conclusions: 
Evidence of the adequacy of the psychometric development of safety climate 
questionnaire tools is still limited. Research is necessary to resolve the controversies in 
the definitions and dimensions of safety culture and climate in healthcare and identify 
related inconsistencies. More importance should be given to the appropriate validation 
of safety climate questionnaires before extending their usage in healthcare contexts 
different from those in which they were originally developed. Mixed methods research 
to understand why psychometric assessment and measurement reporting practices can 
be inadequate and lacking in a theoretical basis is also necessary.  
Limitations: 
There are also several limitations to our study. The exclusion of other bibliographic 
databases, grey literature, and non- English language papers could potentially lead to 
overlooking some studies.  
Theoretical and Practical Implications: The outcomes of this systematic review will 
provide guidance and support to healthcare policymakers, survey users and safety 
researchers to make more informed decisions when selecting or developing an 
appropriate safety climate assessment tool. 
systematic review registration number: CRD 42015016637 
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INTRODUCTION   
Rationale  3 To provide a comprehensive review of quantitative studies designed to assess safety 
climate or safety culture in the hospital setting, with particular focus on questionnaires. 
The objective of the systematic review was to conduct an evaluation of the reported 
psychometric properties of the identified questionnaires in order to provide a structured 
overview of their psychometric adequacy as measurement tools for their stated purpose 
in order to identify an appropriate safety climate tool to be employed for my PhD thesis. 
77 
Objectives  
 
 
4 The PICO framework-Population: Healthcare staff in a hospital setting, Intervention: 
Patient safety climate questionnaires, Studies: Quantitative, Outcome: Psychometric 
properties 
77 
METHODS   
Protocol and 
registration  
5 PROSPERO registration number: CRD 42015016637  
Eligibility criteria  6 The process of identification and selection of eligible papers was conducted in two 
stages. The first stage involved evaluating the potential relevance of all titles and 
abstracts identified from the electronic database searches.  Studies were included if they 
met the following criteria: (1) described a quantitative method of assessing patient 
safety climate, (2) described the results of tool development and psychometric 
evaluation, (3) directed at healthcare staff in a hospital setting. In the second stage, 
papers that were judged to be potentially relevant were retrieved and reviewed against 
the full text inclusion and exclusion criteria. To be eligible for inclusion at this stage, 
studies had to primarily focus on questionnaire development and explicitly state that the 
purpose of the study was to establish the psychometric properties of the tool as part of 
tool development, testing and implementation. Also, the tool also had to be designed for 
general administration to all healthcare staff working in a hospital setting and publically 
available. Only original tools developed in English-language were included as well as 
any updated version of an original tool that was produced by the original team in which 
the latest improved version was included.  
79 
Information sources  7 Electronic search of Medline, PubMed, CINAHL, Web of Science, PsycINFO, Embase 
and Scopus was performed, using the key terms: “Safety Culture”, “Safety Climate”, 
“Safety Attitudes”, “Hospital Safety”, “Patient Safety”, paired with “Health Care 
Workers”, with manual searches of bibliographies of included papers and key journals. 
This review covered English language studies published between January 2004 to 
December 2014. In addition, websites of organisations dedicated to the improvement of 
patient safety, including: The AHRQ; the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, the 
Health Foundation and the National Patient Safety Agency, were also accessed. Finally, 
Proquest dissertation and thesis databases were searched for any unpublished research 
and authors were contacted for any clarification required. 
78 
Search  8 PubMed Search Strategy Summary: (Attitude of Health Personnel [MeSH Terms]) 
AND ((((((safety climate[Title/Abstract]) OR safety culture[Title/Abstract]) OR safety 
attitude[Title/Abstract]) OR patient safety[Title/Abstract]) OR hospital 
safety[Title/Abstract]))  
 (See 
Appendix 1) 
Study selection  9 The process of identification and selection of eligible papers was conducted in two 
stages. The first stage involved evaluating the potential relevance of all titles and 
abstracts identified from the electronic database searches.  Following that, full text 
copies of all papers that were judged to be potentially relevant were retrieved and 
reviewed in the second stage. Two independent reviewers completed title, abstract and 
full text screening of potentially relevant records. Screening results were compared and 
discrepancies were resolved by discussion or arbitration with a third reviewer, when 
necessary. 
79 
Data collection 
process  
10 Data extraction: Data extracted included a description of study setting; sample 
characteristics; study method; and tool features including dimensions covered, 
psychometric performed, theoretical basis and outcome measures. 
82 
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Quality appraisal: Methodological quality of included studies was assessed based on 
the quality criteria developed by Flin and Burns et al. (20). Assessment of the quality of 
each study, included seven items related to the appropriateness of the study 
methodology, study population, data collection and analysis, response rate and results. 
Higher quality studies were considered to be those that met a minimum of six of these 
seven indicators. Psychometric evaluation of included tools was based on 
recommendations by Flin and Burns et al. (20) and included aspects related to content, 
criterion and construct validity and reliability. 
Data items  11 Data extracted included a description of study setting; sample characteristics; study 
method; and tool features including dimensions covered, psychometric performed, 
theoretical basis and outcome measures 
 (See 
Appendix 
3,4,5) 
Risk of bias in 
individual studies  
12 N/A N/A 
Summary measures  13 N/A 
 
N/A 
Synthesis of results  14 N/A N/A 
Risk of bias across 
studies  
15 N/A N/A 
Additional analyses  16 N/A N/A 
RESULTS   
Study selection  17 The search strategy identified a total of 3,576 potential papers. Of these, eighty-eight 
papers were reviewed against the full text inclusion criteria. Five studies met the criteria 
and were included for this review. 
 
(See Figure 
4.2) 
Study characteristics  18 For each study, present characteristics for which data were extracted (e.g., study size, 
PICOS, follow-up period) and provide the citations.  
 
(See Table 
4,5,6,7) 
Risk of bias within 
studies  
19 
N/A N/A 
Results of individual 
studies  
20 
N/A 
88 
Synthesis of results  21 
N/A 88 
Risk of bias across 
studies  
22 
N/A N/A 
Additional analysis  23 
N/A 
N/A 
DISCUSSION   
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Summary of evidence  24 This study aims to provide a comprehensive review of quantitative studies designed to 
assess safety climate in the hospital setting, with particular focus on questionnaires. The 
objective of the systematic review was to provide a structured overview of their 
psychometric adequacy as measurement tools for their stated purpose. All of the five 
reviewed safety climate tools have key similarities and common dimensions. Yet, they 
vary in terms of length, theoretical grounding and reported psychometric properties. 
Instruments varied in scope, with some covering a more comprehensive range of 
dimensions while others focused on the assessment of specific dimensions of safety 
culture. It is recommended that research first be conducted to resolve the controversies 
in the definitions and dimensions of safety culture and climate, and focus on developing 
theoretical models with more evidence to understand how safety culture or climate 
impacts on outcomes. Also, more consideration should be given to psychometric 
properties in the design and selection of tools in order to ensure the robustness of the 
resulting safety culture data. Psychometric testing, on its own, does not fully 
characterize an instrument with other forms of item analysis, such as cognitive testing, 
as they provide rich insight into locally held attitudes and perceptions related to patient 
safety. The outcomes of this systematic review will provide guidance and support to 
healthcare policymakers, survey users and safety researchers to make more informed 
decisions when selecting or developing an appropriate safety climate assessment tool. 
102 
Limitations  25 The exclusion of other bibliographic databases, grey literature, and non- English 
language papers could potentially lead to overlooking some studies. Regarding the 
assessment of the quality of the reviewed studies, some quality indicators were not 
reported in sufficient detail to allow a judgment to be made. In such cases, the indicator 
was marked as unmet and the study quality might have been underestimated due to 
under reporting. Finally, despite using three reviewers to categorise the items, there is 
still the possibility that bias was introduced by the qualitative nature of the process.  
112 
Conclusions  26 The perceived importance of safety culture in improving patient safety and its impact on 
patient outcomes has led to an increasing number of studies that attempt to define and 
assess safety culture in healthcare settings. Several reviews uncovered a wide variety of 
safety climate tools available for use. Still, theoretical and methodological challenges 
limit their use as assessment measures. Pronovost and Sexton (75) warned that “the 
enthusiasm for measuring culture may be outpacing the science”. Critics have 
increasingly called for more rigorous assessments of safety culture and more in-depth 
reporting. It is recommended that research first be conducted to resolve the 
controversies in the definitions and dimensions of safety culture and climate, and focus 
on developing theoretical models with more evidence to understand how safety culture 
or climate impacts on outcomes. Also, more consideration should be given to 
psychometric properties in the design and selection of tools in order to ensure the 
robustness of the resulting safety culture data. 
Psychometric testing, on its own, does not fully characterize an instrument with other 
forms of item analysis, such as cognitive testing, as they provide rich insight into locally 
held attitudes and perceptions related to patient safety. Further research is necessary in 
the development of safety culture theories in healthcare, to study the links between 
culture and outcomes, and to resolve the controversies in the definitions and dimensions 
of safety culture and climate. There is also a need for a safety climate tool to evaluate 
safety attributes in the “local” hospital setting bearing in mind the unique characteristics 
of that particular setting and population. On a practical level, the development of a 
standardized checklist for assessing the quality of climate questionnaires, including 
reported psychometrics, may be beneficial and help provide a more detailed account of 
the questionnaire development process.  Additionally, employing mixed methods tool 
development approaches may help to reveal different aspects of an organisation’s safety 
culture, which can inform and illuminate multiple components of this multidimensional 
construct than is currently the case.  
114 
FUNDING   
Funding  27 N/A   
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Appendix 3: Data Extraction Form 
 
Reference ID: ______ ______ ______ 
Authors: 1. _________________________________     2. _________________________________ 
    3. _________________________________     4. _________________________________ 
    5. _________________________________     6. _________________________________ 
Title: 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
___ 
Source/Journal:___________________________________________________________________________ 
Year: ____________ Volume: __________ Issue: _________ Page________−________ 
 
Study Design 
Type of study: Quantitative 
Data collection method: Questionnaire 
Method of recruitment: __________________________________________________________________ 
Randomization method: _________________________________________________________________ 
Duration of study: ____________________________________________________________ 
Data analysis method: ____________________________________________________________________ 
Ethical approval: _________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Appendices                                                                                                                                                 411 
 
Population characteristics 
Sample size: ______________________________________________________________________________ 
Sample characteristics: __________________________________________________________________ 
Healthcare personnel involved in study: 
Medical practitioners  Pharmacists  Nursing  Midwifery  
Healthcare personnel specialty: 
Medicine  Surgeon Obstetrician  Biochemist Laboratory  
Study setting  
Location of setting:______________________________________________________ 
Type of setting:__________________________________________________________ 
Size of setting:__________________________________________________________ 
 
Aim of the study__________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
SC Definition_________________________________________________ 
Level Of Analysis______________________________________________ 
Study Instrument 
Name of Survey: __________________________________________________________________________ 
Survey focus (Safety Climate/Safety Culture/Other): _______________________________________________ 
Number of scale items: ___________________________Type of scale (Likert):______________ 
Safety climate dimensions: ______________________________________________________________ 
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Number of dimensions: _____  
Study Instrument 
Summary of the main findings 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
_____   
__________________________________________________________________________________________
_____ 
Main conclusions 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
___ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
___ 
Limitations 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
______________ 
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Appendix 4: Quality Appraisal Form 
 
 
Quality Appraisal Criteria 
 
Yes 
 
Partial 
 
No 
 
 
NA 
 
Remarks 
1.! Aim(s) or research question(s) clearly stated? 
 
     
2.! Study methodology and design evident and appropriate? 
 
     
3.! Data collection described and appropriate? 
 
     
4.! Study population described? 
 
     
5.! Data analysis method(s) described and appropriate? 
 
     
6.! Response Rate acceptable 
 
     
7.! Results reported in sufficient detail? 
 
     
 
•! Total Score 
     
•! 0-5 Poor Quality 
•! 6-10 Fair Quality 
•! 11-14 Good Quality 
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Appendix 5: Data extraction results of specialised features 
 
Features 
 
Name of instrument 
 
HSOPSC SAQ 
 
HSOPSC SOS 
 
HSOPSC 
Safety Climate Dimensions:  
•! Number of  
Dimensions 
 
•! Scope of  
Dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
9 
 
 
1 
 
 
6 
 
Communication 
openness 
, Feedback and 
communication about 
error, Frequency of 
event reporting, 
Handoffs and 
transitions, 
Management support 
for patient safety, 
 
Teamwork, Safety 
climate, Job 
satisfaction, Stress 
recognition, Perception 
of management, 
Working conditions. 
 
 
Senior manager's 
engagement, 
Organisational 
resources for safety, 
Overall emphasis on 
safety, Unit safety 
norms, Unit 
recognition and 
support for safety 
 
Self-reported 
“behaviours enabling 
safety culture” through 
collective mindfulness. 
 
Organisational 
leadership support for 
safety,  
Incident follow-up, 
Supervisory 
leadership for safety, 
 
Unit learning culture, 
Enabling open 
communication I: 
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Features 
 
Name of instrument 
 
HSOPSC SAQ 
 
HSOPSC SOS 
 
HSOPSC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-punitive response 
to error, 
Organisational 
learning –Continuous 
improvement, 
Overall perceptions of 
patient safety, 
Staffing, 
Supervisor/manager 
expectations & 
actions promoting 
safety, Teamwork 
across units, 
Teamwork within 
units. 
efforts, Fear of shame, 
Provision of safe care, 
Learning, Fear of 
blame 
 
judgment-free 
environment, 
Enabling open 
communication II: job 
repercussions of 
error.  
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Features 
 
Name of instrument 
 
HSOPSC SAQ 
 
HSOPSC SOS 
 
HSOPSC 
Theoretical basis Literature review in 
areas of safety 
management; 
organisational & 
safety climate & 
culture; medical error 
& error reporting; 
patient safety.  
Existing safety 
climate and culture 
instruments. 
Based on  
Vincent's  
framework for 
analysing risk &  
safety,  
Donabedian's 
conceptual model for 
assessing quality  
 
 
Derived from an 
aviation safety culture 
questionnaire  
High reliability 
organisations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Derived from a naval 
aviation safety culture 
questionnaire  
 
High Reliability 
organisations 
Based on Zohar & 
Hofmann &Mark’s 
work on safety 
climate & error 
literature Adapted 
from work by Singer 
and colleagues  
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Features 
 
Name of instrument 
 
HSOPSC SAQ 
 
HSOPSC SOS 
 
HSOPSC 
Key features 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tested on a large 
sample of hospitals 
Ability to benchmark 
data 
Self-report outcome 
measures 
Tested on a large 
sample of hospitals 
Cross-industry 
comparisons  
Ability to benchmark 
data 
Favourable scores were 
associated with shorter 
lengths of stay& fewer 
medication errors in 
other studies  
Measures safety 
climate among all 
hospital personnel and 
across multiple 
hospitals of different 
types  
Cross-industry 
comparisons  
 
SOS is negatively 
associated with reported 
medication errors and 
patient falls 
Validated for use 
across a range of care 
settings  
 
 
Limitations 
Supervisor/ Manager 
Expectations & 
Actions Promoting 
Patient Safety CFI 
(SRMR) model fit 
statistic at the clinical 
area level was larger 
than desirable, 
Three individual 
dimensions 
demonstrate low 
internal consistency. 
Validated using a sample 
composed exclusively of 
registered nurses 
Questions about 
generalizability 
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Features 
 
Name of instrument 
 
HSOPSC SAQ 
 
HSOPSC SOS 
 
HSOPSC 
=0.88 at unit & 
hospital levels 
Item A7 in the 
Staffing composite 
had a low within- unit 
& within hospital 
factor loading (0.36). 
Staffing had 
Cronbach’s alpha 
=0.62 
 
indicating further scale 
refinement  
 
Modest Response Rate 
 
 
Selection Bias 
Further research and 
cross- validation of 
will be required with 
international samples  
 
More appropriate for 
improvement and 
research  
Data was not suitable 
for multilevel CFA  
•! Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) (Sorra and Dyer, 2010), Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) (Sexton et al., 2006), Patient Safety Climate 
in Healthcare Organisations (PSCHO) (Singer et al., 2007), Canadian Patient Safety Climate Scale (Can-PSC) (Ginsburg et al., 2013), Safety Organising Scale 
(SOS) (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007) 
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Appendix 6: Personal Communication 
 
 
 
Thursday,*December*7,*2017*at*8:49:09*AM*Arabian*Standard*Time
Page*1*of*3
Subject: RE:$HSOPSC$Grounding$Theory
Date: Thursday,$February$11,$2016$at$12:42:26$AM$Arabian$Standard$Time
From: Naomi$Yount
To: Gheed$F$H$A$Alsalem
CC: Naomi$Yount
Hello$Gheed,
$
Thank$you$for$clarifying$your$quesKon.$$The$survey$development$team$examined$several$diﬀerent
views/models$of$safety$culture$when$creaKng$the$Hospital$SOPS.$$We$reviewed$Zohar,$Reason,$and$many
others.$$Our$process$for$developing$the$tool$included$the$following$acKviKes:
 
·         Reviewed$the$literature,$including$exisKng$surveys,$pertaining$to$paKent$safety,$hospital$medical
errors$and$qualityUrelated$events,$error$reporKng,$safety$climate$and$culture,$and$organizaKonal
climate$and$culture.
$
·         Conducted$background$interviews$with$experts$in$the$ﬁeld$of$paKent$safety$and$with$hospital$staﬀ.
$
Based$on$these$acKviKes,$the$design$team$developed$draY$survey$items$to$measure$the$idenKﬁed$key
composites$and$conducted$cogniKve$interviews$with$hospital$staﬀ.$CogniKve$interview$parKcipants$included
clinical$staﬀ,$such$as$physicians,$nurses,$and$other$allied$health$professionals,$and$nonclinical$staﬀ,$including
administrators$and$unit$clerks.$The$design$team$also$received$input$on$the$draY$survey$from$the$Joint
Commission,$addiKonal$paKent$safety$researchers,$hospital$systems$administraKon,$and$professional
associaKons.
$
The$draY$survey$was$pilot$tested$with$more$than$1,400$hospital$employees$from$21$hospitals$across$the
United$States.$The$design$team$examined$the$reliability$and$factor$structure$of$the$paKent$safety$culture
composites.
$
So$in$sum,$the$survey$was$not$developed$following$any$single$model$but$aYer$reviewing$all$and$talking$to$staﬀ
and$experts$in$the$ﬁeld,$designed$the$survey$integraKng$what$was$learned$along$the$way.
$
I$hope$this$helps.$
$
Thanks!
Naomi
$
$
From: Gheed F H A Alsalem [mailto:g.alsalem.1@research.gla.ac.uk] 
Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2016 12:28 PM
To: Naomi Yount
Subject: Re: HSOPSC Grounding Theory
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Appendix 7: Ethical Approval of University of Glasgow 
 
 
  
23#March#2015# 
Professor#Jill#MorrisonDean#for#Learning#and#TeachingCollege#of#Medical,#Veterinary#and#Life#Sciences#University#of#Glasgow# 
Dear#Professor#Morrison# 
MVLS%College%Ethics%CommitteeProject(Title:(Assessment%Of%Patient%Safety%Culture%In%Kuwaiti%Public%Hospitals% 
Thank#you#for#submitting#to#the#MVLS#College#Ethics#Committee#a#copy#of#the#ethics#approval#letter#issued#by#the#Kuwaiti#Ministry#
of#Health,#for#the#above#project.# 
We#will#retain#a#copy#of#this#letter#in#our#files,#together#with#the#full#set#of#application#documents#you#supplied#relating#to#the#project.#
The#MVLS#Ethics#Committee#is#satisfied#that#these#documents#are#in#order#and#comply#fully#with#the#ethical#procedures#of#the#
University#of#Glasgow.#Accordingly,#you#and#your#coPapplicants#at#the#University#of#Glasgow#require#no#further#ethical#clearance#to#
proceed.#This#permission#is#subject#to#the#conditions#detailed#below:# 
4.# Project#end#date:#31#December#2016.# 
5.# The#data#should#be#held#securely#for#a#period#of#ten#years#after#the#completion#of#the#research#project,#or#for#longer#if#specified#
by#the#research#funder#or#sponsor,#in#accordance#with#the#University’s#Code#of#Good#Practice#in#Research:#
(http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_227599_en.pdf)# 
6.# The#research#should#be#carried#out#only#on#the#sites,#and/or#with#the#groups#defined#in#the#application.# 
7.# Any#proposed#changes#in#the#protocol#should#be#submitted#for#reassessment,#except#when#it#is#necessary#to#change#the#protocol#
to#eliminate#hazard#to#the#subjects#or#where#the#change#involves#only#the#administrative#aspects#of#the#project.#The#Ethics#
Committee#should#be#informed#of#any#such#changes.# 
 
Yours#sincerely# 
Professor#William#Martin#College#Ethics#Officer# 
Approval#Morrison.docx# 
 
Professor#William#MartinProfessor#of#Cardiovascular#Pharmacology# 
R507B#Level#5School#of#Life#SciencesWest#Medical#BuildingGlasgow#G12#8QQ#Tel:#0141#330#4489#EPmail:#
William.Martin@glasgow.ac.uk# 
 
Appendices                                                                                                                                              421 
 
 Appendix 8: Ministry of Health Ethical approval and support letter 
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Appendix 8: MOH support letter (continued)  
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Appendix 8 (continued): MOH support letter  
State of KuwaitMinistry of HealthAsst. Undersecretary for Assistance Medical Services Affairs Date: 
13/1/2015No: 34627  
Dear Mr. Undersecretary of the Ministry of Health,  
Subject: To Facilitate The Task Of The Researcher Dr. Gheed Al Salem To Conduct Her Research Study 
Under The Title Of “Assessment Of Patient Safety Culture In Kuwaiti Public Hospitals”.  
Kindly be informed that in accordance with the recommendation of the Standing Committee for the Coordination 
of medical and healthcare research that was formed under Ministerial Decree no. 207 for the year 2012 in its 
meeting held on Tuesday 25/6/2013 to decide on the mechanism of research study applications that do not 
involve any clinical trials, use of drugs, performing clinical tests or taking any samples from participants and 
based on studying the request submitted by the researcher Dr. Gheed Al Salem for her research protocol under 
the title of “Assessment of Patient Safety Culture in Kuwaiti Public Hospitals” which will involve conducting 
interviews and the use of a questionnaire to collect information from all Healthcare Professionals including 
Hospital Directors, Heads of Departments and Units, Doctors, Nursing staff, Pharmacists, Nutritionist , 
Technicians and other healthcare staff in Hospitals and Medical Centers of the Ministry of Health in Kuwait.  
We hereby recommend the approval for the above researcher to perform her research through conducting 
interviews and the use of a questionnaire with the researcher’s commitment to preserve the rights, privacy and 
confidentiality of all the participants in the study in addition to securing the Informed Consent from the 
participants using the approved form.  
Kindly consider and approach accordingly all Healthcare Institutions (Messers/Healthcare Areas Directors, 
Hospitals Directors, Director of Accreditation and Quality) involved in this regard to work to facilitate the task 
of the researcher to conduct her study in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Ministry of Health.  
Sincerely Yours,  
Dr. Jamal Mansour AL HarbiAssistant Undersecretary for Assistance Medical Services AffairsHead of the 
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Standing Committee for the Coordination of Medical and Healthcare Research.  
Dr. Khaled Al-Sahlawy Undersecretary of Ministry of Health  
Incoming MailAsst. Undersecretary for Assistance  
Medical Services Affairs No: 34624Date: 14/1/2015  
Ministry of Health Director of Accreditation and Quality  
No: 39Date: 20/1/2015  
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Appendix 8 (continued): MOH support lette
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Appendix 9: Participant Information Sheet 
 
Study title  
Assessment of Patient Safety Culture in Kuwaiti Public Hospitals 
Researcher Details 
Dr Gheed Alsalem 
Invitation to participate 
You are being invited to take part in this PhD research project. Before you decide to participate it is important 
for you to understand why this research is being done and what it will involve. Please read the following 
information, which explains the purpose of this research and what participation will involve and you may discuss 
this with others if you wish. If you would like further information or you have questions, please contact the 
researcher. You will be given a period of 5-7 days to decide whether or not you wish to participate.  
Thank you for reading this information. If you decide to participate, you will be given a copy of this information 
sheet and your signed consent form.  
What is the purpose of the study? 
Since no measurements of Safety Culture have been conducted at public hospitals in the state of Kuwait, nor 
were valid or reliable instruments available, the purpose of this research is to identify an optimal measure for 
assessing patient safety culture for use in public hospitals in Kuwait. The method that will be used to collect the 
required information will include a questionnaire related to the development of the patient safety culture 
assessment tool. It is expected that data collection will be undertaken over a period of six months.  
Why have I been chosen? 
The participants in this study are frontline healthcare staff who are directly involved in patient care. Therefore, 
you have been chosen because you are one of the healthcare staff whose work affects patient care in the hospital. 
You would be one of a total of 500 healthcare staff helping with this part of the study.  
Do I have to take part? 
No, it is up to you to decide whether or not you want to take part. If you decide to take part you will be given this 
information sheet to keep and you will be asked to sign a consent form. Even after deciding to take part in this 
research, you are still free to withdraw from the research at any point in time and without giving a reason.  
What will happen to me if I take part? 
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If you decide to participate then the researcher will ask you to sign a consent form and afterwards you will fill in 
the questionnaire (Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Questionnaire). There is no potential for physical 
and/or psychological harm / distress to participants during the research.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
This study seeks to contribute to the knowledge base by investigating the suitability of an appropriate patient 
safety culture measure for use in public hospitals in Kuwait. It is hoped that the knowledge generated will 
contribute to the literature on the measurement of the patient safety culture, in particular in Kuwait. There are no 
direct benefits to you.  
What will happen to the results of the research study?  
The results will be published in the PhD thesis. No named information about you will be mentioned in the thesis.  
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
The researcher will securely store all of the data that will be collected. The computer used for analysing the data 
will be password protected. Questionnaires will be stored in a locked filing cabinet in an office that is locked. 
Your anonymity and confidentiality will be preserved at all times. Access to the research data is limited to the 
research teams, which include the supervisors of this research and the researcher (Professor Jillian Morrison, Dr. 
Paul Bowie, Dr. Gheed Alsalem).  
Who is organising and funding the research?  
The research is part of the PhD studies and no organisation is involved in funding.  
Who has reviewed the study? 
The research has been scientifically reviewed by the University of Glasgow, College Of Medical, Veterinary and 
Life Sciences in the United Kingdom. In addition, it has been reviewed by the Medical and Health Sciences 
Research Committee at Ministry Of Health, Kuwait.  
 
Contact for Further Information  
1.! Professor Jill Morrison 
Dean for Learning and Teaching 
College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences 
University of Glasgow 
Tel: +44(0)141 330 8348 
PA: +44 (0)141 330 8330 
Fax: +44 (0)141 330 8331 
Email: jill.morrison@glasgow.ac.uk  
General Practice and Primary Care, 
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Institute of Health and Wellbeing, 
University of Glasgow, 
1,Horselethill Road, 
Glasgow, 
G12 9LX 
2.! Dr. Paul Bowie 
Programme Director 
(Safety & Improvement) 
Postgraduate GP Education 
NHS Education for Scotland 
2 Central Quay 
GLASGOW 
Scotland, UK 
G3 8BW 
Telephone: 0141 223 1463 
                    Email: Paul.Bowie@nes.scot.nhs.uk 
 
3.! Dr Gheed Fouad Alsalem 
PhD student in 
TeI: [in Kuwait+96599885566] [in the UK+44424164627]  
Email: g.alsalem.1@research.gla.ac.uk 
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Appendix 10: Original HSOPSC 
Hospital)Survey)on)Patient)
Safety!
Instructions*
This*survey*asks*for*your*opinions*about*patient*safety*issues,*medical*error,*and*event*
reporting*in*your*hospital*and*will*take*about*10*to*15*minutes*to*complete***
If*you*do*not*wish*to*answer*a*question,*or*if*a*question*does*not*apply*to*you,*you*may*
leave*your*answer*blank.!
!
•! An#“event”'is#defined#as#any#type#of#error,#mistake,#incident,#accident,#or#
deviation,#regardless#of#whether#or#not#it#results#in#patient#harm.#
•! “Patient'safety”#is#defined#as#the#avoidance#and#prevention#of#patient#
injuries#or#adverse#events#resulting#from#the#processes#of#health#care#
delivery.#
*
SECTION*A:*Your*Work*Area/Unit*
In*this*survey,*think*of*your*“unit”*as*the*work*area,*department,*or*clinical*area*of*the*
hospital*where*you*spend*most*of*your*work*time*or*provide*most'of*your*clinical*services.***
*
What*is*your*primary*work*area*or*unit*in*this*hospital?*Select*ONE*answer.*
! a. Many different hospital units/No 
specific unit 
! b. Medicine (non-
surgical) 
! h. Psychiatry/mental 
health 
! n. Other, please specify: 
! c. Surgery  ! i. Rehabilitation  
! d. Obstetrics ! j. Pharmacy   
! e. Pediatrics ! k. Laboratory  
! f. Emergency 
department 
! l. Radiology   
! g. Intensive care unit 
(any type) 
! m. Anesthesiology    
!
Please*indicate*your*agreement*or*disagreement*with*the*following*statements*about*your*
work*area/unit.**
Think*about*your*hospital*work*
area/unit…*
Strongly*
Disagree*
!*
Disagree*
!*
Neither*
!*
Agree*
!*
Strongly*
Agree*
!*
!!1.!People!support!one!another!in!this!unit! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!2.!We!have!enough!staff!to!handle!the!
workload!...............................................! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
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!!3.!When!a!lot!of!work!needs!to!be!done!
quickly,!we!work!together!as!a!team!to!
get!the!work!done!.................................!
"1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!4.!In!this!unit,!people!treat!each!other!
with!respect!..........................................! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!5.!Staff!in!this!unit!work!longer!hours!
than!is!best!for!patient!care!..................! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
SECTION A: Your Work Area/Unit (continued) 
Think*about*your*hospital*work*area/unit…*
Strongly*
Disagree*
!*
*Disagree*
!*
Neither*
!*
Agree*
!*
Strongly*
Agree*
!*
!!6.!We!are!actively!doing!things!to!improve!
patient!safety!....................................................!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!7.!We!use!more!agency/temporary!staff!than!is!
best!for!patient!care!............................................! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!8.!Staff!feel!like!their!mistakes!are!held!against!
them!.................................................................!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!9.!Mistakes!have!led!to!positive!changes!here!.....!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
10.!It!is!just!by!chance!that!more!serious!mistakes!
don’t!happen!around!here!................................!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
11.!When!one!area!in!this!unit!gets!really!busy,!
others!help!out!..................................................!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
12.!When!an!event!is!reported,!it!feels!like!the!
person!is!being!written!up,!not!the!problem!.....!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
13.!After!we!make!changes!to!improve!patient!
safety,!we!evaluate!their!effectiveness!............!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
14.!We!work!in!"crisis!mode"!trying!to!do!too!
much,!too!quickly!..............................................!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
15.!Patient!safety!is!never!sacrificed!to!get!more!
work!done!.........................................................!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
16.!Staff!worry!that!mistakes!they!make!are!kept!
in!their!personnel!file!.......................................! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
17.!We!have!patient!safety!problems!in!this!unit!....!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
18.!Our!procedures!and!systems!are!good!at!
preventing!errors!from!happening!....................!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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SECTION*B:*Your*Supervisor/Manager*
Please*indicate*your*agreement*or*disagreement*with*the*following*statements*about*your*
immediate*supervisor/manager*or*person*to*whom*you*directly*report.**
!
Strongly*
Disagree*
!*
Disagree*
!*
Neither*
!*
Agree*
!*
Strongly*
Agree*
!*
!!1.!My!supervisor/manager!says!a!good!
word!when!he/she!sees!a!job!done!
according!to!established!patient!safety!
procedures!............................................!!
"1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!2.!My!supervisor/manager!seriously!
considers!staff!suggestions!for!
improving!patient!safety!........................!!
"1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!3.!Whenever!pressure!builds!up,!my!
supervisor/manager!wants!us!to!work!
faster,!even!if!it!means!taking!shortcuts!!
"1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!4.!My!supervisor/manager!overlooks!
patient!safety!problems!that!happen!
over!and!over!........................................!!
"1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!
SECTION*C:*Communications*
How*often*do*the*following*things*happen*in*your*work*area/unit?*
Think*about*your*hospital*work*area/unit…*
Never*
!*
Rarely*
!*
SomeU
times*
!*
Most*of*
the*time*
!*
Always*
!*
!!1.!We!are!given!feedback!about!changes!
put!into!place!based!on!event!reports!......!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!2.!Staff!will!freely!speak!up!if!they!see!
something!that!may!negatively!affect!
patient!care!...............................................!!
"1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!3.!We!are!informed!about!errors!that!
happen!in!this!unit!....................................!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!4.!Staff!feel!free!to!question!the!decisions!or!
actions!of!those!with!more!authority!.........!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!5.!In!this!unit,!we!discuss!ways!to!prevent!
errors!from!happening!again!....................!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!6.!Staff!are!afraid!to!ask!questions!when!
something!does!not!seem!right!................!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!
SECTION*D:*Frequency*of*Events*Reported*
In*your*hospital*work*area/unit,*when*the*following*mistakes*happen,*how'often'are'they'
reported?**
!
Never*
!*
Rarely*
!*
SomeU
times*
!*
Most*of*
the*time*
!*
Always*
!*
!!1.!When!a!mistake!is!made,!but!is!
caught#and#corrected#before#
affecting#the#patient,!how!often!is!
this!reported?!..................................!!
"1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
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!!2.!When!a!mistake!is!made,!but!has!
no#potential#to#harm#the#patient,!
how!often!is!this!reported?!..............!!
"1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!3.! When!a!mistake!is!made!that!could#
harm#the#patient,!but!does!not,!how!
often!is!this!reported?!......................!!
"1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
*
SECTION*E:*Patient*Safety*Grade*
Please*give*your*work*area/unit*in*this*hospital*an*overall*grade*on*patient*safety.***
"! "! "! "! "!
A*
Excellent!
B*
Very!Good!
C*
Acceptable!
D*
Poor!
E*
Failing!
*
*
SECTION*F:*Your*Hospital*
Please*indicate*your*agreement*or*disagreement*with*the*following*statements*about*your*
hospital.***
Think*about*your*hospital…*
Strongly*
Disagree*
!*
Disagree*
!*
Neither*
!*
Agree*
!*
Strongly*
Agree*
!*
!!1.!Hospital!management!provides!a!work!
climate!that!promotes!patient!safety!........!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!2.!Hospital!units!do!not!coordinate!well!with!
each!other!...............................................!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!3.!Things!“fall!between!the!cracks”!when!
transferring!patients!from!one!unit!to!
another!....................................................!!
"1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!4.!There!is!good!cooperation!among!
hospital!units!that!need!to!work!together!.!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
SECTION*F:*Your*Hospital*(continued)! * * * * *
Think*about*your*hospital…*
Strongly*
Disagree*
!*
Disagree*
!*
Neither*
!*
Agree*
!*
Strongly*
Agree*
!*
!!5.!Important!patient!care!information!is!
often!lost!during!shift!changes!.................!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!6.!It!is!often!unpleasant!to!work!with!staff!
from!other!hospital!units!..........................!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!7.!Problems!often!occur!in!the!exchange!of!
information!across!hospital!units!.............!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!8.!The!actions!of!hospital!management!
show!that!patient!safety!is!a!top!priority!..!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!!9.!Hospital!management!seems!interested!
in!patient!safety!only!after!an!adverse!
event!happens!.........................................!!
"1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
10.!Hospital!units!work!well!together!to!
provide!the!best!care!for!patients!............!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
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11.!Shift!changes!are!problematic!for!
patients!in!this!hospital!............................!! "1! "2! !3! "4! !5!
!
SECTION*G:*Number*of*Events*Reported*
In*the*past*12*months,*how*many*event*reports*have*you*filled*out*and*submitted?**
"! a.!No!event!reports! "! d.!6!to!10!event!reports!
"! b.!1!to!2!event!reports! "! e.!11!to!20!event!reports!
"! c.!3!to!5!event!reports! "! f.! 21!event!reports!or!more!
!
!
SECTION*H:*Background*Information*
This*information*will*help*in*the*analysis*of*the*survey*results.*
1.* How*long*have*you*worked*in*this*hospital?*
"! a.! Less!than!1!year! "! d.!11!to!15!years!
"! b.! 1!to!5!years! "! e.!16!to!20!years!
"! c.! 6!to!10!years! "! f.! 21!years!or!more!
2.* How*long*have*you*worked*in*your*current*hospital*work*area/unit?*
"! a.! Less!than!1!year! "! d.!11!to!15!years!
"b.!1!to!5!years! "! e.!16!to!20!years!
"! c.! 6!to!10!years! "! f.! 21!years!or!more!
3.* Typically,*how*many*hours*per*week*do*you*work*in*this*hospital?*
"a.!Less!than!20!hours!per!week! "d.!60!to!79!hours!per!week!
"! b.! 20!to!39!hours!per!week! "! e.! 80!to!99!hours!per!week!
"c.!40!to!59!hours!per!week! "! f.! 100!hours!per!week!or!more!!
SECTION*H:*Background*Information*(continued)*
4.* What*is*your*staff*position*in*this*hospital?**Select*ONE*answer*that*best*describes*your*
staff*position.*
"! a.! Registered!Nurse!! "! j.! Respiratory!Therapist!
"! b.! Physician!Assistant/Nurse!Practitioner! "! k.! Physical,!Occupational,!or!Speech!Therapist!
"! c.! LVN/LPN! "! l.! Technician!(e.g.,!EKG,!Lab,!Radiology)!
"! d.! Patient!Care!Asst/Hospital!Aide/Care!Partner! "! m.! Administration/Management!
"! e.! Attending/Staff!Physician! "! n.! Other,!please!specify:!!!!!
"! f.! Resident!Physician/Physician!in!Training! !
"! g.! Pharmacist! !
"! h.! Dietician! !
"! i.! Unit!Assistant/Clerk/Secretary! !
5.* In*your*staff*position,*do*you*typically*have*direct*interaction*or*contact*with*patients?**
"!a.! YES,!I!typically!have!direct!interaction!or!contact!with!patients.!
"!b.! NO,!I!typically!do!NOT!have!direct!interaction!or!contact!with!patients.!
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6.* How*long*have*you*worked*in*your*current*specialty*or*profession?*
"a.! Less!than!1!year! "! d.! 11!to!15!years!
"! b.! 1!to!5!years! "! e.! 16!to!20!years!
"! c.! 6!to!10!years! "! f.! 21!years!or!more!
*
*
SECTION*I:*Your*Comments*
Please*feel*free*to*write*any*comments*about*patient*safety,*error,*or*event*reporting*in*
your*hospital.*
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
THANK'YOU'FOR'COMPLETING'THIS'SURVEY.'
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Appendix 11: Pilot survey form 
Hospital)Survey)on)Patient)Safety!
Instructions*
*
SECTION*A*
*
Kindly*provide*your*feedback*regarding*the*clarity*of*the*statements*provided:*
*
•! YES*=*Clear**
*
•! NO*=*Not*Clear!
!
•! For*all*statements*that*are*not*clear,*please*explain*the*reason*in*the*space*
provided*with*alternative*wording*suggestions*if*possible!
!
Think*about*your*hospital*work*area/unit…*
!!1.!People!support!one!another!in!this!unit:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………! ! !
!!2.!We!have!enough!staff!to!handle!the!workload:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………!
!!3.!When!a!lot!of!work!needs!to!be!done!quickly,!we!work!together!as!a!team!to!get!the!work!
done:!
!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain……………………………………………………………………….!
!!4.!In!this!unit,!people!treat!each!other!with!respect:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………!
!!5.!Staff!in!this!unit!work!longer!hours!than!is!best!for!patient!care!
Clear:!!YES!"!!!!!!!!!NO!*"!!!If!No,!Kindly!explain!not!very!clear!might!need!
rewriting…………………………………………………………………………!
6.! We!are!actively!doing!things!to!improve!patient!safety!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain……………………………………………………………………….!
!!7.!We!use!more!agency/temporary!staff!than!is!best!for!patient!care:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………!
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!!8.!Staff!feel!like!their!mistakes!are!held!against!them:!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………!
!!9.!Mistakes!have!led!to!positive!changes!here:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………!
10.!It!is!just!by!chance!that!more!serious!mistakes!don’t!happen!around!here:!!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………!
11.!When!one!area!in!this!unit!gets!really!busy,!others!help!out:!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………!
12.!When!an!event!is!reported,!it!feels!like!the!person!is!being!written!up,!not!the!problem!:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………!
13.!After!we!make!changes!to!improve!patient!safety,!we!evaluate!their!effectiveness:! !
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………!
14.!We!work!in!"crisis!mode"!trying!to!do!too!much,!too!quickly:!
Clear:!!YES!"!!!!!!!!!NO!*"!!!If!No,!Kindly!explain…the!term!crisis!mode!is!
confusing……………………………………………………………………!
15.!Patient!safety!is!never!sacrificed!to!get!more!work!done:!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………!
16.!Staff!worry!that!mistakes!they!make!are!kept!in!their!personnel!file:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………!
17.!We!have!patient!safety!problems!in!this!unit:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………!
18.!Our!procedures!and!systems!are!good!at!preventing!errors!from!happening:! !
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………!
!
SECTION*B*
*
Kindly*provide*your*feedback*regarding*the*clarity*of*the*statements*provided:*
*
•! YES*=*Clear**
*
•! NO**=*Not*Clear!
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!
•! For*all*statements*that*are*not*clear,*please*explain*the*reason*in*the*space*
provided*with*alternative*wording*suggestions*if*possible!
!
1.!My!supervisor/manager!says!a!good!word!when!he/she!sees!a!job!done!according!to!
established!patient!safety!procedures:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain……………………………………………………………………!
2.!My!supervisor/manager!seriously!considers!staff!suggestions!for!improving!patient!safety:
!.................................................................................................................!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain……………………………………………………………………!
3.!Whenever!pressure!builds!up,!my!supervisor/manager!wants!us!to!work!faster,!even!if!it!
means!taking!shortcuts:!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………!
4.!My!supervisor/manager!overlooks!patient!safety!problems!that!happen!over!and!over:!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain……………………………………………………………………!
*
SECTION*C*
*
Kindly*provide*your*feedback*regarding*the*clarity*of*the*statements*provided:*
*
•! YES*=*Clear**
*
•! NO**=*Not*Clear!
!
•! For*all*statements*that*are*not*clear,*please*explain*the*reason*in*the*space*
provided*with*alternative*wording*suggestions*if*possible!
*
Think*about*your*hospital*work*area/unit…*
1.!We!are!given!feedback!about!changes!put!into!place!based!on!event!reports:!
!Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain…………………………………………………………………………!
2.!Staff!will!freely!speak!up!if!they!see!something!that!may!negatively!affect!patient!care:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain…………………………………………………………………!
3.!We!are!informed!about!errors!that!happen!in!this!unit:!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain…………………………………………………………………!
4.!Staff!feel!free!to!question!the!decisions!or!actions!of!those!with!more!authority:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!explain………………………!
5.!In!this!unit,!we!discuss!ways!to!prevent!errors!from!happening!again:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain…………………………………………………………………!
6.!Staff!are!afraid!to!ask!questions!when!something!does!not!seem!right:!
!
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Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………..!
SECTION*D*
Kindly*provide*your*feedback*regarding*the*clarity*of*the*statements*provided:*
*
•! YES*=*Clear**
*
•! NO*=*Not*Clear!
!
•! For*all*statements*that*are*not*clear,*please*explain*the*reason*in*the*space*
provided*with*alternative*wording*suggestions*if*possible!
!
1.!When!a!mistake!is!made,!but!is!caught#and#corrected#before#affecting#the#patient,!how!often!is!this!
reported?!
Clear:!!YES*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!kindly!explain…………………………………………………………………!
2.!When!a!mistake!is!made,!but!has!no#potential#to#harm#the#patient,!how!often!is!this!reported?!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!kindly!explain…………………………………………………………………!
3.!When!a!mistake!is!made!that!could#harm#the#patient,!but!does!not,!how!often!is!this!reported?!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!kindly!explain…………………………………………………………………!
*
SECTION*E*
*
Kindly*provide*your*feedback*regarding*the*clarity*of*the*statements*provided:*
*
•! YES*=*Clear**
*
•! NO*=*Not*Clear!
!
•! For*all*statements*that*are*not*clear,*please*explain*the*reason*in*the*space*
provided*with*alternative*wording*suggestions*if*possible!
!
Please*give*your*work*area/unit*in*this*hospital*an*overall*grade*on*patient*safety.***
"! "! "! "! "!
A*
Excellent!
B*
Very!Good!
C*
Acceptable!
D*
Poor!
E*
Failing!
!
!
Clear:!!YES!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!explain……………………………!
!
SECTION*F*
*
Kindly*provide*your*feedback*regarding*the*clarity*of*the*statements*provided:*
*
•! YES*=*Clear**
*
•! NO**=*Not*Clear!
!
•! For*all*statements*that*are*not*clear,*please*explain*the*reason*in*the*space*
provided*with*alternative*wording*suggestions*if*possible!
!
*
Think*about*your*hospital…*
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1.!Hospital!management!provides!a!work!climate!that!promotes!patient!safety:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………...!
2.!Hospital!units!do!not!coordinate!well!with!each!other!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain……………………………………………………………….!
3.!Things!“fall!between!the!cracks”!when!transferring!patients!from!one!unit!to!another:!
Clear:!!YES!"!!!!!!!!!*NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!explain…not!a!common!term!might!not!be!
understood…………………………………………………………….!
4.!There!is!good!cooperation!among!hospital!units!that!need!to!work!together:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain……………………………………………………………….!
5.!Important!patient!care!information!is!often!lost!during!shift!changes:!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain……………………………………………………………….! * * * * *
6.!It!is!often!unpleasant!to!work!with!staff!from!other!hospital!units:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………...*
7.!Problems!often!occur!in!the!exchange!of!information!across!hospital!units:! !
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………!
8.!The!actions!of!hospital!management!show!that!patient!safety!is!a!top!priority:!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………!
9.!Hospital!management!seems!interested!in!patient!safety!only!after!an!adverse!event!
happens:!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………!
10.!Hospital!units!work!well!together!to!provide!the!best!care!for!patients:!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………!
11.!Shift!changes!are!problematic!for!patients!in!this!hospital:!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………!
!
SECTION*G*
*
Kindly*provide*your*feedback*regarding*the*clarity*of*the*statements*provided:*
*
•! YES*=*Clear**
*
•! NO*=*Not*Clear!
!
•! For*all*statements*that*are*not*clear,*please*explain*the*reason*in*the*space*
provided*with*alternative*wording*suggestions*if*possible!
Appendices                                                                                                                                              440 
 
!
!
1.* In*the*past*12*months,*how*many*event*reports*have*you*filled*out*and*submitted?**
"! a.!No!event!reports! "! d.!6!to!10!event!reports!
"! b.!1!to!2!event!reports! "! e.!11!to!20!event!reports!
"! c.!3!to!5!event!reports! "! f.! 21!event!reports!or!more!
!
!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!explain……………………………!
*
SECTION*H*
This*information*will*help*in*the*analysis*of*the*survey*results.*
1.* How*long*have*you*worked*in*this*hospital?*
"! a.! Less!than!1!year! "! d.!11!to!15!years!
"! b.! 1!to!5!years! "! e.!16!to!20!years!
"! c.! 6!to!10!years! "! f.! 21!years!or!more!
!!!
Clear:!!YES!*"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain……………………………………………………………………!
!
*
2.*How*long*have*you*worked*in*your*current*hospital*work*area/unit?*
"! a.! Less!than!1!year! "! d.!11!to!15!years!
"b.!1!to!5!years! "! e.!16!to!20!years!
"! c.! 6!to!10!years! "! f.! 21!years!or!more!!
!
Clear:!!YES*!"!!!!!!!!!NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!
explain………………………………………………………………………!
!
!
3.*Typically,*how*many*hours*per*week*do*you*work*in*this*hospital?*
"a.!Less!than!20!hours!per!week! "d.!60!to!79!hours!per!week!
"! b.! 20!to!39!hours!per!week! "! e.! 80!to!99!hours!per!week!
"c.!40!to!59!hours!per!week! "! f.! 100!hours!per!week!or!more!!
!
!
Clear:!!YES!"!!!!!!!!!*NO!"!!!If!No,!Kindly!explain…we!don!not!count!the!work!by!hours,!might!
be!confusing……………………………………………………………………!
!
!
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!
4.*Could*you*kindly*state*the*time*it*took*you*to*complete*the*survey…….minutes.*
'
'
THANK'YOU'FOR'COMPLETING'THIS'SURVEY.
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'
Appendix 12: Details of the modified version of the HSOPSC questionnaire 
HSOPSC modified item 
number and associated 
dimension 
Item 
Staffing  
A5 Staff in this unit work long hours, which negatively affects patient care 
A7 We use more agency staff (staff hired through private contracts) than is 
best for patient care 
A14 We work in “crisis mode” (we work under high pressure), trying to do 
too much, too quickly 
Non-punitive Response to Errors  
A8 Staff feel like their mistakes are held (used) against them 
A12* When an incident is reported, it feels like the person is being reported, 
not the problem 
Overall Perceptions of Patient Safety  
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A10 It is just by chance (by luck) that more serious mistakes don’t happen 
around here 
A15 Patient safety is never sacrificed (given up) to get more work done 
A18 Our policies, procedures and systems are good at preventing (stopping) 
errors from happening 
Supervisors’/Managers’  expectations and actions promoting safety  
B3* Whenever we have more work pressure, my supervisor/manager wants 
us to work faster, even if it means taking shortcuts (a shorter way of 
doing something) 
B4* My supervisor/manager ignores patient safety problems that happen over 
and over 
Feedback & Communication About Error  
C1* We are given feedback about changes made based on incident reports 
Communication Openness  
C4 Staff feel free to question (ask for more details) the decisions or actions 
taken by those with more authority 
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Management Support for Patient Safety  
D1 Hospital management provides a work climate (atmosphere) that 
encourages patient safety 
Handoffs & Transitions  
D3* Things get lost or forgotten (for e.g., medical notes/records, treatment) 
when transferring patients from one unit to another 
D11* Shift changes cause problems for patients in this hospital 
Frequency of error reporting  
E1 When a mistake is made, but is caught (discovered) and corrected 
before affecting the patient, how often is this reported? 
E2 When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient (no 
possible harm), how often is this reported? 
Underlined items were only adjusted through adding an explanation of certain terms in between brackets while * items were re-
worded 
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Appendix 13: Modified HSOPSC 
 
HOSPITAL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY 
CULTURE 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This survey asks for your opinions about patient safety issues, medical error, and incident 
reporting in your hospital and will take about 5 to 10 minutes to complete.  
 
If you do not wish to answer a question, or if a question does not apply to you, you may 
leave your answer blank. 
 
•! An “event” is defined as any type of error, mistake, incident, accident, or deviation, 
regardless of whether or not it results in patient harm. 
 
•! “Patient safety” is defined as the avoidance and prevention of patient injuries or 
adverse events resulting from the processes of health care delivery. 
 
SECTION A: Your Work Area/Unit 
In this survey, think of your “unit” as the work area, department, or clinical area of the hospital where you 
spend most of your work time or provide most of your clinical services.   
 
What is your primary work area or unit in this hospital? Select ONE answer by filling in the box #. 
 
! a. Many different hospital units/No specific unit 
! b. Medicine  ! h. Psychiatry/Mental Health !   n. Infection Control 
! 
c. Surgery  
! i. Physical Therapy & 
Rehabilitation 
! o. Quality & Accreditation 
! d. Obstetrics & Gynaecology ! j. Pharmacy !  p. Administration 
! e. Paediatrics ! k. Laboratory ! q. Other, please specify: 
! f. Emergency Department ! l. Radiology/Nuclear Medicine  
! g. Intensive Care Unit & 
Anaesthesiology  
! 
m. Dietary 
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SECTION A: Your Work Area/Unit (continued) 
 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your work area/unit. 
Select ONE answer by filling in the box #. 
 
Think about your hospital work 
area/unit… 
Strongly 
 Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neither 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1. People support one another in this unit
  
      
2. We have enough staff to handle the 
workload 
      
3. When a lot of work needs to be done 
quickly, we work together as a team to 
get the work done  
      
4. In this unit, people treat each other 
with respect  
      
5. Staff in this unit work long hours, 
which negatively affects patient care 
      
6. We are actively doing things to 
improve patient safety  
      
7. We use more agency staff (staff hired 
through private contracts) than we 
need, which negatively affects patient 
care 
     
8. Staff feel like their mistakes are held 
(used) against them  
      
9. Mistakes have led to positive changes 
here  
      
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10. It is just by chance (by luck) that 
more serious mistakes don’t happen 
around here  
      
11. When one area in this unit gets really 
busy, others help out  
      
12. When an incident is reported, it feels like 
the person is being reported, not the 
problem  
      
SECTION A: Your Work Area/Unit (continued) 
 
Think about your hospital 
work area/unit… 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neither 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
13. After we make changes to 
improve patient safety, we 
evaluate their effectiveness 
      
14. We work in “crisis mode” (we 
work under high pressure), trying 
to do too much, too quickly 
      
15. Patient safety is never sacrificed 
(given up) to get more work done 
      
16. Staff worry that mistakes they 
make are kept in their personnel 
file 
      
17. We have patient safety problems 
in this unit 
      
18. Our policies, procedures and 
systems are good at preventing 
(stopping) errors from happening 
      
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SECTION B: Your Supervisor/Manager 
 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your immediate 
supervisor/manager or person to whom you directly report. Select ONE answer by filling in the box #. 
 
Think about your hospital 
work area/unit… 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neither 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
  1. My supervisor/manager says a 
good word when he/she sees a job 
done according to established 
patient safety procedures 
      
  2. My supervisor/manager seriously 
considers staff suggestions for 
improving patient safety 
      
  3. Whenever we have more work 
pressure, my supervisor/manager 
wants us to work faster, even if it 
means taking shortcuts (a shorter 
way of doing something) 

 

  

 

 

 
 
4. My supervisor/manager ignores 
patient safety problems that 
happen over and over 

 

  

 

 

 
 
 
 
SECTION C: Communications  
 
How often do the following things happen in your work area/unit? Select ONE answer by filling in the box 
#. 
 
Think about your hospital 
work area/unit… Never 
 
Rarely 
 
Some-times 
 
Most of the 
time 
 
Always 
 
  1.We are given feedback about 
changes made based on incident 
reports 
      
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  2. Staff will freely speak up if they 
see something that may negatively 
affect patient care 
      
  3. We are informed about errors that 
happen in this unit 
      
  4. Staff feel free to question (ask for 
more details) the decisions or 
actions taken by those with more 
authority 
      
  5. In this unit, we discuss ways to 
prevent errors from happening 
again 
      
  6. Staff are afraid to ask questions 
when something does not look 
right 
      
 
SECTION D: Your Hospital 
 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements about your hospital.  Select 
ONE answer by filling in the box #. 
 
Think about your hospital Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neither 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
  1. Hospital management provides a 
work climate (atmosphere) that 
encourages patient safety 
      
  2. Hospital units do not coordinate 
well with each other 
      
  3.Things get lost or forgotten (for 
e.g., medical notes/records, 
treatment) when transferring 
patients from one unit to another 
      
  4. There is good cooperation among 
hospital units that need to work 
together 
      
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Think about your hospital Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neither 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
  5. Important patient care information 
is often lost during shift changes 
      
  6. It is often unpleasant to work with 
staff from other hospital units 
      
 
SECTION D: Your Hospital (continued) 
 
Think about your hospital  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neither 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
  7. Problems often occur in the 
exchange of information across 
hospital units 
      
  8. The actions of hospital 
management show that patient 
safety is a top priority 
      
  9. Hospital management seems 
interested in patient safety only 
after an adverse event happens 
      
10. Hospital units work well together 
to provide the best care for 
patients 
      
11. Shift changes cause problems for 
patients in this hospital 
      
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SECTION E: Frequency of Events Reported 
 
In your hospital work area/unit, when the following mistakes happen, how often are they reported? Select 
ONE answer by filling in the box #. 
 
 Never 
 
Rarely 
 
Some-times 
 
Most of the 
time 
 
Always 
 
  1. When a mistake is made, but is 
caught (discovered) and corrected 
before affecting the patient, how 
often is this reported? 
      
  2. When a mistake is made, but has 
no potential to harm the patient 
(no possible harm), how often is 
this reported? 
      
 3. When a mistake is made that 
could harm the patient, but does 
not, how often is this reported? 
      
 
SECTION F: Number of Events Reported 
 
In the past 12 months, how many incident reports have you filled out and submitted? Select ONE answer 
by filling in the box #. 
 
" a. No incident reports " d. 6 to 10 incident reports 
" b. 1 to 2 incident reports " e. 11 to 20 incident reports 
" c. 3 to 5 incident reports " f. 21 incident reports or more 
SECTION G: Patient Safety Grade 
 
Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an overall grade on patient safety.  Select ONE answer by 
filling in the box #. 
" " " " " 
A 
Excellent 
B 
Very Good 
C 
Acceptable 
D 
Poor 
E 
Failing 
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SECTION H: Background Information 
This information will help in the analysis of the survey results. Select ONE answer by filling in the box #. 
 
1.* How long have you worked in this hospital? 
 
" a. Less than 1 year " d. 11 to 15 years 
" b. 1 to 5 years " e. 16 to 20 years 
" c. 6 to 10 years " f. 21 years or more 
 
2.* How long have you worked in your current work area/unit? 
 
" a. Less than 1 year " d. 11 to 15 years 
"    b. 1 to 5 years " e. 16 to 20 years 
" c. 6 to 10 years " f. 21 years or more 
 
3.* Typically, how many hours per week do you work in this hospital? 
 
" a. Less than 20 hours per week "  d. 60 to 79 hours per week 
" b. 20 to 39 hours per week "  e. 80 to 99 hours per week 
" c. 40 to 59 hours per week "  f. 100 hours per week or more 
 
1.* What is your current position in this hospital?  Select ONE answer that best describes your staff 
position. 
 
" a. Assistant Nurse " i. Respiratory Therapist 
" b. Nurse  " j. Physical, Occupational, or Speech Therapist 
" c. Head nurse/Nurse manager  " k. Technician (e.g. EKG, Lab, Radiology) 
" d. Unit Assistant/Clerk/Secretary " l. Administration/Management 
" e. Attending/Staff Physician ghﻘﻣ!khﺑm " m. Other, please specify:  
" f.   Resident Physician/Physician in 
Training /nﺎhﺗﻣq!khﺑmkmﻟq!ﺔhﻠﻛﺑ!kﻟﺎm   
" g. Pharmacist  
"   h.  Dietician  
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5.   What is your gender? 
" a. Male                      
" b. Female 
6.   What is your nationality? 
" a. Kuwaiti                      
" b. Non-Kuwaiti, please specify:………….. 
7.   What is your age group? 
 a.!15-24 
 b.!25-34 
 c.!35-44 
 d.!45-54 
 e.!55-64 
 f.! 65 or above 
 
SECTION H: Background Information (continued) 
 
8.   What is your highest educational qualification? 
" a. PhD Doctorate/Board Certified/Fellowship  
" b. Master’s degree  
" c. Bachelor degree 
" d. Diploma 
" e. Other, please specify: …………………    
 
 
 
 
9.  In your current position, do you typically have direct interaction or contact with patients?  
 
" a. YES, I typically have direct interaction or contact with patients. 
" b. NO, I typically do NOT have direct interaction or contact with patients. 
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10.  How long have you worked in your current specialty or profession? 
 
" a.    Less than 1 year " d. 11 to 15 years 
" b. 1 to 5 years " e. 16 to 20 years 
" c. 6 to 10 years " f. 21 years or more 
 
11. Is your unit involved in the National Patient Safety Programme?   
 
" a. YES                 " b. NO               " c. I don’t know  
 
If YES, please answer the following question below 
 
b. The National Patient Safety Programme is improving Patient Safety in my unit. 
 
 "1. Strongly Disagree    " 2. Disagree     "3. Neither      "4. Agree        "5. Strongly Agree  
 
SECTION I: Your Comments 
 
Please feel free to write any comments about patient safety, error, or incident reporting in your hospital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS SURVEY
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Appendix 14: HSOPSC patient safety culture dimensions and definitions* 
 
*The table has been adopted from (Sorra et al., 2016) 
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Appendix 15: EFA Steps 
The following section is concerned with a step by step approach for EFA and its output.  
Step 1: EFA on all 42 items of HSOPSC 
The EFA strategy was based on running an initial EFA on the 42 items of the original 
12 HSOPSC factor structure. As mentioned earlier, the initial solution for all items was 
constructed using the calibration sample of the Kuwaiti dataset (Sample A, n=640). 
Principle Axis Factoring (PAF) was chosen as the extraction method and Varimax was 
chosen as the rotation method. In addition, a combination of Kaiser’s criterion with 
Eigenvalues greater than one (Eigenvalues > 1) and the Scree plot were used to assess 
the number of factors to be extracted. This resulted in a number of solutions with each 
solution being examined through extracting a number of factors and changing the 
rotations to allow interpretation of the factors.  
The number of factors to be retained depends on both underlying theory and 
quantitative results. Hinkin (1998) adds that the number of factors to be retained should 
be based on a strong theoretical reasoning, and the examination of item loadings on 
latent factors. 
Finally, the interpretation of the solution and the guidelines used must be left to the 
judgement of the researcher, rather than any fast statistical rules (Ferguson and Cox, 
1993, Pallant, 2007). 
Multiple factor analyses were run along with manually setting the number of factors to 
retain: first on the proposed number based on the a priori factor structure; then on the 
number of factors suggested by the Scree plot, if it is different from the proposed 
number; and then at numbers above and below those numbers (Osborne and Costello, 
2009).  
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Initial solution output (12 Factors model) 
As mentioned earlier, to reach a satisfactory solution a number of points need to be 
taken into consideration including identifying items with low communalities, no or low 
loading, items with cross loadings and the theoretical structure of items.  
Factor analysis is based on correlation between variables. Considering this, the table of 
communalities including initial and extracted values, total variance explained and 
rotated factors were examined. In the initial solution, the number of factors is equal to 
the number of the variables. The communalities of the initial solution are reported in 
Appendix 16. 
Examining the communality statistics helps to determine the proportion of variance in 
the variable explained by each of the items, Thus, it is recommended to retain the items 
with higher communalities (De Vellis and Dancer, 1991).  
Low communalities indicate the variables are little related to each other. However, 
interpretation of communalities must be in relation to the interpretability of the factors. 
Osborne and Costello (2009) suggest that variables with a communality below 0.40 
may either be not related to the other items, or suggest an additional factor that should 
be explored. Often variables with low communalities (less than 0.20) are eliminated 
from the analysis (Yong and Pearce, 2013). In my PhD thesis, a value of 0.30 was 
chosen as a low level of communality. It means that less than 30% of the total variance 
of the variable is explained by the total solution. In Appendix 16, the extraction column 
shows the proportion of variance of each variable explained by the initial solution. 
Items A5, A7, A9, A10, A11, A15 and A17 have extracted values of communalities 
less than 0.30. These items are candidates for removal. The total variance, which can be 
explained by the initial solution, is displayed in Appendix 17. Appendix 17 shows three 
broad columns. The first column outlines the initial Eigenvalues and the percentage and 
cumulative percentages of variance accounted for all possible extracted factors. The 
next three columns indicate how many factors have been extracted as determined by 
Kaiser's criterion of Eigenvalues > 1. The final three columns represent the percentages 
of variance explained by each factor after rotation. According to the last column of 
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Appendix 17, the total variance explained by this initial solution shows that 12 factors 
account for around 45% of total variance. This number of factors was determined by 
Kaiser's criterion of Eigenvalues >1.  
The rotated factor matrix of the initial solution is represented in Appendix 18. It shows 
the rotated factor matrix which shows the loadings of the initial solution (12 factors) 
with several items loading on each factor. Item loadings of less than 0.3 were dropped 
according to the recommendation made by Kline (2014). As shown in Appendix 18, 
items A5, A11, A15, and A17 did not load upon any of the 12 factors. Cross loading 
items are D11, D8, D1, C3, C1, B3, A14, A13, A6, and A4. D11 cross loaded on three 
factors: Factor 3, Factor 8, and Factor 12. Nine items cross loaded on two factors. A4 
cross loaded on Factor 4 and Factor 7. Item A6 cross loaded on Factor 4 and Factor 8. 
A13 cross loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 9. Item A14 cross loaded on Factor 6 and 
Factor 10. Item B3 cross loaded on Factor 3 and Factor 8. Item C1 cross loaded on 
Factor 5 and Factor 9. Item C3 cross loaded on Factor 9 and Factor 12. Item D1 cross 
loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 11. Item D8 cross loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 11. The 
summary of 12 Factors solution is represented in Appendix 15; Table 1.  
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Appendix 15; Table 1: Initial solution (12 Factors), structure and loading 
 
Number of 
Factor 
Items Items loading (<0.4) Strongly loading 
items (>0.4) 
1 A13- D1-D2-D4- D8-D10 A13-D8 D1-D2-D4-D10 
2 E1-E2-E3  E1-E2-E3 
3 B3 - D3-D5-D6-D7-D-9-D11 B3-D9-D11 D3-D5-D6-D7 
4 A1-A3-A4-A6 A6 A1-A3-A4 
5 C1-C2-C4-C5-C6 C1-C5 C2-C4-C6 
6 A8-A10-A12-A14-A16 A10 A8-A12-A14-A16 
7 A4- B1-B2 A4 B1-B2 
8 A6-A7-B3-B4-D11 A6-A7-B3-D11 B4 
9 A9- A13-A18-C1-C3 A13-A18-C1-C3 A9 
10 A2-A14  A2-A14 
11 D1-D8 D1 D8 
12 C3-D11 C3-D11  
As shown in Appendix 15; Table 1, the items with loading less 0.4 are as follows: A6, 
A7, A10, A13, A18, B3, C1, C3, C5, D9, and D11. Items A4, D1, and D8 have loading 
< 0.40 on one factor but loading > 0.40 on another factor. Factor 12 has no strongly 
loading item. Factors 8, 9 and 11 have only one item loading strongly. This can indicate 
that a large number of factors were extracted. In summary, the initial solution reported 
in Table 1 clearly shows 8 factors with multiple strongly loading items (>0.40). Factor 
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loadings are considered high if they are greater than 0.60 and moderately high if they 
are above 0.30 and all other loadings should be ignored (Kline, 2014) .  
In general, the initial solution is difficult to interpret for several reasons. Ten items 
have cross loadings. Additionally, one factor did not have any strongly loading item 
and several items had loadings less than 0.40. Five factors have less than three strongly 
loading items (Factors 7,8,9,10,11). Factors which have less than three variables are 
considered as undesirable (Yong and Pearce, 2013). Also, the initial solution accounted 
for around 45% of total variance. 
Since Varimax rotation did not provide a clear initial solution, Oblique rotation was 
used to help in the interpretation of the items in each factor of the initial solution (12 
Factors, 42 items) (Waterson et al., 2010). The pattern matrix is reported in Appendix 
19. 
Step 2: Twelve Factors solution 
At this step, EFA was run with 12 factors, 34 items and Oblique rotation (excluding 
items A5, A10, A11, A13 A15, A17, C1, D9).  
The communalities are presented in Appendix 20. The extraction column of the 
communalities table showed two items (A7 and A9) with poor communalities. The total 
variance which can be explained by the 12 factors is around 49.4% (See Appendix 21). 
As the pattern matrix indicates, item D11 did not load upon any factor (See Appendix 
22). Items A6, A7, A18 and C5 have loadings below 0.40. Therefore, items A7, A9, 
and D11 were excluded from EFA at the next step. 
Step 3: Twelve Factors solution 
At this step, EFA was run again with 12 factors, Oblique rotation and 31 items (A5, 
A10, A11, A13 A15, A17, C1, D9, A7, A9, D11 were excluded). 
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As Appendix 23 indicates, all 31 items have communalities >0.3. Total variance 
explained by 12 Factors is 51.7% of total variance (See Appendix 24). According to 
Appendix 25, all items have loadings within the range of 0.301-0.859. Three items have 
cross loadings on two factors (C2, A4, and A14). Only item D10 has a secondary 
loading (0.301) with a difference of more than 0.20 from the primary loading (0.618). 
There were a number of shifts among the items across factors. Item C2 moved to 
“Feedback and communication about error”, D6 moved to “Handoffs and transitions”, 
A14 moved to “Non-punitive response to error”, A6 moved to “Teamwork within 
units” and A4 moved to “Supervisor and manager expectations and actions promoting 
safety”. All dimensions consisted of one to four safety climate items. The final 
structure of the initial solution is reported in Appendix 26 and it indicates that one 
factor (Factor 12) has only one loading variable. This may indicate that too many 
factors were extracted.  
As mentioned earlier, to allow further estimation of the optimal number of factors to be 
extracted, the use of the  Scree plot is recommended (Cattell, 1966). 
Therefore, the Scree plot of the initial solution was examined for more definition of the 
number of factors which must be extracted (Appendix 15; Figure 1). 
Appendices  462 
 
Appendix 15; Figure 1: Scree plot for initial solution 
 
The scree plot indicates that the break points are at Factor 9 and 8. As recommended by 
Field (2009), only factors to the left of the break point should be retained as they 
contribute the most to the explanation of the variance in the data set (Cattell, 1966).  
The transition in the above plot is gradual with a gentle curve made up of two factors 
(Factor 8 and 9) found between the vertical and horizontal regions of the plot. So, the 
solutions with 9 and 8 factors must be investigated. 
Step 4: Nine Factors solution 
At this step, EFA was conducted with all 42 safety climate items of the HSOPSC and 
an extraction of 9 factors. Varimax was used as the rotation method. 
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As Appendix 27 shows, eight items have poor communalities (items A2, A5, A7, A9, 
A10, A11, A15, A17). The total variance which is explained by the 9 Factors is around 
41% of total variance (See Appendix 28).  
As Appendix 29 shows, the items A5, A7, A9, A15, and A17 loaded upon none of the 9 
factors. Cross loading items are B2, B4, A14, A6, A4, D9, B3, D11, A18, and D2. 
D2 cross loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 2. Item A18 cross loaded on Factor 1 and 
Factor 7. D11 cross loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 2. Item B3 cross loaded on Factor 2 
and Factor 8. Item D9 cross loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 2. Item A4 cross loaded on 
Factor 4 and Factor 7. Item A6 cross loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 4. Item A14 cross 
loaded on Factor 6 and Factor 9. Item B4 cross loaded on Factor 2 and Factor 8. Item 
B2 cross loaded on Factor 4 and Factor 7.  The summary of the 9 Factors solution is 
represented in Appendix 30 and it shows Factor 9 has no strongly loading items and 
Factor 8 has only one strongly loading variable. This may indicate that too many 
factors were extracted in this solution. For further investigation of the issue, the 9 
Factors solution was estimated using the Oblique rotation (Appendix 31 –Appendix 33) 
but Oblique rotation did not change the picture. Two factors are left without any 
strongly loading items (See Appendix 32 and Appendix 33). Therefore, the 9 Factors 
solution provides only seven satisfactory factors with multiple items loading heavily on 
each factor when 42 items are used.  
Step 5: Eight Factors solution 
At this step, EFA was conducted with all 42 safety climate items of the HSOPSC and 
an extraction of 8 factors. Varimax was used as the rotation method. 
 As shown in Appendix 34, nine items have poor communalities (items A2, A5, A7, 
A9, A10, A11, A15, A17, D6). The total variance which is explained by 8 Factors is 
around 39.2% (See Appendix 35).  
Appendix 36 demonstrates that items A15, A5, A9 and A17 loaded upon none of the 
factors. Cross loading items are D2, D9, C5, A6, D11, A14, C4, and B4. 
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Eight items loaded on two factors. D2 cross loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 3. Item D9 
cross loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 3. C5 cross loaded on Factor 2 and Factor 6. Item 
A6 cross loaded on Factor 2 and Factor 7. Item D11 cross loaded on Factor 1 and 
Factor 3. Item A14 cross loaded on Factor 5 and Factor 8. Item C4 cross loaded on 
Factor 2 and Factor 6. B4 cross loaded on Factor 3 and Factor 7. The summary of the 8 
Factors solution is represented in Appendix 37 and it shows Factor 8 has no strongly 
loading item and Factor 7 has only one strongly loading item. For further investigation, 
the 8 Factors solution was estimated using Oblique rotation (Appendix 38) but Oblique 
rotation did not change the picture. One factor (Factor 7, according to Appendix 38) is 
left without any strongly loading items. Therefore, the 8 Factors solution provides only 
six satisfactory factors with multiple items loading strongly on each factor when 42 
items were used. So, the 7 Factors solution was investigated at the next step.  
Step 6: Seven Factors solution 
At this step, EFA was conducted with all 42 safety climate items of the HSOPSC and 
an extraction of 7 factors. Varimax was used as the rotation method. 
As Appendix 39 shows, eleven items have poor communalities (items A2, A5, A7, A9, 
A10, A11, A15, A17, B3, C3, D6). The total variance explained by the 7 factors is 
around 37.4% (See Appendix 40).  
Appendix 41 demonstrates that items A15, A11, A5, A7, A9, and A17 loaded upon 
none of the factors. Cross loading items are C1, A6, B4, D11, A13, A18, and D2. 
Seven items cross loaded on two factors. D2 cross loaded on Factor 2 and Factor 3. 
Item A18 cross loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 2. A13 cross loaded on Factor 1 and 
Factor 2. Item B4 cross loaded on Factor 3 and Factor 6. Item A6 cross loaded on 
Factor 1 and Factor 6. Item C1 cross loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 7. Item D11 cross 
loaded on Factor 2 and Factor 3.  
The summary of 7 Factors solution is represented in Appendix 42 and it shows that 
Factor 7 has no strongly loading item. Factor 6 has only one strongly loading variable. 
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Factor number one included nine items that had loadings >0.4. This factor might be 
divided into two factors meaning that this solution included 7 factors. For more 
examination, the 7 Factors solution was estimated using the Oblique rotation 
(Appendix 43) but Oblique rotation did not change the picture. One factor (Factor 7, 
according to Appendix 43) has only one strongly loading item. Therefore, the 7 Factors 
solution provides only five satisfactory factors with multiple items strongly loading on 
each factor using 42 items.  
Since 12 Factor, 9 Factor, 8 Factor, and 7 Factor solutions were examined, we need 
also to investigate the 11 Factor and 10 Factor solutions because a maximal number of 
appropriate solutions must be investigated in order to identify a common factor 
structure that emerges across the different solutions. 
Step 7: Eleven Factors solution 
At this step, EFA was conducted with all 42 safety climate items of the HSOPSC and 
an extraction of 11 factors. Varimax was used as the rotation method. 
As Appendix 44 indicates, eight items have poor communalities (items A5, A7, A9, 
A10, A11, A15, A17, D6). The total variance which is explained by 8 factors is around 
43.8% (See Appendix 45).  
Appendix 46 demonstrates that items A15, A5, and A17 loaded upon none of the 
factors. Cross loading items are D2, D1, D11, A4, A14, A12, C2, A6, B3, and D8. 
Ten items cross loaded on two factors. D2 cross loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 2. Item 
D1 cross loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 11. D11 cross loaded on Factor 2 and Factor 9. 
Item A4 cross loaded on Factor 4 and Factor 8. Item A14 cross loaded on Factor 5 and 
Factor 10. Item A12 cross loaded on Factor 5 and Factor 6. C2 cross loaded on Factor 6 
and Factor 7. A6 cross loaded on Factor 4 and Factor 9. B3 cross loaded on Factor 2 
and Factor 9. D8 cross loaded on Factor 1 and factor 13. 
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A summary of the 11 Factors solution is represented in Appendix 47 and shows Factor 
9 and Factor 11 have only one strongly loading variable. For further investigation of the 
factor structure, the 11 Factors solution was estimated using the Oblique rotation 
(Appendix 48). But Oblique rotation did not change the picture. Two factors (Factor 10 
and Factor 5, according to Appendix 48) have only one strongly loading item. 
Therefore, the 11 Factors solution provides only nine satisfactory factors with multiple 
heavily loading items on each factor if 42 items are used.  
Step 8: Ten Factors solution 
At this step, EFA was conducted with all 42 safety climate items of the HSOPSC and 
an extraction of 10 factors. Varimax was used as the rotation method. 
 As Appendix 49, eight items have the poor communalities (items A5, A7, A9, A10, 
A11, A15, A17, D6). The total variance which is explained by Eight factors is around 
42.6% of total variance (Appendix 50). 
Appendix 51 demonstrates that items A7, A5, A9 and A17 loaded upon none of the 
factors. Cross loading items are D9, A4, A6, C5, A14, B2, D4, D2, B3, D10 and D11. 
One item (D2) cross loaded on three factors (Factor 1, Factor 2, and Factor 8). D10 
cross loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 8. Item D9 cross loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 12. 
A4 cross loaded on Factor 4 and Factor 7. Item A6 cross loaded on Factor 1 and Factor 
4. C5 cross loaded on Factor 4 and Factor 5. Item A14 cross loaded on Factor 6 and 
Factor 10. Item B2 cross loaded on Factor 4 and Factor 7. D4 cross loaded on Factor 1 
and Factor 8. B3 cross loaded on Factor 2 and Factor 9. The summary of 10 Factors 
solution is represented in Appendix 52 and it indicates that Factor 10 has only one 
strongly loading variable. For further exploration, the 10 Factors solution was estimated 
using the Oblique rotation (Appendix 53). But Oblique rotation did not change the 
picture. One factor (Factor 7, according to Appendix 53) has only one strongly loading 
items. Therefore, the 10 Factors solution provides only nine satisfactory factors with 
multiple heavily loading items if 42 items are used. 
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Appendix 16: The communalities of the initial solution (42 items, n=640) 
HSOPSC Items and corresponding dimensions 
Initial 
values 
Extracted 
values 
(A1) People support one another in this unit (TWWU) .368 .452 
(A2) We have enough staff to handle the workload (S) .303 .465 
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team 
to get the work done (TWWU) .408 .595 
(A4) In this unit, people treat each other with respect (TWWU) .438 .550 
(A5) Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care 
(negatively worded) (S) .154 .140 
(A6) We are actively doing things to improve patient safety (OL) .334 .410 
(A7) We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care. 
(negatively worded) (S) .205 .253 
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are held (used) against them. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) .307 .378 
(A9) Mistakes have led to positive changes here (OL) .190 .235 
(A10) It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around here 
(negatively worded) (OPPS) 
.183 .219 
(A11) When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out (TWWU) .259 .285 
(A12) When an incident is reported, it feels like the person is being reported, 
not the problem. (negatively worded) (NPRE) .317 .397 
(A13) After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their 
effectiveness (OL) .389 .404 
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', trying to do too much, too quickly (S) .309 .456 
(A15) Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done (OPPS) .139 .132 
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file. 
(negatively worded) (NRPE) .299 .453 
(A17) We have patient safety problems in this unit. (negatively worded) 
(OPPS) .185 .168 
(A18) Our policies, procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from 
happening (OPPS) .384 .455 
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HSOPSC Items and corresponding dimensions 
Initial 
values 
Extracted 
values 
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done 
according to established patient safety procedures (SMEA) .547 .730 
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for 
improving patient safety (SMEA) .570 .635 
(B3) Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work 
faster, even if it means taking shortcuts. (negatively worded) (SMEA) .268 .323 
(B4) My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen 
over and over. (negatively worded) (SMEA) .317 .449 
(C1) We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event 
reports (FB) .366 .435 
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect 
patient care (CO) .369 .489 
(C3) We are informed about errors that happen in this unit (FB) .338 .401 
(C4) Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more 
authority (CO) .425 .542 
(C5) In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again (FB) .422 .464 
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right. 
(negatively worded) (CO) .349 .384 
(D1) Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient 
safety (MS) .507 .546 
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) .512 .585 
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' when transferring patients from one unit 
to another (negatively worded) (HO) .338 .446 
(D4) There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work 
together (TWAU) .602 .675 
(D5) Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. 
(negatively worded) (HO) 
 
 
.371 .473 
(D6) It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (TWAU) .263 .315 
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HSOPSC Items and corresponding dimensions 
Initial 
values 
Extracted 
values 
(D7) Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital 
units. (negatively worded) (HO) .340 .374 
(D8) The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top 
priority (MS) .487 .559 
(D9) Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an 
adverse event happens. (negatively worded) (MS) .409 .415 
(D10) Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients 
(TWAU) .616 .690 
(D11) Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital. (negatively 
worded) (HO) .411 .477 
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the 
patient, how often is this reported? (FER) .528 .570 
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how 
often is this reported? (FER) .651 .801 
(E3) When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how 
often is this reported? (FER) .577 .668 
  Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital 
units (TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-
punitive response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), 
Hospital handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of 
patient safety (OPPS). 
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Appendix 17: Total variance explained by the initial solution (n=640) 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 8,634 20,556 20,556 8,132 19,362 19,362 2,661 6,336 6,336 
2 2,690 6,405 26,961 2,270 5,405 24,767 2,253 5,365 11,700 
3 2,277 5,421 32,382 1,745 4,156 28,922 2,178 5,187 16,887 
4 1,845 4,394 36,776 1,338 3,186 32,108 1,806 4,300 21,187 
5 1,655 3,940 40,716 1,145 2,726 34,834 1,768 4,209 25,396 
6 1,416 3,371 44,087 ,836 1,992 36,825 1,610 3,834 29,230 
7 1,317 3,137 47,223 ,726 1,728 38,553 1,487 3,541 32,771 
8 1,251 2,979 50,202 ,712 1,694 40,247 1,392 3,314 36,085 
9 1,129 2,688 52,890 ,653 1,554 41,801 1,310 3,118 39,204 
10 1,087 2,587 55,478 ,530 1,263 43,064 ,916 2,181 41,385 
11 1,023 2,435 57,913 ,420 1,000 44,064 ,868 2,067 43,452 
12 1,013 2,411 60,323 ,383 ,913 44,977 ,640 1,525 44,977 
13 ,942 2,243 62,566       
14 ,932 2,218 64,784       
15 ,872 2,077 66,861       
16 ,807 1,921 68,782       
17 ,790 1,882 70,664       
18 ,751 1,788 72,453       
19 ,734 1,749 74,201       
20 ,708 1,685 75,886       
21 ,669 1,593 77,479       
22 ,646 1,537 79,016       
23 ,630 1,500 80,516       
24 ,624 1,485 82,002 
 
      
Appendices  471 
 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
25 
 
 
,597 1,422 83,424       
26 ,561 1,336 84,760       
27 ,540 1,286 86,046       
28 ,507 1,207 87,253       
29 ,501 1,193 88,446       
30 ,490 1,167 89,613       
31 ,472 1,125 90,737       
32 ,459 1,093 91,831       
33 ,435 1,036 92,867       
34 ,419 ,999 93,865       
35 ,407 ,970 94,836       
36 ,396 ,944 95,779       
37 ,376 ,895 96,674       
38 ,344 ,819 97,493       
39 ,311 ,739 98,232       
40 ,275 ,656 98,888       
41 ,254 ,605 99,493       
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Appendix 18: Rotated factor matrix of the initial solution (n=640) 
 
Items of the HSOPSC 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
(A1) People support one 
another in this unit (TWWU)    ,571         
(A2) We have enough staff to 
handle the workload (S)          ,568   
(A3) When a lot of work needs 
to be done quickly, we work 
together as a team to get the 
work done (TWWU) 
   ,677         
(A4) In this unit, people treat 
each other with respect 
(TWWU) 
   ,575   ,364      
(A5) Staff in this unit work 
longer hours than is best for 
patient care (negatively 
worded) (S) 
            
(A6) We are actively doing 
things to improve patient safety 
(OL) 
   ,353    ,374     
(A7) We use more 
agency/temporary staff than is 
best for patient care. 
(negatively worded) (S) 
       ,400     
(A8) Staff feel like their 
mistakes are held (used) 
against them. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
     ,538       
(A9) Mistakes have led to 
positive changes here (OL)         ,434    
(A10) It is just by chance that 
more serious mistakes don’t 
happen around here (negatively 
worded) (OP) 
     ,313       
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(A11) When one area in this 
unit gets really busy, others 
help out (TWWU) 
 
(A12) When an incident is 
reported, it feels like the person 
is being reported, not the 
problem. (negatively worded) 
(NPRE) 
            
     ,477       
(A13) After we make changes 
to improve patient safety, we 
evaluate their effectiveness 
(OL) 
,301        ,354    
(A14) We work in 'crisis 
mode', trying to do too much, 
too quickly (S) 
     ,424    ,480   
(A15) Patient safety is never 
sacrificed to get more work 
done (OP) 
            
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes 
they make are kept in their 
personnel file. (negatively 
worded) (NRP) 
     ,632       
(A17) We have patient safety 
problems in this unit. 
(negatively worded) (OP) 
            
(A18) Our policies, procedures 
and systems are good at 
preventing errors from 
happening (OP) 
        ,384    
(B1) My supervisor/manager 
says a good word when he/she 
sees a job done according to 
established patient safety 
procedures (SMEA) 
      ,752      
(B2) My supervisor/manager 
seriously considers staff 
suggestions for improving 
patient safety (SMEA) 
      ,588      
(B3) Whenever pressure builds 
up, my supervisor/manager 
wants us to work faster, even if 
it means taking shortcuts. 
(negatively worded) (SMEA) 
  ,327     ,365     
(B4) My supervisor/manager 
overlooks patient safety 
       ,557     
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problems that happen over and 
over. (negatively worded) 
(SMEA) 
(C1) We are given feedback 
about changes put into place 
based on event reports (FB) 
    ,335    ,355    
(C2) Staff will freely speak up 
if they see something that may 
negatively affect patient care 
(CO) 
    ,597        
(C3) We are informed about 
errors that happen in this unit 
(FB) 
        ,309   ,344 
(C4) Staff feel free to question 
the decisions or actions of 
those with more authority (CO) 
    ,622        
(C5) In this unit, we discuss 
ways to prevent errors from 
happening again (FB) 
    ,364        
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask 
questions when something does 
not seem right. (negatively 
worded) (CO) 
(D1) Hospital management 
provides a work climate that 
promotes patient safety (MS) 
    ,505        
,463          ,365  
(D2) Hospital units do not 
coordinate well with each 
other. (negatively worded) 
(TWAU) 
,598            
(D3) Things 'fall between the 
cracks' when transferring 
patients from one unit to 
another (negatively worded) 
(HO) 
  ,616          
(D4) There is good cooperation 
among hospital units that need 
to work together (TWAU) 
,741            
(D5) Important patient care 
information is often lost during 
shift changes. (negatively 
worded) (HO) 
  ,608          
(D6) It is often unpleasant to 
work with staff from other 
  ,498          
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hospital units. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) 
(D7) Problems often occur in 
the exchange of information 
across hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (HO) 
  ,478          
(D8) The actions of hospital 
management show that patient 
safety is a top priority (MS) 
,399          ,492  
(D9) Hospital management 
seems interested in patient 
safety only after an adverse 
event happens. (negatively 
worded) (MS) 
  ,365          
(D10) Hospital units work well 
together to provide the best 
care for patients (TWAU) 
,734            
(D11) Shift changes are 
problematic for patients in this 
hospital. (negatively worded) 
(HO) 
  ,366     ,335    ,308 
(E1) When a mistake is made, 
but is caught and corrected 
before affecting the patient, 
how often is this reported? 
(FER) 
 ,739           
(E2) When a mistake is made, 
but has no potential to harm the 
patient, how often is this 
reported? (FER) 
 ,860           
(E3) When a mistake is made 
that could harm the patient, but 
does not, how often is this 
reported? (FER) 
 ,784           
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a.! Rotation converged in 15 iterations. 
b.! Red indicates no loading item, Blue indicates cross loading items 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL), Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of safety (OPPS) 
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Appendix 19: Pattern matrix for initial solution (42 items, 12 Factors, and 
n=640) 
 HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
(D4) There is good 
cooperation among 
hospital units that need 
to work together 
(TWAU) 
,756            
(D10) Hospital units 
work well together to 
provide the best care for 
patients (TWAU) 
,718            
(D2) Hospital units do 
not coordinate well with 
each other. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) 
,584            
(D1) Hospital 
management provides a 
work climate that 
promotes patient safety 
(MS) 
,352         ,341   
(E2) When a mistake is 
made, but has no 
potential to harm the 
patient, how often is this 
reported? (FER) 
 ,892           
(E3) When a mistake is 
made that could harm the 
patient, but does not, how 
often is this reported? 
(FER) 
 ,806           
(E1) When a mistake is 
made, but is caught and 
corrected before 
affecting the patient, how 
often is this reported? 
(FER) 
 ,766           
(D3) Things 'fall between 
the cracks' when 
transferring patients from 
one unit to another 
(negatively worded) 
(HO) 
  ,631          
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(D5) Important patient 
care information is often 
lost during shift changes. 
(negatively worded) 
(HO) 
  ,570          
(D6) It is often 
unpleasant to work with 
staff from other hospital 
units. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) 
  ,511          
(D7) Problems often 
occur in the exchange of 
information across 
hospital units. 
(negatively worded) 
(HO) 
  ,403          
(D9) Hospital 
management seems 
interested in patient 
safety only after an 
adverse event happens. 
(negatively worded) 
(MS) 
            
(A16) Staff worry that 
mistakes they make are 
kept in their personnel 
file.(negatively worded) 
(NRP) 
   ,646         
(A8) Staff feel like their 
mistakes are held (used) 
against them. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
   ,467         
(A12) When an incident 
is reported, it feels like 
the person is being 
reported, not the 
problem. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
   ,429         
(A10) It is just by chance 
that more serious 
mistakes don’t happen 
around here (negatively 
worded) (OPPS) 
            
(A15) Patient safety is 
never sacrificed to get 
more work done (OPPS) 
            
(B4) My 
supervisor/manager 
    ,567        
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overlooks patient safety 
problems that happen 
over and over. 
(negatively worded) 
(SMEA) 
(A7) We use more 
agency/temporary staff 
than is best for patient 
care. (negatively worded) 
(S) 
    ,388        
(A6) We are actively 
doing things to improve 
patient safety (OL) 
    ,367    ,301    
(B3) Whenever pressure 
builds up, my 
supervisor/manager 
wants us to work faster, 
even if it means taking 
shortcuts. (negatively 
worded) (SMEA) 
    ,351        
(A5) Staff in this unit 
work longer hours than is 
best for patient care 
(negatively worded) (S) 
            
(C4) Staff feel free to 
question the decisions or 
actions of those with 
more authority (CO) 
     -,615       
(C2) Staff will freely 
speak up if they see 
something that may 
negatively affect patient 
care (CO) 
     -,601       
(C6) Staff are afraid to 
ask questions when 
something does not seem 
right. (negatively 
worded) (CO) 
     -,510       
(C1) We are given 
feedback about changes 
put into place based on 
event reports (FB) 
            
(C5) In this unit, we 
discuss ways to prevent 
errors from happening 
again (FB) 
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(A2) We have enough 
staff to handle the 
workload (S) 
      ,578      
(A14) We work in 'crisis 
mode', trying to do too 
much, too quickly (S) 
   ,307   ,514      
(A17) We have patient 
safety problems in this 
unit.(negatively worded) 
(OPPS) 
            
(B1) My 
supervisor/manager says 
a good word when he/she 
sees a job done 
according to established 
patient safety procedures 
(SMEA) 
       ,807     
(B2) My 
supervisor/manager 
seriously considers staff 
suggestions for 
improving patient safety 
(SMEA) 
       ,599     
(A3) When a lot of work 
needs to be done quickly, 
we work together as a 
team to get the work 
done (TWWU) 
        ,709    
(A1) People support one 
another in this unit 
(TWWU) 
        ,589    
(A4) In this unit, people 
treat each other with 
respect (TWWU) 
       ,329 ,528    
(D8) The actions of 
hospital management 
show that patient safety 
is a top priority (MS) 
         ,473   
(A9) Mistakes have led 
to positive changes here 
(OL) 
          -,435  
(A18) Our policies, 
procedures and systems 
are good at preventing 
errors from happening 
(OPPS) 
          -,361  
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(A13) After we make 
changes to improve 
patient safety, we 
evaluate their 
effectiveness (OL) 
            
(A11) When one area in 
this unit gets really busy, 
others help out (TWWU) 
            
(C3) We are informed 
about errors that happen 
in this unit (FB) 
           -,334 
(D11) Shift changes are 
problematic for patients 
in this hospital. 
(negatively worded) 
(HO) 
           -,320 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring, Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a.! Rotation converged in 31 iterations. 
b.! Red indicates items with no loading 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL), Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of safety (OPPS). 
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Appendix 20: Initial and Extracted Communalities (12 factors, 34 Items) 
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HSOPSC Item Initial Extraction 
(A1) People support one another in this unit (TWWU) ,364 ,432 
(A2) We have enough staff to handle the workload (S) ,286 ,441 
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to 
get the work done (TWWU) ,383 ,604 
(A4) In this unit, people treat each other with respect (TWWU) ,433 ,559 
(A6) We are actively doing things to improve patient safety (OL) ,298 ,368 
(A7) We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care. (negatively 
worded) (S) ,174 ,243 
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are held (used) against them. (negatively worded) 
(NPRE) ,283 ,376 
(A9) Mistakes have led to positive changes here (OL) ,172 ,254 
(A12) When an incident is reported, it feels like the person is being reported, not 
the problem. (negatively worded) (NPRE) ,293 ,403 
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', trying to do too much, too quickly (S) ,284 ,510 
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file. 
(negatively worded) (NRP) ,282 ,420 
(A18) Our policies, procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from 
happening (OPPS) ,373 ,461 
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done 
according to established patient safety procedures (SMEA) ,531 ,702 
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving 
patient safety (SMEA) ,567 ,660 
(B3) Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, 
even if it means taking shortcuts. (negatively worded) (SMEA) ,247 ,335 
(B4) My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen over 
and over. (negatively worded) (SMEA) ,303 ,452 
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect 
patient care (CO) ,335 ,461 
(C3) We are informed about errors that happen in this unit (FB) ,326 ,447 
(C4) Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority 
(CO) ,396 ,566 
(C5) In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again (FB) ,397 ,516 
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right. 
(negatively worded) (CO) ,327 ,407 
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(D1) Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety 
(MS) ,485 ,591 
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other. (negatively worded) 
(TWAU) ,504 ,577 
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' when transferring patients from one unit to 
another (negatively worded) (HO) ,319 ,418 
(D4) There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together 
(TWAU) ,595 ,693 
(D5) Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. 
(negatively worded) (HO) ,363 ,499 
(D6) It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) ,257 ,336 
(D7) Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (HO) ,321 ,355 
(D8) The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority 
(MS) ,463 ,546 
(D10) Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients 
(TWAU) ,611 ,699 
(D11) Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital. (negatively 
worded) (HO) ,380 ,435 
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the 
patient, how often is this reported? (FER) ,515 ,577 
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is 
this reported? (FER) ,638 ,790 
(E3) When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often 
is this reported? (FER) ,550 ,654 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 21: Total Variance Explained (12 factors, 34 items) 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadingsa 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 7,416 21,813 21,813 6,947 20,431 20,431 4,147 
2 2,620 7,707 29,520 2,213 6,510 26,941 2,712 
3 2,002 5,889 35,409 1,522 4,475 31,416 2,858 
4 1,703 5,010 40,419 1,213 3,568 34,984 1,861 
5 1,619 4,763 45,182 1,114 3,276 38,260 1,904 
6 1,304 3,837 49,019 ,762 2,241 40,501 2,766 
7 1,184 3,482 52,501 ,651 1,915 42,416 3,397 
8 1,163 3,421 55,922 ,624 1,837 44,252 1,225 
9 1,043 3,067 58,989 ,546 1,607 45,859 2,301 
10 ,964 2,837 61,825 ,466 1,370 47,229 1,992 
11 ,949 2,790 64,616 ,387 1,139 48,369 2,257 
12 ,911 2,679 67,295 ,345 1,013 49,382 1,501 
13 ,787 2,315 69,609     
14 ,741 2,180 71,789     
15 ,728 2,142 73,931     
16 ,694 2,041 75,972     
17 ,680 2,000 77,973     
18 ,625 1,839 79,812     
19 ,597 1,756 81,568     
20 ,588 1,728 83,296     
21 ,553 1,625 84,921     
22 ,527 1,549 86,469     
23 ,513 1,509 87,979     
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Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadingsa 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
24 ,493 1,450 89,429     
25 ,465 1,367 90,796     
26 ,434 1,276 92,072     
27 ,424 1,247 93,319     
28 ,411 1,210 94,529     
29 ,398 1,169 95,699     
30 ,363 1,068 96,767     
31 ,323 ,950 97,717     
32 ,292 ,858 98,575     
33 ,264 ,776 99,351     
34 ,221 ,649 100,000     
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. %; Percentage. 
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Appendix 22: Pattern Matrix (12 factors, 34 items) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
(D4) There is good 
cooperation among hospital 
units that need to work 
together (TWAU) 
,784            
(D10) Hospital units work 
well together to provide the 
best care for patients 
(TWAU) 
,697            
(D2) Hospital units do not 
coordinate well with each 
other. (negatively worded) 
(TWAU) 
,604            
(D11) Shift changes are 
problematic for patients in 
this hospital. (negatively 
worded) (HO) 
            
(E2) When a mistake is 
made, but has no potential to 
harm the patient, how often is 
this reported? (FER) 
 ,863           
(E3) When a mistake is made 
that could harm the patient, 
but does not, how often is 
this reported? (FER) 
 ,805           
(E1) When a mistake is 
made, but is caught and 
corrected before affecting the 
patient, how often is this 
reported? (FER) 
 ,764           
(D5) Important patient care 
information is often lost 
during shift changes. 
(negatively worded) (HO) 
  ,613          
(D3) Things 'fall between the 
cracks' when transferring 
patients from one unit to 
another (negatively worded) 
(HO) 
  ,575          
(D6) It is often unpleasant to 
work with staff from other 
hospital units. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) 
  ,537          
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
(D7) Problems often occur in 
the exchange of information 
across hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (HO) 
  ,417          
(A16) Staff worry that 
mistakes they make are kept 
in their personnel file. 
(negatively worded) (NRP) 
   ,593         
(A8) Staff feel like their 
mistakes are held (used) 
against them. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
   ,516         
(A12) When an incident is 
reported, it feels like the 
person is being reported, not 
the problem. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
   ,473         
(B4) My supervisor/manager 
overlooks patient safety 
problems that happen over 
and over. (negatively 
worded) (SMEA) 
    -,585        
(B3) Whenever pressure 
builds up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us 
to work faster, even if it 
means taking shortcuts. 
(negatively worded) (SMEA) 
    -,429        
(A7) We use more 
agency/temporary staff than 
is best for patient care. 
(negatively worded) (S) 
    -,356        
(A3) When a lot of work 
needs to be done quickly, we 
work together as a team to 
get the work done (TWWU) 
     ,736       
(A1) People support one 
another in this unit (TWWU)      ,532       
(A4) In this unit, people treat 
each other with respect 
(TWWU) 
     ,468 -,361      
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
(A6) We are actively doing 
things to improve patient 
safety (OL) 
     ,334       
(B1) My supervisor/manager 
says a good word when 
he/she sees a job done 
according to established 
patient safety procedures 
(SMEA) 
      -,796      
(B2) My supervisor/manager 
seriously considers staff 
suggestions for improving 
patient safety (SMEA) 
      -,635      
(A14) We work in 'crisis 
mode', trying to do too much, 
too quickly (S) 
   ,331    ,559     
(A2) We have enough staff to 
handle the workload (S)        ,522     
(C4) Staff feel free to 
question the decisions or 
actions of those with more 
authority (CO) 
        ,656    
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask 
questions when something 
does not seem right. 
(negatively worded) (CO) 
        ,530    
(C2) Staff will freely speak 
up if they see something that 
may negatively affect patient 
care (CO) 
        ,478  ,343  
(D8) The actions of hospital 
management show that 
patient safety is a top priority 
(MS) 
         ,522   
(D1) Hospital management 
provides a work climate that 
promotes patient safety (MS) 
         ,488   
(C3) We are informed about 
errors that happen in this unit 
(FB) 
          ,491  
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
(C5) In this unit, we discuss 
ways to prevent errors from 
happening again (FB) 
          ,387  
(A9) Mistakes have led to 
positive changes here (OL)            ,436 
(A18) Our policies, 
procedures and systems are 
good at preventing errors 
from happening (OPPS) 
           ,316 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a.! Rotation converged in 32 iterations. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 23: Initial and Extracted Communalities (12 factors, 31 items) 
HSOPSC Item Initial Extraction 
(A1) People support one another in this unit (TWWU) ,363 ,425 
(A2) We have enough staff to handle the workload (S) ,282 ,536 
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to 
get the work done (TWWU) ,378 ,602 
(A4) In this unit, people treat each other with respect (TWWU) ,427 ,547 
(A6) We are actively doing things to improve patient safety (OL) ,279 ,335 
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are held (used) against them. (negatively worded) 
(NPRE) ,257 ,322 
(A12) When an incident is reported, it feels like the person is being reported, not the 
problem. (negatively worded) (NPRE) ,278 ,436 
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', trying to do too much, too quickly (S) ,283 ,499 
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file. 
(negatively worded) (NRP) ,279 ,458 
(A18) Our policies, procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from 
happening (OPPS) ,357 ,468 
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done 
according to established patient safety procedures (SMEA) ,528 ,718 
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving 
patient safety (SMEA) ,561 ,655 
(B3) Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, 
even if it means taking shortcuts. (negatively worded) (SMEA) ,236 ,346 
(B4) My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen over 
and over. (negatively worded) (SMEA) ,281 ,455 
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect 
patient care (CO) ,329 ,451 
(C3) We are informed about errors that happen in this unit (FB) ,307 ,407 
(C4) Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority 
(CO) ,379 ,546 
(C5) In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again (FB) ,387 ,540 
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right. 
(negatively worded) (CO) ,327 ,473 
(D1) Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety 
(MS) ,482 ,597 
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(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other. (negatively worded) 
(TWAU) ,489 ,550 
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' when transferring patients from one unit to 
another (negatively worded) (HO) ,315 ,430 
(D4) There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together 
(TWAU) ,595 ,764 
(D5) Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. 
(negatively worded) (HO) ,354 ,483 
(D6) It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) ,255 ,349 
(D7) Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (HO) ,290 ,332 
(D8) The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority 
(MS) ,456 ,608 
(D10) Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients 
(TWAU) ,605 ,684 
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the 
patient, how often is this reported? (FER) ,512 ,591 
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is 
this reported? (FER) ,637 ,787 
(E3) When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is 
this reported? (FER) ,543 ,643 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 24: Total Variance Explained (12 Factors, 31 items) 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 7,036 22,695 22,695 6,584 21,238 21,238 2,542 
2 2,561 8,260 30,955 2,173 7,009 28,247 2,611 
3 1,929 6,221 37,176 1,435 4,627 32,874 2,513 
4 1,678 5,412 42,588 1,202 3,878 36,753 1,935 
5 1,568 5,059 47,648 1,085 3,501 40,254 1,652 
6 1,259 4,062 51,710 ,737 2,377 42,631 1,502 
7 1,111 3,583 55,293 ,627 2,023 44,654 2,564 
8 1,034 3,335 58,628 ,585 1,887 46,541 2,952 
9 1,024 3,302 61,930 ,522 1,684 48,224 2,477 
10 ,938 3,025 64,955 ,443 1,430 49,655 3,594 
11 ,870 2,806 67,760 ,365 1,177 50,832 3,131 
12 ,780 2,518 70,278 ,281 ,906 51,738 ,925 
13 ,740 2,386 72,664     
14 ,710 2,289 74,953     
15 ,690 2,227 77,180     
16 ,623 2,011 79,191     
17 ,597 1,926 81,117     
18 ,576 1,857 82,974     
19 ,549 1,772 84,746     
20 ,530 1,709 86,455     
21 ,511 1,647 88,102     
22 ,482 1,555 89,657     
23 ,439 1,417 91,074     
24 ,435 1,402 92,476     
25 ,421 1,359 93,836     
26 ,410 1,323 95,158     
27 ,374 1,206 96,364     
28 ,342 1,103 97,467     
29 ,295 ,951 98,418     
30 ,269 ,868 99,286     
31 ,221 ,714 100,000     
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. %; Percentage. 
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Appendix 25:  Pattern Matrix (12 Factors, 31 items) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
(C5) In this unit, we discuss 
ways to prevent errors from 
happening again (FB) 
,557            
(C3) We are informed about 
errors that happen in this 
unit (FB) 
,367            
(E2) When a mistake is 
made, but has no potential to 
harm the patient, how often 
is this reported? (FER) 
 ,859           
(E3) When a mistake is 
made that could harm the 
patient, but does not, how 
often is this reported? (FER) 
 ,783           
(E1) When a mistake is 
made, but is caught and 
corrected before affecting 
the patient, how often is this 
reported? (FER) 
 ,780           
(D5) Important patient care 
information is often lost 
during shift changes. 
(negatively worded) (HO) 
  ,575          
(D3) Things 'fall between 
the cracks' when transferring 
patients from one unit to 
another (negatively worded) 
(HO) 
  ,573          
(D6) It is often unpleasant to 
work with staff from other 
hospital units. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) 
  ,537          
(D7) Problems often occur 
in the exchange of 
information across hospital 
units. (negatively worded) 
(HO) 
  ,394          
(A16) Staff worry that 
mistakes they make are kept 
in their personnel file. 
(negatively worded) (NRP) 
   ,629         
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
(A12) When an incident is 
reported, it feels like the 
person is being reported, not 
the problem. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
   ,519         
(A8) Staff feel like their 
mistakes are held (used) 
against them. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
   ,476         
(B4) My supervisor/manager 
overlooks patient safety 
problems that happen over 
and over. (negatively 
worded) (SMEA) 
    ,591        
(B3) Whenever pressure 
builds up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us 
to work faster, even if it 
means taking shortcuts. 
(negatively worded) 
(SMEA) 
    ,514        
(A2) We have enough staff 
to handle the workload (S)      ,673       
(A14) We work in 'crisis 
mode', trying to do too 
much, too quickly (S) 
   ,365  ,432       
(A3) When a lot of work 
needs to be done quickly, we 
work together as a team to 
get the work done (TWWU) 
      ,732      
(A1) People support one 
another in this unit 
(TWWU) 
      ,486      
(A4) In this unit, people 
treat each other with respect 
(TWWU) 
      ,437 -,340     
(A6) We are actively doing 
things to improve patient 
safety (OL) 
      ,387      
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
(B1) My supervisor/manager 
says a good word when 
he/she sees a job done 
according to established 
patient safety procedures 
(SMEA) 
       -,783     
(B2) My supervisor/manager 
seriously considers staff 
suggestions for improving 
patient safety (SMEA) 
       -,604     
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask 
questions when something 
does not seem right. 
(negatively worded) (CO) 
        ,623    
(C4) Staff feel free to 
question the decisions or 
actions of those with more 
authority (CO) 
        ,621    
(C2) Staff will freely speak 
up if they see something that 
may negatively affect patient 
care (CO) 
,329        ,434    
(D4) There is good 
cooperation among hospital 
units that need to work 
together (TWAU) 
         -,827   
(D10) Hospital units work 
well together to provide the 
best care for patients 
(TWAU) 
         -,618 0.301  
(D2) Hospital units do not 
coordinate well with each 
other. (negatively worded) 
(TWAU) 
         -,534   
(D8) The actions of hospital 
management show that 
patient safety is a top 
priority (MS) 
          ,685  
(D1) Hospital management 
provides a work climate that 
promotes patient safety (MS) 
          ,572  
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
(A18) Our policies, 
procedures and systems are 
good at preventing errors 
from happening (OPPS) 
           ,391 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a.! Rotation converged in 27 iterations. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 26: Structure of final initial solution (12 Factors, 31 items) 
Numbe
r of 
Factor 
Factor Loading of items 
(>0.3) 
Number of items 
1 Feedback and Communication About 
Error 
C3-C5-C2 3 
2 Frequency of Events Reported E1-E2-E3 3 
3 Handoffs and Transitions D3-D5-D6-D7 4 
4 Non-punitive Response to Errors A8-A12-A14-A16 4 
5 Supervisor/Manager Expectations 
and Actions Promoting Safety  
B3-B4 2 
6 Staffing A2-A14 2 
7 Teamwork within units A1-A3-A4-A6 4 
8 Supervisor/Manager Expectations 
and Actions Promoting Patient 
Safety 
B1-B2-A4 3 
9 Communication openness C2-C4-C6 3 
10 Teamwork across units D2-D4-D10 3 
11 Management Support for Patient 
Safety 
D1-D8 2 
12 Overall Perceptions of Patient Safety A18 1 
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Appendix 27: Initial and Extracted Communalities (9 Factors, 42 Items, 
Varimax rotation) 
HSOPSC Item Initial Extraction 
(A1) People support one another in this unit (TWWU) ,368 ,356 
(A2) We have enough staff to handle the workload (S) ,303 ,275 
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we 
work together as a team to get the work done (TWWU) ,408 ,603 
(A4) In this unit, people treat each other with respect 
(TWWU) ,438 ,534 
(A6) We are actively doing things to improve patient 
safety (OL) ,334 ,374 
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are held (used) 
against them. (negatively worded) (NPRE) ,307 ,388 
(A12) When an incident is reported, it feels like the 
person is being reported, not the problem. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
,317 ,325 
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', trying to do too much, 
too quickly (S) ,309 ,399 
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in 
their personnel file.(negatively worded) (NRP) ,299 ,392 
(A18) Our policies, procedures and systems are good at 
preventing errors from happening (OPPS) ,384 ,430 
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HSOPSC Item Initial Extraction 
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a good word when 
he/she sees a job done according to established patient 
safety procedures (SMEA) 
,547 ,745 
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff 
suggestions for improving patient safety (SMEA) ,570 ,615 
(B3) Whenever pressure builds up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it 
means taking shortcuts. (negatively worded) (SMEA) 
,268 ,322 
(B4) My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety 
problems that happen over and over. (negatively 
worded)  (SMEA) 
,317 ,386 
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they see something 
that may negatively affect patient care (CO) ,369 ,470 
(C3) We are informed about errors that happen in this 
unit (FB) ,338 ,338 
(C4) Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions 
of those with more authority (CO) ,425 ,511 
(C5) In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors 
from happening again (FB) ,422 ,402 
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions when something 
does not seem right. (negatively worded) (CO) ,349 ,344 
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HSOPSC Item Initial Extraction 
(D1) Hospital management provides a work climate 
that promotes patient safety (MS) ,507 ,489 
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate well with each 
other. (negatively worded) (TWAU) ,512 ,517 
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' when transferring 
patients from one unit to another (negatively worded) 
(HO) 
,338 ,408 
(D4) There is good cooperation among hospital units 
that need to work together (TWAU) ,602 ,619 
(D5) Important patient care information is often lost 
during shift changes. (negatively worded) (HO) ,371 ,398 
(D6) It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other 
hospital units. (negatively worded) (TWAU) ,263 ,268 
(D7) Problems often occur in the exchange of 
information across hospital units. (negatively worded) 
(HO) 
,340 ,373 
(D8) The actions of hospital management show that 
patient safety is a top priority (MS) ,487 ,506 
(D10) Hospital units work well together to provide the 
best care for patients (TWAU) ,616 ,670 
Appendices  501 
 
HSOPSC Item Initial Extraction 
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is caught and 
corrected before affecting the patient, how often is this 
reported? (FER) 
,528 ,574 
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has no potential to 
harm the patient, how often is this reported? (FER) ,651 ,780 
(E3) When a mistake is made that could harm the 
patient, but does not, how often is this reported? (FER) ,577 ,624 
(A5) Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for 
patient care (negatively worded) (S) ,154 ,134 
(A7) We use more agency/temporary staff than is best 
for patient care. (negatively worded) (S) ,205 ,193 
(A9) Mistakes have led to positive changes here (OL) ,190 ,164 
(A10) It is just by chance that more serious mistakes 
don’t happen around here (negatively worded) (OPPS) ,183 ,195 
(A11) When one area in this unit gets really busy, 
others help out (TWWU) ,259 ,249 
(A13) After we make changes to improve patient 
safety, we evaluate their effectiveness (OL) ,389 ,391 
(A15) Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more 
work done (OPPS) ,139 ,107 
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HSOPSC Item Initial Extraction 
(A17) We have patient safety problems in this unit. 
(negatively worded) (OPPS) ,185 ,131 
(C1) We are given feedback about changes put into 
place based on event reports (FB) ,366 ,413 
(D9) Hospital management seems interested in patient 
safety only after an adverse event happens. (negatively 
worded) (MS) 
,409 ,417 
(D11) Shift changes are problematic for patients in this 
hospital. (negatively worded) (HO) ,411 ,410 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 28: Total Variance Explained (9 Factors, 42 Items, Varimax 
rotation) 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 8,634 20,556 20,556 8,094 19,271 19,271 3,484 8,295 8,295 
2 2,690 6,405 26,961 2,239 5,332 24,603 2,358 5,615 13,910 
3 2,277 5,421 32,382 1,716 4,085 28,688 2,203 5,245 19,155 
4 1,845 4,394 36,776 1,301 3,097 31,785 1,971 4,692 23,847 
5 1,655 3,940 40,716 1,092 2,601 34,386 1,956 4,657 28,504 
6 1,416 3,371 44,087 ,803 1,912 36,298 1,882 4,482 32,986 
7 1,317 3,137 47,223 ,687 1,635 37,933 1,437 3,422 36,408 
8 1,251 2,979 50,202 ,674 1,604 39,537 1,016 2,420 38,828 
9 1,129 2,688 52,890 ,636 1,513 41,050 ,933 2,222 41,050 
10 1,087 2,587 55,478       
11 1,023 2,435 57,913       
12 1,013 2,411 60,323       
13 ,942 2,243 62,566       
14 ,932 2,218 64,784       
15 ,872 2,077 66,861       
16 ,807 1,921 68,782       
17 ,790 1,882 70,664       
18 ,751 1,788 72,453       
19 ,734 1,749 74,201       
20 ,708 1,685 75,886       
21 ,669 1,593 77,479       
22 ,646 1,537 79,016       
23 ,630 1,500 80,516       
24 ,624 1,485 82,002       
Appendices  504 
 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
          
25 ,597 1,422 83,424       
26 ,561 1,336 84,760       
27 ,540 1,286 86,046       
28 ,507 1,207 87,253       
29 ,501 1,193 88,446       
30 ,490 1,167 89,613       
31 ,472 1,125 90,737       
32 ,459 1,093 91,831       
33 ,435 1,036 92,867       
34 ,419 ,999 93,865       
35 ,407 ,970 94,836       
36 ,396 ,944 95,779       
37 ,376 ,895 96,674       
38 ,344 ,819 97,493       
39 ,311 ,739 98,232       
40 ,275 ,656 98,888       
41 ,254 ,605 99,493       
42 ,213 ,507 100,000       
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. %; Percentage. 
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Appendix 29: Rotated Factor Matrix (9 Factors solutions, Varimax rotation) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
(D10) Hospital units work well together to 
provide the best care for patients (TWAU) ,723         
(D8) The actions of hospital management 
show that patient safety is a top priority 
(MS) 
,618         
(D4) There is good cooperation among 
hospital units that need to work together 
(TWAU) 
,616         
(D1) Hospital management provides a work 
climate that promotes patient safety (MS) ,602         
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate well 
with each other. (negatively worded) 
(TWAU) 
,500 ,363        
(A18) Our policies, procedures and systems 
are good at preventing errors from 
happening (OPPS) 
,484      ,301   
(A13) After we make changes to improve 
patient safety, we evaluate their 
effectiveness (OL) 
,420         
(A9) Mistakes have led to positive changes 
here (OL)          
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' when 
transferring patients from one unit to 
another (negatively worded) (HO) 
 ,612        
(D5) Important patient care information is 
often lost during shift changes. (negatively 
worded) (HO) 
 ,584        
(D7) Problems often occur in the exchange 
of information across hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (HO) 
 ,492        
(D6) It is often unpleasant to work with 
staff from other hospital units. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) 
 ,456        
(D11) Shift changes are problematic for 
patients in this hospital. (negatively 
worded) (HO) 
,352 ,413        
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Appendix 29: Rotated Factor Matrix (9 Factors solutions, Varimax rotation) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
(B3) Whenever pressure builds up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, 
even if it means taking shortcuts. 
(negatively worded) (SMEA) 
 ,384      ,323  
(D9) Hospital management seems interested 
in patient safety only after an adverse event 
happens. (negatively worded) (MS) 
,380 ,381        
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has no 
potential to harm the patient, how often is 
this reported? (FER) 
  ,852       
(E3) When a mistake is made that could 
harm the patient, but does not, how often is 
this reported? (FER) 
  ,771       
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is caught 
and corrected before affecting the patient, 
how often is this reported? (FER) 
  ,740       
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be done 
quickly, we work together as a team to get 
the work done (TWWU) 
   ,697      
(A4) In this unit, people treat each other 
with respect (TWWU)    ,568   ,364   
(A1) People support one another in this unit 
(TWWU)    ,490      
(A6) We are actively doing things to 
improve patient safety (OL) ,312   ,431      
(A15) Patient safety is never sacrificed to 
get more work done (OPPS)          
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they see 
something that may negatively affect 
patient care (CO) 
    ,633     
(C4) Staff feel free to question the decisions 
or actions of those with more authority 
(CO) 
    ,564     
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions when 
something does not seem right. (negatively 
worded) (CO) 
    ,450     
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Appendix 29: Rotated Factor Matrix (9 Factors solutions, Varimax rotation) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
(C1) We are given feedback about changes 
put into place based on event reports (FB)     ,427     
(C3) We are informed about errors that 
happen in this unit (FB)     ,411     
(C5) In this unit, we discuss ways to 
prevent errors from happening again (FB)     ,358     
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are held 
(used) against them. (negatively worded) 
(NPRE) 
     ,570    
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they make 
are kept in their personnel file. (negatively 
worded) (NRP) 
     ,564    
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', trying to do 
too much, too quickly (S)      ,514   ,349 
(A12) When an incident is reported, it feels 
like the person is being reported, not the 
problem. (negatively worded) (NPRE) 
     ,468    
(A10) It is just by chance that more serious 
mistakes don’t happen around here 
(negatively worded) (OPPS) 
     ,352    
(A5) Staff in this unit work longer hours 
than is best for patient care (negatively 
worded) (S) 
         
(A7) We use more agency/temporary staff 
than is best for patient care. (negatively 
worded) (S) 
         
(A17) We have patient safety problems in 
this unit. (negatively worded) (OPPS)          
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a good 
word when he/she sees a job done 
according to established patient safety 
procedures (SMEA) 
      ,763   
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously 
considers staff suggestions for improving 
patient safety (SMEA) 
   ,334   ,557   
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Appendix 29: Rotated Factor Matrix (9 Factors solutions, Varimax rotation) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
(B4) My supervisor/manager overlooks 
patient safety problems that happen over 
and over. (negatively worded) (SMEA) 
 ,331      ,463  
(A2) We have enough staff to handle the 
workload (S)         ,353 
(A11) When one area in this unit gets really 
busy, others help out (TWWU)         ,341 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 13 iterations. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 30: Nine Factors solution (Varimax rotation), structure and 
loading  
Number of 
Factor 
Items Items loading  
    (<0.4) 
Strongly loading 
items  
          (>0.4) 
1 D1-D4-D8-D10-D2-A18-A13- 
D11-D9-A6 
D11-D9-A6 D1-D4-D8-D10-D2-
A18-A13 
2 B3-B4-D9-D2-D3-D5-D6-D7-
D11 
B3-B4-D9-D2 D3-D5-D6-D7-D11 
3 E1-E2-E3  E1-E2-E3 
4 A1-A3-A4-A6- B2 B2 A1-A3-A4-A6 
5 C1-C2-C4-C5-C6 C5 C1-C2-C3-C4-C6 
6 A8-A10-A12-A14-A16 A10 A8-A12-A14-A16 
7 A4- B1-B2 A4 B1-B2 
8 B3-B4 B3 B4 
9 A14-A2-A11 A14-A2-A11  
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Appendix 31: Initial and Extracted Communalities (9 Factors, 42 Items 
Direct Oblimin rotation) 
HSOPSC Item Initial Extraction 
(A1) People support one another in this unit (TWWU) ,368 ,356 
(A2) We have enough staff to handle the workload (S) ,303 ,275 
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we 
work together as a team to get the work done (TWWU) ,408 ,603 
(A4) In this unit, people treat each other with respect 
(TWWU) ,438 ,534 
(A5) Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for 
patient care (negatively worded) (S) ,154 ,134 
(A6) We are actively doing things to improve patient 
safety (OL) ,334 ,374 
(A7) We use more agency/temporary staff than is best 
for patient care. (negatively worded) (S) ,205 ,193 
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are held (used) 
against them. (negatively worded) (NPRE) ,307 ,388 
(A9) Mistakes have led to positive changes here (OL) ,190 ,164 
(A10) It is just by chance that more serious mistakes 
don’t happen around here (negatively worded) (OPPS) ,183 ,195 
(A11) When one area in this unit gets really busy, 
others help out (TWWU) ,259 ,249 
(A12) When an incident is reported, it feels like the 
person is being reported, not the problem. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
,317 ,325 
(A13) After we make changes to improve patient 
safety, we evaluate their effectiveness (OL) ,389 ,391 
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', trying to do too much, 
too quickly (S) ,309 ,399 
(A15) Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more 
work done (OPPS) ,139 ,107 
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in 
their personnel file. (negatively worded) (NRP) ,299 ,392 
(A17) We have patient safety problems in this unit. 
(negatively worded) (OPPS) ,185 ,131 
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(A18) Our policies, procedures and systems are good at 
preventing errors from happening (OPPS) ,384 ,430 
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a good word when 
he/she sees a job done according to established patient 
safety procedures (SMEA) 
,547 ,745 
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff 
suggestions for improving patient safety (SMEA) ,570 ,615 
(B3) Whenever pressure builds up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it 
means taking shortcuts. (negatively worded) (SMEA) 
,268 ,322 
(B4) My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety 
problems that happen over and over. (negatively 
worded) (SMEA) 
,317 ,386 
(C1) We are given feedback about changes put into 
place based on event reports (FB) ,366 ,413 
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they see something 
that may negatively affect patient care (CO) ,369 ,470 
(C3) We are informed about errors that happen in this 
unit (FB) ,338 ,338 
(C4) Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions 
of those with more authority (CO) ,425 ,511 
(C5) In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors 
from happening again (FB) ,422 ,402 
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions when something 
does not seem right. (negatively worded) (CO) ,349 ,344 
(D1) Hospital management provides a work climate 
that promotes patient safety (MS) ,507 ,489 
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate well with each 
other. (negatively worded) (TWAU) ,512 ,517 
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' when transferring 
patients from one unit to another (negatively worded) 
(HO) 
,338 ,408 
(D4) There is good cooperation among hospital units 
that need to work together (TWAU) ,602 ,619 
(D5) Important patient care information is often lost 
during shift changes. (negatively worded) (HO) ,371 ,398 
(D6) It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other 
hospital units. (negatively worded) (TWAU) ,263 ,268 
Appendices  512 
 
(D7) Problems often occur in the exchange of 
information across hospital units. (negatively worded) 
(HO) 
,340 ,373 
(D8) The actions of hospital management show that 
patient safety is a top priority (MS) ,487 ,506 
(D9) Hospital management seems interested in patient 
safety only after an adverse event happens. (negatively 
worded) (MS) 
,409 ,417 
(D10) Hospital units work well together to provide the 
best care for patients (TWAU) ,616 ,670 
(D11) Shift changes are problematic for patients in this 
hospital. (negatively worded) (HO) ,411 ,410 
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is caught and 
corrected before affecting the patient, how often is this 
reported? (FER) 
,528 ,574 
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has no potential to 
harm the patient, how often is this reported? (FER) ,651 ,780 
(E3) When a mistake is made that could harm the 
patient, but does not, how often is this reported? (FER) ,577 ,624 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 32: Pattern Matrix (9 Factors, 42 items, Direct Oblimin rotation) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
(D10) Hospital units 
work well together 
to provide the best 
care for patients 
(TWAU) 
,703         
(D4) There is good 
cooperation among 
hospital units that 
need to work 
together (TWAU) 
,590         
(D8) The actions of 
hospital 
management show 
that patient safety is 
a top priority (MS) 
,589         
(D1) Hospital 
management 
provides a work 
climate that 
promotes patient 
safety (MS) 
,533         
(D2) Hospital units 
do not coordinate 
well with each 
other. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) 
,427         
(D9) Hospital 
management seems 
interested in patient 
safety only after an 
adverse event 
happens. (negatively 
worded) (MS) 
         
(A13) After we 
make changes to 
improve patient 
safety, we evaluate 
their effectiveness 
(OL) 
         
(A9) Mistakes have 
led to positive 
changes here (OL) 
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
(E2) When a 
mistake is made, but 
has no potential to 
harm the patient, 
how often is this 
reported? (FER) 
 ,873        
(E3) When a 
mistake is made that 
could harm the 
patient, but does 
not, how often is 
this reported? (FER) 
 ,789        
(E1) When a 
mistake is made, but 
is caught and 
corrected before 
affecting the patient, 
how often is this 
reported? (FER) 
 ,761        
(A17) We have 
patient safety 
problems in this 
unit. (negatively 
worded) (OPPS) 
         
(D3) Things 'fall 
between the cracks' 
when transferring 
patients from one 
unit to another 
(negatively worded) 
(HO) 
  ,633       
(D5) Important 
patient care 
information is often 
lost during shift 
changes. (negatively 
worded) (HO) 
  ,570       
(D7) Problems often 
occur in the 
exchange of 
information across 
hospital units. 
(negatively worded) 
(HO) 
  ,471       
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
(D6) It is often 
unpleasant to work 
with staff from 
other hospital units. 
(negatively worded) 
(TWAU) 
  ,448       
(B3) Whenever 
pressure builds up, 
my 
supervisor/manager 
wants us to work 
faster, even if it 
means taking 
shortcuts. 
(negatively worded) 
(SMEA) 
  ,355    ,337   
(D11) Shift changes 
are problematic for 
patients in this 
hospital. (negatively 
worded) (HO) 
  ,335       
(A16) Staff worry 
that mistakes they 
make are kept in 
their personnel file. 
(negatively worded) 
(NRP) 
   ,599      
(A14) We work in 
'crisis mode', trying 
to do too much, too 
quickly (S) 
   ,571      
(A8) Staff feel like 
their mistakes are 
held (used) against 
them. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
   ,484      
(A12) When an 
incident is reported, 
it feels like the 
person is being 
reported, not the 
problem. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
   ,393      
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
(A5) Staff in this 
unit work longer 
hours than is best 
for patient care 
(negatively worded) 
(S) 
         
(A15) Patient safety 
is never sacrificed 
to get more work 
done (OPPS) 
         
(A7) We use more 
agency/temporary 
staff than is best for 
patient care. 
(negatively worded) 
(S) 
    ,377     
(A10) It is just by 
chance that more 
serious mistakes 
don’t happen around 
here (negatively 
worded) (OPPS) 
    ,304     
(C2) Staff will 
freely speak up if 
they see something 
that may negatively 
affect patient care 
(CO) 
     -,685    
(C4) Staff feel free 
to question the 
decisions or actions 
of those with more 
authority (CO) 
     -,544    
(C6) Staff are afraid 
to ask questions 
when something 
does not seem right. 
(negatively worded) 
(CO) 
     -,443    
(C1) We are given 
feedback about 
changes put into 
place based on event 
reports (FB) 
     -,431    
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
(C3) We are 
informed about 
errors that happen in 
this unit (FB) 
     -,416    
(C5) In this unit, we 
discuss ways to 
prevent errors from 
happening again 
(FB) 
         
(B4) My 
supervisor/manager 
overlooks patient 
safety problems that 
happen over and 
over. (negatively 
worded) (SMEA) 
      ,323   
(B1) My 
supervisor/manager 
says a good word 
when he/she sees a 
job done according 
to established 
patient safety 
procedures (SMEA) 
       ,897  
(B2) My 
supervisor/manager 
seriously considers 
staff suggestions for 
improving patient 
safety (SMEA) 
       ,643  
(A4) In this unit, 
people treat each 
other with respect 
(TWWU) 
       ,420 ,365 
(A18) Our policies, 
procedures and 
systems are good at 
preventing errors 
from happening 
(OPPS) 
,341       ,355  
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
(A3) When a lot of 
work needs to be 
done quickly, we 
work together as a 
team to get the work 
done (TWWU) 
        ,775 
(A6) We are 
actively doing 
things to improve 
patient safety (OL) 
        ,407 
(A1) People support 
one another in this 
unit (TWWU) 
        ,396 
(A11) When one 
area in this unit gets 
really busy, others 
help out (TWWU) 
         
(A2) We have 
enough staff to 
handle the workload 
(S) 
         
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a.! Rotation converged in 47 iterations. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 33: Nine Factors solution (42 items, Direct Oblimin), structure and 
loading  
Number of 
Factor 
Items Loading (<0.4) Strongly loading (>0.4) 
1 D1-D2-D4-D8-D10- A18 A18 D10-D4-D8-D1-D2 
2 E1-E2-E3  E1-E2-E3 
3 B3- D3-D5-D7-D6-D11 B3-D11 D3-D5-D7-D6 
4 A16-A14-A8-A12 A12 A16-A14-A8 
5 A7-A10 A7-A10  
6 C1-C2-C3-C4-C6  C1-C2-C3-C4-C6 
7 B3-B4 B3-B4  
8 A4-B1-B2-A18 A18 A4-B1-B2 
9 A1-A4- A3-A6 A1-A4 A3-A6 
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Appendix 34: Initial and Extracted Communalities (8 factors, 42 items) 
HSOPSC Item Initial Extraction 
(A1) People support one another in this unit (TWWU) ,368 ,349 
(A2) We have enough staff to handle the workload (S) ,303 ,282 
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to 
get the work done (TWWU) ,408 ,369 
(A4) In this unit, people treat each other with respect (TWWU) ,438 ,569 
(A5) Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care (negatively 
worded) (S) ,154 ,135 
(A6) We are actively doing things to improve patient safety (OL) ,334 ,357 
(A7) We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care. (negatively 
worded) (S) ,205 ,191 
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are held (used) against them. (negatively worded) 
(NPRE) ,307 ,376 
(A9) Mistakes have led to positive changes here (OL) ,190 ,157 
(A10) It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around here 
(negatively worded) (OPPS) ,183 ,192 
(A11) When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out (TWWU) ,259 ,237 
(A12) When an incident is reported, it feels like the person is being reported, not the 
problem. (negatively worded) (NPRE) ,317 ,317 
(A13) After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their 
effectiveness (OL) ,389 ,393 
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', trying to do too much, too quickly (S) ,309 ,407 
(A15) Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done (OPPS) ,139 ,107 
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file. 
(negatively worded) (NRP) ,299 ,392 
(A17) We have patient safety problems in this unit. (negatively worded) (OPPS) ,185 ,130 
(A18) Our policies, procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from 
happening (OPPS) ,384 ,344 
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done 
according to established patient safety procedures (SMEA) ,547 ,451 
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving 
patient safety (SMEA) ,570 ,545 
(B3) Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, 
even if it means taking shortcuts. (negatively worded) (SMEA) ,268 ,321 
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HSOPSC Item Initial Extraction 
(B4) My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen over and 
over. (negatively worded) (SMEA) ,317 ,394 
(C1) We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports 
(FB) ,366 ,411 
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect 
patient care (CO) ,369 ,432 
(C3) We are informed about errors that happen in this unit (FB) ,338 ,341 
(C4) Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority 
(CO) ,425 ,477 
(C5) In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again (FB) ,422 ,404 
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right. 
(negatively worded) (CO) ,349 ,347 
(D1) Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety 
(MS) ,507 ,492 
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other. (negatively worded) 
(TWAU) ,512 ,517 
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' when transferring patients from one unit to 
another (negatively worded) (HO) ,338 ,405 
(D4) There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together 
(TWAU) ,602 ,601 
(D5) Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. 
(negatively worded) (HO) ,371 ,394 
(D6) It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) ,263 ,269 
(D7) Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (HO) ,340 ,372 
(D8) The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority 
(MS) ,487 ,511 
(D9) Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse 
event happens. (negatively worded) (MS) ,409 ,419 
(D10) Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients 
(TWAU) ,616 ,662 
(D11) Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital. (negatively 
worded) (HO) ,411 ,407 
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the 
patient, how often is this reported? (FER) ,528 ,573 
Appendices  522 
 
HSOPSC Item Initial Extraction 
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is 
this reported? (FER) ,651 ,777 
(E3) When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is 
this reported? (FER) ,577 ,624 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 35: Total Variance Explained by 8 factors (42 items, Varimax 
rotation) 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 8,634 20,556 20,556 8,068 19,210 19,210 3,305 7,868 7,868 
2 2,690 6,405 26,961 2,216 5,276 24,486 3,011 7,170 15,038 
3 2,277 5,421 32,382 1,698 4,043 28,529 2,312 5,506 20,543 
4 1,845 4,394 36,776 1,295 3,082 31,611 2,195 5,227 25,770 
5 1,655 3,940 40,716 1,081 2,573 34,184 1,814 4,319 30,089 
6 1,416 3,371 44,087 ,768 1,830 36,013 1,783 4,246 34,335 
7 1,317 3,137 47,223 ,685 1,630 37,644 1,130 2,690 37,025 
8 1,251 2,979 50,202 ,639 1,522 39,166 ,899 2,141 39,166 
9 1,129 2,688 52,890       
10 1,087 2,587 55,478       
11 1,023 2,435 57,913       
12 1,013 2,411 60,323       
13 ,942 2,243 62,566       
14 ,932 2,218 64,784       
15 ,872 2,077 66,861       
16 ,807 1,921 68,782       
17 ,790 1,882 70,664       
18 ,751 1,788 72,453       
19 ,734 1,749 74,201       
20 ,708 1,685 75,886       
21 ,669 1,593 77,479       
22 ,646 1,537 79,016       
23 ,630 1,500 80,516       
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24 ,624 1,485 82,002       
25 ,597 1,422 83,424       
26 ,561 1,336 84,760       
27 ,540 1,286 86,046       
28 ,507 1,207 87,253       
29 ,501 1,193 88,446       
30 ,490 1,167 89,613       
31 ,472 1,125 90,737       
32 ,459 1,093 91,831       
33 ,435 1,036 92,867       
34 ,419 ,999 93,865       
35 ,407 ,970 94,836       
36 ,396 ,944 95,779       
37 ,376 ,895 96,674       
38 ,344 ,819 97,493       
39 ,311 ,739 98,232       
40 ,275 ,656 98,888       
41 ,254 ,605 99,493       
42 ,213 ,507 100,000       
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. %, Percentage. 
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Appendix 36: Rotated Factor Matrix (8 factors, 42 items, Varimax rotation) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(D10) Hospital units work well 
together to provide the best care for 
patients (TWAU) 
,739        
(D4) There is good cooperation 
among hospital units that need to 
work together (TWAU) 
,635        
(D8) The actions of hospital 
management show that patient safety 
is a top priority (MS) 
,611        
(D1) Hospital management provides a 
work climate that promotes patient 
safety (MS) 
,599        
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate 
well with each other. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) 
,510  ,352      
(A18) Our policies, procedures and 
systems are good at preventing errors 
from happening (OPPS) 
,415        
(A13) After we make changes to 
improve patient safety, we evaluate 
their effectiveness (OL) 
,388        
(D9) Hospital management seems 
interested in patient safety only after 
an adverse event happens. (negatively 
worded) (MS) 
,374  ,367      
(A9) Mistakes have led to positive 
changes here (OL)         
(A4) In this unit, people treat each 
other with respect (TWWU)  ,717       
(B2) My supervisor/manager 
seriously considers staff suggestions 
for improving patient safety (SMEA) 
 ,612       
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a 
good word when he/she sees a job 
done according to established patient 
safety procedures (SMEA) 
 ,563       
(A1) People support one another in 
this unit (TWWU)  ,539       
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be 
done quickly, we work together as a 
team to get the work done (TWWU) 
 ,526       
(C5) In this unit, we discuss ways to 
prevent errors from happening again 
(FB) 
 ,390    ,328   
(A6) We are actively doing things to 
improve patient safety (OL)  ,363     ,349  
(A15) Patient safety is never 
sacrificed to get more work done 
(OPPS) 
        
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' 
when transferring patients from one 
unit to another (negatively worded) 
(HO) 
  ,604      
(D5) Important patient care 
information is often lost during shift 
changes. (negatively worded) (HO) 
  ,578      
(D7) Problems often occur in the 
exchange of information across 
hospital units. (negatively worded) 
(HO) 
  ,491      
(D6) It is often unpleasant to work 
with staff from other hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (TWAU) 
  ,452      
(D11) Shift changes are problematic 
for patients in this hospital. 
(negatively worded) (HO) 
,341  ,416      
(B3) Whenever pressure builds up, 
my supervisor/manager wants us to 
work faster, even if it means taking 
shortcuts. (negatively worded) 
(SMEA) 
  ,396      
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has 
no potential to harm the patient, how 
often is this reported? (FER) 
   ,849     
(E3) When a mistake is made that 
could harm the patient, but does not, 
how often is this reported? (FER) 
   ,772     
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is 
caught and corrected before affecting 
the patient, how often is this 
reported? (FER) 
   ,739     
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they 
make are kept in their personnel 
file.(negatively worded) (NRP) 
    ,585    
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are 
held (used) against them. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
    ,560    
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', 
trying to do too much, too quickly (S)     ,500   ,382 
(A12) When an incident is reported, it 
feels like the person is being reported, 
not the problem. (negatively worded) 
(NPRE) 
    ,446    
(A10) It is just by chance that more 
serious mistakes don’t happen around 
here (negatively worded) (OPPS) 
    ,347    
(A5) Staff in this unit work longer 
hours than is best for patient care 
(negatively worded) (S) 
        
(A17) We have patient safety 
problems in this unit. (negatively 
worded) (OPPS) 
        
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they 
see something that may negatively 
affect patient care (CO) 
     ,591   
(C4) Staff feel free to question the 
decisions or actions of those with 
more authority (CO) 
 ,394    ,477   
(C1) We are given feedback about 
changes put into place based on event 
reports (FB) 
     ,437   
(C3) We are informed about errors 
that happen in this unit (FB)      ,435   
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions 
when something does not seem right. 
(negatively worded) (CO) 
     ,418   
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(B4) My supervisor/manager 
overlooks patient safety problems that 
happen over and over. (negatively 
worded) (SMEA) 
  ,341    ,465  
(A7) We use more agency/temporary 
staff than is best for patient care. 
(negatively worded) (S) 
      ,302  
(A2) We have enough staff to handle 
the workload (S)        ,355 
(A11) When one area in this unit gets 
really busy, others help out (TWWU)        ,326 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 11 iterations. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 37: Eight Factors solution (Varimax rotation): structure and 
loading  
Number 
of Factor 
Items Items loading 
(<0.4) 
Strongly loading 
items (>0.4) 
1 D10-D4-D8-D1-D2-A18- A13-
D9-D11 
A13-D9-D11 D10-D4-D8-D1-D2-
A18 
2 A4-B2-B1-A1-A3- C5-A6-C4 C5-A6-C4 A4-B2-B1-A1-A3 
3 D11-D6-D7-D5-D3- B4-B3-
D9-D2 
B4-B3-D9-D2 D11-D6-D7-D5-D3 
4 E1-E2-E3  E1-E2-E3 
5 A12-A14-A8-A16-A10 A10 A12-A14-A8-A16 
6 C1-C2-C4-C6-C3-C5 C5 C1-C2-C4-C6-C3 
7 A6-A7-B4 A6-A7 B4 
8 A2-A11-A14 A2-A11-A14  
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Appendix 38: Pattern Matrix (8 factors, 42 items, Direct Oblimin rotation) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(D10) Hospital units 
work well together to 
provide the best care 
for patients (TWAU) 
,730        
(D8) The actions of 
hospital management 
show that patient 
safety is a top priority 
(MS) 
,617        
(D4) There is good 
cooperation among 
hospital units that 
need to work together 
(TWAU) 
,606        
(D1) Hospital 
management provides 
a work climate that 
promotes patient 
safety (MS) 
,562        
(D2) Hospital units do 
not coordinate well 
with each other. 
(negatively worded) 
(TWAU) 
,448        
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(A18) Our policies, 
procedures and 
systems are good at 
preventing errors from 
happening (OPPS) 
,345        
(D9) Hospital 
management seems 
interested in patient 
safety only after an 
adverse event 
happens. (negatively 
worded) (MS) 
,319        
(A13) After we make 
changes to improve 
patient safety, we 
evaluate their 
effectiveness (OL) 
        
(E2) When a mistake 
is made, but has no 
potential to harm the 
patient, how often is 
this reported? (FER) 
 ,869       
(E3) When a mistake 
is made that could 
harm the patient, but 
does not, how often is 
this reported? (FER) 
 ,791       
(E1) When a mistake 
is made, but is caught 
and corrected before 
affecting the patient, 
how often is this 
reported? (FER) 
 ,760       
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(D3) Things 'fall 
between the cracks' 
when transferring 
patients from one unit 
to another (negatively 
worded) (HO) 
  ,634      
(D5) Important patient 
care information is 
often lost during shift 
changes. (negatively 
worded) (HO) 
  ,573      
(D7) Problems often 
occur in the exchange 
of information across 
hospital units. 
(negatively worded) 
(HO) 
  ,474      
(D6) It is often 
unpleasant to work 
with staff from other 
hospital units. 
(negatively worded) 
(TWAU) 
  ,449      
(B3) Whenever 
pressure builds up, my 
supervisor/manager 
wants us to work 
faster, even if it means 
taking shortcuts. 
(negatively worded) 
(SMEA) 
  ,378      
(D11) Shift changes 
are problematic for 
patients in this 
hospital. (negatively 
worded) (HO) 
  ,353      
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(A16) Staff worry that 
mistakes they make 
are kept in their 
personnel file. 
(negatively worded) 
(NRP) 
   ,607     
(A8) Staff feel like 
their mistakes are held 
(used) against them. 
(negatively worded) 
(NPRE) 
   ,543     
(A14) We work in 
'crisis mode', trying to 
do too much, too 
quickly (S) 
   ,502   ,369  
(A12) When an 
incident is reported, it 
feels like the person is 
being reported, not the 
problem. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
   ,405     
(A10) It is just by 
chance that more 
serious mistakes don’t 
happen around here 
(negatively worded) 
(OPPS) 
   ,323     
(A5) Staff in this unit 
work longer hours 
than is best for patient 
care (negatively 
worded) (S) 
        
(A17) We have patient 
safety problems in this 
unit. (negatively 
worded) (OPPS) 
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(B4) My 
supervisor/manager 
overlooks patient 
safety problems that 
happen over and over. 
(negatively worded) 
(SMEA) 
    ,427    
(A7) We use more 
agency/temporary 
staff than is best for 
patient care. 
(negatively worded) 
(S) 
    ,305    
(C2) Staff will freely 
speak up if they see 
something that may 
negatively affect 
patient care (CO) 
     -,647   
(C4) Staff feel free to 
question the decisions 
or actions of those 
with more authority 
(CO) 
     -,481   
(C3) We are informed 
about errors that 
happen in this unit 
(FB) 
     -,458   
(C1) We are given 
feedback about 
changes put into place 
based on event reports 
(FB) 
     -,449   
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(C6) Staff are afraid to 
ask questions when 
something does not 
seem right. (negatively 
worded) (CO) 
     -,437   
(A9) Mistakes have 
led to positive changes 
here (OL) 
        
(A2) We have enough 
staff to handle the 
workload (S) 
      ,334  
(A11) When one area 
in this unit gets really 
busy, others help out 
(TWWU) 
      ,312  
(A4) In this unit, 
people treat each other 
with respect (TWWU) 
       ,762 
(B2) My 
supervisor/manager 
seriously considers 
staff suggestions for 
improving patient 
safety (SMEA) 
       ,564 
(A1) People support 
one another in this unit 
(TWWU) 
       ,541 
(A3) When a lot of 
work needs to be done 
quickly, we work 
together as a team to 
get the work done 
(TWWU) 
       ,530 
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(B1) My 
supervisor/manager 
says a good word 
when he/she sees a job 
done according to 
established patient 
safety procedures 
(SMEA) 
       ,515 
(A6) We are actively 
doing things to 
improve patient safety 
(OL) 
    ,322   ,333 
(C5) In this unit, we 
discuss ways to 
prevent errors from 
happening again (FB) 
        
(A15) Patient safety is 
never sacrificed to get 
more work done 
(OPPS) 
        
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 23 iterations. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 39: Initial and Extracted Communalities (7 factors, 42 items, 
Varimax rotation) 
HSOPSC Item Initial Extraction 
(A1) People support one another in this unit (TWWU) ,368 ,343 
(A2) We have enough staff to handle the workload (S) ,303 ,234 
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to 
get the work done (TWWU) ,408 ,340 
(A4) In this unit, people treat each other with respect (TWWU) ,438 ,543 
(A5) Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care (negatively 
worded) (S) ,154 ,135 
(A6) We are actively doing things to improve patient safety (OL) ,334 ,357 
(A7) We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care. (negatively 
worded) (S) ,205 ,175 
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are held (used) against them. (negatively worded) 
(NPRE) ,307 ,367 
(A9) Mistakes have led to positive changes here (OL) ,190 ,152 
(A10) It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around here 
(negatively worded) (OPPS) ,183 ,178 
(A11) When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out (TWWU) ,259 ,199 
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(A12) When an incident is reported, it feels like the person is being reported, not the 
problem. (negatively worded) (NPRE) ,317 ,316 
(A13) After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their 
effectiveness (OL) ,389 ,390 
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', trying to do too much, too quickly (S) ,309 ,352 
(A15) Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done (OPPS) ,139 ,105 
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel 
file.(negatively worded) (NRP) ,299 ,381 
(A17) We have patient safety problems in this unit.(negatively worded) (OPPS) ,185 ,129 
(A18) Our policies, procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from 
happening (OPPS) ,384 ,318 
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done 
according to established patient safety procedures (SMEA) ,547 ,429 
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving 
patient safety (SMEA) ,570 ,513 
(B3) Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, 
even if it means taking shortcuts. (negatively worded) (SMEA) ,268 ,286 
(B4) My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen over 
and over. (negatively worded)  (SMEA) ,317 ,397 
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(C1) We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports 
(FB) ,366 ,412 
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect 
patient care (CO) ,369 ,327 
(C3) We are informed about errors that happen in this unit (FB) ,338 ,277 
(C4) Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority 
(CO) ,425 ,487 
(C5) In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again (FB) ,422 ,401 
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right. 
(negatively worded) (CO) ,349 ,341 
(D1) Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety 
(MS) ,507 ,492 
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other. (negatively worded) 
(TWAU) ,512 ,514 
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' when transferring patients from one unit to 
another (negatively worded) (HO) ,338 ,338 
(D4) There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together 
(TWAU) ,602 ,599 
(D5) Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. 
(negatively worded) (HO) ,371 ,395 
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(D6) It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) ,263 ,266 
(D7) Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (HO) ,340 ,359 
(D8) The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority 
(MS) ,487 ,425 
(D9) Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse 
event happens. (negatively worded) (MS) ,409 ,398 
(D10) Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients 
(TWAU) ,616 ,666 
(D11) Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital. (negatively 
worded) (HO) ,411 ,410 
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the 
patient, how often is this reported? (FER) ,528 ,545 
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is 
this reported? (FER) ,651 ,769 
(E3) When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is 
this reported? (FER) ,577 ,630 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 40: Total Variance Explained (7 factors, 42 items, Varimax 
rotation) 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 8,634 20,556 20,556 8,050 19,167 19,167 3,897 9,278 9,278 
2 2,690 6,405 26,961 2,202 5,242 24,409 3,135 7,464 16,742 
3 2,277 5,421 32,382 1,682 4,006 28,415 2,627 6,256 22,998 
4 1,845 4,394 36,776 1,280 3,047 31,462 2,231 5,311 28,309 
5 1,655 3,940 40,716 1,068 2,542 34,004 1,850 4,404 32,713 
6 1,416 3,371 44,087 ,749 1,783 35,787 1,055 2,512 35,226 
7 1,317 3,137 47,223 ,661 1,575 37,362 ,897 2,136 37,362 
8 1,251 2,979 50,202       
9 1,129 2,688 52,890       
10 1,087 2,587 55,478       
11 1,023 2,435 57,913       
12 1,013 2,411 60,323       
13 ,942 2,243 62,566       
14 ,932 2,218 64,784       
15 ,872 2,077 66,861       
16 ,807 1,921 68,782       
17 ,790 1,882 70,664       
18 ,751 1,788 72,453       
19 ,734 1,749 74,201       
20 ,708 1,685 75,886       
21 ,669 1,593 77,479       
22 ,646 1,537 79,016       
23 ,630 1,500 80,516       
24 ,624 1,485 82,002       
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Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
25 ,597 1,422 83,424       
26 ,561 1,336 84,760       
27 ,540 1,286 86,046       
28 ,507 1,207 87,253       
29 ,501 1,193 88,446       
30 ,490 1,167 89,613       
31 ,472 1,125 90,737       
32 ,459 1,093 91,831       
33 ,435 1,036 92,867       
34 ,419 ,999 93,865       
35 ,407 ,970 94,836       
36 ,396 ,944 95,779       
37 ,376 ,895 96,674       
38 ,344 ,819 97,493       
39 ,311 ,739 98,232       
40 ,275 ,656 98,888       
41 ,254 ,605 99,493       
42 ,213 ,507 100,000       
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS
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Appendix 41: Rotated Factor Matrix (7 factors, 42 items, Varimax rotation) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(A4) In this unit, people treat each other with respect (TWWU) ,638       
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff 
suggestions for improving patient safety (SMEA) ,623       
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she 
sees a job done according to established patient safety 
procedures (SMEA) 
,608       
(C4) Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those 
with more authority (CO) ,596       
(A1) People support one another in this unit (TWWU) ,506       
(C5) In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from 
happening again (FB) ,500       
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may 
negatively affect patient care (CO) ,474       
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work 
together as a team to get the work done (TWWU) ,471       
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not 
seem right. (negatively worded) (CO) ,438       
(C3) We are informed about errors that happen in this unit (FB) ,341       
(A11) When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help 
out (TWWU)        
(A15) Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done 
(OPPS)        
(A9) Mistakes have led to positive changes here (OL)        
(D10) Hospital units work well together to provide the best 
care for patients (TWAU)  ,744      
(D4) There is good cooperation among hospital units that need 
to work together (TWAU)  ,684      
(D1) Hospital management provides a work climate that 
promotes patient safety (MS)  ,584      
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other. 
(negatively worded) (TWAU)  ,531 ,341     
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(D8) The actions of hospital management show that patient 
safety is a top priority (MS)  ,506      
(A18) Our policies, procedures and systems are good at 
preventing errors from happening (OPPS) ,319 ,357      
(A13) After we make changes to improve patient safety, we 
evaluate their effectiveness (OL) ,356 ,356      
(A2) We have enough staff to handle the workload (S)  ,310      
(D5) Important patient care information is often lost during 
shift changes. (negatively worded) (HO)   ,603     
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' when transferring patients 
from one unit to another (negatively worded) (HO)   ,547     
(D7) Problems often occur in the exchange of information 
across hospital units. (negatively worded) (HO)   ,481     
(D11) Shift changes are problematic for patients in this 
hospital. (negatively worded) (HO)  ,306 ,464     
(D6) It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other 
hospital units. (negatively worded) (TWAU)   ,452     
(D9) Hospital management seems interested in patient safety 
only after an adverse event happens. (negatively worded) (MS)   ,451     
(B4) My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems 
that happen over and over. (negatively worded) (SMEA)   ,397   ,382  
(B3) Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager 
wants us to work faster, even if it means taking shortcuts. 
(negatively worded) (SMEA) 
  ,388     
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the 
patient, how often is this reported? (FER)    ,848    
(E3) When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but 
does not, how often is this reported? (FER)    ,780    
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected 
before affecting the patient, how often is this reported? (FER)    ,720    
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their 
personnel file. (negatively worded) (NRP)     ,580   
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are held (used) against them. 
(negatively worded) (NPRE)     ,551   
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', trying to do too much, too 
quickly (S)     ,519   
(A12) When an incident is reported, it feels like the person is 
being reported, not the problem. (negatively worded) (NPRE)     ,464   
(A10) It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t 
happen around here (negatively worded) (OPPS)     ,337   
(A5) Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient 
care (negatively worded) (S)        
(A17) We have patient safety problems in this unit. (negatively 
worded) (OPPS)        
(A6) We are actively doing things to improve patient safety 
(OL) ,317     ,414  
(A7) We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for 
patient care. (negatively worded) (S)        
(C1) We are given feedback about changes put into place based 
on event reports (FB) ,322      ,398 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 15 iterations. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS)
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Appendix 42: Seven Factors solution (Varimax rotation), structure and 
loading 
 
 
 
Number of 
Factor 
Items Items loading 
(<0.4) 
Strongly loading items 
(>0.4) 
1 A4-B2-B1-C4-A1-C5-C2-A3-
C6- C3-A18-A13-A6-C1 
C3-A18-A13-A6-
C1 
A4-B2-B1-C4-A1-C5-
C2-A3-C6 
2 A2-A13-A18-D11- D1-D2-D4-
D8-D10 
A2-A13-A18-D11 D1-D2-D4-D8-D10 
3 D2-B4-B3- D3-D5-D6-D7-
D11-D9 
D2-B4-B3 D3-D5-D6-D7-D11-
D9 
4 E1-E2-E3  E1-E2-E3 
5 A12-A14-A8-A16-A10 A10 A12-A14-A8-A16 
6 A6-B4 B4 A6 
7 C1 C1  
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Appendix 43: Pattern Matrix (7 factors, 42 items Oblique rotation) 
 
Pattern Matrixa 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor*
1* 2* 3* 4* 5* 6* 7*
(A1)!People!support!one!another!in!this!unit!
(TWWU)!      
v
,328!  
(A3)!When!a!lot!of!work!needs!to!be!done!
quickly,!we!work!together!as!a!team!to!get!the!
work!done!(TWWU)!
    ,319!   
(A4)!In!this!unit,!people!treat!each!other!with!
respect!(TWWU)!      
v
,407!
v
,425!
(A8)!Staff!feel!like!their!mistakes!are!held!
(used)!against!them.!(negatively!worded)!
(NPRE)!
   ,555!    
(A12)!When!an!incident!is!reported,!it!feels!like!
the!person!is!being!reported,!not!the!problem.!
(negatively!worded)!(NPRE)!
   ,436!    
(A14)!We!work!in!'crisis!mode',!trying!to!do!too!
much,!too!quickly!(S)!    ,518!    
(A16)!Staff!worry!that!mistakes!they!make!are!
kept!in!their!personnel!file.(negatively!worded)!
(NRP)!
   ,593!    
(B1)!My!supervisor/manager!says!a!good!word!
when!he/she!sees!a!job!done!according!to!
established!patient!safety!procedures!(SMEA)!
     v,531!  
(B2)!My!supervisor/manager!seriously!
considers!staff!suggestions!for!improving!
patient!safety!(SMEA)!
     v,475!  
(C2)!Staff!will!freely!speak!up!if!they!see!
something!that!may!negatively!affect!patient!
care!(CO)!
     v,536!  
(C4)!Staff!feel!free!to!question!the!decisions!or!
actions!of!those!with!more!authority!(CO)!      
v
,704!  
(C6)!Staff!are!afraid!to!ask!questions!when!
something!does!not!seem!right.!(negatively!
worded)!(CO)!
     v,533!  
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(D1)!Hospital!management!provides!a!work!
climate!that!promotes!patient!safety!(MS)! ,583!       
(D2)!Hospital!units!do!not!coordinate!well!with!
each!other.!(negatively!worded)!(TWAU)! ,511!       
(D3)!Things!'fall!between!the!cracks'!when!
transferring!patients!from!one!unit!to!another!
(negatively!worded)!(HO)!
  ,562!     
(D4)!There!is!good!cooperation!among!hospital!
units!that!need!to!work!together!(TWAU)! ,711!       
(D5)!Important!patient!care!information!is!often!
lost!during!shift!changes.!(negatively!worded)!
(HO)!
  ,597!     
(D6)!It!is!often!unpleasant!to!work!with!staff!
from!other!hospital!units.!(negatively!worded)!
(TWAU)!
  ,451!     
(D7)!Problems!often!occur!in!the!exchange!of!
information!across!hospital!units.!(negatively!
worded)!(HO)!
  ,446!     
(D8)!The!actions!of!hospital!management!show!
that!patient!safety!is!a!top!priority!(MS)! ,501!       
(E1)!When!a!mistake!is!made,!but!is!caught!
and!corrected!before!affecting!the!patient,!how!
often!is!this!reported?!(FER)!
 ,742!      
(E2)!When!a!mistake!is!made,!but!has!no!
potential!to!harm!the!patient,!how!often!is!this!
reported?!(FER)!
 ,870!      
(E3)!When!a!mistake!is!made!that!could!harm!
the!patient,!but!does!not,!how!often!is!this!
reported?!(FER)!
 ,806!      
(A2)!We!have!enough!staff!to!handle!the!
workload!(S)! ,315!       
(A5)!Staff!in!this!unit!work!longer!hours!than!is!
best!for!patient!care!(negatively!worded)!(S)!        
(A6)!We!are!actively!doing!things!to!improve!
patient!safety!(OL)!     ,470!   
(A7)!We!use!more!agency/temporary!staff!than!
is!best!for!patient!care.!(negatively!worded)!(S)!        
(A9)!Mistakes!have!led!to!positive!changes!
here!(OL)!        
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(A10)!It!is!just!by!chance!that!more!serious!
mistakes!don’t!happen!around!here!(negatively!
worded)!(OPPS)!
   ,344!    
(A11)!When!one!area!in!this!unit!gets!really!
busy,!others!help!out!(TWWU)!        
(A13)!After!we!make!changes!to!improve!
patient!safety,!we!evaluate!their!effectiveness!
(OL)!
,302!       
(A15)!Patient!safety!is!never!sacrificed!to!get!
more!work!done!(OPPS)!        
(A17)!We!have!patient!safety!problems!in!this!
unit.!(negatively!worded)!(OPPS)!        
(A18)!Our!policies,!procedures!and!systems!are!
good!at!preventing!errors!from!happening!
(OPPS)!
,314!       
(B3)!Whenever!pressure!builds!up,!my!
supervisor/manager!wants!us!to!work!faster,!
even!if!it!means!taking!shortcuts.!(negatively!
worded)!(SMEA)!
  ,317!     
(B4)!My!supervisor/manager!overlooks!patient!
safety!problems!that!happen!over!and!over.!
(negatively!worded)!(SMEA)!
  ,306!  ,464!   
(C1)!We!are!given!feedback!about!changes!put!
into!place!based!on!event!reports!(FB)!      
v
,380!  
(C3)!We!are!informed!about!errors!that!happen!
in!this!unit!(FB)!      
v
,324!  
(C5)!In!this!unit,!we!discuss!ways!to!prevent!
errors!from!happening!again!(FB)!      
v
,416!  
(D9)!Hospital!management!seems!interested!in!
patient!safety!only!after!an!adverse!event!
happens.!(negatively!worded)!(MS)!
  ,377!     
(D10)!Hospital!units!work!well!together!to!
provide!the!best!care!for!patients!(TWAU)! ,774!       
(D11)!Shift!changes!are!problematic!for!
patients!in!this!hospital.!(negatively!worded)!
(HO)!
  ,388!     
Extraction!Method:!Principal!Axis!Factoring.!!
!Rotation!Method:!Oblimin!with!Kaiser!Normalization.!
a.! Rotation!converged!in!26!iterations.!
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— continuous improvement 
(OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units (TWAU), Communication openness (CO), 
Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management 
support for patient safety (MS), Hospital handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions 
of patient safety (OPPS). 
!
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Appendix 44: Initial and Extracted Communalities (11 factors, 42 items, 
Varimax rotation) 
HSOPSC Item Initial Extraction 
(A1) People support one another in this unit (TWWU) ,368 ,424 
(A2) We have enough staff to handle the workload (S) ,303 ,412 
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to 
get the work done (TWWU) ,408 ,603 
(A4) In this unit, people treat each other with respect (TWWU) ,438 ,554 
(A5) Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care (negatively 
worded) (S) ,154 ,142 
(A6) We are actively doing things to improve patient safety (OL) ,334 ,391 
(A7) We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care. (negatively 
worded) (S) ,205 ,263 
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are held (used) against them. (negatively worded) 
(NPRE) ,307 ,383 
(A9) Mistakes have led to positive changes here (OL) ,190 ,179 
(A10) It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around here 
(negatively worded) (OPPS) ,183 ,219 
(A11) When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out (TWWU) ,259 ,257 
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(A12) When an incident is reported, it feels like the person is being reported, not the 
problem. (negatively worded) (NPRE) ,317 ,389 
(A13) After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their 
effectiveness (OL) ,389 ,394 
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', trying to do too much, too quickly (S) ,309 ,460 
(A15) Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done (OPPS) ,139 ,125 
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel 
file.(negatively worded) (NRP) ,299 ,398 
(A17) We have patient safety problems in this unit. (negatively worded) (OPPS) ,185 ,144 
(A18) Our policies, procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from 
happening (OPPS) ,384 ,455 
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done 
according to established patient safety procedures (SMEA) ,547 ,726 
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving 
patient safety (SMEA) ,570 ,637 
(B3) Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, 
even if it means taking shortcuts. (negatively worded) (SMEA) ,268 ,325 
(B4) My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen over and 
over. (negatively worded) (SMEA) ,317 ,435 
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(C1) We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports 
(FB) ,366 ,439 
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect 
patient care (CO) ,369 ,485 
(C3) We are informed about errors that happen in this unit (FB) ,338 ,393 
(C4) Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority 
(CO) ,425 ,545 
(C5) In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again (FB) ,422 ,404 
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right. 
(negatively worded) (CO) ,349 ,388 
(D1) Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety 
(MS) ,507 ,549 
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other. (negatively worded) 
(TWAU) ,512 ,558 
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' when transferring patients from one unit to 
another (negatively worded) (HO) ,338 ,399 
(D4) There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together 
(TWAU) ,602 ,682 
(D5) Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. 
(negatively worded) (HO) ,371 ,471 
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(D6) It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) ,263 ,285 
(D7) Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (HO) ,340 ,378 
(D8) The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority 
(MS) ,487 ,545 
(D9) Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse 
event happens. (negatively worded) (MS) ,409 ,415 
(D10) Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients 
(TWAU) ,616 ,693 
(D11) Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital. (negatively 
worded) (HO) ,411 ,447 
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the 
patient, how often is this reported? (FER) ,528 ,575 
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is 
this reported? (FER) ,651 ,775 
(E3) When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is 
this reported? (FER) ,577 ,649 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
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Appendix 45: Total Variance Explained by 11 factors (42 items, Varimax 
rotation) 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 8,634 20,556 20,556 8,121 19,337 19,337 2,430 5,785 5,785 
2 2,690 6,405 26,961 2,259 5,378 24,715 2,376 5,656 11,442 
3 2,277 5,421 32,382 1,735 4,131 28,846 2,214 5,271 16,712 
4 1,845 4,394 36,776 1,329 3,164 32,010 1,836 4,372 21,084 
5 1,655 3,940 40,716 1,130 2,691 34,701 1,754 4,176 25,260 
6 1,416 3,371 44,087 ,830 1,975 36,676 1,617 3,850 29,110 
7 1,317 3,137 47,223 ,713 1,697 38,373 1,602 3,814 32,923 
8 1,251 2,979 50,202 ,698 1,663 40,036 1,444 3,437 36,360 
9 1,129 2,688 52,890 ,649 1,545 41,580 1,266 3,013 39,374 
10 1,087 2,587 55,478 ,516 1,228 42,809 ,931 2,217 41,590 
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11 1,023 2,435 57,913 ,409 ,975 43,784 ,921 2,193 43,784 
12 1,013 2,411 60,323       
13 ,942 2,243 62,566       
14 ,932 2,218 64,784       
15 ,872 2,077 66,861       
16 ,807 1,921 68,782       
17 ,790 1,882 70,664       
18 ,751 1,788 72,453       
19 ,734 1,749 74,201       
20 ,708 1,685 75,886       
21 ,669 1,593 77,479       
22 ,646 1,537 79,016       
23 ,630 1,500 80,516       
24 ,624 1,485 82,002       
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25 ,597 1,422 83,424       
26 ,561 1,336 84,760       
27 ,540 1,286 86,046       
28 ,507 1,207 87,253       
29 ,501 1,193 88,446       
30 ,490 1,167 89,613       
31 ,472 1,125 90,737       
32 ,459 1,093 91,831       
33 ,435 1,036 92,867       
34 ,419 ,999 93,865       
35 ,407 ,970 94,836       
36 ,396 ,944 95,779       
37 ,376 ,895 96,674       
38 ,344 ,819 97,493       
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39 ,311 ,739 98,232       
40 ,275 ,656 98,888       
41 ,254 ,605 99,493       
42 ,213 ,507 100,000       
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
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Appendix 46: Rotated Factor Matrix (11 factors, 42 items, Varimax rotation) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(D4) There is good cooperation 
among hospital units that need to 
work together (TWAU) 
,738           
(D10) Hospital units work well 
together to provide the best care for 
patients (TWAU) 
,720           
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate 
well with each other. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) 
,559 ,332          
(D1) Hospital management provides a 
work climate that promotes patient 
safety (MS) 
,437          ,399 
(D5) Important patient care 
information is often lost during shift 
changes. (negatively worded) (HO) 
 ,630          
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' 
when transferring patients from one 
unit to another (negatively worded) 
(HO) 
 ,586          
(D7) Problems often occur in the 
exchange of information across 
hospital units. (negatively worded) 
(HO) 
 ,505          
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(D6) It is often unpleasant to work 
with staff from other hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (TWAU) 
 ,480          
(D11) Shift changes are problematic 
for patients in this hospital. 
(negatively worded) (HO) 
 ,417       ,305   
(D9) Hospital management seems 
interested in patient safety only after 
an adverse event happens. (negatively 
worded) (MS) 
 ,398          
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has 
no potential to harm the patient, how 
often is this reported? (FER) 
  ,848         
(E3) When a mistake is made that 
could harm the patient, but does not, 
how often is this reported? (FER) 
  ,784         
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is 
caught and corrected before affecting 
the patient, how often is this reported? 
(FER) 
  ,741         
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be 
done quickly, we work together as a 
team to get the work done (TWWU) 
   ,681        
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(A4) In this unit, people treat each 
other with respect (TWWU)    ,584    ,359    
(A1) People support one another in 
this unit (TWWU)    ,559        
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they 
make are kept in their personnel 
file.(negatively worded) (NRP) 
    ,577       
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are 
held (used) against them. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
    ,562       
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', trying 
to do too much, too quickly (S)     ,488     ,425  
(A12) When an incident is reported, it 
feels like the person is being reported, 
not the problem. (negatively worded) 
(NPRE) 
    ,474 ,327      
(A10) It is just by chance that more 
serious mistakes don’t happen around 
here (negatively worded) (OPPS) 
    ,337       
(A17) We have patient safety 
problems in this unit. (negatively 
worded) (OPPS) 
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(C3) We are informed about errors 
that happen in this unit (FB)      ,489      
(A18) Our policies, procedures and 
systems are good at preventing errors 
from happening (OPPS) 
     ,450      
(C1) We are given feedback about 
changes put into place based on event 
reports (FB) 
     ,421      
(A9) Mistakes have led to positive 
changes here (OL)      ,335      
(A13) After we make changes to 
improve patient safety, we evaluate 
their effectiveness (OL) 
     ,320      
(C4) Staff feel free to question the 
decisions or actions of those with 
more authority (CO) 
      ,636     
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they 
see something that may negatively 
affect patient care (CO) 
     ,335 ,554     
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions 
when something does not seem right. 
(negatively worded) (CO) 
      ,513     
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(C5) In this unit, we discuss ways to 
prevent errors from happening again 
(FB) 
      ,314     
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a 
good word when he/she sees a job 
done according to established patient 
safety procedures (SMEA) 
       ,745    
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously 
considers staff suggestions for 
improving patient safety (SMEA) 
       ,583    
(B4) My supervisor/manager 
overlooks patient safety problems that 
happen over and over. (negatively 
worded) (SMEA) 
        ,552   
(A6) We are actively doing things to 
improve patient safety (OL)    ,359     ,379   
(A7) We use more agency/temporary 
staff than is best for patient care. 
(negatively worded) (S) 
        ,376   
(B3) Whenever pressure builds up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us to work 
faster, even if it means taking 
shortcuts. (negatively worded) 
(SMEA) 
 ,348       ,363   
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(A5) Staff in this unit work longer 
hours than is best for patient care 
(negatively worded) (S) 
           
(A2) We have enough staff to handle 
the workload (S)          ,528  
(A11) When one area in this unit gets 
really busy, others help out (TWWU)          ,326  
(D8) The actions of hospital 
management show that patient safety 
is a top priority (MS) 
,371          ,494 
(A15) Patient safety is never 
sacrificed to get more work done 
(OPPS) 
           
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 13 iterations. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 47: Eleven Factors solution (Varimax rotation), structure and 
loading  
Number of 
Factor 
Items Items loading 
(<0.4) 
Strongly loading 
(>0.4) 
1 D4-D10-D2-D1-D8 D8 D4-D10-D2-D1 
2 D5-D3-D7-D6-D11- B3-D2-D9 B3-D2-D9 D5-D3-D7-D6-D11 
3 E1-E2-E3  E1-E2-E3 
4 A3-A4-A1-A6 A6 A3-A4-A1 
5 A12-A14-A8-A16-A10 A10 A12-A14-A8-A16 
6 C3-A18-C1- A12-A9-A13-C2 A12-A9-A13-C2 C3-A18-C1 
7 C6-C2-C4-C5 C5 C6-C2-C4 
8 B1-B2-A4 A4 B1-B2 
9 B4- B3-A6-A7-D11 B3-A6-A7-D11 B4 
10 A14-A2-A11 A11 A14-A2 
11 D8-D1 D1 D8 
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Appendix 48: Pattern Matrix (11 factors, 42 items, Oblique rotation) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(D4) There is good 
cooperation among 
hospital units that 
need to work 
together (TWAU) 
,762           
(D10) Hospital 
units work well 
together to provide 
the best care for 
patients (TWAU) 
,731           
(D2) Hospital units 
do not coordinate 
well with each 
other. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) 
,545           
(D1) Hospital 
management 
provides a work 
climate that 
promotes patient 
safety (MS) 
,369         ,353  
(E2) When a 
mistake is made, 
but has no potential 
to harm the patient, 
how often is this 
reported? (FER) 
 ,864          
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(E3) When a 
mistake is made 
that could harm the 
patient, but does 
not, how often is 
this reported? 
(FER) 
 ,808          
(E1) When a 
mistake is made, 
but is caught and 
corrected before 
affecting the 
patient, how often 
is this reported? 
(FER) 
 ,762          
(D5) Important 
patient care 
information is 
often lost during 
shift changes. 
(negatively 
worded) (HO) 
  ,618         
(D3) Things 'fall 
between the cracks' 
when transferring 
patients from one 
unit to another 
(negatively 
worded) (HO) 
  ,584         
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(D6) It is often 
unpleasant to work 
with staff from 
other hospital 
units. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) 
  ,481         
(D7) Problems 
often occur in the 
exchange of 
information across 
hospital units. 
(negatively 
worded) (HO) 
  ,456         
(D9) Hospital 
management seems 
interested in 
patient safety only 
after an adverse 
event happens. 
(negatively 
worded) (MS) 
           
(D11) Shift 
changes are 
problematic for 
patients in this 
hospital. 
(negatively 
worded) (HO) 
           
(A17) We have 
patient safety 
problems in this 
unit. (negatively 
worded) (OPPS) 
           
Appendices  568 
 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(A16) Staff worry 
that mistakes they 
make are kept in 
their personnel file. 
(negatively 
worded) (NRP) 
   ,598        
(A8) Staff feel like 
their mistakes are 
held (used) against 
them. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
   ,527        
(A12) When an 
incident is 
reported, it feels 
like the person is 
being reported, not 
the problem. 
(negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
   ,432       -,334 
(A10) It is just by 
chance that more 
serious mistakes 
don’t happen 
around here 
(negatively 
worded) (OPPS) 
           
(B4) My 
supervisor/manager 
overlooks patient 
safety problems 
that happen over 
and over. 
(negatively 
worded) (SMEA) 
    ,564       
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(B3) Whenever 
pressure builds up, 
my 
supervisor/manager 
wants us to work 
faster, even if it 
means taking 
shortcuts. 
(negatively 
worded) (SMEA) 
    ,388       
(A7) We use more 
agency/temporary 
staff than is best 
for patient care. 
(negatively 
worded) (S) 
    ,375       
(A6) We are 
actively doing 
things to improve 
patient safety (OL) 
    ,330    ,329   
(A5) Staff in this 
unit work longer 
hours than is best 
for patient care 
(negatively 
worded) (S) 
           
(C4) Staff feel free 
to question the 
decisions or actions 
of those with more 
authority (CO) 
     -,623      
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(C2) Staff will 
freely speak up if 
they see something 
that may negatively 
affect patient care 
(CO) 
     -,559      
(C6) Staff are 
afraid to ask 
questions when 
something does not 
seem right. 
(negatively 
worded) (CO) 
     -,516      
(C5) In this unit, 
we discuss ways to 
prevent errors from 
happening again 
(FB) 
           
(A2) We have 
enough staff to 
handle the 
workload (S) 
      ,520     
(A14) We work in 
'crisis mode', trying 
to do too much, too 
quickly (S) 
   ,406   ,451     
Appendices  571 
 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(A11) When one 
area in this unit 
gets really busy, 
others help out 
(TWWU) 
           
(B1) My 
supervisor/manager 
says a good word 
when he/she sees a 
job done according 
to established 
patient safety 
procedures 
(SMEA) 
       ,811    
(B2) My 
supervisor/manager 
seriously considers 
staff suggestions 
for improving 
patient safety 
(SMEA) 
       ,606    
(A3) When a lot of 
work needs to be 
done quickly, we 
work together as a 
team to get the 
work done 
(TWWU) 
        ,735   
(A1) People 
support one another 
in this unit 
(TWWU) 
        ,562   
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(A4) In this unit, 
people treat each 
other with respect 
(TWWU) 
       ,339 ,526   
(D8) The actions of 
hospital 
management show 
that patient safety 
is a top priority 
(MS) 
,310         ,460  
(A15) Patient 
safety is never 
sacrificed to get 
more work done 
(OPPS) 
           
(C3) We are 
informed about 
errors that happen 
in this unit (FB) 
          -,472 
(A18) Our policies, 
procedures and 
systems are good at 
preventing errors 
from happening 
(OPPS) 
          -,402 
(C1) We are given 
feedback about 
changes put into 
place based on 
event reports (FB) 
          -,350 
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(A9) Mistakes have 
led to positive 
changes here (OL) 
          -,310 
(A13) After we 
make changes to 
improve patient 
safety, we evaluate 
their effectiveness 
(OL) 
           
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 24 iterations. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 49: Initial and Extracted Communalities (10 factors, 42 items, 
Varimax rotation) 
HSOPSC Item 
 Initial Extraction 
(A1) People support one another in this unit (TWWU) ,368 ,354 
(A2) We have enough staff to handle the workload (S) ,303 ,420 
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to 
get the work done (TWWU) ,408 ,592 
(A4) In this unit, people treat each other with respect (TWWU) ,438 ,530 
(A5) Staff in this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care (negatively 
worded) (S) ,154 ,133 
(A6) We are actively doing things to improve patient safety (OL) ,334 ,378 
(A7) We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care. (negatively 
worded) (S) ,205 ,239 
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are held (used) against them. (negatively worded) 
(NPRE) ,307 ,385 
(A9) Mistakes have led to positive changes here (OL) ,190 ,163 
(A10) It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t happen around here 
(negatively worded) (OPPS) ,183 ,216 
(A11) When one area in this unit gets really busy, others help out (TWWU) ,259 ,257 
(A12) When an incident is reported, it feels like the person is being reported, not the 
problem. (negatively worded) (NPRE) ,317 ,336 
(A13) After we make changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their 
effectiveness (OL) ,389 ,394 
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', trying to do too much, too quickly (S) ,309 ,430 
(A15) Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done (OPPS) ,139 ,115 
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel 
file.(negatively worded) (NRP) ,299 ,396 
(A17) We have patient safety problems in this unit. (negatively worded) (OPPS) ,185 ,143 
(A18) Our policies, procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from 
happening (OPPS) ,384 ,433 
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done 
according to established patient safety procedures (SMEA) ,547 ,742 
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving 
patient safety (SMEA) ,570 ,612 
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HSOPSC Item 
 Initial Extraction 
(B3) Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, 
even if it means taking shortcuts. (negatively worded) (SMEA) ,268 ,323 
(B4) My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen over and 
over. (negatively worded) (SMEA) ,317 ,387 
(C1) We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports 
(FB) ,366 ,435 
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect 
patient care (CO) ,369 ,500 
(C3) We are informed about errors that happen in this unit (FB) ,338 ,342 
(C4) Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority 
(CO) ,425 ,506 
(C5) In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from happening again (FB) ,422 ,407 
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right. 
(negatively worded) (CO) ,349 ,344 
(D1) Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety 
(MS) ,507 ,538 
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other. (negatively worded) 
(TWAU) ,512 ,560 
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' when transferring patients from one unit to 
another (negatively worded) (HO) ,338 ,401 
(D4) There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together 
(TWAU) ,602 ,677 
(D5) Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. 
(negatively worded) (HO) ,371 ,477 
(D6) It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) ,263 ,273 
(D7) Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (HO) ,340 ,369 
(D8) The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority 
(MS) ,487 ,550 
(D9) Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse 
event happens. (negatively worded) (MS) ,409 ,416 
(D10) Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients 
(TWAU) ,616 ,671 
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HSOPSC Item 
 Initial Extraction 
(D11) Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital. (negatively 
worded) (HO) ,411 ,438 
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the 
patient, how often is this reported? (FER) ,528 ,575 
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often is 
this reported? (FER) ,651 ,773 
(E3) When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how often is 
this reported? (FER) ,577 ,647 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 50: Total Variance Explained (10 factors, 42 items, Varimax 
rotation) 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 8,634 20,556 20,556 8,110 19,309 19,309 2,650 6,310 6,310 
2 2,690 6,405 26,961 2,248 5,353 24,662 2,229 5,308 11,618 
3 2,277 5,421 32,382 1,727 4,111 28,773 2,216 5,277 16,895 
4 1,845 4,394 36,776 1,316 3,134 31,907 2,035 4,845 21,740 
5 1,655 3,940 40,716 1,116 2,656 34,564 1,963 4,673 26,413 
6 1,416 3,371 44,087 ,814 1,938 36,502 1,854 4,414 30,827 
7 1,317 3,137 47,223 ,704 1,676 38,178 1,436 3,418 34,245 
8 1,251 2,979 50,202 ,691 1,646 39,824 1,366 3,253 37,498 
9 1,129 2,688 52,890 ,639 1,520 41,345 1,229 2,927 40,425 
10 1,087 2,587 55,478 ,511 1,217 42,562 ,897 2,137 42,562 
11 1,023 2,435 57,913       
12 1,013 2,411 60,323       
13 ,942 2,243 62,566       
14 ,932 2,218 64,784       
15 ,872 2,077 66,861       
16 ,807 1,921 68,782       
17 ,790 1,882 70,664       
18 ,751 1,788 72,453       
19 ,734 1,749 74,201       
20 ,708 1,685 75,886       
21 ,669 1,593 77,479       
22 ,646 1,537 79,016       
23 ,630 1,500 80,516       
24 ,624 1,485 82,002       
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Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
25 ,597 1,422 83,424       
26 ,561 1,336 84,760       
27 ,540 1,286 86,046       
28 ,507 1,207 87,253       
29 ,501 1,193 88,446       
30 ,490 1,167 89,613       
31 ,472 1,125 90,737       
32 ,459 1,093 91,831       
33 ,435 1,036 92,867       
34 ,419 ,999 93,865       
35 ,407 ,970 94,836       
36 ,396 ,944 95,779       
37 ,376 ,895 96,674       
38 ,344 ,819 97,493       
39 ,311 ,739 98,232       
40 ,275 ,656 98,888       
41 ,254 ,605 99,493       
42 ,213 ,507 100,000       
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. %, Percentage. 
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Appendix 51: Rotated Factor Matrix (10 factors, 42 items, Varimax rotation) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(D8) The actions of hospital management 
show that patient safety is a top priority 
(MS) 
,646          
(D1) Hospital management provides a work 
climate that promotes patient safety (MS) ,567          
(D10) Hospital units work well together to 
provide the best care for patients (TWAU) ,533       ,509   
(A18) Our policies, procedures and systems 
are good at preventing errors from 
happening (OPPS) 
,510          
(A13) After we make changes to improve 
patient safety, we evaluate their 
effectiveness (OL) 
,386          
(A9) Mistakes have led to positive changes 
here (OL)           
(D5) Important patient care information is 
often lost during shift changes. (negatively 
worded) (HO) 
 ,639         
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' when 
transferring patients from one unit to 
another (negatively worded) (HO) 
 ,589         
(D6) It is often unpleasant to work with staff 
from other hospital units. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) 
 ,468         
(D7) Problems often occur in the exchange 
of information across hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (HO) 
 ,465         
(D9) Hospital management seems interested 
in patient safety only after an adverse event 
happens. (negatively worded) (MS) 
,377 ,379         
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has no 
potential to harm the patient, how often is 
this reported? (FER) 
  ,848        
(E3) When a mistake is made that could 
harm the patient, but does not, how often is 
this reported? (FER) 
  ,785        
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is caught 
and corrected before affecting the patient, 
how often is this reported? (FER) 
  ,741        
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be done 
quickly, we work together as a team to get 
the work done (TWWU) 
   ,698       
(A4) In this unit, people treat each other 
with respect (TWWU)    ,562   ,369    
(A1) People support one another in this unit 
(TWWU)    ,489       
(A6) We are actively doing things to 
improve patient safety (OL) ,315   ,449       
(A15) Patient safety is never sacrificed to 
get more work done (OPPS)           
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they see 
something that may negatively affect patient 
care (CO) 
    ,641      
(C4) Staff feel free to question the decisions 
or actions of those with more authority (CO)     ,565      
(C1) We are given feedback about changes 
put into place based on event reports (FB)     ,446      
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions when 
something does not seem right. (negatively 
worded) (CO) 
    ,443      
(C3) We are informed about errors that 
happen in this unit (FB)     ,404      
(C5) In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent 
errors from happening again (FB)    ,301 ,349      
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are held 
(used) against them. (negatively worded) 
(NPRE) 
     ,572     
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they make 
are kept in their personnel file. (negatively 
worded) (NRP) 
     ,568     
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', trying to do 
too much, too quickly (S)      ,506    ,379 
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(A12) When an incident is reported, it feels 
like the person is being reported, not the 
problem. (negatively worded) (NPRE) 
     ,456     
(A10) It is just by chance that more serious 
mistakes don’t happen around here 
(negatively worded) (OPPS) 
     ,359     
(A5) Staff in this unit work longer hours 
than is best for patient care (negatively 
worded) (S) 
          
(A17) We have patient safety problems in 
this unit. (negatively worded) (OPPS)           
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a good 
word when he/she sees a job done according 
to established patient safety procedures 
(SMEA) 
      ,760    
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously 
considers staff suggestions for improving 
patient safety (SMEA) 
   ,339   ,555    
(D4) There is good cooperation among 
hospital units that need to work together 
(TWAU) 
,366       ,635   
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate well 
with each other. (negatively worded) 
(TWAU) 
,307 ,322      ,492   
(B4) My supervisor/manager overlooks 
patient safety problems that happen over and 
over. (negatively worded) (SMEA) 
        ,484  
(B3) Whenever pressure builds up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, 
even if it means taking shortcuts. (negatively 
worded) (SMEA) 
 ,308       ,439  
(D11) Shift changes are problematic for 
patients in this hospital. (negatively worded) 
(HO) 
 ,349       ,409  
(A2) We have enough staff to handle the 
workload (S)          ,540 
(A11) When one area in this unit gets really 
busy, others help out (TWWU)          ,328 
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(A7) We use more agency/temporary staff 
than is best for patient care. (negatively 
worded) (S) 
          
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a.! Rotation converged in 12 iterations. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 52: Ten Factors solution (Varimax rotation), structure and loading  
Number of 
Factor 
Items Loading (<0.4) Strongly loading 
(>0.4) 
1 D8-D1-D10-A18- A13-D9-A6-
D4-D2 
A13-D9-A6-D4-D2 D8-D1-D10-A18 
2 D6-D7-D3-D5- D11-B3-D2-D9 D11-B3-D2-D9 D6-D7-D3-D5 
3 E1-E2-E3  E1-E2-E3 
4 A3-A4-A1-A6- B2-C5 B2-C5 A3-A4-A1-A6 
5 C2-C4-C1-C6-C3-C5 C5 C2-C4-C1-C6-C3 
6 A12-A14-A16-A8-A10 A10 A12-A14-A16-A8 
7 B1-B2-A4 A4 B1-B2 
8 D2-D4-D10  D2-D4-D10 
9 B3-B4-D11  B3-B4-D11 
10 A2- A11-A14 A11-A14 A2 
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Appendix 53: Pattern Matrix (10 Factors, 42 items, Oblique Rotation) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(D8) The actions of hospital 
management show that patient safety is 
a top priority (MS) 
,562          
(D1) Hospital management provides a 
work climate that promotes patient 
safety (MS) 
,419          
(A18) Our policies, procedures and 
systems are good at preventing errors 
from happening (OPPS) 
,371       ,331   
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has 
no potential to harm the patient, how 
often is this reported? (FER) 
 ,868         
(E3) When a mistake is made that could 
harm the patient, but does not, how 
often is this reported? (FER) 
 ,813         
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is 
caught and corrected before affecting 
the patient, how often is this reported? 
(FER) 
 ,765         
(D5) Important patient care information 
is often lost during shift changes. 
(negatively worded) (HO) 
  ,635        
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' 
when transferring patients from one unit 
to another (negatively worded) (HO) 
  ,585        
(D6) It is often unpleasant to work with 
staff from other hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (TWAU) 
  ,457        
(D7) Problems often occur in the 
exchange of information across hospital 
units. (negatively worded) (HO) 
  ,421        
(D9) Hospital management seems 
interested in patient safety only after an 
adverse event happens. (negatively 
worded) (MS) 
          
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they 
make are kept in their personnel file. 
(negatively worded) (NRP) 
   ,603       
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are 
held (used) against them. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
   ,558       
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', trying 
to do too much, too quickly (S)    ,500   ,362    
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(A12) When an incident is reported, it 
feels like the person is being reported, 
not the problem. (negatively worded) 
(NPRE) 
   ,411       
(A10) It is just by chance that more 
serious mistakes don’t happen around 
here (negatively worded) (OPPS) 
   ,318       
(A5) Staff in this unit work longer 
hours than is best for patient care 
(negatively worded) (S) 
          
(A17) We have patient safety problems 
in this unit. (negatively worded) (OPPS)           
(A15) Patient safety is never sacrificed 
to get more work done (OPPS)           
(B4) My supervisor/manager overlooks 
patient safety problems that happen 
over and over. (negatively worded) 
(SMEA) 
    ,460      
(B3) Whenever pressure builds up, my 
supervisor/manager wants us to work 
faster, even if it means taking shortcuts. 
(negatively worded) (SMEA) 
    ,437      
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(D11) Shift changes are problematic for 
patients in this hospital. (negatively 
worded) (HO) 
    ,387      
(A13) After we make changes to 
improve patient safety, we evaluate 
their effectiveness (OL) 
          
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they 
see something that may negatively 
affect patient care (CO) 
     -,690     
(C4) Staff feel free to question the 
decisions or actions of those with more 
authority (CO) 
     -,521     
(C1) We are given feedback about 
changes put into place based on event 
reports (FB) 
     -,438     
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions 
when something does not seem right. 
(negatively worded) (CO) 
     -,422     
(C3) We are informed about errors that 
happen in this unit (FB)      
-
,404     
(C5) In this unit, we discuss ways to 
prevent errors from happening again 
(FB) 
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(A9) Mistakes have led to positive 
changes here (OL)           
(A2) We have enough staff to handle 
the workload (S)       ,532    
(A7) We use more agency/temporary 
staff than is best for patient care. 
(negatively worded) (S) 
          
(A11) When one area in this unit gets 
really busy, others help out (TWWU)           
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a 
good word when he/she sees a job done 
according to established patient safety 
procedures (SMEA) 
       ,878   
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously 
considers staff suggestions for 
improving patient safety (SMEA) 
       ,623   
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be 
done quickly, we work together as a 
team to get the work done (TWWU) 
        ,747  
(A6) We are actively doing things to 
improve patient safety (OL)         ,453  
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(A4) In this unit, people treat each other 
with respect (TWWU)        ,414 ,441  
(A1) People support one another in this 
unit (TWWU)         ,428  
(D4) There is good cooperation among 
hospital units that need to work together 
(TWAU) 
         -,705 
(D10) Hospital units work well together 
to provide the best care for patients 
(TWAU) 
         -,615 
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate 
well with each other. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) 
         -,530 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a.! Rotation converged in 37 iterations. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 54: Initial and Extracted Communalities (8 factors, 27 items, 
Oblique rotation) 
 
HSOPSC Item 
Initial Extraction 
(A1) People support one another in this unit (TWWU) ,357 ,492 
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a 
team to get the work done (TWWU) ,308 ,408 
(A4) In this unit, people treat each other with respect (TWWU) ,410 ,531 
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are held (used) against them. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) ,259 ,344 
(A12) When an incident is reported, it feels like the person is being 
reported, not the problem. (negatively worded) (NPRE) ,290 ,321 
(A14) We work in 'crisis mode', trying to do too much, too quickly (S) ,209 ,241 
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file. 
(negatively worded) (NRP) ,266 ,407 
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done 
according to established patient safety procedures (SMEA) ,493 ,707 
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for 
improving patient safety (SMEA) ,556 ,644 
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively 
affect patient care (CO) ,320 ,495 
(C4) Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more 
authority (CO) ,380 ,444 
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right. 
(negatively worded) (CO) ,323 ,362 
(D1) Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient 
safety (MS) ,473 ,552 
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other. (negatively 
worded) (TWAU) ,480 ,525 
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' when transferring patients from one 
unit to another (negatively worded) (HO) ,306 ,450 
(D4) There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work 
together (TWAU) ,593 ,765 
(D5) Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. 
(negatively worded) (HO) ,338 ,469 
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HSOPSC Item 
Initial Extraction 
(D6) It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (TWAU) ,255 ,290 
(D7) Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital 
units. (negatively worded) (HO) ,275 ,312 
(D8) The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top 
priority (MS) ,441 ,544 
(D10) Hospital units work well together to provide the best care for patients 
(TWAU) ,601 ,678 
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting 
the patient, how often is this reported? (FER) ,517 ,597 
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how 
often is this reported? (FER) ,625 ,757 
(E3) When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how 
often is this reported? (FER) ,540 ,642 
(B4) My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen 
over and over. (negatively worded) (SMEA) ,198 ,200 
(C1) We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event 
reports (FB) ,335 ,359 
(C3) We are informed about errors that happen in this unit (FB) ,282 ,288 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 55: Total Variance Explained (8 factors, 27 items, Oblique 
rotation) 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadingsa 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 6,281 23,265 23,265 5,798 21,475 21,475 2,683 
2 2,495 9,242 32,507 2,096 7,764 29,239 2,520 
3 1,843 6,827 39,334 1,346 4,987 34,226 2,747 
4 1,658 6,140 45,474 1,059 3,922 38,148 2,293 
5 1,410 5,221 50,695 ,917 3,397 41,545 3,082 
6 1,207 4,471 55,166 ,655 2,424 43,969 2,778 
7 1,000 3,704 58,870 ,519 1,922 45,891 3,016 
8 ,946 3,505 62,375 ,433 1,602 47,493 2,241 
9 ,922 3,416 65,792     
10 ,873 3,232 69,023     
11 ,760 2,816 71,839     
12 ,694 2,571 74,410     
13 ,676 2,503 76,913     
14 ,645 2,389 79,302     
15 ,602 2,230 81,532     
16 ,589 2,180 83,712     
17 ,547 2,027 85,739     
18 ,511 1,892 87,631     
19 ,482 1,787 89,417     
20 ,454 1,680 91,098     
21 ,453 1,676 92,774     
22 ,414 1,532 94,306     
23 ,380 1,407 95,713     
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24 ,350 1,297 97,010     
25 ,305 1,129 98,139     
26 ,275 1,019 99,158     
27 ,227 ,842 100,000     
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Appendix 56: Pattern Matrix (8 factors, 27 items, Oblique rotation) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(D4) There is good 
cooperation among 
hospital units that 
need to work together 
(TWAU) 
,773        
(D10) Hospital units 
work well together to 
provide the best care 
for patients (TWAU) 
,594       -,332 
(D2) Hospital units do 
not coordinate well 
with each other. 
(negatively worded) 
(TWAU) 
,455        
(E2) When a mistake 
is made, but has no 
potential to harm the 
patient, how often is 
this reported? (FER) 
 ,853       
(E3) When a mistake 
is made that could 
harm the patient, but 
does not, how often is 
this reported? (FER) 
 ,788       
(E1) When a mistake 
is made, but is caught 
and corrected before 
affecting the patient, 
how often is this 
reported? (FER) 
 ,777       
(D3) Things 'fall 
between the cracks' 
when transferring 
patients from one unit 
to another (negatively 
worded) (HO) 
  -,670      
(D5) Important patient 
care information is 
often lost during shift 
changes. (negatively 
worded) (HO) 
  -,652      
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(D6) It is often 
unpleasant to work 
with staff from other 
hospital units. 
(negatively worded) 
(TWAU) 
  -,482      
(D7) Problems often 
occur in the exchange 
of information across 
hospital units. 
(negatively worded) 
(HO) 
  -,432      
(B4) My 
supervisor/manager 
overlooks patient 
safety problems that 
happen over and over. 
(negatively worded) 
(SMEA) 
  -,312      
(A16) Staff worry that 
mistakes they make 
are kept in their 
personnel file. 
(negatively worded) 
(NRP) 
   ,637     
(A8) Staff feel like 
their mistakes are held 
(used) against them. 
(negatively worded) 
(NPRE) 
   ,548     
(A14) We work in 
'crisis mode', trying to 
do too much, too 
quickly (S) 
   ,489     
(A12) When an 
incident is reported, it 
feels like the person is 
being reported, not the 
problem. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
   ,482     
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(B1) My 
supervisor/manager 
says a good word 
when he/she sees a job 
done according to 
established patient 
safety procedures 
(SMEA) 
    ,842    
(B2) My 
supervisor/manager 
seriously considers 
staff suggestions for 
improving patient 
safety (SMEA) 
    ,650    
(C2) Staff will freely 
speak up if they see 
something that may 
negatively affect 
patient care (CO) 
     -,669   
(C4) Staff feel free to 
question the decisions 
or actions of those 
with more authority 
(CO) 
     -,457   
(C1) We are given 
feedback about 
changes put into place 
based on event reports 
(FB) 
     -,415   
(C6) Staff are afraid to 
ask questions when 
something does not 
seem right. 
(negatively worded) 
(CO) 
     -,414   
(C3) We are informed 
about errors that 
happen in this unit 
(FB) 
     -,364   
(A1) People support 
one another in this 
unit (TWWU) 
      ,691  
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(A3) When a lot of 
work needs to be done 
quickly, we work 
together as a team to 
get the work done 
(TWWU) 
      ,625  
(A4) In this unit, 
people treat each other 
with respect (TWWU) 
      ,593  
(D8) The actions of 
hospital management 
show that patient 
safety is a top priority 
(MS) 
       -,610 
(D1) Hospital 
management provides 
a work climate that 
promotes patient 
safety (MS) 
       -,524 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a.! Rotation converged in 24 iterations. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 57: Initial and Extracted Communalities (8 factors 24 items 
Oblique rotation) 
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Appendix 58: Total Variance Explained (8 factors, 24 items Oblique rotation) 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadingsa 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 5,532 23,048 23,048 5,046 21,024 21,024 2,719 
2 2,461 10,255 33,304 2,074 8,640 29,664 2,383 
3 1,813 7,552 40,856 1,287 5,361 35,025 2,324 
4 1,623 6,764 47,620 1,027 4,280 39,305 2,161 
5 1,194 4,974 52,595 ,684 2,849 42,154 1,815 
6 1,128 4,699 57,294 ,592 2,466 44,619 2,277 
7 ,949 3,954 61,248 ,507 2,112 46,731 2,740 
8 ,916 3,816 65,065 ,404 1,684 48,415 2,412 
9 ,823 3,430 68,494     
10 ,812 3,385 71,879     
11 ,737 3,073 74,952     
12 ,663 2,762 77,714     
13 ,602 2,509 80,223     
14 ,588 2,450 82,674     
15 ,551 2,296 84,970     
16 ,535 2,230 87,200     
17 ,503 2,094 89,294     
18 ,462 1,925 91,219     
19 ,436 1,818 93,037     
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20 ,398 1,660 94,696     
21 ,369 1,537 96,234     
22 ,351 1,463 97,697     
23 ,299 1,245 98,941     
24 ,254 1,059 100,000     
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Appendix 59: Pattern Matrix (8 factors, 24 items, Oblique rotation) 
HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(B1) My 
supervisor/manager 
says a good word 
when he/she sees a job 
done according to 
established patient 
safety procedures 
(SMEA) 
,823        
(B2) My 
supervisor/manager 
seriously considers 
staff suggestions for 
improving patient 
safety (SMEA) 
,629        
(E2) When a mistake 
is made, but has no 
potential to harm the 
patient, how often is 
this reported? (FER) 
 ,855       
(E3) When a mistake 
is made that could 
harm the patient, but 
does not, how often is 
this reported? (FER) 
 ,788       
(E1) When a mistake 
is made, but is caught 
and corrected before 
affecting the patient, 
how often is this 
reported? (FER) 
 ,774       
(D3) Things 'fall 
between the cracks' 
when transferring 
patients from one unit 
to another (negatively 
worded) (HO) 
  ,643      
(D5) Important patient 
care information is 
often lost during shift 
changes. (negatively 
worded) (HO) 
  ,634      
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(D6) It is often 
unpleasant to work 
with staff from other 
hospital units. 
(negatively worded) 
(TWAU) 
  ,512      
(D7) Problems often 
occur in the exchange 
of information across 
hospital units. 
(negatively worded) 
(HO) 
  ,426      
(A16) Staff worry that 
mistakes they make 
are kept in their 
personnel 
file.(negatively 
worded) (NRP) 
   ,618     
(A8) Staff feel like 
their mistakes are held 
(used) against them. 
(negatively worded) 
(NPRE) 
   ,569     
(A14) We work in 
'crisis mode', trying to 
do too much, too 
quickly (S) 
   ,482     
(A12) When an 
incident is reported, it 
feels like the person is 
being reported, not the 
problem. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) 
   ,476     
(D4) There is good 
cooperation among 
hospital units that need 
to work together 
(TWAU) 
    -,590    
(D2) Hospital units do 
not coordinate well 
with each other. 
(negatively worded) 
(TWAU) 
    -,491    
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(C2) Staff will freely 
speak up if they see 
something that may 
negatively affect 
patient care (CO) 
     -,600   
(C4) Staff feel free to 
question the decisions 
or actions of those 
with more authority 
(CO) 
     -,508   
(C6) Staff are afraid to 
ask questions when 
something does not 
seem right. (negatively 
worded) (CO) 
     -,500   
(C1) We are given 
feedback about 
changes put into place 
based on event reports 
(FB) 
     -,367   
(A1) People support 
one another in this unit 
(TWWU) 
      ,676  
(A3) When a lot of 
work needs to be done 
quickly, we work 
together as a team to 
get the work done 
(TWWU) 
      ,621  
(A4) In this unit, 
people treat each other 
with respect (TWWU) 
      ,587  
(D1) Hospital 
management provides 
a work climate that 
promotes patient 
safety (MS) 
 
 
       ,705 
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HSOPSC Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(D8) The actions of 
hospital management 
show that patient 
safety is a top priority 
(MS) 
       ,567 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a.! Rotation converged in 15 iterations. 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 60: Pattern Matrix (8 factors, 22 items, Oblique rotation) 
 
Supervisor/manager expectations & actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs & transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 61: Communalities of the final EFA solution (8 factors) 
HSOPSC Item Initial Extraction 
(A1) People support one another in this unit (TWWU) ,354 ,504 
(A3) When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team 
to get the work done (TWWU) ,298 ,418 
(A4) In this unit, people treat each other with respect (TWWU) ,404 ,520 
(A8) Staff feel like their mistakes are held (used) against them. (negatively 
worded) (NPRE) ,236 ,366 
(A12) When an incident is reported, it feels like the person is being reported, not 
the problem. (negatively worded) (NPRE) ,234 ,330 
(A16) Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel 
file.(negatively worded) (NRPE) ,228 ,352 
(B1) My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done 
according to established patient safety procedures (SMEA) ,476 ,707 
(B2) My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving 
patient safety (SMEA) ,550 ,646 
(C2) Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect 
patient care (CO) ,259 ,364 
(C4) Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more 
authority (CO) ,358 ,498 
(C6) Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right. 
(negatively worded) (CO) ,317 ,471 
(D1) Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety 
(MS) ,452 ,653 
(D2) Hospital units do not coordinate well with each other. (negatively worded) 
(TWAU) ,473 ,587 
(D3) Things 'fall between the cracks' when transferring patients from one unit to 
another (negatively worded) (HO) ,282 ,410 
(D4) There is good cooperation among hospital units that need to work together 
(TWAU) ,455 ,632 
(D5) Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes. 
(negatively worded) (HO) ,324 ,482 
(D6) It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (TWAU) ,251 ,316 
(D7) Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital units. 
(negatively worded) (HO) ,264 ,308 
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HSOPSC Item Initial Extraction 
(D8) The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top 
priority (MS) ,373 ,472 
(E1) When a mistake is made, but is caught and corrected before affecting the 
patient, how often is this reported? (FER) ,506 ,592 
(E2) When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm the patient, how often 
is this reported? (FER) ,613 ,772 
(E3) When a mistake is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how 
often is this reported? (FER) ,535 ,642 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting safety (SMEA), Organisational learning— 
continuous improvement (OL),Teamwork within hospital units (TWWU), Teamwork across hospital units 
(TWAU), Communication openness (CO), Feedback and communication about error (FB), Non-punitive 
response to error (NPRE), Staffing (S), Hospital management support for patient safety (MS), Hospital 
handoffs and transitions (HO), Frequency of incident reporting (FER), Overall perceptions of patient safety 
(OPPS). 
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Appendix 62: Total variance explained by 8 factors within final EFA solution 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadingsa 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 5,257 23,895 23,895 4,784 21,748 21,748 2,636 
2 2,431 11,048 34,943 2,053 9,330 31,078 2,276 
3 1,752 7,962 42,905 1,250 5,681 36,759 2,287 
4 1,446 6,572 49,477 ,871 3,957 40,716 1,997 
5 1,172 5,328 54,805 ,673 3,060 43,776 1,919 
6 1,051 4,778 59,583 ,517 2,349 46,125 2,549 
7 ,942 4,284 63,867 ,504 2,290 48,414 2,300 
8 ,890 4,044 67,911 ,393 1,788 50,203 2,267 
9 ,757 3,441 71,351     
10 ,729 3,314 74,665     
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11 ,661 3,007 77,671     
12 ,639 2,905 80,576     
13 ,576 2,618 83,195     
14 ,547 2,484 85,679     
15 ,527 2,393 88,073     
16 ,463 2,104 90,177     
17 ,446 2,029 92,206     
18 ,430 1,954 94,160     
19 ,371 1,686 95,847     
20 ,355 1,614 97,461     
21 ,304 1,380 98,841     
22 ,255 1,159 100,000     
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Appendix 63: EFA within final 8 Factors solution for each scale 
Factor 1 Items loadings 
B1 0.801 
B2 0.801 
Factor 2 Items loadings 
E1 0.766 
E2 0.883 
E3 0.769 
Factor 3 Items loadings 
D3 0.584 
D5 0.666 
D6 0.563 
D7 0.518 
Factor 4 Items loadings 
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A16 0.544 
A8 0.595 
A12 0.572 
Factor 5 Items loadings 
D2 0.774 
D4 0.774 
Factor 6 Items loadings 
A1 0.733 
A3 0.589 
A4 0.669 
Factor 7 Items loadings 
C2 0.541 
C4 0.674 
C6 0.665 
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Factor 8 Items loadings 
D1 0.745 
D8 0.745 
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Appendix 64: Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Item Descriptive 
Statistics (n=1310) 
 
•! Note: SD/D; strongly disagree and disagree, N; Neither, SA/A; 
strongly agree and agree, an “*” indicates items that are negatively 
worded and reverse-scored 
 
Appendices  614 
 
Appendix 65: Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Positively Worded 
Item Descriptive Statistics (n=1310) 
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Appendix 66: Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Negatively Worded 
Item Descriptive Statistics (n=1310) 
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                                 Appendix 67: Item-Level Results for the three hospitals 
  
 
   
1.##Teamwork#Within#Units
1.#People#support#one#another#in#this#unit.#(A1) (Missing#=#1%)
2.#When#a#lot#of#work#needs#to#be#done#quickly,#
we#work#together#as#a#team#to#get#the#work#done.#
(A3)
(Missing#=#3%)
3.#In#this#unit,#people#treat#each#other#with#
respect.#(A4)
(Missing#=#1%)
4.#When#one#area#in#this#unit#gets#really#busy,#
others#help#out.#(A11)
(Missing#=#2%)
2.##Supervisor/Manager#Expectations#&#Actions#
Promoting#Patient#Safety
1.#My#supervisor/manager#says#a#good#word#
when#he/she#sees#a#job#done#according#to#
established#patient#safety#procedures.#(B1)
(Missing#=#2%)
2.#My#supervisor/manager#seriously#considers#
staff#suggestions#for#improving#patient#safety.#
(Missing#=#2%)
3.#Whenever#pressure#builds#up,#my#
supervisor/manager#wants#us#to#work#faster,#even#
(Missing#=#3%)
4.#My#supervisor/manager#overlooks#patient#
safety#problems#that#happen#over#and#over.#(B4R) (Missing#=#2%)
3.##Organizational#Learning—Continuous#
Improvement
1.#We#are#actively#doing#things#to#improve#patient#
safety.#(A6)
(Missing#=#1%)
2.#Mistakes#have#led#to#positive#changes#here.#
(A9) (Missing#=#4%)
3.#After#we#make#changes#to#improve#patient#
safety,#we#evaluate#their#effectiveness.#(A13)
(Missing#=#2%)
4.##Management#Support#for#Patient#Safety
1.#Hospital#management#provides#a#work#climate#
that#promotes#patient#safety.#(D1)
(Missing#=#2%)
2.#The#actions#of#hospital#management#show#that#
patient#safety#is#a#top#priority.#(D8)
(Missing#=#2%)
3.#Hospital#management#seems#interested#in#
patient#safety#only#after#an#adverse#event#
happens.#(D9R)
(Missing#=#3%)
Number#of#responses=1310
Note:#1)#“R”#=#a#negatively#worded#itemV#2)#Chart#totals#exclude#missing#&#may#not#sum#to#100%#due#to#
roundingV#3)#Missing#=#%#of#respondents#with#missing#dataV#4)#Item#data#not#displayed#for#fewer#than#3#
respondentsV#5)#%#not#displayed#for#5%#or#less.
87% 8%
79% 12% 10%
Positive Neutral Negative
80% 12% 8%
Positive Neutral Negative
Positive Neutral Negative
Positive Neutral Negative
61% 18% 21%
92%
71% 17% 12%
82% 11% 7%
78% 11% 11%
83% 9% 8%
60% 18% 22%
92%
83% 10% 7%
72% 11% 18%
89% 6%
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Appendix (continued): Item-Level Results for All hospitals  
 
 
 
 
 
5.##Overall#Perceptions#of#Patient#Safety
1.#It#is#just#by#chance#that#more#serious#mistakes#
don’t#happen#around#here.#(A10R) (Missing#=#4%)
2.#Patient#safety#is#never#sacrificed#to#get#more#
work#done.#(A15) (Missing#=#5%)
3.#We#have#patient#safety#problems#in#this#unit.#
(A17R) (Missing#=#3%)
4.#Our#procedures#and#systems#are#good#at#
preventing#errors#from#happening.#(A18) (Missing#=#2%)
6.##Feedback#and#Communication#About#Error
1.#We#are#given#feedback#about#changes#put#into#
place#based#on#event#reports.#(C1) (Missing#=#3%)
2.#We#are#informed#about#errors#that#happen#in#
this#unit.#(C3) (Missing#=#3%)
3.#In#this#unit,#we#discuss#ways#to#prevent#errors#
from#happening#again.#(C5) (Missing#=#3%)
7.##Communication#Openness
1.#Staff#will#freely#speak#up#if#they#see#something#
that#may#negatively#affect#patient#care.#(C2) (Missing#=#2%)
2.#Staff#feel#free#to#question#the#decisions#or#
actions#of#those#with#more#authority.#(C4) (Missing#=#3%)
3.#Staff#are#afraid#to#ask#questions#when#
something#does#not#seem#right.#(C6R) (Missing#=#2%)
8.##Frequency#of#Events#Reported
1.#When#a#mistake#is#made,#but#is#caught#and#
corrected#before#affecting#the#patient,#how#often#is#
this#reported?#(E1)
(Missing#=#4%)
2.#When#a#mistake#is#made,#but#has#no#potential#
to#harm#the#patient,#how#often#is#this#reported?# (Missing#=#4%)
3.#When#a#mistake#is#made#that#could#harm#the#
patient,#but#does#not,#how#often#is#this#reported?#
(E3)
(Missing#=#6%)
Note:#1)#“R”#=#a#negatively#worded#itemY#2)#Chart#totals#exclude#missing#&#may#not#sum#to#100%#due#to#
roundingY#3)#Missing#=#%#of#respondents#with#missing#dataY#4)#Item#data#not#displayed#for#fewer#than#3#
respondentsY#5)#%#not#displayed#for#5%#or#less.
Note:#1)#“R”#=#a#negatively#worded#itemY#2)#Chart#totals#exclude#missing#&#may#not#sum#to#100%#due#to#
roundingY#3)#Missing#=#%#of#respondents#with#missing#dataY#4)#Item#data#not#displayed#for#fewer#than#3#
respondentsY#5)#%#not#displayed#for#5%#or#less.
50% 15% 35%
68% 11% 21%
45% 17% 39%
Positive Neutral Negative
Positive Neutral Negative
Positive Neutral Negative
Positive Neutral Negative
81% 11% 7%
37% 39% 24%
75% 17% 8%
74% 18% 7%
56% 25% 18%
39% 31% 31%
45% 34% 21%
48% 21% 30%
45% 26% 29%
57% 19% 24%
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Appendix (continued): Item-Level Results for All hospitals  
  
9.##Teamwork#Across#Units
1.#Hospital#units#do#not#coordinate#well#with#each#
other.#(D2R) (Missing#=#2%)
2.#There#is#good#cooperation#among#hospital#units#
that#need#to#work#together.#(D4) (Missing#=#2%)
3.#It#is#often#unpleasant#to#work#with#staff#from#
other#hospital#units.#(D6R) (Missing#=#4%)
4.#Hospital#units#work#well#together#to#provide#the#
best#care#for#patients.#(D10) (Missing#=#2%)
10.##Staffing
1.#We#have#enough#staff#to#handle#the#workload.#
(A2) (Missing#=#2%)
2.#Staff#in#this#unit#work#longer#hours#than#is#best#
for#patient#care.#(A5R) (Missing#=#4%)
3.#We#use#more#agency/temporary#staff#than#is#
best#for#patient#care.#(A7R) (Missing#=#6%)
4.#We#work#in#“crisis#mode”#trying#to#do#too#much,#
too#quickly.#(A14R) (Missing#=#2%)
11.##Handoffs#&#Transitions
1.#Things#“fall#between#the#cracks”#when#
transferring#patients#from#one#unit#to#another.#
(D3R)
(Missing#=#5%)
2.#Important#patient#care#information#is#often#lost#
during#shift#changes.#(D5R) (Missing#=#4%)
3.#Problems#often#occur#in#the#exchange#of#
information#across#hospital#units.#(D7R) (Missing#=#4%)
4.#Shift#changes#are#problematic#for#patients#in#
this#hospital.#(D11R) (Missing#=#4%)
12.##Nonpunitive#Response#to#Error
1.#Staff#feel#like#their#mistakes#are#held#against#
them.#(A8R) (Missing#=#5%)
2.#When#an#event#is#reported,#it#feels#like#the#
person#is#being#written#up,#not#the#problem.#
(A12R)
(Missing#=#4%)
3.#Staff#worry#that#mistakes#they#make#are#kept#in#
their#personnel#file.#(A16R) (Missing#=#3%)
Note:#1)#“R”#=#a#negatively#worde #itemX#2)#Chart#totals#exclud #missing#&#may#not#sum#to#100%#due#to#
roundingX#3)#Missing#=#%#of#respondents#with#missing#dataX#4)#Item#data#not#displayed#for#fewer#than#3#
respondentsX#5)#%#not#displayed#for#5%#or#less.
Note:#1)#“R”#=#a#negatively#worded#itemX#2)#Chart#totals#exclude#missing#&#may#not#sum#to#100%#due#to#
roundingX#3)#Missing#=#%#of#respondents#with#missing#dataX#4)#Item#data#not#displayed#for#fewer#than#3#
respondentsX#5)#%#not#displayed#for#5%#or#less.
Positive Neutral Negative
Positive Neutral Negative
Positive Neutral Negative
Positive Neutral Negative
57% 17% 26%
70% 16% 14%
60% 24% 16%
80% 11% 8%
65% 9% 26%
57% 15% 28%
70% 16% 14%
29% 18% 53%
67% 19% 15%
75% 11% 13%
49% 26% 25%
70% 16% 14%
39% 24% 37%
42% 16% 43%
20% 15% 65%
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Appendix 68: Item level comparative results for Kuwaiti and US hospitals 
 
Note:!1)!Comparative!results!are!based!on!data!from!653!hospitals!included!in!the!Hospital!Survey!on!Patient!Safety!
Culture!2014!Comparative!Database!Reportz!2)!“R”!indicates!a!negatively!worded!itemz!3)!Item!data!not!displayed!for!
fewer!than!3!respondents.! !
1.##Teamwork#Within#Units MIN MAX
A1 1.$People$support$one$another$in$this$unit. 46% 100%
A3
2.$When$a$lot$of$work$needs$to$be$done$
quickly,$we$work$together$as$a$team$to$get$the$
work$done.
46% 100%
A4 3.$In$this$unit,$people$treat$each$other$with$
respect.
38% 96%
A11 4.$When$one$area$in$this$unit$gets$really$busy,$
others$help$out.
49% 94%
2.##Supervisor/Manager#Expectations#&#Actions#Promoting#Patient#Safety
B1
1.$My$supervisor/manager$says$a$good$word$
when$he/she$sees$a$job$done$according$to$
established$patient$safety$procedures.$
42% 94%
B2
2.$My$supervisor/manager$seriously$
considers$staff$suggestions$for$improving$
patient$safety.
43% 100%
B3R
3.$Whenever$pressure$builds$up,$my$
supervisor/manager$wants$us$to$work$faster,$
even$if$it$means$taking$shortcuts.
47% 95%
B4R 4.$My$supervisor/manager$overlooks$patient$
safety$problems$that$happen$over$and$over.$
51% 94%
3.##Organizational#Learning—Continuous#Improvement
A6 1.$We$are$actively$doing$things$to$improve$
patient$safety.
59% 100%
A9
2.$Mistakes$have$led$to$positive$changes$here.
32% 89%
A13 3.$After$we$make$changes$to$improve$patient$
safety,$we$evaluate$their$effectiveness.
47% 95%
Survey#Item#%#Positive#Response
Database#
Hospitals#
Average#######################################################################
%#Positive
Survey#Items#By#################################################
Patient#Safety#Culture#AreaItem
ItemSLevel#Comparative#Results#for#All#hospitals
72%
71%
87%
77%
79%
77%
80%
75%
89%
86%
Database# Hospitals#Average# %#Positive
Kuwaiti#Hospital#%#Positive
92%
84%
71%
64%
82%
71%
83%
80%
92%
86%
61%
75%
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%0%
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Appendix (continued): Item level comparative results for Kuwaiti and US 
hospitals 
 
 
 
 
 
4.##Management#Support#for#Patient#Safety MIN MAX
D1 1.$Hospital$management$provides$a$work$
climate$that$promotes$patient$safety.
40% 100%
D8 2.$The$actions$of$hospital$management$show$
that$patient$safety$is$a$top$priority.$
39% 100%
D9R
3.$Hospital$management$seems$interested$in$
patient$safety$only$after$an$adverse$event$
happens.$
19% 100%
5.##Overall#Perceptions#of#Patient#Safety
A10R 1.$It$is$just$by$chance$that$more$serious$
mistakes$don’t$happen$around$here.
29% 92%
A15 2.$Patient$safety$is$never$sacrificed$to$get$
more$work$done.$
23% 100%
A17R 3.$We$have$patient$safety$problems$in$this$
unit.$
22% 100%
A18 4.$Our$procedures$and$systems$are$good$at$
preventing$errors$from$happening.$
40% 94%
6.##Feedback#and#Communication#About#Error
C1 1.$We$are$given$feedback$about$changes$put$
into$place$based$on$event$reports.$
27% 91%
C3 2.$We$are$informed$about$errors$that$happen$
in$this$unit.$
37% 93%
C5 3.$In$this$unit,$we$discuss$ways$to$prevent$
errors$from$happening$again.$
38% 100%
Note:$1)$Comparative$results$are$based$on$data$from$653$hospitals$included$in$the$Hospital$Survey$on$Patient$
Safety$Culture$2014$Comparative$Database$ReportU$$2)$“R”$indicates$a$negatively$worded$itemU$3)$Item$data$not$
displayed$for$fewer$than$3$respondents.
Note:$1)$Comparative$results$are$based$on$data$from$653$hospitals$included$in$the$Hospital$Survey$on$Patient$
Safety$Culture$2014$Comparative$Database$ReportU$$2)$“R”$indicates$a$negatively$worded$itemU$3)$Item$data$not$
displayed$for$fewer$than$3$respondents.
83%
75%
78%
81%
60%
61%
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%0%
75%
67%
37%
59%
81%
73%
Database# Hospitals#Average# %#Positive
Kuwaiti#Hospital#%#Positive
74%
73%
45%
65%
50%
62%
68%
64%
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Appendix (continued): Item level comparative results for Kuwaiti and US 
hospitals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.##Communication#Openness MIN MAX
C2
1.%Staff%will%freely%speak%up%if%they%see%
something%that%may%negatively%affect%patient%
care.
38% 100%
C4 2.%Staff%feel%free%to%question%the%decisions%or%
actions%of%those%with%more%authority.
20% 75%
C6R 3.%Staff%are%afraid%to%ask%questions%when%
something%does%not%seem%right.
25% 85%
8.##Frequency#of#Events#Reported
E1
1.%When%a%mistake%is%made,%but%is%caught%and%
corrected%before%affecting%the%patient,%how%
often%is%this%reported?
38% 89%
E2
2.%When%a%mistake%is%made,%but%has%no%
potential%to%harm%the%patient,%how%often%is%this%
reported?
38% 87%
E3
3.%When%a%mistake%is%made%that%could%harm%
the%patient,%but%does%not,%how%often%is%this%
reported?
50% 100%
9.##Teamwork#Across#Units
D2R 1.%Hospital%units%do%not%coordinate%well%with%
each%other.%
21% 85%
D4 2.%There%is%good%cooperation%among%hospital%
units%that%need%to%work%together.
29% 90%
D6R 3.%It%is%often%unpleasant%to%work%with%staff%
from%other%hospital%units.
40% 90%
D10 4.%Hospital%units%work%well%together%to%provide%
the%best%care%for%patients.
41% 100%
Note:%1)%Comparative%results%are%based%on%data%from%653%hospitals%included%in%the%Hospital%Survey%on%Patient%
Safety%Culture%2014%Comparative%Database%ReportT%%2)%“R”%indicates%a%negatively%worded%itemT%3)%Item%data%not%
displayed%for%fewer%than%3%respondents.
Note:%1)%Comparative%results%are%based%on%data%from%653%hospitals%included%in%the%Hospital%Survey%on%Patient%
Safety%Culture%2014%Comparative%Database%ReportT%%2)%“R”%indicates%a%negatively%worded%itemT%3)%Item%data%not%
displayed%for%fewer%than%3%respondents.
39%
48%
56%
76%
45%
63%
57%
75%
60%
62%
80%
71%
57%
48%
70%
62%
Database# Hospitals#Average# %#Positive
Kuwaiti Hospital#%#Positive
48%
60%
45%
62%
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%0%
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Appendix (continued): Item level comparative results for Kuwaiti and US 
hospitals 
 
 
 
 
10.$$Staffing MIN MAX
A2 1.%We%have%enough%staff%to%handle%the%workload. 11% 94%
A5R 2.%Staff%in%this%unit%work%longer%hours%than%is%best%for%patient%
care.%%%
25% 78%
A7R 3.%We%use%more%agency/temporary%staff%than%is%best%for%
patient%care.%%%%%
11% 100%
A14R 4.%We%work%in%“crisis%mode”%trying%to%do%too%much,%too%quickly.% 17% 81%
11.$$Handoffs$&$Transitions
D3R 1.%Things%“fall%between%the%cracks”%when%transferring%patients%
from%one%unit%to%%another.
16% 84%
D5R 2.%Important%patient%care%information%is%often%lost%during%shift%
changes.
27% 100%
D7R 3.%Problems%often%occur%in%the%exchange%of%information%across%
hospital%units.
13% 89%
D11R 4.%Shift%changes%are%problematic%for%patients%in%this%hospital. 24% 89%
12.$$Nonpunitive$Response$to$Error
A8R 1.%Staff%feel%like%their%mistakes%are%held%against%them.% 20% 82%
A12R 2.%When%an%event%is%reported,%it%feels%like%the%person%is%being%
written%up,%not%the%problem.
16% 81%
A16R 3.%Staff%worry%that%mistakes%they%make%are%kept%in%their%
personnel%file.%
0% 75%
Note:%1)%Comparative%results%are%based%on%data%from%653%hospitals%included%in%the%Hospital%Survey%on%Patient%Safety%Culture%2014%Comparative%Database%
ReportW%%2)%“R”%indicates%a%negatively%worded%itemW%3)%Item%data%not%displayed%for%fewer%than%3%respondents.
65%
54%
29%
50%
67%
43%
75%
53%
49%
46%
39%
50%
70%
47%
42%
48%
20%
35%
Database$ Hospitals$Average$ %$Positive
Kuwaiti$Hospital$%$Positive
70%
66%
57%
52%
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%0%
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Appendix 69: Informed consent form 
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Appendix 70: Hospital comparisons based mean positive scores of the HSOPSC 
sub-scales 
Dimension Comparison 
Group 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
F Sig. Pairwise 
Comparisons 
SMEA A 540 3.1123 1.19815 16.275* .000*** Hospital C > A & B 
B 477 3.2334 1.19408 
C 281 3.5715 1.05837 
All 1298 3.2562 1.17984 
OL A 545 3.4676 1.15278 4.965* .007** Hospital C > B 
B 481 3.3770 1.19526 
C 282 3.6365 1.04693 
All 1308 3.4707 1.15005 
MS A 541 3.0055 1.42312 28.541* .000*** Hospital C > A & B 
B 479 2.9342 1.53076 
C 283 3.5931 1.14630 
All 1303 3.1069 1.43229 
OPPS A 545 2.4739 1.18915 26.170* .000*** Hospital C > A & B 
B 482 2.4251 1.12851 
C 282 2.9911 1.10568 
All 1309 2.5674 1.17000 
FC A 538 2.6859 1.52994 6.574* .001** Hospital C > A & B 
B 478 2.6900 1.51296 
C 282 3.0301 1.36679 
All 1298 2.7622 1.49521 
CO A 539 2.0284 1.65900 4.594 .010* Hospital C > A & B 
Appendices  625 
 
Dimension Comparison 
Group 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
F Sig. Pairwise 
Comparisons 
B 478 1.9529 1.65838 
C 281 2.3233 1.68619 
All 1298 2.0645 1.66930 
S  A 545 2.2313 1.20566 4.509 .011* Hospital C > A  
B 482 2.3231 1.25268 
C 282 2.5012 1.21423 
All 1309 2.3233 1.22829 
HO A 540 2.7829 1.48736 7.828 .000*** Hospital C > B 
B 475 2.5949 1.50452 
C 278 3.0357 1.41947 
All 1293 2.7682 1.48723 
*Welch’s F-statistic is reported and pairwise comparisons were performed using the Games-Howell test. For remaining safety culture 
variables, the homogeneity of variance assumption was met and the standard F-statistic and results from Tukey’s tests are presented.  
Teamwork within units (TWWU), Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and actions (SMEA), Organisational Learning (OL), Hospital 
management’s commitment to safety (MS), Overall perceptions of patient safety (OPPS), Feedback and Communication about error (FC), 
Communication Openness (CO), Frequency of events reported (FER), Teamwork across units (TWAU), Staffing (S), Handoffs (HO) and 
Non-punitive response to error (NPRE). *** p < .001, ** p<.01, p<.05*. 
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Appendix 71: Hospital departments comparisons based on mean positive scores 
of the HSOPSC sub-scales 
Dimension Comparison Group N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
F Sig. Pairwise 
Comparisons 
TWWU Medicine 303 3.7489 1.00986 3.068* .017* Medicine > Surgery 
Surgery 243 3.4300 1.11359 
Pediatrics 172 3.6686 .88998 
Laboratory 113 3.6438 1.19051 
Radiology 
& Nuclear Medicine 
125 3.6400 1.01272 
All 956 3.6267 1.04542 
MS Medicine 301 3.2824 1.37612 2.846* .024* Medicine 
>Radiology & 
Nuclear Medicine 
 
Laboratory > 
Radiology & Nuclear 
Medicine 
Surgery 242 3.1804 1.40146 
Pediatrics 171 3.2349 1.37611 
Laboratory 112 3.4241 1.19766 
Radiology 
& Nuclear Medicine 
125 2.8187 1.65073 
All 951 3.2036 1.40922 
OPPS Medicine 303 2.6513 1.13934 4.724* .001** Surgery > Pediatrics 
Laboratory > 
Pediatrics 
 
Surgery 243 2.7339 1.11420 
Pediatrics 172 2.3818 1.02862 
Laboratory 113 2.8680 1.16777 
Radiology 
& Nuclear Medicine 
126 2.4597 1.30323 
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Dimension Comparison Group N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
F Sig. Pairwise 
Comparisons 
All 957 2.6242 1.14886 
CO Medicine 301 1.9884 1.63723 3.491* .008** Radiology & Nuclear 
Medicine > 
Medicine, Surgery, 
Pediatrics 
Surgery 242 2.0503 1.67752 
Pediatrics 172 1.9089 1.56962 
Laboratory 111 2.0901 1.82350 
Radiology 
& Nuclear Medicine 
124 2.5591 1.61018 
All 950 2.0761 1.66301 
FER Medicine 293 2.3515 1.99511 6.252 .000*** Radiology & Nuclear 
Medicine < 
Medicine, Surgery, 
Pediatrics, 
Laboratory 
Surgery 235 2.5348 1.96530 
Pediatrics 167 2.7625 1.92291 
Laboratory 108 2.5540 1.87344 
Radiology 
& Nuclear Medicine 
121 1.6584 1.98208 
All 924 2.4053 1.98118 
S Medicine 303 2.3740 1.16672 4.697* .001** Laboratory > 
Medicine, Surgery, 
Radiology & Nuclear 
Medicine 
Surgery 243 2.2209 1.16651 
Pediatrics 172 2.4390 1.17661 
Laboratory 113 2.8525 1.36804 
Radiology 
& Nuclear Medicine 
126 2.3029 1.29793 
All 957 2.3939 1.22298 
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Dimension Comparison Group N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
F Sig. Pairwise 
Comparisons 
HO Medicine 300 2.8556 1.42162 11.040* .000*** Radiology & Nuclear 
Medicine < 
Medicine, Surgery, 
Pediatrics 
 
Laboratory < 
Surgery, Pediatrics 
 
Pediatrics > 
Medicine, Surgery, 
Laboratory, 
Radiology & Nuclear 
Medicine 
Surgery 242 2.9084 1.38797 
Pediatrics 169 3.2993 1.18824 
Laboratory 105 2.4071 1.48709 
Radiology 
& Nuclear Medicine 
125 2.3267 1.74300 
All 941 2.8286 1.45931 
*Welch’s F-statistic is reported and pairwise comparisons were performed using the Games-Howell test. For remaining safety culture 
variables, the homogeneity of variance assumption was met and the standard F-statistic and results from Tukey’s tests are presented.  
Teamwork within units (TWWU), Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and actions (SMEA), Organisational Learning (OL), Hospital 
management’s commitment to safety (MS), Overall perceptions of patient safety (OPPS), Feedback and Communication about error (FC), 
Communication Openness (CO), Frequency of events reported (FER), Teamwork across units (TWAU), Staffing (S), Handovers (HO) and 
Non-punitive response to error (NPRE). *** p < .001, ** p<.01, p<.05*. 
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Appendix 72: Professional groups comparisons based on mean positive scores of 
the HSOPSC sub-scales 
Dimension Comparison Group N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
F Sig. Pairwise 
Comparisons 
OL Nurses 754 3.6784 1.01165 12.245 .000*** Nurses > Physicians  
Nurses > AHP**** 
 
Technicians > 
Physicians & AHP 
Physicians 268 3.0162 1.32995 
Allied Health 
Professionals 
51 2.9150 1.36600 
Unit Clerk 4 3.8333 .91287 
Technicians 176 3.5275 .99938 
Management 13 3.2308 1.47438 
All 1266 3.4824 1.14031 
MS Nurses 753 3.3749 1.26392 14.191 .000*** Nurses > Physicians 
 
Technicians > 
Physicians 
 
Physicians 268 2.4714 1.59497 
Allied Health 
Professionals 
52 2.7051 1.63253 
Unit Clerk 4 2.4167 2.06155 
Technicians 174 3.2126 1.39586 
Management 13 2.5128 1.58474 
All 1264 3.1216 1.42795 
FC Nurses 751 2.9334 1.40101 6.399 .001** Nurses > Physicians 
  Nurses > AHP 
 
Technicians > 
Physicians 
Physicians 266 2.3966 1.47916 
Allied Health 
Professionals 
51 2.1340 1.70425 
Unit Clerk 4 2.1667 1.81557 
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Dimension Comparison Group N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
F Sig. Pairwise 
Comparisons 
Technicians 172 2.8740 1.64961 
 
Management 13 2.6667 1.88070 
All 1257 2.7741 1.49202 
CO Nurses 752 1.9118 1.62602 4.320 .001** Nurses < Physicians 
 
Physicians 266 2.3471 1.69628 
Allied Health 
Professionals 
51 2.6667 1.79010 
Unit Clerk 4 2.5833 1.50000 
Technicians 171 2.0780 1.67403 
Management 13 2.2821 1.45835 
All 1257 2.0631 1.66358 
FER Nurses 737 2.5640 1.97503 11.883 .000*** Nurses > Physicians 
Nurses > AHP 
 
Physicians > AHP 
 
Technicians > AHP 
Physicians 259 1.8507 1.87647 
Allied Health 
Professionals 
52 .9744 1.60994 
Unit Clerk 4 3.2500 2.18369 
Technicians 169 2.0621 1.96335 
Management 13 2.2564 2.18223 
All 1234 2.2776 1.98090 
TWAU Nurses 754 3.0700 1.28266 12.210 .000*** Nurses > Physicians 
Nurses > AHP 
 
Physicians 268 2.2593 1.51015 
Allied Health 
Professionals 
51 2.3562 1.67913 
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Dimension Comparison Group N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
F Sig. Pairwise 
Comparisons 
Unit Clerk 4 2.2500 2.59808 
Technicians > 
Physicians 
Technicians 173 2.8926 1.48748 
Management 13 2.6667 1.66667 
All 1263 2.8381 1.42629 
HO Nurses 753 3.1357 1.32287 19.649 .000*** Nurses > Physicians 
Nurses > AHP 
Nurses > Technicians 
Physicians 267 2.2175 1.45086 
Allied Health 
Professionals 
52 2.1442 1.89779 
Unit Clerk 4 2.1250 2.17466 
Technicians 167 2.3937 1.61368 
Management 13 2.2885 1.77320 
All 1256 2.7888 1.48678 
Underlined F statistic indicates Welch’s F-statistic is reported and pairwise comparisons were performed using the Games-Howell test. For 
remaining safety culture variables, the homogeneity of variance assumption was met and the standard F-statistic and results from Tukey’s 
tests are presented. ****AHP (Allied Health Professionals). 
Teamwork within units (TWWU), Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and actions (SMEA), Organisational Learning (OL), Hospital 
management’s commitment to safety (MS), Overall perceptions of patient safety (OPPS), Feedback and Communication about error (FC), 
Communication Openness (CO), Frequency of events reported (FER), Teamwork across units (TWAU), Staffing (S), Handovers (HO) and 
Non-punitive response to error (NPRE). *** p < .001, ** p<.01, p<.0 
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Appendix 73: Age groups comparisons based on the mean positive scores of the 
HSOPSC sub-scales 
Dimension Comparison 
Group 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
F Sig. Pairwise 
Comparisons 
OL 15-24 21 3.2222 1.08696 2.433* .05 25-34 years > 35-44 
years 
25-34 558 3.5821 1.02579 
35-44 501 3.3659 1.22304 
45-54 147 3.5499 1.09732 
55-64 52 3.2500 1.49199 
65 or above 6 3.1111 1.97390 
All 1285 3.4726 1.14535 
*Welch’s F-statistic is reported and pairwise comparisons were performed using the Games-Howell test. For remaining safety culture 
variables, the homogeneity of variance assumption was met and the standard F-statistic and results from Tukey’s tests are presented.  
Teamwork within units (TWWU), Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and actions (SMEA), Organisational Learning (OL), Hospital 
management’s commitment to safety (MS), Overall perceptions of patient safety (OPPS), Feedback and Communication about error (FC), 
Communication Openness (CO), Frequency of events reported (FER), Teamwork across units (TWAU), Staffing (S), Handovers (HO) and 
Non-punitive response to error (NPRE). *** p < .001, ** p<.01, p<.05*.
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Appendix 74: Tenure in profession comparisons based on mean positive scores of 
the HSOPSC sub-scales 
Dimension Comparison 
Group 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
F Sig. Pairwise Comparisons 
MS Less than 1 year 70 2.5381 1.65483 2.260 .048*   
 11-15 years > Less than 1 
year 
  
 
1-5 years 302 3.0475 1.38212 
6-10 years 363 3.1501 1.46680 
11-15 years 276 3.2192 1.35287 
16-20 years 134 3.1617 1.49895 
21 years or more 118 3.0551 1.42293 
All 1263 3.0991 1.43820 
OPPS Less than 1 year 70 2.3929 1.04980 2.367 .038*  11-15 years > 1-5 years 
1-5 years 302 2.4332 1.11216 
6-10 years 364 2.5609 1.18183 
11-15 years 276 2.7095 1.19018 
16-20 years 135 2.6673 1.16513 
21 years or more 119 2.6828 1.21990 
All 1266 2.5764 1.16552 
HO Less than 1 year 70 2.3952 1.38354 2.652 .022*  11-15 years > Less than 1 
year 
 11-15 years > 1-5 years 
 
 
1-5 years 299 2.6145 1.45441 
6-10 years 363 2.7851 1.51997 
11-15 years 273 2.9802 1.44914 
16-20 years 133 2.7857 1.53626 
21 years or more 117 2.7699 1.51863 
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Dimension Comparison 
Group 
N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
F Sig. Pairwise Comparisons 
All 1255 2.7638 1.48845 
NPRE Less than 1 year 70 1.5905 1.48657 2.522 .028* 6-10 years > 1-5 years 
1-5 years 301 1.1977 1.31570 
6-10 years 364 1.5197 1.46362 
11-15 years 275 1.4255 1.44828 
16-20 years 135 1.2753 1.37893 
21 years or more 119 1.2213 1.40639 
All 1264 1.3722 1.41743 
Underlined F statistic indicates Welch’s F-statistic is reported and pairwise comparisons were performed using the Games-Howell test. For remaining safety culture variables, 
the homogeneity of variance assumption was met and the standard F-statistic and results from Tukey’s tests are presented. Teamwork within units (TWWU), 
Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and actions (SMEA), Organisational Learning (OL), Hospital management’s commitment to safety (MS), Overall perceptions of patient 
safety (OPPS), Feedback and Communication about error (FC), Communication Openness (CO), Frequency of events reported (FER), Teamwork across units (TWAU), 
Staffing (S), Handovers (HO) and Non-punitive response to error (NPRE). *** p < .001, ** p<.01, p<.05*
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Appendix 75: Gender comparisons based on mean positive scores of the 
HSOPSC sub-scales 
Dimension Comparison 
Group 
N Mean Std. Deviation t Sig. (2-tailed) 
TWWU Male 479 3.5099 1.14627 -2.024 .043* 
Female 807 3.6384 1.01793 
OL Male 478 3.2716 1.25642 -4.641 .000*** 
Female 808 3.5893 1.05756 
FC Male 473 2.5920 1.54688 -3.105 .002** 
Female 804 2.8640 1.45107 
TWAU Male 477 2.6483 1.53725 -3.297 .001** 
Female 806 2.9288 1.35615 
HO Male 473 2.5266 1.55462 -4.490 .000*** 
Female 803 2.9193 1.42753 
Teamwork within units (TWWU), Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and actions (SMEA), Organisational Learning (OL), Hospital 
management’s commitment to safety (MS), Overall perceptions of patient safety (OPPS), Feedback and Communication about error (FC), 
Communication Openness (CO), Frequency of events reported (FER), Teamwork across units (TWAU), Staffing (S), Handovers (HO) and 
Non-punitive response to error (NPRE). *** p < .001, ** p<.01, p<.05*. 
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Appendix 76: Nationality comparisons based on mean positive scores of the 
HSOPSC sub-scales 
Dimension Comparison 
Group 
N Mean Std. Deviation t Sig. (2-
tailed) 
SMEA Kuwaiti 112 2.8624 1.36219 -3.268 .001** 
Non-Kuwaiti 1158 3.2974 1.15252 
OL Kuwaiti 113 3.0295 1.31351 -3.780 .000*** 
Non-Kuwaiti 1167 3.5127 1.12006 
MS Kuwaiti 113 1.9381 1.66342 -7.983 .000*** 
Non-Kuwaiti 1164 3.2265 1.34909 
OPPS Kuwaiti 113 2.2972 1.31690 -2.323 .022* 
Non-Kuwaiti 1168 2.5954 1.14722 
FER Kuwaiti 113 1.3392 1.79117 -5.765 .000*** 
Non-Kuwaiti 1134 2.3679 1.97708 
Teamwork within units (TWWU), Supervisors’/Managers’ expectations and actions (SMEA), Organisational Learning (OL), Hospital 
management’s commitment to safety (MS), Overall perceptions of patient safety (OPPS), Feedback and Communication about error (FC), 
Communication Openness (CO), Frequency of events reported (FER), Teamwork across units (TWAU), Staffing (S), Handovers (HO) and 
Non-punitive response to error (NPRE). *** p < .001, ** p<.01, p<.05* 
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Appendix 77: Final regression model for Handoffs and Transitions  
Predictor Variables  
Handoffs and Transitions 
Mean SD Beta T Significance 
Hospital 
Site 
1.81 .772 .035 1.255 .210 
Hospital Departments 5.80 4.019 .010 .292 .770 
Tenure in Hospital 2.90 1.346 -.020 -.505 .614 
Professional groups 4.25 3.279 -.226 -8.080 .000*** 
Tenure in Profession  3.36 1.345 .073 2.605 .009** 
Age group 2.73 .863 -.052 -1.368 .171 
R Square .054 
Adjusted R .053 
*** p < .001, ** p<.01 
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Appendix 78: Final Regression Models 
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Appendix 79: Open comments frequencies and categories 
Category 
 
 
Frequency 
 
 
Percentage 
% 
Staffing 31 15% 
Policies & Procedures 31 15% 
Incident Reporting 26 12.6% 
Communication 19 9% 
Staff perceptions about Patient Safety 18 8.7% 
Staff wellbeing 14 6.8% 
Training & Education 12 5.8% 
Workload 9 4.4% 
Equipment & Supplies 7 3.4% 
Work environment 6 3% 
Teamwork 6 3% 
Facilities 5 2.4% 
Feedback & communication about adverse events 5 2.4% 
Information management 4 2% 
Patient related issues 3 1.4% 
Safety System 3 1.4% 
Top Management Support 3 1.4% 
Staff satisfaction 2 1% 
Physician related issues 2 1% 
Patient education 2 1% 
Organisational conditions 2 1% 
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Physical environment 2 1% 
Infection control 2 1% 
Documentation 1 0.5% 
Incentives 1 0.5% 
Benchmarking 1 0.5% 
Monitoring 1 0.5% 
Quality indicators 1 0.5% 
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Appendix 80: Participant information sheet 
 
Study title  
Participant Information Sheet  
 
Assessment of Patient Safety Culture in Kuwaiti Public Hospitals  
Researcher Details  
Dr Gheed Alsalem  
Invitation to participate  
You are being invited to take part in this PhD research project. Before you decide to 
participate it is important for you to understand why this research is being done and what it 
involves. Please read the following information, which explains the purpose of this research 
and what it involves. This will allow you to decide whether you wish to take part in the study. 
If you would like further information or you have questions, please contact the researcher. 
You will be given a period of 5-7 days to decide whether or not you wish to participate.  
If you decide to participate, you will be given a copy of this information sheet and your 
signed consent form. Thank you.  
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What is the purpose of the study?  
The purpose of this research is to assess aspects of safety culture in Kuwaiti public hospitals 
identified by a questionnaire survey that has been completed by staff in your hospital.  
The aim of this interview is to obtain a deeper understanding of the elements influencing 
patient safety culture in Kuwaiti hospitals.  
Why have I been chosen?  
The participants in this study are healthcare staff who are directly involved in patient care. 
Therefore, you have been chosen because you are one of the healthcare staff whose work 
affects patient care in the hospital. You would be one of a total of 10 healthcare staff helping 
with this part of the study.  
Do I have to take part?  
No, it is up to you to decide whether or not you want to take part. If you decide to take part 
you will be given this information sheet to keep and you will be asked to sign a consent form. 
Even after deciding to take part in this research, you are still free to withdraw from the 
research at any point in time and without giving a reason.  
What will happen to me if I take part?  
If you decide to participate then the researcher will ask you to sign a consent form and 
afterwards you will be invited to participate in the interview to explore different aspects of 
safety culture in your hospital and the importance of these factors in maintaining patient and 
worker safety.  
If you agree to participate in my research, I will conduct an interview with you at a time and 
location of your choice so that it will not interfere with your work. The interview should last 
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approximately 30 minutes. With your permission, I will audiotape and take notes during the 
interview. The recording is to accurately record the information you provide, and will be used 
for transcription purposes only. If you choose not to be audiotaped, I will take notes instead. If 
you agree to being audiotaped but feel uncomfortable at any time during the interview, I can 
turn off the recorder at your request. Or if you don't wish to continue, you can stop the 
interview at any time. There is no potential for physical and/or psychological harm / distress 
to participants during the research.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
This study seeks to contribute to the knowledge base by investigating patient safety culture in 
public hospitals in Kuwait. It is hoped that the knowledge generated will contribute to the 
literature on the measurement and assessment of patient safety culture, in particular in 
Kuwait. There are no direct benefits to you.  
What will happen to the results of the research study?  
The results will be published in the PhD thesis. No named information about you will be 
mentioned in the thesis.  
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?  
The researcher will securely store all of the data that will be collected. The computer used for 
analysing the data will be password protected. Transcripts be stored in a locked filing cabinet 
in an office that is locked. Your anonymity and confidentiality will be preserved at all times. 
Access to the research data is limited to the research teams, which include the supervisors of 
this research and the researcher (Professor Jillian Morrison, Dr. Paul Bowie, Dr. Gheed 
Alsalem).  
Who is organising and funding the research?  
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The research is part of the PhD studies and no organisation is involved in funding.  
Who has reviewed the study?  
The research has been scientifically reviewed by the University of Glasgow, College Of 
Medical and Life Sciences in the United Kingdom. In addition, it has been reviewed by the 
Medical and Health Sciences Research Committee at Ministry Of Health, Kuwait.  
Contact for Further Information  
Professor Jill Morrison 
Dean for Learning and Teaching 
College of Medical, Veterinary and Life 
Sciences 
University of Glasgow 
Tel: +44(0)141 330 8348 
Fax: +44 (0)141 330 8331 
Email: jill.morrison@glasgow.ac.uk 
General Practice and Primary Care, Institute 
of Health and Wellbeing, 
University of Glasgow, 1, Horselethill 
Road, Glasgow, G12 9LX 
 
Dr. Paul BowieProgramme 
Director(Safety & Improvement) 
Postgraduate GP Education NHS 
Education for Scotland 2 Central 
QuayGLASGOWScotland, UKG3 
8BWTelephone: 0141 223 1463 
Email: Paul.Bowie@nes.scot.nhs.uk 
 
Dr Gheed Fouad Alsalem PhD student 
inTeI:[in Kuwait+96599885566][in 
the U.K+44424164627] Email: 
g.alsalem.1@research.gla.ac.uk 
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Appendix 81:  Informed consent 
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Appendix 82: Interview schedule 
 
•! What do you think about measuring safety culture in your hospital? Is it useful? how valuable is the 
information? 
1. When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work 
together as a    team to get the work done. (A3) 
 
 
 
•! Definition: “Staff support each other, treat each 
other with respect, and work together as a team” 
•! Do you think this mirrors the current situation 
within your hospital fit with your views and 
perceptions?  
•! Tell me about teamwork within your unit 
•! In your opinion how does teamwork within your 
unit affect patient safety? In what ways?  
•! Reflecting on the issues you talked about, do you 
have any suggestions to improve teamwork within 
your unit? What steps could make a difference?  
  
 
2.! We are actively doing things to improve patient safety. (A6)      
 
 
•! Definition: “Mistakes have led to positive changes and changes are evaluated for effectiveness” 
•! Do you think this mirrors the current situation within your hospital and fit with your views and 
perceptions?  
•! In your experience, how does your hospital help you learn from your mistakes? In what ways?  
•! Reflecting on the issues you talked about, do you have any suggestions for improvement within your 
unit? What steps could make a difference? 
 
 
 
Appendices  664 
 
  
3. My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established patient safety 
procedures. (B1)        
     
•! Definition: “Supervisors’/Managers’ consider staff suggestions for improving patient safety, praise 
staff for following patient safety procedures, and do not overlook patient safety problems” 
•! Do you think this mirrors the current situation within your hospital and fit with your views and 
perceptions?  
•! In your opinion what level of importance/support does heads of department place on patient safety?  
Can it affect patient safety? In what ways?  
•! Reflecting on the issues you talked about, do you have any suggestions for improvement? What steps 
could make a difference?  
 
4. The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority. (D8) 
 
•! Definition: “Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety and shows that 
patient safety is a top priority” 
•! Do you think this mirrors the current situation within your hospital and fit with your views and 
perceptions?  
•! Can you tell me what level of importance/support your hospital management put on patient safety and 
can you give an example to support your answer?  
•! Can this affect patient safety? In what ways?  
•! Reflecting on the issues you talked about, do you have any suggestions for improvement within your 
unit? What steps could make a difference?  
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5. Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file. (A16R)  
    
•! Definition: “Staff feel that their mistakes and event reports are not held against them and that mistakes are 
not kept in their personnel file” 
•! Do you think this mirrors the current situation within your hospital and fit with your views and 
perceptions?  
•! From your observations do you think health care workers are concerned about personal consequences 
when they report an error in your hospital? Please explain the reasons for your answer?   
•! Can this affect patient safety? In what ways? 
•! Reflecting on the issues you talked about, do you have any suggestions for improvement within your 
unit? What steps could make a difference?  
 
 
6. Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more authority. (C4) 
     
•! Definition: “Staff freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect a patient and feel free 
to question those with more authority” 
•! Do you think this mirrors the current situation within your hospital and fit with your views and 
perceptions?   
•! Can this affect patient safety? In what ways?  
•! In your opinion how does communication between professionals affect patient safety in your hospital?  
•! Reflecting on the issues you talked about, do you have any suggestions for improvement within your 
unit? What steps could make a difference?  
 
•! What are the facilitators and barriers to good patient safety culture practice in Kuwaiti hospitals?  
•! Is there anything else you want to share about patient safety, which we did not cover during our 
interview? 
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Appendix 83: Researcher’s Reflection 
Reflections on my Ph.D. journey 
‘If you see it in your mind, you’re going to hold it in your hand’  
(Byrne 2006, p.9) 
While reflecting on the experience of doing a doctorate, I came to the realization that I truly 
enjoyed this process, at least for the most part. I have invested four years in doing this 
research project. As a result, a large part of my personal development over the past years 
involved gaining a deeper understanding of my inner strengths, in addition to accepting and 
working around my limitations. I firmly believe that my Ph.D. studies have been an 
invaluable learning experience. It boosted my confidence in attaining the goals I have always 
aimed to achieve. I gained valuable knowledge and skills, grew in my confidence and 
independence of mind and made many contacts. I believe that I have become proficient in the 
process of doing research in my field and have gained much understanding of the, sometimes 
chaotic, nature of the research process. I have learned that research can sometimes be 
extremely rewarding and even thrilling, still at other times frustrating and tiresome. Now, I 
will be able to celebrate overcoming the many obstacles that I had to face for the past four 
years from leaving my family and friends to living and studying abroad. Completing my 
Ph.D. will be a milestone in my academic and professional career.  It marks the culmination 
of one of my biggest goals.   
The beginnings of my journey 
Almost a hundred years ago, George Eliot, in her novel Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial 
Life, painted a picture of the medical profession as ‘the finest in the world, presenting the 
most perfect interchange between science and art, offering the most direct alliance between 
intellectual conquest and the social good’ (Eliot 2003, p.153). These words carry a truth 
which is close to my heart.  Before embarking on my Ph.D. journey, I was always interested 
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in my patients’ well-being. I was unsatisfied with the level of public healthcare services. 
There has been an overwhelming number of medical errors and harm to patients. As a result, 
demands to make healthcare facilities safer for patients has arisen. I felt the need for further 
experience in healthcare that would enable me to provide a better level of quality and safety 
of healthcare services for populations rather than individuals. I had always envisioned that 
someday I would hold a position, not of power, but one whereby I can add value to the world.  
I had an interest in pursuing a career in healthcare management ever since I was a medical 
student.  I believed then, as I do now, that my goal was not simply to maintain a job at the 
Ministry of Health but to bring about real change in the way the healthcare system functioned 
in Kuwait.  The question I always asked myself, however, is can I do it.   
Looking back, as many of us do at our life and our achievements, I realize now that I always 
knew my destiny. I have also found colleagues and friends who supported and encouraged 
such a vision and are ready to work with me on this. Then, my journey began with applying 
for a Master’s Degree in Healthcare Management at the University of Manchester and 
following that was my application for a Ph.D. at the University of Glasgow. Four years ago, I 
left the comfort of my home where I had family, friends and work I really loved. I arrived at 
Glasgow, and everything changed. I tried to acquire skills and expertise through personal 
experience, exposure to the experience of my supervisors and simultaneous reading of texts 
and literature in addition to continuously attending lectures, workshops and international 
conferences. The paradigm through which I see myself professionally and personally evolved, 
especially the way I view my role within my organisation. 
Utilizing specific tools and methods, I was able to critically evaluate my organisation 
resulting in new discoveries which were not necessarily all negative.  In the highly centralized 
healthcare system of Kuwait, doctors and nurses are still fighting for their voice to be heard 
within the Ministry of Health. Policies, rules and regulations are usually enforced from the top 
down through political agendas rather than patients’ needs and expectations. Nevertheless, 
there has been an evident move towards a long-term commitment to safety and quality 
improvement. The question that needs to be asked, however, is how far has this commitment 
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translated into real improvements for patients. This maybe partly related to the lack of data or 
baseline measures related to patient safety. Also, the political agenda of parliament members 
is creating a deadlock with government, stalling any reform initiatives and delaying planned 
programs. Thus, the healthcare needs of the population are being overlooked.  In a country as 
rich as Kuwait, one wonders why time, effort and resources are being wasted and 
underutilized especially that with the current economic crisis.  Clinicians are having to deal 
with faulty equipment, fragmented teams, limited resources, communication issues and 
difficult colleagues and patients. Such a complex and unstable environment calls for a leader 
who is able to navigate through many obstacles in search of the best interests of patients. As a 
part of this system, I needed the right mindset to give me the confidence and belief that I will 
be able to initiate positive change within such a bureaucratic environment. I needed to be a 
leader. 
Ernest Boyer called for ‘one that not only promotes the scholarship of discovering knowledge, 
but also celebrates the scholarship of integrating knowledge, of communicating knowledge, 
and of applying knowledge through professional service’ (Boyer 1994, p. A48).  This 
statement rings true to me, for as medical doctors, we are viewed as leaders in our 
communities and as leaders we assume a responsibility to use our skills to improve the level 
of the healthcare provided to society. I was responsible for developing and implementing 
several safety and quality improvement initiatives. The usual hospital approach of identifying 
the problem, analysing the root causes, and exploring solutions made limited progress with 
increasingly obvious limitations. Such a traditional “problem-based” approach led to 
defensiveness and resistance by healthcare providers who ultimately showed low levels of 
commitment and enthusiasm. Alternatively, in my opinion, a more positive approach that 
acknowledges problems but then involves groups in building solutions based on what already 
works. This helps staff to become more enthusiastic, generating more creative solutions to 
their challenges and doing their best at implementing what they help to create and I intend on 
implementing such an innovative approach when I go back to my organisation. The first 
challenge I faced was in trying to convince the Ministry of Health to fund my project as a 
Ph.D. project.  Since Kuwait’s National Accreditation Program requires hospitals to assess 
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their patient safety climate as part of the accreditation standards, I have used this as my main 
leverage point when I applied for a Ph.D. scholarship. Also, the recent rise in the “Patient 
Safety” movement pushed it even further. Thus, I have been ready with my proposal around 
the topic of patient safety assessment before applying for the Ph.D. program.  
Year One 
My research activity during the first year has been mainly focused on reviewing the scientific 
literature concerning safety culture and the development of a research protocol with a three-
year Ph.D. plan including the time frame needed for completion. This foundation stage has 
provided the blue print for the rest of my Ph.D. journey. It helped follow the rules for rigorous 
and formal research. I had to work through developing an appropriate research methodology 
and a systematic review was the first step for identifying an appropriate safety climate tool to 
be employed in my study.  
In relation to general development, I covered several training and professional development 
activities required for the Ph.D. program including: information resources and search skills, 
writing your thesis, successful writing, the philosophy of science, project management, 
developing research independence and ethical issues and procedures for non-clinical research 
involving humans. These courses, alongside my systematic review, helped me develop many 
areas in my research including information searching skills and how to make the most of 
information resources in the library. In addition, I learned about reference management 
software, other tools for managing information, different search databases, copyright, 
plagiarism and information ethics. My secondary research skills were greatly improved as a 
result of conducting the systematic review. The  
Based on the results of my systematic review, I conducted a pilot study for the chosen survey 
tool to assess the suitability of the language and the terms used. This helped me in 
establishing the needed connections to arrange for my future data collection including the 
survey and interviews. I also gained ethical approval both at the MVLS College Ethics 
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Committee and the Ministry of Health. I have to stress the positive role of my supervisors 
here. They helped me deal with issues that arose at different phases of the research, 
particularly in the stage of methodology. They also offered me valuable and practical advice, 
both academically and personally. 
This phase assisted me as an early stage researcher to gain an insight into the research agenda 
for future planning and to respond to trends in research. I learned that researchers must 
respect the rights, interests and dignity of participants and related persons in research in 
addition to obtaining the informed consent and protecting the anonymity and confidentiality 
of the information obtained. I was exposed to project management techniques that helped me 
in planning my Ph.D. including risk and time management and handling issues related to 
family and social life. I have also learned effective strategies for dealing with my supervisors.  
The importance of networking with other researchers who are interested in the same research 
field and the value of receiving feedback and critique from peers was highlighted. Also, the 
importance of communicating and publishing research results was stressed upon. Thus, the 
researcher was involved in several activities including: Oral presentations at the “General 
Practice and Primary Care” research meetings and at the annual Institute of Health and 
Wellbeing first year research student presentations. Also, I had a panel interview with two 
members of the institute and an annual review. 
Year Two and Three 
Upon reflection, I found field work in the three hospitals to be a challenging, but interesting, 
part of my research. At this stage, I was attempting to answer the different research questions 
through the employment of various research methods. I learned about the numerous primary 
data collection methods. As a result, I was engaged in conducting a general survey and 
interviews. I divided the process of data collection in the three hospitals into different phases 
including planning, preparation, distribution and collection. I learned the difference between 
the various sampling methods and chose the most suitable ones for my research. I also 
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focused on obtaining an appropriate sample size. The data management and analysis phases 
were carefully planned and executed, especially since I was using the data set for both 
descriptive and psychometric analysis.  
This phase also included conducting interviews with key informants. This enabled me to 
move beyond the limitations of structured questionnaires to open-ended questions that allow 
respondents to explain their perceptions and experiences in their own words. Communication 
with the interviewees provided valuable that added depth to the results of the survey and 
scientific literature. 
The researcher was involved in several activities including: 
a)! Poster preparation and display at the 20th Annual International Forum on Quality 
and Safety in Healthcare in London. 
b)! Submission of a publication of the results of the systematic review of literature in a 
scientific journal. 
c)! Two oral presentations at the “General Practice and Primary Care” research 
meeting.  
d)! Two panel interviews and two annual reviews. 
Year Four 
As I look back at my original proposal, I realize the extent of growth in my ability as an 
academic researcher. During the process of write-up, I prepared several drafts of my thesis 
chapters and I had to continuously revise the structure and content of my thesis, and on times 
adjust my research questions. This process resulted from coming across other people’s work, 
analysing data and my supervisors’ input. I recognised the value of revisiting my main aims, 
objectives and research questions when writing the different chapters. It helped me focus on 
my goals and remain on track. The proof-reading took longer than I expected, especially since 
I faced many issues with the different softwares I used. Also, I realized how important it is to 
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share thoughts and develop ideas with other fellow postgraduates. At this stage, further 
preparation is needed involving careful reading and revision to get the details precise. 
I am aware that my journey is not over yet. I look forward to the final step which is the viva.  
Challenges and Strengths 
I can simply say that, at certain times, I felt that my Ph.D. thesis was an impossible task that 
will never end. From my experience, the key to completing a Ph.D. is hard work and 
persistence, time management, exercise and a lot of prayer. Juggling a career, a family of 
four, and my academic and professional aspirations, I had to face the limiting factor of time. I 
had little confidence that I can overcome this ultimate culprit.  As it turns out, the support of 
those around me, and the increased confidence that I gained over the past years, gave me both 
the strength and the will to believe that even with this limitation I will succeed. I significantly 
benefited from improving my time-management skills. In addition to extensive preparation 
and careful planning within a specified time frame.  
Firstly, I faced challenges in terms of ensuring the progress of the study according to the 
proposed timetable. I had underestimated the duration of time required for certain phases of 
my research. These challenges mainly arose at the systematic review stage of the research and 
at the psychometric analysis stage. Working over-time, increasing the levels of my personal 
discipline, daily planning and re-adjusting the time-frame for the study helped me deal with 
delays. spending many hours in preparations for data collection and the encouragement given 
by my supervisors, friends and relatives pushed me to overcome the many obstacles I faced.  
In general, my self-confidence and communication skills has greatly improved as a result of 
conducting this research in addition to my time and project management techniques. This was 
mainly achieved through overcoming the many challenges I had to face.  
Before my Ph.D., I had prior experience of conducting surveys, interviews and literature 
reviews as a master’s student. However, I had no knowledge of how to conduct a systematic 
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review and how to perform psychometric analysis. As a result, they were the most demanding 
and time-consuming requirements of the project. I faced many challenges with the systematic 
review, specifically in the quality appraisal of the reported psychometric properties. I 
overcome that with reading, reading and more reading. I extensively reviewed literature and 
books. This helped me a lot once I reached the phase of psychometric analysis. I also faced 
many challenges conducting a survey in three hospitals, one of which is in a rural area. It took 
tremendous effort to organise and coordinate the process according to a specified time line. I 
had established key connections during the pilot survey phase. This helped me tremendously 
as I was able to coordinate my efforts and organise my time. Also, I always had a backup 
plan. I had a fourth hospital on hold just in case I faced any issues during the data collection 
process. Doing the psychometric analysis was another hurdle I faced. It was an unrecognised 
territory for me. But I had to step up to the challenge. I did extensive research around this 
area. My supervisors advised me to get statistical assistance from the Robertson Centre for 
Biostatistics and I was assigned to a statistician for advice and guidance on conducting the 
psychometric analysis. This proofed to be a difficult situation as the statistician was a junior 
and had limited experience around this area. As a result, I had to educate myself and keep on 
running the analysis till I reached the final solution. This took a lot of time and effort but I am 
thankful to have gone through that as I have confidence in my results and feel as though I 
became an expert in this area. 
Interviews were another challenge. I was aware of the potential influence of gender and 
nationality on the depth and detail of information provided by the interviewees, especially 
since I am a Kuwaiti physician. To overcome this obstacle, interviewees were assured of the 
complete independence of the researcher with full confidentiality of data. Despite the 
sensitivity of the topic, especially in relation to cultural factors, the perceived openness and 
the depth of information provided are suggestive of the minimum effect of this potential 
barrier on the results. Overall, this experience will prove to be highly beneficial in my future 
academic and professional progression. 
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On a personal level, I faced one of the biggest challenges in my life, my father’s illness which 
had a major impact on my life. I also faced many challenges related to moving to Glasgow 
and accustoming to my new life while trying to run the lives of my family across continents. 
Finally, I consider myself a reflective person, however, I have never thought about it or why I 
do it.  I had an increased awareness of the act of reflection through my Ph.D. journey.  I 
gained more insight and a better idea of who I am, who I want to become and how to get there 
for both my personal and professional life.  I realized that reflection can be a learning tool.  
Much learning across life is unplanned, emergent and experiential.  
I hope that by understanding, supporting and collaborating with healthcare workers, we will 
foster a healthy environment for both patients and staff. It is my way of giving back to a 
country that has given me so much more than these words can articulate. 
Conclusion 
“There are only two ways to live your life. One is as though nothing is a miracle. The other is 
as though everything is a miracle.” 
Albert Einstein 
I think if we look round us, we can find miracles everywhere and for a second, looking 
through the eyes of a reflective learner, I consider my experience a miracle from God. It 
helped me understand one of God’s most important gifts to me; my intellect and my family so 
thank you, God. 
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